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POLITIC LAW; 
WNG  A  SEQUEL TO  THE PRINCIPLES OF  THE LA* 
OF NATURE. 
PART I. 
Which  treats of  the origin and nature of  civil society, yf~ouereigntj 
in general,  of  its peculiar  characteristic,  limitations, and essen- 
tial partr. 
CHAP.  I. 
Containing  a frw general  and prelirnil~avy r@ection~,  which Jeme 
as an introduction to this and the following  parts. 
I.  WHATEVER has  been  hitherto  explained,  col,- 
cerning the rights and duties of man, relates to the natural and 
primitive  society,  established  by  God  himself, independent of 
human institution.  We  must new treat of civil society, or the 
body  politic,  which is  deservedly esteemed the  completest of 
societies,  and  to which  the  name of  State has been given by 
way of preference. 
IT.  For  this purpose  we shall  repeat here the  substance of 
some principles, established  in the  preceding  volume, and we 
shall give a further explication of  others relative to this subject. 
I. Human society is originally and in itself a state of  equali- 
ty and independence. 
2.  The  institution of sovereignty destroys this independence. 
3.  This institution does not subvert natural society. 
4.  On the contrary it contributes to strengthen and cement it, 
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111.  To  form therefore a just idea of civil society we must call 
it natural society itself, modified in such a manner,  that there is 
a sovereign presiding over it, on whose will whatever relates to 
the welfare of  the society ultimately depends ;  to the end that, 
by these means mankind may attain, with greater certainty, that 
happiness, to which they all naturally aspire. 
IV.  The institution of civil societies produces some new re- 
lations  amongst  mankind ;  I mean  such  as  subsist  between 
those different bodies or communities,  'which  are  called  states 
or nations, from which  the law  of nations and cirik  polity are 
derived. 
V.  In  fact so soon as states are formed, they acquire, in some 
measure,  personal properties;  and  consequently  we  may  at- 
tribute the same rights and obligations to them, as are attribut- 
ed  to individuals, considered as members of society.  And in- 
deed it  is  evident,  that,  if. reason  imposes certain  duties on 
individuals towards each other, it prescribes likewise those very 
same  rules of  conduct  to nations,  (which  are  composed  only 
of men) in  the intercourse,  which  they may  have  with  each 
other. 
VI. We  may  therefore apply  to kingdoms  and  nations the 
several maxims  of  natural  law, hitherto  explained ; and  the 
same law, which is called natural when speaking of iodividuals, 
is distinguished by  the  name  of  the law of nations, when ap- 
plied  to  men,  considered as  members forming those  diierent 
bodies, known by the name of states or nations. 
VII.  To enter into this subject  we must observe, that  the 
natural state of  nations, with respect to  each  other, is that  of 
society and peace.  This society is likewise a state of equality 
and  independence,  which  establishes  between  them  a right 
of  equality,  by which  they  are  cbliged to have the same  re- 
gard  for  each  other.  The general principle therefore  of the 
law of nations is nothing more than  the  general law of  socia- 
bility, which obliges nations to the same duties, as are prescrib- 
ed to individuals. 
VIII.  Thus the law of natural equality, that which  prohib- 
its our injuring  any  person,  and  commands  the  reparation of 
damage done,  the law likewise of beneficence, of fidelity to our 
engagements,  &C.  are so many laws in regard to nations, which 
impose both on the people and on their respective soveriegns the 
same duties, as are prescribed to individuals. 
IX.  It is a point of  some importance to attend to the nature 
and origin of tle law  of  nations, such  as  hath been here et- 
plained ;  for it follows thence, that  the  law  of  nations  is  of 
equal authority with the law of  nature  itself, of  which it an- 
stitutes a part,  and that  they are equally sacred and venerable, 
since both have the Deity for their author. 
X.  There cannot even be any other law of nations really ob- 
ligatory,  and  intrinsically  invested  with  the  force  of  a  law. 
For,  since all nations are in respect to  exh other ~IP  a state of 
perfect equality, it is beyond contradictiorr, that, if there be  any 
common law betwixt  them, it must necessarily hwe God,  their 
common sovereign,  for its author. 
XI.  As to what  concerns  the  tacit  consent or customs of 
nations,  on which some doctors establish a law of  natiolls, they 
cannot of themselves produce a real obligation.  For from this 
only, that several nations have behaved towards each other  for 
some time after a certain manner,  it does not follow, that the91 
have laid  themselves under a necessity of  acting constantly so 
for the future,  and n~uch  less,  that every other  nation is oblige 
ed to conform to this custom. 
XII.  All:  that  can  be said is,  that,  when once a pa~icular 
usage or custom is introduced between nations, that have a fre- 
quent intercourse with  each other, these nations are,  and may 
reasonably be  supposed  to submit to this  usage,  unless  they 
have in expresb terms declared, that they will not conform to it 
any longer ;  and this is all the effect,  tha can be  aaributed to 
the received usages between  nations. 
XIII.  This being premised, we may distinguish two swts  of 
laws of nations, one necessary, which is obligatory cif  itself, and 
no way differs from the law of  nature ;  the other arbitrary and 
free,  founded only  on a kind of tacit convention, and deriving 
all its hrce from the law of nature, which  cornman&  W ta  be 
faithful to our engagemects. 
XIV.  What has been said concerning the law of  nations fu+ 
nishes princes with sevaal important reflections ;  am~ilgehdrs, ra  THE  PRINCIPLES OF  POLITIC LAW.  '  3 
that since the law of  nations is in  reality nothing else, but the 
Jaw of  nature itself,  there is but one and the same rule of  jus- 
tice for all mankind ;  insomuch that those princes, who violate 
them,  are guilty of  as great a crime, as  private  people ;  espe- 
cially as their wicked  actions are generally attended with more 
unhappy comequences, than those of  private people. 
XV.  Another  consequence, that  may  be  drawn from the 
principles we have established, relating to the law of nature and 
nations, is to form a just idea of that science so necessary to the 
directors of nations, which is called Policy.  By policy therefore 
is meant that knowledge  or ability, by which a sovereign pro- 
vides for the preservation, security, prosperity, and glory of  the 
nation  he governs, without  doing  any  prejudice to other peo- 
ple, but rather consulting their advantage, as much as possible. 
XVI.  In short that,  which  is called prudence, in respect to 
private persons, is distinguished by  the  name of  policy,  when 
applied to sovereigns ;  and as that mischievdus ability, by which 
a person seeks his own advantage to the detriment of others, and 
which is called artifice or cunning, is deserving of censure in in- 
dividuals, it is equally so in those princes, whose policy aims at 
procuring  the advantage of  their own  nation,  to the prejudice 
of what $bey  owe to ather people,  in virtue  of  the laws of hu* 
manity and justice. 
XVII.  From what has been said of the nature of civil socie- 
ty in general, it is easy to comprehend, that,  among all human 
institutions, there is none more considerable than this ;  and that, 
as it emSraces whatever is interesting to the happiness of  socie- 
ty,  it is a very extensive subject, and consequently that it is im- 
portant  alike both to princes and people to have proper instruc- 
&ions  upon this head. 
XVIII.  That we may reduce the several articles relative  to 
this matter into sorxe order,  we shall divide our work  into four 
parts. 
The first will treat of the origin and nature of civil mcieties, 
of the manner,  in which states are formed, of sovereignty in gen- 
eral,  its  proper  characteristics,  its  limitations  and  essential 
parts. 
In  the  second we shall explain the different forms of govern- 
ment, the various ways of  acquiring or losing sovereignty, and 
the reciprocal duties of  sovereigns and subjects. 
The third will  contain a more particular inquiry into those 
essential parts of  sovereignty, which are relative to the internal 
administration of  the  state, such as  the  legislative power,  the 
supreme power in respect to religion, the right of  inflicting pun- 
ishments, that, which the sovereign has over the estates and ef- 
fects,  contained in his dominions, &c. 
In the fourth in fine we shall explain the rights ob  sovereigns 
with regard to foreigners,  where we shall treat  of  the right  of 
war,  and of  whatever is relative to that subject, of  alliances, and 
other public treaties,  and likewise of the rights of ambassadors. 
CHAP.  11. 
Of  t6e  veal  origin  of civil  societies. 
I. c  IVIL  society is  nothing  more, than the union of a 
multitude  of  people, who  agree to live in subjection to a sove- 
reign, in order to find, through his protection and care, the hap- 
piness,  to which they naturally aspire. 
11.  Whenever the question concerning the origin of civil so- 
ciety is started, it may be considered in two different ways ;  for 
either I am asked my opinion concerning the origin of  govern- 
ments in reality and in fact;  or else in regard  to the  right of 
congruity  and  fitness ;  that  is,  what  are the reasons,  which 
should induce mankind to renounce their natural liberty, and to 
prefer a civil state to that of nature ?  Let us see first what can 
be said in regard to the fact. 
111.  As  the establishment of society and civil government is 
almost coeval with the world, and there are but very few records 
extant of  those first  ages ;  nothing can be advanced  with cer- 
tainty concerning the real  origin  of  civil societies.  All,  that 
political writers say upon this subject, is reduced to conjectures, 
that have more or less probability. 
IV.  Some attribute the origin  of  civil  societies to  paternal 
authority.  These observe,  that  all  the  ancient traditions in- 
form us, that the first men lived a long time ;  by this longevity, I 4,  THE  PRINCWLES OF  POLITIC LAW.  =5 
joined to the multiplicity of  wives,  which was then permitted, 
a great  number of  families saw  themsehes  united under  the 
authority of  one grandfather ;  atld as  it is difficult for a  sucie- 
ty, any thing numerous, to maintain  itself  without a  supreme 
authority, it  is natural to  imagine, that  their  childrgn, accus- 
tomed from  their  infancy  to  respect  and  obey  their fathers, 
voluntarily resigned the supreme command into their hands, so 
soon as they arrived to a full maturity of reason. 
V.  Others suppose, that the fear and diffidence, which man- 
kind had of  one another, was thir inducement to unite togeth- 
er under a  chief,  in order  to  shekm  themselves  from  those 
mischiefs,  which they apprehnded.  From the iniquity of  the 
first men,  say they, proceed war,  as also the necessity, to which 
they were  reduced,  of  submitting  to masters,  by  whom their 
rights and privileges might be htermined. 
VI.  Some there are in fine, who pretend, that the  first  be- 
ginnings of  civil societies are to be attributed to ambition, sup- 
ported hy force or abilities.  The most dexterous, the strongest, 
and the most ambitious reduced at first the simplest and weak- 
est  into subjection ;  those growing Qtates  were afterwards  in- 
sensibly strengthened by conquests, and  by the concurrence  of 
such, as became voluntayr members cf  those societies. 
VD. Such are the principal  conjectures of poiitical  writers 
in regard to the orign of  societies ;  to which let us add a few 
xeflectians. 
The first is,  that, in the institutioia of  societies, mankind  in 
alT  probability  thought  rather  of  redressing the evils,  wBich 
they had experienced,  than  of  procuring  the  several  advan- 
tages resulting from  laws, from  commerce, from  the arts and! 
sciences, and from all those other  improvements so  frequently 
mentioned in history. 
P.  The natural disposition  of  mankind, and  their  general 
manner of  acting, do not by any  means permit us to refer the 
institution of  all governments,  to a general and uniform princi- 
ple.  More natural it is to think,  that different circumstancec 
sve  rise to different states. 
3.  We  behold without doubt the first image of government in 
democratic society,  or in hlmilies ;  but there  is all the groba- 
bility in the world, that it was  ambition, supported by force or 
abilities, which first subjected the several fathers of families W- 
der the dominion  of  a chief.  This appears  very agreeable to 
the natural disposition of  mankind, and seems further support- 
ed by the manner,  in which the scripture speaks of  Nimrod,* 
the first king mentioned in history. 
4.  When such a body politic was once framecl, several oth- 
ers joined  themselves to it afterwards through different mdtives ; 
and other fathers of families, being aftitid oi iwule or oppres- 
sion fran those growing states, determined to fmm themsehrer 
into the like societies, and to choose to themsehes a  chief. 
5.  Be this as it may, we must  nd imagine,  that the  first 
6tiates were such, 3s exist in our days.  Human imtitrstione are 
ever weak and imperfect in  their beginnings,  there is  nothiq 
but time and experience, that can  gradually bring them to por- 
fection. 
The fir*  states were in all pmobddity wry  small.  Engs in 
those days were only a kind of  chidtais, or particular magi* 
Mes,  appointed for deciding disputes, ox  for tb  commmd  of 
armies.  Hence  we find by  the  most ancient  histories,  rht 
he  were sometimes several kings in one ad  the same nation. 
TclIII.  But to  conclude,  whatever can  be said in re@  tc, 
the  original  of  the  first  governments consists,  wording  to 
what we have already observed, in mere comjectures, tbt  have 
only more or less probability.  Besides this k  a question nth- 
er curious, than useful or necessary ;  the point of  irnprtarscq 
and that particularly interesting to mankind,  ie to know whetb 
the establishment of  government and of supreme authority, wzs 
really necessary, and whether mmkind derive from it  any m- 
siderable advantages.  This is what we  call the right sf m 
gruity or fitness, and what we are going IKWY  t.e eumine. 
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CHAP.  111. 
Ofthe right of  congruity or jtness  with regard  to  the institutiorr- 
of  civil society, and the necessity of  o supreme authority ;  of civ- 
il liberty ;  that it jzfar  pr&w~b/e to  natural liberty, and  that 
the state is of all  human  tenditions the  most pwfect,  the most 
reasonable, and consequently the natural state of  man. 
I.  W  E  are here to inquire, whether the establishment 
of civil society, and of a supreme authority, was absolutely nec- 
essary to mankind, or whether they could not live happy with- 
out it ?  And whether sovereignty, whose original is owing per- 
haps to usurpation,  ambition, and violence,  does not include an 
attempt against the natural equality and independency of man ? 
These are without doubt questions  of  importance,  and which 
merit the utmost attention. 
11.  I grant, at first setting out, that the primitive and  orig- 
inal society, which nature has established amongst mankind, is a 
state of equality and independence ;  it is likewise true,  that the 
law of  nature is that,  to which  all me6 are obliged to conform 
their actions ;  and in fine  it is certain,  that this law is in itself 
most perfect, and the best adapted for the preservation and hap- 
piness of mankind. 
111.  It must likewise  be granted,  that  if  mankind,  during 
the time they lived in natural society, had exactly conformed to 
nature's  laws,  nothing would  have  been wanting to  complete 
their happiness,  nor would  there  have been  any occasion  to 
establish a supreme  authority  upon earth.  They would have 
lived in a mutual intercourse of love and beneficence,  in a sim- 
plicity without state or pomp,  in an equality without  jealousy, 
strangers to all superiority, but that of  virtue, and to every oth- 
er ambition, than that of being disinterested and generous. 
IV.  But mankind were  not long directed  by  so  perfect a 
rule j  the vivacity  of their  passions soon  weakened  the force 
of nature's law, which ceased now  to be a bridle sufficient for 
them, so that they could  no  longer be left  to themselves thus 
weakened and blinded by their passions.  Let us explain this a 
little more particularly. 
V.  Laws are incapable of  contributing to  the happiness of 
8ociety, unless they be sufficiently known,  The laws of  nature 
cannot be  known otherwise to  man,  than as he makes  a right 
use of his reason ;  but as the greatest  part of mankind,abandon- 
ed to themselves,  listen rather to the prejudices  of  passion than 
to reason and truth, it thence follows, that, in the state of  natural 
society, the laws of nature were know11  but very imperfectly, and 
consequently, that, in this  condition  of things, man could not 
lead a happy life. 
V1.  Besides,  the state of nature wanted another  thing,  fie- 
cessary for the happiness and tranquillity of  society, I mean a 
common judge,  acknowledged as such, whose business  it  is  to 
decide the differences, that every  day arise betwixt individuals. 
VII.  In this state, as every one would be supreme arbiter of 
his own actions, and would have a right of being judge  himself 
both of the  laws of  nature and of  the  manner,  in  which  he 
ought  to apply them,  this independence and  excessive  liberty 
could not but be productive of disorder and confusion, especial* 
ly  in cases,  where there happened  to be any clashing  of inter- 
ests or passions. 
VIII.  In fine,  as in the state of  nature no one had a power 
of enforcing the execution of the laws, nor an authority to pun- 
ish the violation of  them,  this was a third inconveniency of the 
state of  primitive society, by which the efficacy of  naturul laws 
was almost entirely destroyed.  For,  as  men  are framed,  the 
laws derive their greatest force from the coercive power,  which 
by exemplary punishments,  intimidates the wicked,  and  balan- 
ces tile superior force of pleasure and passion. 
IX.  Such were the inconveniences, that attended the state of 
nature.  By the excessive liberty and independence, which man- 
kind  enjoyed, they  were  hurried into  perpetual troubles;  for 
which reason they were under an absolute necessity of quitting 
this state of independence, and of  seeking a remedy against the 
evils, of  which it was productive ;  and this remedy they found 
in the establishment of  civil society and a sovereign authority. 
X.  But this  could  not  be  obtained  without  effecting  two 
things equally  necessary ; the  first  was  to unite together by 
means of a more particular  society ;  the  second, to form this 
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man could not enjoy all the advantages of liberty, but inasmuch 
as this liberty was made subject to reason,  and the laws of  na- 
ture were the rule and measure of  the exercise of it.  But if  it 
be true in fact, that  &he  state of  nature was attended with  the 
several inconveniences already mentioned, inconveniences, which 
almost effaced the impression and force of  natural  laws, it is a 
plain consequence, that natural liberty must have greatly suffer- 
ed thereby, and that by  not being restrained within the limits of 
the law of nature,  it could not  but degenerate  into  licentious- 
ness, and  reduce mankind to  the  most frightful  and the most 
melancholy of  situations. 
XX.  As they were  perpetually divided by  contentions,  the 
strongest  oppressed the weakest;  they possessed  nothing with 
tranquillity ;  they enjoyed no repose ;  and what we ought par- 
ticularly to observe is, that all these evils were owing chiefly to 
that very independence, which mankind were possessed of in re- 
g&rd  to each other, and which  deprived them of all  security of 
the exercise of their liberty;  insomuch that, by being too free, 
they enjoyed no freedom at all ;  for freedom'l-'here can be none, 
whed it is not subject to the direction of  laws. 
XXI.  If it be therefore true,  that the civil state gives a new 
force to the laws of  nature, if ic  be true also, that the establish- 
ment  of sovereignity secures,  in a more  effectual manner,  the 
observance of  those  laws,  we must conclude,  that the liberty, 
which man enjoys in this state, is far more perfect, more secure, 
and better adapted  to  procure his  happiness, than that,  which 
he was possessed of  in the state of  nature. 
XXII.  True it is, that the institution of government and sove- 
reignty is a considerable limitation to natural  liberty,  for  man 
must renounce that  power of  disposing of  his own person and 
actions,  in a word, his  independence.  But  what  better  use 
could  mankind  make of  their  liberty, than to renounce every 
dangerous tendency it had in regard to themselves, and to  pre- 
serve no more of it, than was necessary to procure their own re- 
al and solid happiness ? 
XXIII.  Civil liberty is therefore, in the main,  nothing more 
than natural liberty, divested  of  that part of it, which formed 
the independence  of  individuals, by  the authority, which the7 
have conferred on their sovereign. 
XXIV.  This liberty is still attended  with  two  considerable 
advantages,  which natural  liberty had  not.  The first  is  the 
right of  insisting, that their  sovereign  shall  make good use of 
his authority, agreeqbly to the purposes, for  which  he was in- 
trusted with it.  The  second is the security, which prudence re- 
quires, that the subjects should reserve to themselves for the ex- 
ecution  of  their  former  right,  a security absolutely necessary, 
and without which the people can never enjoy any solid liberty. 
XXV.  Let us therefore conclt~de,  that,  to give an adequate 
definition of civil liberty, we must say, that it is natural liberty 
itself, divested of  that part, which constituted the independence 
of individuals,  by the authority,  which it confers on sovereigns, 
and attended with a right of  insisting on his making a good use 
of his authority,  and with a moral  security, that this right will 
have its effect. 
XXVI.  Since civil liberty  therefore is far preferable to that 
of nature,  we  may  safely  conclude, that the  civil state, which 
procures this liberty to mankind, is of  all human states the most 
perfect, the most reasonable, and of course the true natural state 
of man. 
XXVII.  And indeed, since man, by his nature, is a free and 
intelligent being,  capable of discovering his state by himself, as 
well as its ultimate end,  and  of  taking the necessary measures 
to attain it,it  is properly in this point of view, that we must con- 
siderhis natural state; that is,the natural state of man must bethat, 
which is most agreeable to his nature,tohis constitution,to reason, 
to thegood use of his faculties, and to his ultimate end ;  all which 
circumstances perfectly agree with the civil state.  In short, as 
the  institution  of  government  and  supreme  authority  brings 
men back to the observance of  the laws of  nature,  and conse- 
quently to the rod  of  happiness, it makes them return to the$ 
natural state, from  which  they  had  strayed  by  the bad  use, 
which they made of  their liberty. 
XXVIII.  The reflections we have here made on the advan- 
tages,  which men derive from  government,  deserve very great 
attention. 
I.  They are extremely proper for removing the false notions, 
which most people have upon this subject ;  as if the civil &ate sa  THE PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITIC LAW,  a3 
could not be established but in  prejudice to their natural liber- 
ty ;  and as if government had been invented only to satisfy the 
ambition of  designing men, contrary to the interest of  the rest 
of  the community. 
2.  They inspire mankind with a love and respect for so sal- 
utary an institution,  disposing them  thus to &bmit voluntarily 
to whatever the civil society requires of  them, from a conviction, 
that the advantages thence  derived are very considerable. 
3.  'hy  may likewise tend  greatly to  increase the love  of 
one's country,  the  first seeds of  which nature  herself has im- 
planted,  as it were, in  the hearts  of  all mankind, in  order to 
promote,  as it most effectually does, the  happiness  of  society. 
Sextus Empiricus relates,  that it was a custom among the an- 
''  cient Persians,  upon  the death of  a king,  to pass five days in 
"  a state of  anarchy, as an  inducement to be  more faithful to 
"  his successor, from  the  experience they  acquired of  the in- 
"  conveniences of anarchy, of the many murders, robberies, and 
U every other mischief,  with which  it  is pregnant."" 
XXIX.  As these  reflections  are  proper  for  removing  the 
prejudices of  private people,  so they likewise  contain most ex- 
cellent instructions even for sovereigns.  For is there any ehing 
better adapted for making princes sensible of  the full extent of 
their duty, than to reflect seriously on the ends, which the peo- 
ple proposed to themselves, in entrusting them with their liber- 
ty, that is,  with whatever is most valuable to them ;  and on the 
engagements into which they entered, by  charging  themselves 
with so sacred a deposit ?  When mankind renounced their  in- 
dependence and natural liberty, by giving masters to themselves, 
it was in order to be sheltered  from the evils, with which they 
were afflicted, and in hopes, that, under the protection and care 
of their sovereign,  they should meet with solid happiness.  Thus 
have we seen, that by civil liberty  mankind acquired a right of 
insisting upon their sovereign's  using his authority agreeable to 
design, with which he was entrusted with it, which was to 
render their subjects wise and virtuous,  and thereby to promote 
their real felicity.  In a word, whatever has been said concern- 
ing the advantages of' the civil state,  in preference to  that of 
A~W'O.  lib. I. sect.  33.  Vid. Herodot. lib. I.  cap. 96, & srq. 
nature,  supposes this state in its dde perfection ;  and that both 
subjects and sovereign discharge their duties towards each other. 
CHAP.  IV. 
Of  the g.rsemtial constitution of ~tate~,  ntld of the matzner, itt  which 
they  arpfirmed. 
I. AmR  treating  of the original of  eiqil ~oeieties,  the 
natural order of our subject leads us to enquire into the essen- 
tial  constitution  of  states, that is,  into  the  manner. in  which 
they  are  formed,  and  the  internal  frame  of  those  surprising 
structures. 
11.  From what has been said in the preceding chapter itfol- 
lows, that the only effectual method, which mankind could em- 
ploy in order  to screen  themselves from the evils,  with which 
they were  afflicted  in the  state of  nature, and  to procure  to 
themselves all the advantages wanting to their security and hap- 
piness,  must be drawn from man himself,  and  from the assist- 
ance of  society. 
111.  For  this purpose it  was necessary,  that a multitude ol 
people should unite in so particular  a manner that their preser- 
vation inust depend on each  ther,  to the end,  that they remain 
under a necessity of mutual  assistance, and, Ly this junction  of 
strength and  interests, be  able  not  only  to repel  the insults, 
against  which  each  individual  could  not  guard  so  easily, 
but  also  to  contain  those,  who  should  attempt  to  deviate 
from their duty, and to promote more effectually their common 
advantage.  Let us explain more particularly  how this  could 
be effected. 
IV.  Two  things were necessary for this purpose. 
I.  It was necessary to unite forevet the wills of all the mem- 
bers  of the society in such a  manner,  that from that time fob 
ward they should  never  desire but  one and the same thing, in 
whatever  rclates  to  the  end  and purpose of  society.  2.  It 
was requisite afterwards to establish a supreme power, support- 
ed by the strength of  the whole body  (by  which  means  the7 
tnight  over awe those,  who should be inclinable to disturb the 24  THE  PRINCIPLES OF 
peace) and to inflict a present and sensible evil on such, as should 
attempt to act contrary to the public good. 
V. It is from  this  union of  wills and of  strength,  that  the 
body politic or state results ;  and  without  it  we  could  never 
conceive a civil society.  For let the number of confederates be 
ever so great,  if each man was to  fallow his  own private judg- 
ment  in  things,  relating  to the public good,  they  would  only 
embarrass one another ; and the  diversity  of  inclinations and 
judgments,  arising  from  the  levity  and  natural inconstancy of 
man, would soon demolish all concord, and mankind would thus 
relapse into the inconveniences of  the ssate of nature.  Besides, 
a society of  that kind could,never act  long in concert,  and for 
the same end,  not maintain itself in that harmony, which  con- 
stitutes its whole  strength,  without  a  superior  power,  whose 
business it is to serve as a check  to the inconstancy and malice 
of man, and to oblige  each individual .to direct all his actions 
to the public utility. 
VI.  All this is performed by means of  covenants ;  for  this 
union of wills in one and the same person could never be so ef- 
fected, as to actually destroy the natural diversity of inclinations 
and sentiments ;  but it is done by an engagement, which every 
man enters into, of submitting his private will to that of  a sin- 
gle person, or of an assembly j  insomuch that every resolution 
of  this  person  or  assembly,  concerning things  relative to the 
public security or advantage, must be  considered, as  the posi- 
tive will of all in general, and of  each in particular. 
VII. With regard to the union of strength, which produces 
the sovereign power, it is not formed by each man's communi- 
cating physically his strength to a single person, so as to remain 
utterly weak and impotent ;  but by a  covenant or engagement, 
whereby all in general and each in particular  oblige themselves 
to make no use of their strength, but in such a manner, as shall 
be prescribed to them by the person, on whom they have,  with 
one common accord, conferred the supreme authority. 
VIII. By  this union of  the body  politic under one and the 
same chief, each individual acquires, in some measure, as much 
strength, as  the whole  society  united.  Suppose for  instance 
&ere  are a million of men in the commonwealth,  each man is 
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able to  resist this  million,  by  means  of  their  subjection  to 
the sovereign, who keeps them  all in awe,  and  hinders  them 
from hurting one another.  This multiplication of  strength in 
the body politic resembles that of  each member in  the human 
body ;  take them asunder, and their vigor is no more ;  but by 
their mutual  union the  strength  of  each  increases,  and  they 
form altogether a robust and animated body. 
IX.  The  state may be defined a society, by which a multitude 
of peopIe  unite together,  under the  dependance of a sovereign, 
In order to find,  through his protection and care, the happiness, 
to which they naturally  aspire.  The  definition, which  Tully 
gives,  amounts nearly to the same;  MuLtitudojuvis consensu, et 
utilitati~  communione sociata.  A multitude of people united to- 
gether by a common interest,  and by common laws, to which 
they submit with one accord. 
X.  The state is therefore considered as a body, or as a moral 
person,  of which the sovereign is the chief or head, and the sub- 
jects are the members ; in consequence  of which we attribute 
to this person certain acf  ons peculiar to him, certain rights, priv- 
ileges, and possessions, distinct from those of  each citizen,  and 
to which  neither  each citizen, nor  many,  nor even  altogether 
can pretend ;  but the sovereign only: 
XI.  It is moreover this union of several persons in one body, 
produced by the concurrence  of  the wills  and the strength of 
every individuaI in one and the same person, that distinguishes 
the state from a multitude.  For a niultitude is o111y an assem- 
blage of several persons, each of whom has his own will, with the 
liberty of judging,  according to his own notions, of whatever is 
proposed to him,  and  of determining as he pleases ;  for which 
reason they can  be  said to have only one  will.  Whereas  the 
state is a body, or a society, animated by one only soul,  which 
directs all  its  motions, and  makes all its members  act after a 
constant and uniform manner, with a view to one and the same 
end,  namely the ~ublic  uti!ity. 
XII.  But it  will be here objected, that if  the union  of  the 
will and  of the strength of  each member of the society, in the 
person of  the sovereign,  destroy neither the will nor  the natu- 
sal force of each individual ;  if they always continue in possessiop 
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of  it;  and if  they are able in fact to employ it against the sav- 
ereign himself;  what does the force of the state consist in, and 
what is it, that constitutes the security of  this  society ?  I an- 
swer, that two things contribute  chiefly  to  maintain the stak, 
and the sovereign, who is the soul of  it. 
The first is the engagement itself, by which individuals hare 
subjected  themselves  to the command of  a sove~ign  ;  an W- 
gdgement, which derives a considerable force both  from divine 
authority, and from the sanction of  an oath.  But as to vicious 
and ill disposed minds, on whom these motives make no impres 
sion, the strength .of  the government consists chiefly in the fear 
of  those  punishments,  which  the  sovereign  may inflict upon 
them, by virtue of  the power, with which he is invested. 
XIII. Now since the means,by  which the sovereign is enabled 
to compel rebellious and refractory persons to their duty, consists 
in this,  that the rest of  the mbjects join their strength with him 
for thio: end (for were it  not for this, he would have  no more 
power,  than the  lowest of  his subjects) it fullows that it is the 
ready submission  of  good subjects, that furnishes the sovereign 
with the means of  repressing  the  insolent, and of  maintaini~ 
his authority. 
XIV.  But povideh a sovereign shows ever  so small  an at- 
tachtrent to his duty,  he will always find it easy to fix the better 
part  of  his  subjects  in his interest,  and of  course to have the 
greatest part of the strength  of  the  state in his  hands,  and to 
n~aintain  the authority of  the government.  Experience has al- 
ways shown, that princes need  only a common share of  vistae 
to be adored by  their  subjects,  We  may therefore affirm, that 
the sovereign  is cwable  of  deriving  from  himself  the means, 
necessary for the support of his authority;  and  that a prude~t 
exercise of the sovereignty, pursuant to the end, for which it was 
desigced, constitutes at the same time the happiness of the peo- 
ple,  and,  by a necessary  consequence, the greatest  security  of 
the government in the person of  the sovereign. 
XV.  Tracing the principles here established in vegard to  the 
formation of  states,  &c.  were  we to suppose, that a multitude 
sf people,  who had  lived hitherto independent of each other, 
wanted ts ahblisih a civil society,  we  shall fid  a necessity for 
different eovenapta, irnd  for a general decree. 
E.  The first covenant is  that,  by which each individual en- 
gages with all the rest to join  farever in one body,  and to regu- 
latq wi&  we  cammon wnsent, whatever  r+g;lrds  their  pres 
ervatim  and their common security.  Those, whn do  not  en- 
ter inta thia first engagement,  =main  evclv&d  fram the new 
society. 
a.  There mvst afterwards be  a decree made f~r  settlipg the 
few  of  government ;  ~therwiss  they could never take any fixt 
measures  for promping  effectuaUy,  and in concert,  the public 
security an4 welfare. 
3.  In fine, when once  the  form  of  gavernment  is  settled, 
there must SR arjother envenant, whereby,  after having pitched 
upon one st more persons to be ipvested with the power of  gov- 
erning, thofe, m  whom this wpreme authority is conferred,  en- 
gage to consult most carefully the common security and advan- 
tage,  and the others promise  fidelity and allegiance to the mv- 
ereign.  This last cavesant includes a submission of the strength 
and will of  each individual to the will of the had  of the socie- 
ty,  as far as the puhlic good requires ;  and thus it is, that a reg- 
ular state and perfect govqnment are farmed. 
XVI.  What we have hitherto delivered may be further illus- 
trated by  the account we  have in history concerning the foun- 
dation of tbe Roman state.  At first we behold  o multitude of 
people,  who flock together with a view af oettling on the banks 
of the Tiber ;  afterwards they ra~sult  qbout what form of  gov- 
ernmeat they shaU  establish, ad,  the party  far rn~narehp  pre- 
vailing, they confer  the supreme authority m Eomulus.* 
XVII.  And though we are strzngers to the original of most 
states,  yet  we must not imagine, that what has been here said 
concerning the manner,  in  which  civil societies are formed,  is 
a mere fiction,  Fw, sirice it is ecrtaia, that all  civil  societies 
had a beginning,  it is impossible to coiiceive how the members, 
of which  they are composed, ceuld  ape  to  live together,  de- 
pendant m a  supreme avthoritg, without supposbg the cove- 
nants abo~ementioned. 
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XVIII.  And yet all  writers do not erglain the 06- 
gin of  states after our manner.  Some there are,"  who pretend 
that states are forhed  merely by the covenant of  the  subjects 
with one another, by  which  each  man enters into an engage- 
ment with all the rest not to resist the wiU of  the sovereign, upon 
condition, that the rest ontheir side submit to the same engage- 
ment ;  but they  pretend, that  there is no origin4 compact be- 
tween the shereign and the subjects. 
XIX.  The reason, why these writers give this explication of 
the matter, is obvious.  Their design  is  to  give  an  arbitrary 
and unlimited authority to sovereigns, and  to  deprive the sub- 
jects of  every means of  withdrawing their allegiance upon any 
pretext whatever,  notwithstanding the  bad  use  the  sovereign 
may make of his uthority.  For this purpose  it was absolutely 
necessary  to  free kings from all restraint  of  compact or cove- 
nant between them and  their  subjects,  which,  without doubt, 
is the chief instrument of  limiting their power. 
XX.  But notwithstanding it is of  the utmost  importance to 
mankind to support the  authority  of  kings,  and to  defend  it 
against the attempts of  restless  and  mutinous  spirits,  yet  we 
must not deny evident truths, or refuse to  acknowledge a cov- 
enant,  in  which there is manifestly a mutual  promise of per- 
forming things,  to which they were not before obliged. 
XXI. When I submit voluntarily to a prince, I promise him 
allegiance on condition,  that he will protect me 3  the prince on 
his side promises  me  his  protection  on  condition, that I will 
obey him.  Before  this promise, I was  not  obliged  to  obey 
him, nor was he  obliged to protect me,  at least  by  any pe$cct 
obligation j  it is therefore evident, that there must be a mutual 
engagement. 
XXII.  But there is still something more ;  for, so far is the 
system, we  are here refuting, from  strengthening the supreme 
authority, and  from screening it from the capricious invasions 
of the subject, that, on the contrary, nothing is of  a more dan- 
gerous  consequence to%overeigns, than  to  fi~  their  right on 
such a foundation.  For if  the obligation of  the subjects towards 
their princes is founded merely on the mutual covenant between 
the bubjects, by  which each man engages  for the  sake  of  the 
~est  to obey the sovereign, on condition, that  the  rest  do the 
same for his sake ;  it is  evident, that at this rate every subject 
makes the force of  his engagement depend on the execution of 
that of every other fellow subject;  and consequently, if anyone 
refuses to obey the savereign, all  the  rest  stand ~eleased  from 
their allegiance.  Thus by endeavouring to extend the rights of 
sovereigns beyond their just limits,instead of  strengthening, they 
rather inadvertently weaken them. 
CHAP.  V. 
Of  the ~overeign,  sovereignty, ana the ~u&ttx, 
T  I.  HE  sovereign in a  state  is  that persow,  who  has a 
right of commanding in the last resort. 
11.  As to the  sovereignty we  must  define it  the right  of 
cvmrnanding  civil  society  in  the last  resort,  which right  the 
members  of  this society have conferred  on one  and  the same 
person, with a view to preserve order and  security in the corn 
monwealth, and in general to procure, under his protection and 
through  his  care,  their own real happiness, and especially the 
sure exercise of  their liberty. 
111.  I say  m the first place, that sovereignty is  the right d 
commanding civil society in the last resort, to show that then* 
ture of sovereignty consists chie0y in two things. 
The fiwt is the right of commanding the membersof the so- 
ciety; that is,  of directing their actions with authority, or with a 
power of compelling. 
The second is,  that this right ought to be that of  command- 
ing in the last resort in such  a manner, that every private per- 
son be obliged to  submit,  without  a power left to any man of 
resisting.  Otherwise, if this authority was not superior to ev- 
ery other upon earth,  it could establish no order or security in 
the commonweJth, though these are the ends, forwhich it war 
established. 
IV.  In the second place I say, that it is a right conferred on 
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be not only r single man,  but likewise a multitude of  men, unitr 
ed in comcil, and forming only one  will,  by  means af a pluml- 
tj  of  sufhges,  as  we shall more particularly explain hereafter. 
V.  Thirdly 1 sap to one and the same person to show,  that 
sovereignty can admit of  m sham  or  partition, that there is no 
savereign  at  all,  when  there  are  many,  because there  is no 
one, who commands then in the last resort,  and none  of  them 
tmeing  obliged to give way  to the other,  thir  competition must 
necessarily throw every thing into disorder and confusion. 
VI.  I add in fine to procure their own happiness, &c.  in or- 
der to point out the end of sovereignty, that  is  the welfare of 
the people.  When sovereigns once lose sight of  this end, when 
they pervert it to their private interests, or caprices,  sovereign- 
ty then degenerates  into tyranny, and ceases to be a legitimate 
authority.  Such is the idea, we  ought to form of  a  sovereign 
and of  sovereignty. 
VII.  A14 the other members of  the state are called subjects, 
thai is, they are under an obligation of obeying the soveceign. 
VIU. Now a person becomes a member or subject of a state 
two ways, either by  an express or by a tacit Covenant. 
IX  If  by  an express covenant, the thing admits of  no diffi- 
culty.  But,  with regard to a tacit covenant, we must observe, 
that the first founders of states, and  a11  those, who  afterwards 
became members thereof,  are supposed to have stipulated,  that 
their children and descendants should, at  their coming into the 
world,  have  the right of  enjoying those advantages, which are 
common te d  the members of  the state, provided nevertheless 
that &ese  descendants, when they attain to  the use of  rewon, 
be on their  part  willing to  submit to the  government, and to 
~C-P  the authority of the sovereign. 
X.  I  said provided the descendants acknowledged the author- 
ity of  the  sovereign ;  for the stipulation of  the parents cannot, 
in its  own aatuce,  have  the  force  of  subjecting the children 
;rgaMst heir will to  an authority, to  which they wodd not of 
hka  chose  to submit.  Hence the authority of  the sove- 
reign over the  children of  the  members  of  the state, and the 
ri&,tlll  tbe other  hand,  which thesechildren have to the pro- 
tection of the  sovereign, and  to the advantages of  the gom- 
ment, ale founded on mutual consent. 
XI.  Now if the children of  members of  the state, upon at- 
taining to the years of discretion, are willing to live in the place 
cif  their parentage, ar in their native country,  they  are  hy this 
very act supposed to submit themselves to the power,  that  gor- 
erns the state, and  consequwtiy they ought to enjoy, as memo 
bers  of  that  state,  the  advantages  naturally  arising from  it. 
This is  the  reason  likewise, that,  when  once  the sweneign is 
acknowledged, he has no oocasion to tender the oath  of allegi- 
ance to the children, who are afterward born in his dominions. 
XII.  Besides, it  is  a maxim,  which has been ever consider- 
ed,  as a general law of  government, that whosoever merely exa- 
ters upon the territories of a state, ad  by a much stronger rea- 
son  those, who are desircuc of  enjoying the advantages,  which 
are to be  found  there,  are supposed  to renounce  heir natural 
liberty, and to submit to the established  laws and governwe&, 
so far as the ~ublic  and  private  safety  require.  And,  if Qq 
refuse to do this,  shey may  be  collsidered  as enemies, in tki 
sense  at  least, that the government has a right to F-l  km  .the 
country ;  ad  this is likewise a tacit covenant, by which they 
make a temporary submission to the governmeat. 
XIII,  Subjects  are sometimes called riwes, or members of the 
civil state ;  some indeed make no distinction between these two 
terms, but I think k is better to distim,guish them.  The appal- 
lation of civis ought to be understood only of those,  who share 
in  aU the advant4ges and  pivileges of  the associatiq  and 
who are properly members of  the state either by  birth,  oh h 
some other me. All the rest  are  rather inmates, strang- 
ers, m temporary inhabitants,  than  members.  As to women 
and servants, the title  of  member is  applicable to  them  only 
irmmuch as shey enjoy certain rights, in virtue of  their depend- 
ance on their domestic governor, who  is praperiy a member of 
the state ;  and all this depends on the laws ad  particular cus- 
toms  of  each government. 
XIV. To  pceed ;  members, besides the goneral relation of 
being united in the same civil society, have likewise many oth- 
er particular  relations,  which are  reducible to  two  principal 
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The first is, when private people compose particular bodies or 
corporations. 
The second is,  when  sovereigns  entrusr particular  persons 
with some share of the administration. 
XV.  Those particular bodies are called Companies, Chambers, 
Collegej, Societies, Communitiej.  But it is  to  be  observed,  that 
all these particular  societies are finally subordinate to the sove- 
reign. 
XVI.  Besides, we may consider  some as more ancient than 
the establishment of civil-stites, and others as formtid since. 
XVII.  The latter are likewise either public,  such as are esrab- 
lished by the authority of  the sovereign, and then they generally 
enjoy some particular privileges,  agreeably to  their parents ;  or 
private, such as are formed by private people. 
XVIII.  In fine, these private bodies are either lawful or tin- 
lawful.  The former are those, which,  having nothing in their 
nature contrary  to good order,  good manners,  or the authority 
of the sovereign, ate supposed to be approved of by  the  state, 
though they have not received any formal sanction.  With res- 
pect to urilawful bodies, we mean not only those, whose mem- 
bers unite for the open commission of any crime, such as gangs 
of robbers, thieves,  pirates, banditti, but likewise all other kinds 
of  confederaciee, which the subjects enter into without the con- 
sent of  the  sovereign,  and contrary to the end of  civil society. 
These engagements are called cabals, factions, conspiracies. 
XIX. Those members,  whom  the sovereign  entrusts with 
some share of  administration, which they exercise in his name 
and by his authority, have in consequence thereof particular re- 
lations to the rest of  the members, and are under stronger  en- 
gagements to the sovereign  3  these are called ministers, public of- 
ficers, or magistrates. 
XX.  Such are the regems of a kingdom,  during a minority, 
the governors of provinces and  towns,  the commanders of  ar- 
mies,  the  directors of  the treasury, the presidents of courts of 
justice, ambassadors, or envoys to foreign powers,  &c.  As all 
these persons are entrusted with a share  of  the administration, 
they represent the sovereign, and it is they, who  have properlr 
the name of  public ministers. 
XXI.  Others there  are,  who assist merely in the execution 
of public business,  such as counsellors, who only give their opin- 
ion, secretaries, rcceivers of the  public  revenue, soldiers, subal- 
km  oficers,  &c. 
CHAP.  V1. 
Of  the imniediate sourct; andfoundation of jovereignty. 
I.  THOUGH  what has been said  in  the fourth chapter 
concerning the structure of states is suflicienr to she* the orig- 
ifial and soutce of  sovereignty, as well as its real foundation ;  yet, 
as this is one of  those questions, on which political writers are 
greatly divided, it will not be  amiss  to  examine  it  somewhat 
more particularly ;  and what  remains still to be said upon this 
subject will help to give us a more complerc idea of  the nature 
and end of sovereignty, 
11.  When we  inquire here into  the source of  sovereignty, 
our intent is to know the nearest and immediate  source of  it ; 
now it is certain, that the supreme authority,  as well as the  ti- 
tle, on which this power is established, and which constitutes its 
right, is derived  immediately  from the very  covenants, which 
constitute civ3 society, and give birth to govertimentc 
111.  And indeed,  upon  considering the  primitive  state  of 
man, it appears most certain, thar the appellations of sovereigns 
and subjects, masters and  slaves,  are unknown to nature.  Na- 
ture has made us all of the same species, all equal, all free and 
bdepefident of  each other ;  in short she was williqg that thoae 
on whom she has bestowed the same  faculties, should have all 
the same rights.  It is therefore beyond all doubt, that,  in  this 
primitive  state of  nature,  no man has  of  himself  an  original 
right of  commanding others, or any title to sovereignty. 
IV.  There is none but God alone, that has,  in  consequence 
of  his nature and perfections, a natural, essential, and inherent 
right of  giving laws to mankind, and of  exercising an absolute 
sovereignty over  them.  The case  is otherwise  between man 
and man ;  they  are in their own nature as independent of  one 
another, as  they are dependent  on God.  This liberty and in- 
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dependence is therefore a right naturally  belonging to man9 of 
which it would be unjust to deprive him against his will. 
V.  But if  this be the case,  and there is yet  a  supreme au- 
thority subsisting amongst  mankind, whence can this authority 
arise,  unless it be from the compacts  or covenants, which men 
have made amongst themselves upon this subject  ?  For,  as we 
have a right of  transferring cur property  ro another by a  cov- 
enant ;  so,  by  a voluntary  submission, a person may convey to 
another, who accepts of  the renunciation,  the natural right he 
bad of disposing of  his liberty and natural  strength. 
VI.  It must therefore be  agreed,  that  sovereignty  resides 
originally in the people, and in each individual with regard  to 
himself ;  and that it is the transferring and uniting the  several 
rights of  individuals in the person  of  the sovereign, that con- 
stitutes him such,  and really produces  sovereignty.  It is  be- 
yond all dispute  for example, that,  when  the  Romans  dose 
Romulus and Numa for their kings, they must have conferred 
upon them, by this very act, the sovereignty, which those prin- 
ces were  not. possessed of  before, and  to which they had cer- 
tainly no other right, thn  what was derived from  the election 
of  the people. 
VII.  Nevertheless,  though it, be evident, that the immediate 
original of  sovereignty is owing to  human covenants, yet noth- 
ing can hinder us from  affirming, with  good ground, that it i 
of  divine, as well as humail right. 
VIII.  And indeed right reason having.  made  it plainly ap- 
pear, after the multiplication of  mankind,  that  the  establish- 
ment  of  civil societies and  of  a supreme authority was  abso- 
lutely necessary for the order, tranquillity,  and preservation of 
the species, it is as convincing a  proof,  that this institution  is 
agreeable to the designs of  Providence,  as if  God himself had 
declared it to  mankind by a  positive  revelation.  And,  since 
God is essentially fond of  order, he is  doubtless  willing, that 
there should be a supreme  authority  upon earth,  which  alone 
is capable of procuring and supporting that order amongst man- 
kid,  by  enforcing the observance of  the laws of  nature.. 
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IX. There is a beautiful passage of Cicero to tlis purpose." 
,Kothing  is  more agreeable  to the .(upreme Deity, that governs  this 
universe, than civil societies lrmufulb estrrblished. 
X.  When therefore we give to sovereigns-the title of  God s 
vicegerents  upon earth,  this  does  not imply,  that they  derive 
their authority immediately  from God;  but  it signifies  only, 
that by  means  of the power lodged  in  their hands,  and with 
which the people have invested them,  they maintain, agreeably 
to the views of  the Deity, both order and peace,  and thus pro- 
cure the felicity of mankind. 
XI.  But if  these magnificent titles add a considerabie lustre 
to sovereignty, and render it more respectable,  they afford like- 
wise,  at the same time,  an excellent  lesson  to princes.  For 
they cannot  deserve the title of  God's  vicegerents upon earth, 
but inasmuch as they make use of  their  authority pursuant to 
the views and purposes, for which they  were entrusted uritl~  it, 
and agreeably to  the intention  of the  Deity,  that is,  for the 
liappiness of  the people, by using all their endeavors to inspire 
them with virtuous principles. 
XI. This without doubt is suficient to make us look upon 
the original of  government,  as sacred ;  and to induce  subjects 
to show submission and respect  to the person  uf the sovereign. 
But there are politcal writers,  who carry the thing further, and 
maintain that it is God, who  confers immediately the supreme 
power on princes,  without any  intervention  or concurrence of 
men. 
XIII.  For this  purpose, they make a distinction bctwixt the 
cause of  the state, and the cause of  sovereignty.  They confess 
indeed,  that  states are formed by covenants,  but  they  insist, 
that God himsdf  is  the immediate  cause of  the  sovereignty. 
According  to their  notions,  the people,  who  choose to them- 
selves a king, do  not by this  act confer the  supreme authority 
upon him,  they only point out the  person,  whom heaven is to 
entrust with it.  Thus the consent of the people to the domin, 
ion  of  one or  more  persons, may  be considered  as a  channel, 
*  NIB;!  est ill; principi  Dco,  qui  omnrm bunc  nrundrrm  rtgit, quod .quidam  in trrri 
d;d acccptiur, pram  ronrilia caturqac  Lcninum .isrrc  sqcinti,  p14n  ciwitates  rrpp:ll~~t~ 
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through  which the  supreme autllority flows,  hut is sot its real 
Source. 
XIV.  The principal argument, which these writers adopt, is, 
that, as neither each individual  amongst a number of  free and 
independent  people,  nor  the whole collective multitude, are in 
any wise possessed of  the supreme authority,  they cannot con- 
fer it on the prince.  But this argument proves nothing.  Tt  is 
true,  that  neither  each member of  the society, nor  the  whole 
multitude collected, are formally invested with the supreme au- 
thority, such as we behold it in the sovereign, but it is sufficient, 
that  th:y  possess it  virtually,  that  is, that  they  have  within 
themselves all, that is  necessary  to  enable them,  by the con- 
currence  of  their free  will and  consent, to produce  it in the 
sovereign. 
XV.  Since every indivdual has a  natural right  of  disposing 
of  his  natural  freedom  according  ss he  thinks  proper,  why 
should he  not have  a  power  of  transferring  to  another  that 
right, which he has of directing himself ?  Now is it not manifest, 
that,  if  all the members  of  this society  agree  to transfer  this 
right to one of their fellow members, this cession will be the near- 
est and immediate cause of  sovereignty?  It is therefore evident, 
that there  itl each individual, the seeds as it were of  the su- 
preme power.  The case is here very near the same, as in that 
of several voices,  collected together, which by their union pro- 
duces a harmony, that was not to be found separately in each. 
XVI. But it will be here objected, that the scripture itself saysl 
that every man ought to be subject to the supreme powers, be- 
cause they are established by  God."  I answer with Grotius, 
that men have established civil  societies, not in consequence of 
a divine ordinance, hut of  their voluntary motion, induced by the 
experience they had of  the  incapacity,  which separate families 
were under,  of  defending themselves against the insults and at- 
tacks of human violence.  Thence (he adds) arises the civil pow- 
er,  which  St. Peter,  for  this  reason  calls  a  hunzan  power,t 
though in other parts of scripture it bears the name of a divine 
institution,"  because God has approved of it as an establishment 
useful  to mankind.+ 
XVII.  The other arguments in favor of the opinion we have 
been here refuting do not even deserve our notice.  In general 
it may be observed, that never were more wretched reasons pro- 
duced upon this subjuct,  as the reader may be easily convinced 
by reading Puffendorf on the Law of Nature and Nations, who, 
in the chapter  corresponding  to this, gives these  arguments at 
length, and fully refutes them.f 
XVIII.  Let vs therefore conclude, that the opinion of those, 
who pretend that God is the immediate  cause  of sovereignty, 
has no other foundation,  than that of adulation and flattery, by 
which,  in order to  render the authority af sovereigns more ab. 
solute, they have attempted to render  it  independent of all hu. 
man compact, and dependant only on God.  But were we even 
to grant,  that princes hold their authority immediately of God, 
yet the consequences, which some political writers want to in* 
fer,  could not be drawn from this principle. 
XIX.  For since it is most certain, that God could never en. 
trust princes  with  this supreme authority, but far the good of 
society in general,  as well as of individuals, the exercise of this 
power must necessarily be limited by the very intention, which 
the Deity had in conferring it on the sovereign ;  insomuch thg 
the people would still have the same right af  refusing  to obey 
a prince, who, instead of concurring with the views of the Dei. 
ty,  would  on the contrary endeavour to cross and defeat  them, 
by rendering his people miserable, as we shall prQve  mare par. 
ticularly  hereafter. 
" Rom. xiii. I. 
t Grotius  on the  Right of  War  and Peace, book  i.  chap. h,  Q 7,  xr Na t 
See  above,  No.  7,  and following. 
#  See the Law of  Nature aod  Nations,  bo&  uii chap. iii 
+ MDO.  xiii  t Ep. i. chap. ii. yer.13. THE PRINCIPLES OF  FOLlTIC LAW, 
CHAP.  VII. 
Of  th8  nscntil character$  of  sovereignty, b tnod$catiom,  ~rnt 
and  limits. 
X.  Of  the cbavacteristics of ~overeignty. 
S  I.  OVEREIGNTY we  have  defined,  a right  of  cont. 
manding in the last resort in civil society, which right the mem- 
bers of this  society  have  conferred upon  some person,  with a 
view of  maintaining order  and  security in the commonwealth. 
This definition shews us the principal characteristics of the pow- 
er, that governs the state, and this is whas  it will  be proper to 
explain here in a more particular manner. 
11.  The first characteristic, and that, from which all the oth- 
as  flow,  is its being a supreme and independent power, that is, 
a power,  that judges in the last resort of whatever is susceptible 
of human direction, and relates to the welfare and advantage of 
society ;  insomuch that this power acknowledges no other supe- 
rior power on earth. 
111.  It must  be  observed  however, that, when we  say  the 
civil power is of  its own nature supreme  and iodepeadent,  we 
do not mean thereby,  that it does  not  depend, in regard to  its 
original, on the human will.*  All, that we would have under- 
~tood,  is, that,  when once this power is established, it acknowl- 
edges no  other  upon  earth superior or equal to it,  and conse- 
quently, that whatever it ordains in the plenitude of  its power 
cannot be reversed by any other human will,  as superior to it. 
IV,  That in  every  government  there should  be such a  $U- 
preme power is a point absolutely necessary ;  the very nature of 
the thing requires it, otherwise it is impossible for it to subsist, 
For, since powers cannot be multiplied to infinity, we must nec- 
essarily stop at some degree  of  authority  superior to all other. 
And let the form of government be what it will,  monarchical, 
aristocratical,  democratical, or mixt, we must  always submit to 
a supreme decision ;  since it implies a contradiction to say, that 
there is any person above him, who holds the highest rank in the 
same order of  beings. 
V.  A second  characteristic, which  is a consequence  of  the 
former, is that the sovereign, as such, is not accountable to any 
person upon earth for his conduct, nor liable to any punishment 
from man ;  for both suppose a superior. 
VI.  There are two ways of being accountable. 
One as to a superior, who has a right of reversing what has 
been done,  if  he does not fin&  it to his liking,  and even of  in- 
flicting some punishment,  and this is inconsistent with the idea 
of  a  sovereign. 
The  other as  to an equal, whose approbation we are desir- 
ous of having ;  and in this sense a sovereign may be accountz- 
ble,without  any absurdity. And even they, who have a right idea 
of  honour,  endeavour by such means to acquire  the  approba- 
tion and esteem of  mankind,  by letting all the world see,  that 
they act with prudence  and integrity.  But this  does not im- 
ply any dependance. 
VII. I  said that the sovereign, as such, was neither account- 
able nor punishable ;  that is,  so  long as he continues  really a 
sovereign, and has not forfeited his right.  For it is past alldoubt, 
that if  the sovereign, utterly forgetful of the end, for which he 
was entrusted with the sovereignty, appliedit to a quite contrary 
purpose, and thus became an enemy to the state ;  the sovereignty 
returns  ($so  facto)  to the nation,  who, in that case, can act to- 
9.vards  the person,  who was their  sovereign, in the manner the  J 
think most agreeable to their security and interests.  For,  what- 
ever notion  we may entertain of  sovereignty,  no  man in  his 
senses will  pretend to say,  that it is an undoubted  title to foE 
low the impulse of  our irregular  passions with  impunity,  and 
thus to become an enemy  to society. 
VIII.  A third characteristic essential to sovereignty  consid- 
ered in itself,  is  that the  sovereign, as  such, be above all hu- 
man or  civil law.  I say,  all  human  law;  for  there  is  no 
doubt but  the  sovereign is  subjcct to the diving  laws,whether 
natural or positive. 
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Regum  timetidor~rn  in  pr@i.ios greger, 
Reger in ipsos imperium est  Jovis. 
HOR.  lib.  3. Od.  I. 
IX  But with regrard to laws merely human, as their whole 
force and  obligation  ultimately  depends  on  the  will  of  the 
sovereign, they  cannot,  with  any propriety  of  speech, be said 
to be obligatory in  respect to  him ;  for obligation  necessarily 
rupposeth two persons, a superior and an inferior. 
X.  And  yet  natural  equity  requires  sometimes,  that  the 
prince should  conform  to his  own laws, to the end,  that  his 
subjec~  may  be  more  effectually  induced  to  observe  them. 
This is extremely well expressed in  these verses of  Claudian.* 
In commrme jubes, ri quid, ctfises9e tenendurn, 
Primus jusra  subi ;  tunc ohttruantior  &q~i 
pit populus,  nec ferrt  negat, rum viderit ipsufii 
Auctorem parere  ~ibi  3  componitu~  orbis 
Regis ad exemplum nec  sic injectere sensrls 
Humdnos edictd valetat, ut vita i-egenti~. 
Would you your public laws should sacred stand, 
Lead first the way, and act what you comm;ltrd, 
The crowd grow mild and tractable to see 
The author governed by his own decree. 
The worM turns round,  as its great matter draws, 
And princes lives bind stronger than their laws. 
XI.  To proceed, in treating here  of  sovereignty,  we  sup. 
pose that it is really and absolutely such in its own nature,  and 
that the  establishment of  civil laws ultimately  depends on the 
sole will of  the person,  who enjoys the  honours  and  title  of 
aovereign, insomuch,  that his  authority,  in this respect, cannot 
be limited ; otherwise this superiority of the prince above the 
laws is not applicable to him  in  the full  extent,  in which we 
have given it him, 
XII.  This sovereignty, such as we have now represented it, 
De IV. Consul i-lonor, ver.  296, et sep 
resided originally in the  people.  But  when once  the  people 
have transferred their right to a  sovereign, they cannot,  witha 
out contradiction,  be supposed to continue  still  masters of  it. 
XIII.  Hence the  distinction,  which  some political  writers 
make,  between  real sovereignby, which always resides in the peo- 
ple,  and actual sovereignty, which belongs to the king, is equal- 
ly absurd and dangerous.  For it is ridiculous to pretend, that 
after the people  have conferred the  supreme  authority on the 
king, they should still  continue in  possession of  that  very  au- 
thority superior to the king himself. 
XIV.  We  must therefore observe here a just medium,  and 
establish principles, that  neither  favor  tyranny, nor  the  spirit 
of  mutiny and rebellion. 
I.  It is certain that,  sr, soon as the people submit to a king, 
really such, they have no longer the supreme power. 
2.  But it does not follow, from the people's  having confer- 
red the supreme power in such a manner, that they have reserv- 
ed to themselves in no case the right of  resuming it. 
3.  This reservation is sometimes  explicit ;  but there  is al- 
ways 3 tacit one, the effect of  which discloses itself, when the 
person, intrusted with  the supreme authority,  perverts it to an 
use directly contrary to  the  end, for  which it  was  conferred 
upon him, as will better appear hereafter. 
XV.  But though it be absolutely necessary, that there should 
be a supreme and  independent  authority  in the state,  there  is 
nevertheless some difference, especially in monarchies and aris- 
tocracies, with regard to the manner, in which those, who are in- 
trusted with this power,  exercise it.  In some states the prince 
governs  as  he thinks proper 5  in others he is obliged to follow 
some fixt and constant rules, from which he is not allowed to de- 
viate ;  this is what I call the modifications of  sovereignty, and 
hence arises the distinction of  absolute and limited sovereignty. 
2.  Of  absolute  soverejgnfy. 
XVI.  Absolute sovereignty is therefore nothing else, but the 
right of governing the state as the prince thinks proper, accord- 
ing as the present situation of afbirs seems to require, and witb- 
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out &g  obliged to consult any person whatever, or  to foilovr 
any fixt and perpetual rules. 
XVII.  Upon this head we hate several important reflections 
to make. 
3.  The word abmIute  is generally very odious to repub- 
Lcans ;  and I must confess, that when it is misunderstood, it is 
apt to make the most dangerous  impression  on  the  minds  of 
princes, especially in the mouths of  flatterers. 
a.  In order to form a just  idea of  it, we must trace it to its 
principle.  In the  state  of  nature every man  has  an absolute 
right to act after what manner he  thinks most conducive to his 
happiness, and  without  being  obliged  to  consult  any  person 
whatever, provided however he does nothing contrary to the laws 
of nature.  Consequently when a  multitude  of men  unite to- 
gether, in order to form a state, this body hath the same liberty in 
regard to matters,  in which the public good is concerned. 
3.  When therefore the whole body of  the people confer the 
sovereignty upon a prince, with this extent and absolute power, 
which originally resided in themselves,  and without adding any 
particular  limitation to it,  we call that sovereignty absolute. 
4.  Things being thus constituted,  we must not conLound an 
absolute power with an  arbitrary,  despotic,  and  unlimited  au- 
thority.  For, from  what we  have  here advanced concerning 
the  original  and  nature of  absolute sovereignty, it manifestly 
follows, that it  is  limited, from its very nature,  by  the  inten- 
tion of  those,  who  conferred  it on the sovereign,  and by the 
very laws of  God.  This  is what  we  must  explain more  at 
large. 
XVIII.  The end,  which mankind proposed to hemselves in 
renouncing  their natural independence, and establishing govern- 
ment  and sovereignty, was doubtless to redress the evils, which 
they labored under,  and to secure their happiness.  If so, how 
is it possible to conceive, that those, who with this view grant- 
ed an absolute power to the sovereign, should have intended  to 
give him  an arbitrary  and  unlimited  authority,  so  as to intitle 
him tb gratify his caprice and passions to  the prejudice of  the 
life, property, and liberty of  the  subject ?  On the contrary we 
have shown above,  that the civil state must necessarily empow- 
er the subject* to insist upon the sovereign's udng his authmity 
for their advantage, and according to the purposes, for which he 
was intrusted with it. 
XIX.  It inust  therefore be acknowledged, that it never was 
the intention of the people to confer absolute  sovereignty upon 
a prince, but  with this express  condition, that  the public pod 
should be the supreme law to direct him ;  consequently so long, 
as the  prince acts with this view,  he  is authorised  by the peo- 
ple;  but, on the contrary,  if  he makes use of his power merely 
to ruin and destroy his subjectsi he acts imirely crf his own head, 
and not in virtue  of  the poweij with  which he was itatrusted 
by the peogle. 
XX.  Still further, the very  nature of the thing does not al- 
hw  absolute power to be extended beyond the bounds of pub- 
lic utility ;  for absdute sovef.eignty cannot esnfer a right upon 
the sovereign, wirich the people had not originally in themsehe~. 
Now before the  establishment  of  civil society, surely  no man 
had a power of injuring either himself or others ;  consequently 
absolute power cannot give the sovereign a right to hurt and a- 
buse his subjects. 
XXI.  In the state of  nature every man was absolute master 
of  his own  person and  actions, provided he  confined himself 
within  the limits  of  the  law  of  nature.  Absolute power is 
formed only by  the union of  all  the rights of  individuals in the 
person  of  the sovereign ; of  course the absolute power of  the 
sovereign  is  confined within  the  same  bounds,  as  those, by 
which the absolute pbwer of  individuals was originally limited 
XXII.  But 1  go still further and affitm,  that,  supposing even 
a nation had been really willing to grant their sovereign  an ar- 
bitrary and unlimited power, this concession woald of  ir~eif  b2 
void and of  no effect. 
XXIII.  No man can divest himself  so far of his libetty, as to 
stihit  to an arbitrary prince, who is to treathim absolutely ac- 
cording to his fancy.  This would be renouncing his own life, 
which he is not master of;  it would  be  ret~outlcifig  his duty, 
which is never permitted;  and if  thus it be with regzrd  to an 
individual, who should make himself a slave, much leas hath an 
entire liation that power,  which is not t'o  be found in any i$  its 
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XXIV.  By this it appears nost evident, that all sovereignty, 
how absolute soever  we suppose it, hath its limits ;  and that it 
can never imply an arbitrary power in the prince of doing what- 
ever he pleases,  without any other rule or reason  than his own 
despotic will. 
XXV.  For how indeed should we attribute any such power 
to the creature, when it is not to be found in the supreme Being 
himsdf ?  His absolute dominian is not founded on a blind will ; 
his sovereign will is  alw~ys  determined by the immutable rules 
of wisdom, justice, and beneficence. 
XXVI.  In short  the right  of  commanding, or sovereignty, 
ought always to be established ultimately on a power of  doing 
good, otherwise it cannot be  productive of  a  real  obligation ; 
for reason cannot approve or submit to it ;  and this is what distin- 
guishes  empire  and  sovereignty  from  violence  and  tyranny. 
Such are the ideas we ought to form  of  absolute  sovereignty. 
J.  Of  limited  smereignty. 
XXVII.  But although  absolute power,  considered in  itself, 
and such as we have now represented  it, implies nothing odious 
or unlawful,  and  in  that sense  people may  confer it upon the 
sovereign ;  yet we must  allow, that the  experience of  all ages 
has informed mankind, that this is not the form of government, 
which suits them best, nor the fittest for procuring them a state 
of  tranquillity and happiness. 
XXVIII.  Whatever distance there may be between the sub- 
jects and  the sovereign, in whatsoever degree  of  elevation the 
latter may  be placed above the rest, still he is a human creature 
like themselves ;  their souls are all cast as it were in the same 
mould, they are all subject to the same prejudices, and suscepti- 
ble of  the same passions. 
XXIX.  Again, the very station, which sovereigns  occupy, ex- 
poses them to temptations, uc!;nown  to  private people.  The 
gecerality  of princes have  neither virtue nor courage sufficient 
to moderate their passions, when they find they  nay  do what- 
ever they list.  The people have therefore great reason t9 fear, 
that aq ~nlimited  authority will turn out to their prejudice, and 
that if they do not reserve some security  to themselves,  against 
the sovereign's  abusing it, he will some time or other abuse it. 
XXX,  It is  these  reflections,  justified by  experience,  that 
have  induced  most, and  those the wisest nations to set bounds 
to the power of  their sovereigns, and to  prescribe the  manner 
in which the latter are to govern ;  and this has produced what 
is called limited sovereignty. 
XXXI.  But,  though this  limitation of  the  supreme power 
be advantageous to the people,  it does no injury to the princes 
themselves ;  nay it may rather be said,  it turns out to their ad- 
vantage, and forms the greatest security to their authority. 
XXXII.  It does no  injury  to princes ;  for,  if  they  could 
not be  satisfied with a limited authority,  their  business was  to 
refuse the crown;  and when  once they  have  accepted  of  it 
upon these conditions they are no longer at liberty to endeavor 
afterwards to break through them,  or to strive to render them- 
selves absolute. 
XXXIII.  It is rather advantageous to princes, because those, 
who are invested with absolute power, and are desirous of  dis- 
charging their duty,  are obliged to a  far greater vigilance  and 
circumspection,  and exposed  to  Inore fatigue, than those, who 
have their task as  it were marked out to  them, and are not 31- 
lowed to deviate from certain rules. 
XXXIV.  In fine this  limitation  of  sovereignty  forms  the 
greatest security to  the authority of  princes ;  for,  as they  are 
less exposed hereby to temptation,  they avoid that popular fury, 
which is sometimes discharged on those, who, having  been in- 
vested with absolute authority, abuse it to the public prejudice. 
Absolute power easily degenerates into despotism, and despotism 
paves the way  for  the greatest and most  fatal resolutions, that 
can  happen  to sovereigns.  This is what th  experience of all 
ages  has verified.  It is therefore a happy incapacity in kings 
not to be able to act contrary to the laws of theii country. 
XXXV.  Let us therefore conclude, that it entirely depends 
upon a free people,  to invest  the  sovereigns, whom they place 
over  their  heads, with an  authority  either absolute, or limited 
by certain laws, provided these laws contain nothing contrary to 
justice,  nor to the  end  of government,  These regulations, bq 4'5  THE  PRINCIPLES OF  PQLITLC  LAW.  47 
which the atlprm authdty is kept  within hds,  are &led 
tlk f;/kBamt~naZ lawj $f  tS/e  &ate. 
4.  Of filuidrnent~i  laws. 
XXXVI.  The  fundamental  laws  of  a state, taken itl their 
full extent, are not only the decrees, bj  which the entire body of 
the nation determine the form of government, and the manner 
of succeeding to the crown ;  but are likewise the covenants be- 
twixt the people and the person, on whom they confer the sove- 
reignty,  which regulate the manner of governing, and by  which 
he  supreme authority is limited. 
XXXVII.  These regulations ark called fundamental laws, be- 
cause they are the basis as it were, and foundation of  the state, 
on which the structure of  the government ij  raised, and because 
the people look upon those regulations, as their principal strength 
and support. 
XXXVIII.  The name  of  laws  l~owever  has been given to 
these regulations in an impropet and figurative sense ;  for, prop- 
erly speaking, they are real covenants.  But, as those covenants 
are obligatory between  the  contracting  parties,  they have  the 
force of laws themselves.  Let us  explain this more at large. 
XXXIX.  I.  I observe in the first place, that there is  a kind 
of  fundamental law  essential  to all governments, even in those 
states, where the most absolute sovereignty prevails.  This law 
is that of the public good, from which  the sovereign can never 
depart, without being wanting in his duty ;  but this alone is not 
sufficient to limit the sovereignty- 
XL.  Hence those promises either tacit or  express, by which 
princes bind  themselves even by oath,  when they  come to the 
crown,  of  governing according to the laws of  justice and equi- 
ty,&  consulting the public good, of  oppressing no man, of pro- 
tecting the virtuous,  and of  punishing evil doers, and the like, 
do not iqly  any  limitation to their authority, nor any diminu- 
tion of their  absolute  power.  It is sufficient,  that  the  choice 
of the  means for procuring  the  advantage of  the  state, and the 
method of  putting them in practice, be  left  to  the  judgment 
and  disposal of the sovereign ;  otherwise the distinction of  ab- 
solute and fimited power would be utterly  abolished. 
XLI.  2.  But with regard to fundamental laws, properly so 
called, they are only more particular  precautions,  taken by the 
people, to oblige  sovereigns more strongly to employ  their au- 
thority,  agreeably to the general rule of the public good.  ?Xis 
may be done several  ways ;  but  still  these  limitations  of the 
sovereignty have mare or less force, according as the nation has 
taken more or less precautions, that they shall have their due ef- 
fect. 
XLII.  Hence,  I.  a nation may require  of a sovereign, that 
he will engage,  by a particular promise,  not to make any new 
laws, nor to levy new imposts, to tax only some particular things, 
to give places and emplayments only to a certain set of people, 
and nat to take any foreign troops into his pay,  &c.  Then in- 
deed the supreme authority is limited in those different  respects, 
insomuch that whatever the king attempts afterwards, contrary 
to the formal engagement he entered into,  shall be void  and of 
no effect.  But if  there should  happen to be  an  extraordinarjr 
case, in which the sovereign thought it conducive to the public 
good to deviate from the  fundamental  laws,  he is not allowed 
to do it of  his own  head,  in contempt of  his  sqlemn  engage 
mept ;  but in that  case  he ought to  consult the people them- 
selves or  their  reprexentativcs.  Otherwise,  under pretence of 
some necessity  or utility,  the sovereign might  easily break his 
word, and frustrate the effect of  the  precautions,  taken by  the 
nation to limit his power.  And yet PufYendorf  thinks other- 
wise.*  But, for a still greater  security of  the  performance of 
the engagements, into  which the  sovereign entered,  and which 
limit his power, it is proper to require explicitly of him, that he 
shall convene a general assembly of the people,  or of their rep- 
resentatives, or of  the nobility  of  the country,  when any mat- 
ters happen to fall under debate, which it was thought improp 
er to leave to  his decision.  Or else the nation may  previously 
establish a  council,  a senate, or a  parliament,  without whose 
consent the prince shall be  rendered  incapable of  acting in re- 
gard to things, which the nation did not think  fit to  submit to 
his will. 
XLIII.  2.  History informs us,  that some nations have carri- 
*  See the Law of  N.~tu:e  and Nitions, book vii. chap. vi,  sect,  IQ. THE PRINCIPLE9 OF  POLITIC  LAW. 
cd their  precautions still further, by inserting in plain terms, in 
their  fundamental  laws,  a  condition  or clause,  by  which the 
king was  declared to  have  forfeited  his  crown,  if  he  broke 
through those laws.  Puffendorf gives an example of  this, tak- 
en from the  oath of  allegiance,  which  the  people of  Aragon 
formerly made to their kings.  We,  who have as much power as 
you,  make you  our king,  upon  condition,  that you  maintain inviolably 
our rights and liberties, and not  otherwise. 
SLIV. It is by such precautions as these, that a nation real- 
ly limits the authority,  she confers  on  the  sovereign,  and se- 
cures her liberty.  For,  as we have  already observed,  civil lib- 
erty ought to be accompanied not only with a right of insisting 
on the sovereign's making a due use of his authority, but more- 
over with a moral certainty, that this right shall have its effect. 
And the only  way to  render the people thus  certain  is to use 
proper  precautions against the  abuse  of  the  sovereign power, 
and in such a  manner, that these precautions  cannot  be easily 
eluded. 
XLV.  Besides,  we must  observe, that  these  limitations of 
the sovereign  power do not  render it defective, nor make  any 
diminution in the supreme authority ;  for a prince, or a senate, 
who has been invested with the supreme power upon this foot- 
ing, may exercise every act of  it as well, as in an absolute mon- 
archy.  All the difference is,  that in the latter the prince alone 
determines  ultimately according to his private judgment ;  but, 
in a limited monarchy, there is a certain assembly, who, in con- 
junction  with the king, take cognizance of particular affairs, and 
whose consent is a necessary coadition, without which the king 
can determine  nothing.  But the wisdom and virtue of  good 
sovereigns are strengthened by the concurring assistance of those, 
who have a share in the  authority.  Princes  always do  what 
they incline to,  when they  incline  to nothing but  what is just 
and good ;  and they ought to esteem themselves happy in havd 
ing it put out of their power to act otherwise. 
XLVI.  3.  In a word,  as the fundamental laws, which limit 
the sovereign authority, are nothing  else but the means,  which 
the people use to zssure themselves, that the prince will not re- 
cede from the  general  law of  the public good  in the most imd 
portant conjunctures,  it cannot be  said,  that they  render  the 
sovereignty imperfect or defective.  For, if we suppose a prince 
invested with  absolute  authority, but at the same  time blessed 
with so much wisdom  and  virtue,  that he will never, even in 
the most  trifling  case,  deviate from the laws, which the public 
good requires,  and that all his detern~inations  shall be subjected 
to this superior rule, can we, for that reason,  say, that his pow- 
er is in the  least weakened or diminished ?  No certainly ;  for 
the precautions, which the people  take against the weakness or 
the  wickedness  inseparable  from human nature in limiting the 
power of their sovereigns, to hinder them from abusing it,  do not 
in the least weaken  cr diminish  the  sovereignty ;  but,  on  the 
contrary,  they  render it more  perfect, by  reducing  the  sove- 
reign  to  a  necessity of  doing good, and  consequently by put- 
ting him as it were out of  a capacity of misbehaving. 
XLVII.  Neither are we to  believe,  that there are  two dis- 
tinct wills in  a state,  whose sovereignty is limited in the man- 
ner we have explained;  for the state wills or determines noth- 
ing but by the will of the king.  Only it is to be observed, that, 
when  a conr!ition  stipulated happeils  to  be broken,  the  king 
cannot  decree  at  all,  or at  least  he  must do  so in vain  in 
certain points ;  but he is  not,  for this reason,  less a sovereign, 
than he was before.  Because a prince  cannot  do every thing 
according to his humour, it  does  not follow that he is not the 
sovereign.  Sovereign  and  absolute  power  ought  not  to  be 
confounded ;  and,  from what has been said, it is evident, that 
the one may  subsist without the other. 
XLVIII.  4.  Lastly,  there  is  still another  manner of  limit- 
ing the  authority of  those,  to  whom the  sovereignty  is com- 
mitted ;  which is,  not to trust all the  different rights,  included 
in the sovereignty, to one single person ;  but to lodge them in 
separate hands, or in  different bodies ;  that  they  may  modify 
or restrain  the sovereignty. 
XLIX.  For example, if we suppose, that the body of the na- 
tion reserves to itself the legislative power, and that of creating 
the principal  magistrates ;  that it gives the  king  the  military 
and executive powers, &c. and that  it trusts to a smate, com- 
posed of  the principal men,  the judiciary power, that  of  lay- 
ing taxes,  &c.  it is easily conceived,  that this m;cy be execut- 
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ed in different manners, in the choice of  which prudence must 
determine us. 
L.  If  the  government  is  established on this footing5 then, 
by the original compact of  association,  there is  a kind of  par& 
tition  in the rights of  the sovereignty, by a reciprocal contract 
m stipulation between the different bodies of  the state.  Thii 
partition produces  a balance of  power,  which  places  the  dif- 
ferent bodies of the state in such a mutual depkndance, as  re- 
tains every one,  who  has a share  in  the  sovereign  authority, 
within the bounds, which the law prescribes to them,  by which 
means the public liberty is secured.  For example, the regal au- 
thority is  balanced  by  the power of  the people,  and a  third 
order serves as  a  counterbalance  to the two  former  to keep 
them always in an equilibrium,  and  hinder the one from sub- 
verting the other.  And this is sufficient, concerning the distinc- 
tion between absolute and limited sovereignty. 
5.  Ofpatrimonial and usufructuary kingdoms. 
LI.  In order to finish this chapter,  let us observe, that there 
is stin  another accidental  difference in  the manner of  posses- 
sing the sovereignty,  especiaIIy with respect to  kings,  Some 
are masters of their crown in the way of patrimony,  which they 
are permitted to share, transfer,  or alienate to whom they have 
a  mind ;  in a word, of  which they can  dispose, as they think 
proper ;  others hold  the  sovereignty in  the way of  use  only, 
not of  property ;  and this either for tl1,ems~lves  only,  or with 
the power of  transmitting it to their descendants according  to 
the laws, established for the succession.  It is upon this foun- 
hation, that the learned distinguish kingdoms  into patrimonial, 
and usufructuary or not patrimonial, 
LII.  We  shall here add, that those kings possess the crown 
in full property, who have acquired the sovereignty by right of 
conquest ;  or those, to  whom  a people  have  delivered  them- 
selves up  without reserve,  in order to avoid a greater evil ;  but 
that, on the contrary,  those kings,  who have been  established 
by a free consent of  the people,  possess the crown in the way 
bf  use only.  This is the ma~mer,  in which  Grotius  explains 
this distinction,  in which he has been followed by  Puffendorf, 
and by most of  the other commentators or  writers.* 
LIII.  On this we may  make the following remarks. 
I.  There is no reason to hinder the sovereign power, as well 
as every other right, from being alienated or transferred.  In this 
there is nothing contrary to the nature of the thing ;  and,  if  the 
agreement  between  the prince  and the people  bears,  that the 
pllince shall have full  right to dispose of the crown,  as he shall 
think proper,  this will be  what we call a patrimonial  kingdom. 
2.  But examples of such agreements are very rare ;  and we 
hardly find any other except that of  the  Egyptians  with their 
king, mentioned in Genesis.+ 
3.  The sovereign  power,  however absolute, is not of itself 
invested with the right of  property,  nor conseqtiently Gith the 
power of alienation.  These two ideas are intirely distinct, and 
have no necessary connexion with each other. 
4.  It is true,  some alledge a great many examples of  alien- 
ation~,  made in all ages by sovereigns ;  but  either those alien- 
ations had  no effect ;  or  they were made with an  express  or 
tacit consent of the people ;  or lastly they were founded on no 
other title, than that of  force. 
5. Let us  therefore  take it  for an  incontestible  principle, 
that, in dubious cases, every kingdom ought to be  judged  not 
patrimonial,  so  long as it cannot be proved, that a people sub- 
mitted themselves on that footing to a sovereign. 
CHAP. VIII. 
0J the  parts  g  sovereignty,  or  of  the dferent  ezsential  right$, 
which it includes. 
I  I.  N order to finish this first part nothing remains, but to 
treat of  the different parts of  sovereignty.  We  may consider 
s~vereignty  as  an  assemblage  of  various rights  and  different 
powers,  which,  though  distinct,  are nevertheless conferred for 
the same end ;  that is to say, for the good of  the  society, and 
See  Grotius on  thc right of war  and peace,  lib. i.chap.iii. sect. rI and IS 
&c.  Puffendorf on the lawjof  nature and nations, lib, vii. chnp.vi. sect.  14, IS. 
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w~hich  are all essentially necessary  for this same end.  Thw 
ditTerent rights and powers are called the essential parts of sovm 
reignty. 
11.  To be  convinced, that  these  are the parts of sovereign- 
ty, we need only attend to its nature and end. 
The end of  sovereignty is  the preservation, the tranquillity, 
and the happiness of the state, as well within itself,  as with res- 
pect to its interests  abroad;  so that sovereignty must  include 
every thing, that is essentially necessary  for procuring this,two- 
fold end. 
111.  I.  As this is the case, tlre first part of  sovereignty, and 
that, which is,  as it were,  tlie foiindatioil of  all the rest, is the 
legislative power, by virtue  of  which the  sovereig~l  establishes 
general and perpetual  rules,  which  Are  called  kazu~.  By these 
means every  one knows how  he  ought to co1:duct himself for 
the preservation of  peace and good order, what share he retains 
of his natural  liberty, and  how he ought to exert his rights, sa 
as not to disturb the public tranquillity. 
It is by means of  laws, that  we  contrive  so  nobly to  unite 
the prodigious diversity of  sentiments and inclinations, observa- 
ble  ainong  men, and establish that concert and harmony so es- 
sential to society, since they direct  the dderent actions of  indi- 
viduals to the general good and advantage.  But it must be sup- 
posed, that the laws of  the  sovereign contain nothing opposite 
to the divine laws, whether natural or revcaiecl. 
IV.  2.  To  the legislative we  must join  the coercive power, 
that is to say,  the right of ordaining punishments  against those, 
who molest the commcnity by  their irregularities, and the povr- 
er of actually inflicting them.  Without this power the estab- 
lishment  of  civil society and  of  laws would  be absolutely use- 
less, and we could not propose to live in peace and s~fety.  But, 
that the dread of  punislin~ents  may make a sufficient irnpression 
on the minds of the people,  the right of punishing must extend 
to the power of  inflicting the greatest  of  natural  evils,  which 
is death ;  otherwise the dread of  punishment  would  not be al- 
ways capable of  counterbalancing  the force of pleasure, and thc 
impulse of passion.  In a word the subjects must have a strong- 
er interest to observe,  than  to violate the iaw.  Thus the vin- 
dictive power is certainly the high-  degree of authority, which 
one man can hold over another. 
V.  3.  Further it is necessary for the preservation of peace, 
that the sovereign should have a right to take cognizance of the 
different quarrels between  the  eubjecte,  and to decide them in 
the last resort;  as also to examine the accusations, laid against 
any person, in order  to absolve or punish  him by his sentence, 
confolmably to the laws ;  this is what we call juri~dittion,  or the 
judiciary  power.  To this we must  also refer the right of par- 
doning criminals, when the public utility requires it. 
VI.  4.  Besides, as the ways  of  thinking,  or  opinions, em- 
braced by the subject,  may have a very great influence  on  the 
welfare of  the commonwealth,  it is necessary that  sovereignty 
should include a right  of  examining  the  doctrines,  taught  in 
the  state;  so  that  nothing  may  be  publicly  advanced, 
but  what  is  conformable  to  truth,  and  conducive  to  the 
advantage  of  society.  Hence  it  is,  that  it  belongs  to the 
sovereign to establish professors, academies, and public schools ; 
and the  supreme power, in  matters of  religion, is as much his 
right,  as the nature of  the thing will permit  After having se- 
cured  the public repose  at home,  it  is necessary to  guard the 
people against strangers, and to procure to them, by  leagues with 
foreign  states, all the necessary aids and advantages, whether in 
the seasons of  peace or war. 
VII.  5.  In consequence of  this, the sovereign ought to  be 
invested with the power of assembling and arming his subjects, 
or of  raising other troops in as great a number,  as is  necessary 
for the safety and defence of  a state, and of making peace, when 
he shall judge proper. 
VIII.  6.  Hence also arises  the right  of  contracting public 
engagements,  of  making  treaties  and  alliances  with  foreign 
sates, and of  obliging all the subjects to observe them. 
IX.  7.  But  as the public affairs, both  at home and abroad, 
cannot be conducted by a single person, and as the sovereign is 
incapable of discharging all these duties, he must certainly have 
a power to create ministers and subordinate  magistrates, whose 
business it is to take care of the public welfare, and transact the 
affairs of  the state in his name,  and under his authority.  The 54  THE  PRINCIPLES OF 
sovereign,  who has  entrusted them  with  those  employments, 
may,  and ought to compel them to discharge  them, and oblige 
them to give an exact account of their administration. 
X.  8.  Lastly the affairs of the state necessarily demand, both 
in times of  peace  and  war,  considerable expenses, which  the 
sovereign himself  neither can nor ought to furnish.  He must 
therefore have a right of reserving to himself a part of the goods 
or products of the country, or of  obliging the subjects  to con- 
tribute either by their purse, or by their labor and personal ser- 
vice,  as much, as the public necessities demand, and this is cal- 
Ld the right of subsidies or  taxes. 
TO  this part of the sovereignty we may refer the prerogative 
of  coining  money,  the right of  hunting,  with  that of  fishing, 
&c.  These are the principal  essential to sovereignty. 




which are explained the diferent forms cfgovtrnment, the ways 
of acquiring  or  losing  sovereignty, and  the rec+rocal  dutie~  of 
  we reigns  and  rubject~. 
CHAP.  I. 
Of  the  various forms  of  government. 
I.  NATIONS  have been sensible, that it was essential to 
their happiness and safety to establish some form of government. 
They have all agreed in this point,  that it was necessary to insti- 
'tute a supreme power,  to whose will every thing should be ul- 
timately submitted. 
11.  But the more the establishment of a supreme power is ne- 
cessary, the more important is the choice of the person, invest- 
ed with that high  dignity.  Hence it is that,  in,  regard to this 
article, nations are  extremely divided,  having entrusted the su- 
preme  power  in different hands,  according  as they judged  it 
most  conducive  to their safety  and  happiness;  neither  have 
they taken this step without making several systems and restric- 
tions, which may vary greatly.  This is the origin of the differ- 
ent forms of government. 
111.  There are therefore various  forms of  gcvernment,  ac- 
cording to the  different subjects, in whom  the sovereignty im- 
mediately resides, and according as it is inherent either in a sin- 56  THE  PRINCIPLES OF  POLITIC LAW.  57 
gle person,  or in a single assembly, more or less compounded, 
and this is what forms the constitution of the state. 
IV.  These different forms of  government may be reduced to 
two general  classes,  sameiy  to the simple  forms,  or to those, 
which ,are compounded or mixed. 
V.  There are three simple forms of  government ;  Democra- 
cy,  Aristocracy, and Monarchy. 
VI.  Some  nations, more diffident than  others,  have placed 
the sovereign power in the multitude itself, that is to say, in the 
heads of families, assembled and met in council ;  and such gov- 
ernments are called Popular or Democratic. 
VII.  Other nations of a bolder turn, passing  to the opposite 
extreme,  have established Monarchy,  or the  government of  a 
single man.  Thus Monarchy is a state,  in which the supreme 
power, and all the rights essential to it, reside in a  single per- 
son, who is called King,  Monarch, or  Emperor. 
VIII.  Others have kept a  due  medium between  those two 
extremes, and lodged the whole sovereign authority in a coun- 
cil,  composed of  select members, and this  is termed an  Aris- 
tocracy, or the government of the Nobles. 
IX.  Lastly other nations  have  been  persuaded,  that it  was 
necessary, by a mixtare of  the simple forms, to establish a com- 
pound  government,  and,  making a division of  the sovereignty, 
to intrust the different  parts of  it to  diEerent hands;  to tern- 
per,  for exzrrple, Monarchy with Aristocracy;  and at thesame 
time to give the people a share in the sovereignty ;  this niay be 
executed ditrerent ways. 
X.  In order to have a more particular ,knotvIedge of the na- 
ture of these different forms of  government,  we must observe, 
that, as in Democracies the sovereign is a moral person, formed 
by  the  union  of  all  the  heads of families  into a single will, 
there are three things absolutely necesszry for the canstitution of 
this form of  government. 
r.  That there be a certain place, and regulated time5 for de- 
liberating in common on the public affairs ;  the members of the 
sovereign  council might  assemble at different times,  or places, 
whence  factions would arise, which  would inier:.upt  the unioli 
essential to the state. 
2.  It must be established for a rule, that the plurality of suf- 
frage~  shall pass for the will of  the whole ;  otherwise no affair 
could be determined, it being impossible that a great number of 
people should be always of  the same opinion.  We  must there- 
fore  esteem  it  the essential quality  of  a moral body, that the 
resolution of the majority sha!l  pass {or  the will of  the whole. 
3.  Lastly it is essential,  that magistrates should be appointei 
to convene the people in extraordii~~ry  cases, to disptch ordinary 
aff~irs  in their  name, and to see  that t:le  decrees of  the assem- 
My be executed ;  for, since the sovereign council cannot always 
sit, it is evident that it cannot take the direction of  everjr thing 
itself. 
XI.  With  regard  to  Aristocracies,  since  the  sovereignty 
resides in a council  or  senate, composed  of  the principal  inell 
of the nation,  it is absolutely necessary that  the  conditions es- 
sential  to the  constition of  a Democracy,  and which we  h;ve 
above  mentioned,  should  also  concur to establish an Aristoc- 
racy. 
XII.  Further,  Aristocracy  may  be of  two kinds, either bp 
birth and hereditary,or  elective.  The aristocracy by birth, and 
hereditary, is that, which is confined to a certain number of fan- 
ilies,  to  which birth alone gives right,  and which passes  from 
parents to their children, without any choice, and to the exclu- 
sion of  all others.  On the contrary, the elective Aristocracy is 
that,  in which a person arrives  at  the government  by  election 
only, and without receiving any  right from birth. 
XITI.  in  a word, it may be equally observed of Aristocracies 
and Democracies, that, whether in a popul~r  state, or in a gov- 
ernment of  the nobles, every citizen, or every  member of the 
supreme council, has not the  supreme  power,  nor  even a part 
of it;  but this  power resides either in the general assembly of 
the people, convened according to the laws, or in  the council of 
the nobles ;  for it is one thing to have a share in the sovereign- 
ty, and another to have the right of  suffrage in an assembly in- 
vested with the sovereign power. 
XIV.  As  to Monarchy, it is  established,  when  the  whole 
body of  the people confer  tjle sovereign power on a singlc per- 
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son,  which  is done by an  agreement betwixt  the king and his 
subjects, as we have before explained. 
XV. 'There is therefore this essential difference between Mon- 
archy and the two other forms of government, that, in Democ- 
racies  and  Aristocracies, the actual exercise  of  the  sovereign 
authority depends on the  concurrence of  certain circumstances 
of time and place ;  dateas  in a .Monarchy, at ledst when it is 
simple  and  absolute, the prince can give his orders at all times, 
and in all places.  It  is Rome wherever the Emprrar  re~idr~. 
m.  Another remark,  which very  naturally occurs on this 
occasion, is, that in a Monarchy, when the king orders any thing 
contrary to justice  and equity, he is certainly to blame, because 
in him the civil  and  natural wills  are  the  same thing.  But 
when the assembly of  the people, or a senate, form  an  unjust 
resolution, only those citizens or senators, who carried the point, 
render themselves really acctmatable, and not those, who were 
of the opposite sentiment.  Let this suffice forthe simple forms 
of  government. 
XVII.  As to mixed or compound governments, they are es- 
tablished, as we have observed, by the concurrence of the three 
simple forms, or only of two ;  when for example the king, the 
nobles, and the people,  or only the two lattw,  share the differ- 
ent parts  of  the sovereignty between them,  so that one  admia- 
isters some  parts  of  it, and the others  the  remainder.  ?his 
mixture may be made various ways, as  we observe in most re- 
publics. 
XVIII.  It is true, to consider sovereignty ifi itself, and in the 
height of  plenitude and perfection,  a11  the rights,  which  it  in- 
c!udes,  ought to belong to a single person, or to one body, with- 
out. any partition ;  so that there be but one supreme will to gov- 
ern the subject.  There cannot  properly  speaking be  several 
sovereigns in a state, who shall act as they please, independent- 
ly  of  each  other.  This is  morally  impassible,  and besides 
would manifestly tend to the ruin and destruction  wf society. 
XIX.  But this union of  the supreme power does not hinder 
the whole body of the nation, in which this power originally re- 
sides, from regulating the government by a fundamental law, in 
such a manner,  as to commit the exercise of  the different parts 
of he  supreme power to different  persons or bodies,  who  may 
act independently of each other,in regard to therightscommitted 
to them,  but  still  subordinate to the laws,  from  whieh  those 
rights are derived. 
XX.  And  provided  the  fundamental laws, which establish 
this species of  partition in the sovereignty, regulate the respec- 
tive limits of  the different branches of the legislature, so that we 
may easily see  the extent of  their  jurisdictiop;  this  partitiolr 
produces neither a  plurality of sovereigns, nor an opposition be- 
tween them,  nor any irregularity in the government. 
XXI.  In a word, in this case there is, properlyspeaking, but 
one sovereign, who in himself is possessed of the fulness of  pow- 
er.  There  is  but  one supreme  will.  'rhis  wvereign  is the 
body of  the people, formed  by the union  d  a11  the  orders  of 
the state ;  and this supreme will is the very law, by  which the 
whole body of the nation mzkes its resolutions known. 
XXIT.  They, wlm thus  share the sovereignty  ainong  them, 
=re properly no more,  than the  executors  of  the law ;  since it 
is  from the law itself, that they hold their power.  And as these 
fundamental laws  are real covenants,  or what the civilians call 
pact convents, between the different orders of the republic,+ by 
which they mutually  stipulate, that each shall have such a par- 
ticular  part of  the sovereignty, and that this shall establish  the 
form of  government, it is evident that, by these means, each of 
the contracting parties acquires a right not only of exercising the 
power,  granted  to it, but also of  preserving that original right. 
mEI.  Such party cannot even  be divested  of  its right iu 
spite of itself, md by  the will of  the rest, so long at least 3s it 
conducts itself  in a manner conformable  to the  Iaws, and not 
manifestly opposite to the public welfare. 
XXIV, h a word, the constitution of those governments Wn 
be changed only in  the same manner, and by  the  same  metb. 
ods, by  which it was established, that is to say,  by  the  unani- 
mous concurrewe of all the contracting parties, who have  fix4 
the form of government by  the original contrJct. 
XXV.  This  constitution  of  the state by no  means  dertroys 
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severil bodies,  really  distinct  in  themselves,  but joined  bp a 
fundamental law in a mutual ongagemenr. 
XXVI.  From what  has  been said on  the nature of  mixed 
or  compound  governments  it  follows,  that,  in  all  such 
states,  the sovereignty is limited ;  for as the different branches 
are not committed to a single person,  but lodged  in  different 
hands,  the power of  those,  who have  a  share in the  govern- 
ment,  is thereby  restrained ;  and  a3 they are thus  a check to 
each other, this produces such a balance of ?uthority, as secures 
the public weal,  and the libeny of  individuals. 
XXVIL  Bar  with  respecr  to simple  governments;  in 
these the sovereignty may be either absolute or limited.  Those, 
who are possessed of  the ~oereigntp,  exercise it  sanetimes in 
zn absolute,  and sometimes in a limited manner, by fundament- 
al  laws,  which prescribe bounds to  the sorereign,  with rqard 
to the manner, in  which he ought to govern. 
XXVIfl.  On this occasion  it is expedient to observe,  that 
all  the accidental  circumstances,  which  can  modify  simple 
Monarchies or Aristocracies,  and which in some  measure may 
be said to limit sovereignty,  do not, for that reason, change the 
form  of  government,  which still continues the  same.  One 
government may partake somewhat of another, when the man- 
ner, in which the sovereign governs, seems to be borrowed from 
the form of  the latter ;  hut it does not, for that reason,  change 
its nature. 
XXIX.  Far  example,  in a Democratic state the people  may 
intrust' the care of  several affairs either to a principal  member, 
nr to a senate.  In an Aristocracy there may be a chief  mag- 
istrate, invested with a  part~cular  authority, or an assembly of 
the people to be consulted on sonle occasions.  Or  lastly, in a 
Monarchic state, impoxtant  affairs may be laid before a  senate, 
&c.  But these accidental circumstances do by no means change 
the form of the government ;  neither is there a partition of  the 
mrereignty on this account  3  the  state  still  continues  purely 
either Democratic,  Aristocratic, or Monarchic. 
XXX.  In a word there is a wide difference between  exer- 
Elsing a proper power,  and acting by a foreign and  precarious 
authority, which may  every minute be taken away by him, who 
eonferred it.  Thus what constitutes the characteristic of mix- 
ed or compound commonwealths,  and distinguishes them from 
simple  governments, is,  that the  different orders of  the state, 
who have a share in the sovereignty,  possess the rights,  which 
they exercise, by an equal title, that  is to say,  in virtue of  the 
fundamental law, and  not under the title of  commission,  as if 
the one was only the minister or executor of  the  other's  will. 
We  must therefore be sure to distinguish between  the form of 
government, and the manner of  governing. 
XXXI.  These are the principal observations with respect to 
the various  forms  of  government.  Puffendorf explains  him- 
self in a  somewhat  different manner,  and calls  those govern- 
ments irregular, which we have styled mixed ;  and he glves the 
name of  regular to the simple governments.* 
XXXII.  But this regularity is only in idea ;  the true rule of 
practice'ought to be  that,  which is most conformable to the end 
of  civil society, supposing men to be in  their usual  stite, ahd 
taking the general course of  things into the account, according 
to the experience of all countries and ages.  Now on this foot- 
ing, the states, in which  the whole  depends  on a  single will, 
are so far  from  being happy,  that  it  is certain  their  subjects 
havc the most frequect reason to lament the loss  of  their nat- 
ural independence. 
XXXIIL Besides, it is with the body politic, as with the hu- 
man body ;  there is a difference between a sound and cachectia 
state. 
XXXIV.  These disorders arise either from the abuse of the 
sovereign power,  or from the  bad  constitution  of  the state ; 
and the causes thcreof are to be sought for either in the defects 
of the governors, or in those of the government itself. 
XXXV.  In Monarchies, the defects of the person are,  when 
the king has  not  the  qualifications  necessary  for  reigning, 
when he  has little  or no attachment to the  public  good,  and 
when  he  delivers his subjects up as a prey,  either to the ava 
rice or ambition of  his ministers,  &c. 
XXXVI.  With regard to Aristocracies,  the defects of  the 
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persons are, when, by intrigue and other sinister methods, tl~eeg 
introduce into the council  either wicked  men, or such,  as  are 
incapable of  business,  while persons  of  merit are  excluded ; 
when  factions and cabals  are formed ;  and  wlien  the  aobles 
treat the populace as slaves,  &c. 
XXXVII.  In Gne,  we sometimes see  plso in  Democracies, 
that their  assemblies  are disturbed with  iatatine  broils,  and 
merit is oppressed by  envy, &c, 
XXXVIII.  In regard  to the defects  of  government,  they 
are of  various kinds.  For  example, if  the  laws of  the state 
be not conformable to the natural genius of the people, tending 
to engage in a war a nation, that is not naturally warlike, but in- 
clined to the  peaceful arts ;  or if  they be  not agrecablc to the 
situation and the  natural  products of  the  country ;  thus it is 
bad conduct  not to promote commerce and manufactures in  a 
province, well situated for that pqose, and abounding with the 
materials of  trade.  It is also a  defect of  government,  if  the 
constitution  of  the state renders  the  dispatch  of  affairs very 
slow or difficult, as in Poland,  where the opposition of a single 
member dissolves the diet. 
XXXI&  It is  customary to  give particular names to these 
defects  in government.  Thus the corruption of  Monarchy is 
called Tyranny.  Oligarchy is the abuse of  Aristocracy ;  and 
the abuse  of  Democracy is  called Ochlocracy.  But it often 
happens, that these words denote less a defect or disorder in th.~ 
state, than some particular passion  or  disgust  in  those, who 
use them. 
XL.  To  conclude this chapter,  we have only to  take some 
dce  of  those compound  forms  of  government, which  are 
formed by the union  of  several particular states,  These may 
be  defined an assemblage of perfect governments strictly united 
by  me   articular bond, $0 that they seem to make but a sin- 
gle body  with  respect to the affairs,  which interest  them  in 
common, though each  preserves its sovereignty full and entire, 
independently  of  the others. 
XLt.  This assemblage is formed either by the union of two 
or more distinct states under one and the same king ;  as for inl 
aznce,  England, Scotland, and Irelqnd, before the union  lately 
made between Enghnd and  Scotland ;  or  when  seoenl inde- 
pendent states agree  among themselves  to form  but a  hgle 
body ;  such are the united provinces of  the Netherlands, ad 
the Swiss  cantons. 
XLII.  The  first kind of  union  may happen either by mar- 
riage,  or by  succession, or when  a people choose tix  the'i king 
the sovereign of anotk  county ;  so that those different states 
come to be united under a prince, who perm  each in partic- 
ular  its fundamental laws. 
XLIII.  As to  the compound  governments, fornwd bg  the 
perpetual confederacy  of  several states,  it is  to h  obsemed, 
that this is the only methad,  by  which  several mall govern- 
ments, too weak to maintain themselves separately agaimt their 
enemies, art enabled to preserve their liberties. 
XLIV.  These confederate states engage  to each other only 
to exercise, with common  consent, certain  parts  of  the 
reignty, especially  those,  which  relate to their mutual deftxace 
against foreign enemies.  But each of  the confederates re* 
an entire liberty of exercising, as it thinks proper, those partsof 
the sovereignty, which are not mentioned in the treaty of  nniorr, 
as parts, that ought to be exercised in common. 
XLV.  Lastly  it  is  absolutely  necessary,  in  confe&raie 
states, to ascertain a time and  place far assembling, when  oc- 
&on  requires,  and to  invleet some  member with a  power  of 
convening the asmbly for  extraordinary affiirs, and  saich  as 
will  not  admit  of  delay.  Or  they may  establish  a perpet- 
ual assembly, composed of  the deputies of tach state, fm  dis- 
patching common afiirs  according to the orders of their mpe- 
rim. 
An  esray on  tbL quc&,  which ie the  beet form d  govelrmaeat 3 
1.  IT  is certainly one of  the most important quntim, t 
politics, and has most exercised the  men ofgeaiw to 
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11.  Bveq form of governmmt has its advantages and incon- 
venienres inseparable  .from it.  It would be in vain to seek for 
a government absolutely perfect ;  and however perfect it might 
appear in speculation, yet ~t  is certain, that in practiae, and UR- 
&r the administration  af  men, it will  ever  be  attended with 
some particular  defects. 
111.  But though we cannot amve at the summitof perfection 
in this respect, it is nevertheless certain, that there are different 
degrees, which prudence must  determine.  That government 
ought to be accounted the most complete, which  best  answers 
the  end of  its institution, and is attended with fewest inconve- 
niencies.  Be this as it may,  the examination  of this  question 
furnishes very  useful  instructions  both to  subjects and  sove- 
reigns. 
IV.  Disputes on this subject are of a very ancient date ;  and 
there is nothing more interesting upon the topic,  than what we 
read in the father of  history, Herodotus,  who relates what pas- 
sed in the council of the seven chiefs of  Persia, when the gov- 
ernment was to be  reestablished after  the death of  Cambyses, 
and the punishment of the Magus, who had usurped the throne 
under the pretext of being Smerdis, the son of Cyrus. 
V.  Otanes was of  opinion, that Persia should be formed into 
a republic, and spoke nearly in the following  strain.  "  I am 
not of opinion that we  should  lodge  the government in the 
hands of  a single person.  You know to what excess Cambpses 
''  proceeded, and to what degree of insolence the Magus arrived. 
"  How can the state be well governed  in a monarchy,  where a 
'c  single person  is permitted  to  act  according to his pleasure 2 
An authority uncontroled  corrupts  the  most virtuous  man, 
and defeats his best qualities.  Envy and insolence flow  from 
"  riches and  prosperity;  and  all other vices are derived from 
"  those two  sources.  Kings  hate virtuous men,  who  oppose 
U their unjust designs, but caress the wicked,  who favor them 
A single  person  cannot see  every thing with his own eyes 5 
"  he often lends a favorable  ear  to false accusations ;  he sub- 
"  verts  the  laws and customs of  the country ;  he attacks  the 
chastity of women, and wantonly puts the innocent to death. 
When the people have the government  in their  own hdnds, 
"  the  equality  among  the members  prevents  all  those  evils. 
"  The magistrates are, in this case, chosen by lot ;  they render 
"  an  account of  their  administration, and  they  form all their 
"  resolutions in common  with the people.  I am therefore of 
"  opinion, that we ought to  reject  Monarchy, and  introduce a 
"  popular government, because we rather find these advantages 
"  in a multitude,  than in a single person,"  Such was the ha- 
rangue of Otonea 
VI.  But Magabyses spoke in favor of  Aristocracy.  "  I ap- 
"  prove,"  said he,  a  of the opinion of  Otanes  with respect  to 
"  exterminating Monarchy, but I believe he is wrong in endeav- 
"  ouring to persuade us to trust the government to the discre- 
'' tion of  the people ;  for surely nothing can be imagined more 
"  stupid and insolent, than the giddy multitude.  Why should we 
"  reject the power of  a single  man, to  deliver up ourselves to 
"  the tyranny of a blind and disorderly populace ? If a king set a- 
"  bout an enterprise, he is at least capable of  listening to  advice ; 
"  but the people are a blind monster, devoid of  reason and capaci- 
"  ty.  They are strangers to decency, virtue, and their own inter- 
"  ests.  They do every thing precipitately, without judgmenr, 
'' and without order, resembling a rapid  torrent,  which cannot 
"  be stemmed.  If therefore you  desire  the ruin  of  the Per- 
"  sians,  establish a popular government.  As to myself,  1 am 
"  of opinion, that we should make choice of  virtuous men,  and 
lodge  the  government  in their hands?  Such was the sen- 
timent of Magabyses. 
VII.  After him Darius spoke in the following terms.  "  I 
a  am of opinion, that there is a great  deal of good sense in the 
"  speech, which  Magabyses has  made against a popular state ; 
"  but I also think, that he is not entirely in the right, when he 
"  prefers the government of a small number to Monarchy.  It is 
'' certain, that tlothing can be imagined better, or more perfect, 
"  than the administration of  a virtuous man.  Besides, when a 
''  single man is mastcr, it is more difficult for the enemy to dis- 
"  cover his secret counsels  and  resolutions.  When the gov- 
"  ernment is in the hands of  many,  it is impossible but enmity 
"  and hatred must arise among them ;  for, as every one desires 
"  his opinion to be followed, they gradually become mutual en- 
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"  mies.  Emulation and jealousy  divide them, and then  their 
'l aversions run to  excess.  Hence arise seditions ;  from sedi- 
tions,  murders;  and from murders a monarch insensibly be- 
"  comes necessary.  Thus the government  at  length  is  ewe 
to fall Into the  hds  of  a single person.  In a popubr state 
'' there must needs be a great  store  of malice and cocrwptim. 
It  is true equality  does not generate hatred  1 but it foments 
a  friendship  among  the wicked,  who support each  other,  titt 
"  some  person  or orher,  wlno by  his behavior has acquired an 
authority over the multitude, discovers the frauds, and exposes 
"  the perfidy of  those villains.  Such a man shews hhnwli re- 
"  ally a monarch 3  and hence we  know  that Monarchy is the 
"  most naturaI governwnt, since the  seditions of  Ariaocracy 
and the corruption of Democracy are eqml  inducements hr 
"  our  uniting the supreme power in the bnds  af a single per- 
"  son." 
The opinion  of Darim  was approved,  and the government 
of  Persia  continged  monarchic.  We  thought this passage of 
history  sAcientIy interesting to 6e  related. on this occasiorr. 
VIII.  To  determine this question we must trace  matters to 
their very source.  Liberty, under whih  we must comprehend 
&l  the most valuable enjoyments, has two enemies in civil. soci- 
ety.  The first is licentiousness  and  confusiott ;  and the m- 
ond is oppression, arishg from tyranny. 
IX.  The first ~f these evils arises from libe~ay  itself, when it 
is  not kept within due bounds. 
The  second is, owing  to  the remedy,  which mankind have 
contrived against the former evil,  that is,  to sovereignty. 
X  The height  ot: human  feLicitg and prudence is  to know 
flow m  gwrd a*  those two enemies.  The only method is 
to have a  well  co~1atitued  gcpllernnrent, formed with such pre- 
cautionj, as to banish licentiousness, and get be  m wag  intro- 
ductive to tyranny. 
XI.  It is thki happy tempecament, that done can give us the 
idca of  a good, goverrunent.  It Is  evident,  that  the  political 
constitution,  which wods these extremes, i6  SO justly fitted for 
the preservation of  order, and for providing against  the neces- 
sities of  the people,  that  it leaves  them a  sufficient  security, 
:hat  this end shall be perpetually held in view. 
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XII.  But here we  shall  be asked,  which government is  it, 
that approaches nearest to this perfection ?  Before  we  answer 
this  question, it  is proper to observe,  that  it is very different 
from  our being  asked,  which is the  most  legitimate  govern- 
ment  ? 
XIII.  As for  the latter question, it is certain,  that  govern- 
ments of  every kind, which are founded  on the  free acquies- 
cence of  the people, whether express or justified by a long ancl 
peaceable possession,  are all equalIy legitimate, so long at le3st 
as, by  the  intention of the sovereign, they tend to promote the 
happiness of  the people.  Thus  no  other  cause  can  subvert 
a government, but an open and actual violence,  either in its es- 
rablkhment, or in its exercise ;  'I mean usurpation,  or tyranny. 
XIV.  To return to the principal question, I affirm,  that the 
best  government  is  neither  absolute  Monarchy,  nor  that, 
which is intirely popular.  The f~rrner  is  too violent, encroack- 
es  on liberty,  and inclines too much  to tyranny ;  :he  latter is 
too weak,  leaves the people too much  to themselves,  and tends 
to confusion and licentiousness. 
XV. It were to be wished, for the glory of sovereigns and for 
the happiness of the people,that  we could contest the fact above 
asserted with respect to absolute governments.  We  may ven- 
ture  to affirm, that  nothing  can be  compared to  an absolute 
government in the hands of  a wise  and virtuous  prince.  Or- 
der, diligence, secrecy, expedition, the greatest enterprizes, and 
the most happy  execution, are  the certain effects of  it.  Dig- 
nities,  honors,  rewards, and punishments, are all dispensed u~lc 
der it with justice and discernment.  So glorious a reign is the 
era of the golden age. 
XVI.  But to govern in this manner a  superior genius,  per- 
fect virtue,  great experience, and uninterrupted application, are 
necessary  Man, in so high an elevation, is  rarely capable  of 
so many accomplishments.  The  multitude of  objects diverts 
his attention ;  pride  seduces him,  pleasure  tempts him,  and 
flattery, the  bane of  the great, does him  more  injury than  all 
the rest.  It is difficult to escape eo  many snares;  and it gem 
erally happens, that an absolute prince becomes an easy prey to 
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XVII.  Hence  proceeds  the  disgust of  people  to absolute 
governments, and this disgust sometimes is worked up to aver- 
sion and hatred.  This has also given occasion to politicians ts 
make two important reflections. 
The first is, that, in an absolute government, it is rare to see 
the peop!e  interest  themselves in  its preservation.  Oppressed 
with their burdens,  they long for  a revolution,  which  cannot 
render their situation more uncomfortable. 
The second is,  that it is  the interest of princes to engage the 
people in the support of their government, and  to give them a 
share  therein,  by  privileges,  tending to  secure their  liberty. 
This  is the best expedient to promote the safety of  princes at 
home, together with their power  abroad, and  glory  in  every 
respect. 
XVIII.  It has been said  of  the Romans,  that,  so  long as 
they fought for their own interests, they were invincible ;  but, 
as soon  as they  became  slaves  under absolute  masters, their 
courage  failed,  and  they asked  for  no  more than  bread  and 
public diversions ;  panem  et circenz. 
XIX.  On  the contrary, in states, wXere the people have some 
share in the government, every  individual  interests himself in 
the public good,  because each, according to his quality or mer- 
it, partakes of  the general success, or feels the loss,  sustained 
by  the  state.  This is what renders men active and  generous, 
what inspires them with  an ardent  love of  their country, and 
with an invincible courage, so as to be proof  against the great- 
est misfortunes. 
XX.  When Hannibal had  gained four victories over the Ro- 
mans,  and killed more than two hundred thousand of  that na- 
tion, when,  much about the same time,  the two  brave Scipios 
perished in Spain, not to mention several considerable losses at 
sea and in Sicily,  who could have thought,  that  Rome could 
have withstood her enemies ?  Yet the virtue of  her citizens, 
the love they bore their country, and the interest they had in the 
government,  augmented  the  strength of  that  republic in the 
midst of  her calamities, and  at last she surmounted every dif- 
ficulty.  Among the  Lacedzmonians  and  Athenians we find 
several examples to the same point. 
XXI.  These advantages are  not found in absolute  govern- 
ments.  We  may justly  affirm, that it is  an essential defect in 
them not to interest the people in their preservation ;  that they 
are too violent, tending too much to oppression, and very little 
to the good of  the subject. 
XXII.  Such are absolute governments ;  those of  the popu- 
Iar kind are no better,  and we may say they have no advantage 
but liberty, and their leaving the people at their option to choose 
a better. 
XXIII.  Absolute governments have at least two advantages ; 
the first is, that they have happy intervals, when in the hands of 
good princes ;  the second is, that they have a greater degree of 
force, activity, and expedition. 
XXIV.  But a popular government has none of those advan- 
tages ;  formed  by  the multitude,  it bears a strong  resemblance 
to that many-headed monster.  The multitude is  a mixture of 
all kinds of  people ;  it contains a few  men of  parts,  some of 
whom may have honest intentions ;  but far the greater number 
cannot be depended on, as they have nothing to  lose, and con- 
sequently can hardly L=  txuated.  Besides, a multitude  always 
acts with slowness and confusion.  Secrecy and precaution are 
advantages unknown to them. 
XXV.  Liberty is not wanting  in  popular states ;  nay,  they 
have rather too much of  it,  since it degenerates into licentious- 
ness.  Hence it is that they are ever tottering and weak.  In- 
testine commotions, or  foreign attacks, often throw them  into 
consternation.  It  is  their ordinary  fate to fall a prey to the 
ambition of  their fellow citizens, or to foreign usurpation, and 
thus to pass fram the highest liberty to the lowest slavery. 
XXVI.  This  is proved by  the experience of  different  na. 
tions.  Even at present Poland is a striking example of the de- 
fects of  popular government, from  the anarchy  and  disorder, 
which reigns in that republic.  It is the  sport of  its  own in- 
habitants and of  foreign nations,  and is frequently the seat  of 
intestine war ;  because,  under the appearance of  Monarchy, it 
is indeed too popular a government. 
XXVII. We  need only read the histories of  Florence and Ge- 
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publics suffer from  the multitude,  when the latter  attempt to 
govern.  The  ancient republics, especially Athens,  the  most 
considerable in  Greece,  are capable of  setting  this truth in a 
stronger light. 
XXVIII.  111 a  word  Rome  perished in  the hands  of  the 
people ;  and monarchy gave birth to it.  The  patricians, who 
composed the senate, by freeing it  from  the regal dignity, had 
rendered  it mistress of  Italy.  The people,  by  bhe  encroach- 
ment of  the tribunes,  gradually  usurped the  authority of  the 
senate.  From that time discipline was relaxed, and gave place 
to licentiousness.  At length the  republic was reduced, by the 
people themselves, to the most abject slavery. 
XXIX.  It is not therefore to be doubted,  but popular gov- 
ernments are the weakest and worst of  all others.  If  we con- 
sider the education of  the vulgar, their laborious employments, 
their ignorance and brutality,  we must  quickly perceive,  that 
they are made to be  ;  and that good  order and their 
own advantage forbid them to interfere with that province. 
XXX.  If therefore neither the government of  the multitude, 
nor the  absolute will of a single person, Are  fit to procure  the 
happiness of  a nation, it follows, that the best governments are 
those,  which are so tempered,  as to  secure  the happiness of 
the  subjects by avoiding tyranny and  licentiousness. 
XXXI.  There are two ways of  finding this temperament. 
The first consists in  lodging the  sovereign  in a  council so 
composed, both as to the  number and choice of  persons,  that 
there shall be amoral certainty of  their having no other interests, 
than those of  the community, and of  their  being always ready 
to give a faithful account of  their conduct.  This is what  we 
see happily practised in most republics. 
XXXII.  The second is to limicthe sovereignty of  the prince 
in monarchic states, by fundamental laws, or to invest the per- 
son, who enjoys the honors  and title of  sovereignty,  with on- 
ly a part  of  the supreme  authority,  and to lodge the  other in 
different hands, for example  in a council or parliament.  This 
is what gives birth to limited monarchies." 
XXXIII.  With regard to Monarchies, it is proper for exam- 
ple, that the military and legislative powers, together with that 
of raising taxes, should be  lodged in different hands, to the end, 
that they may not be easily abused.  It is esy  to conceive, that 
these restrictions may be made  different  ways.  The  genera1 
rule,  which prudence directs, is to limit the power of  the prince 
so,  that no  danger may  be  apprehended from  it ;  but  at the 
same time not to  carry things to excess,  for fear of  weakening 
the government. 
XXXIV. By followirlg this jwt medium, the people will enjoy 
the most perfect liberty, since they haveall the moral securities, 
that the prince will not abuse his  power.  The prince, on the 
other hand,  being as it were under a necessity of doing his du- 
ty,  considerably strengthens his authority, and enjoys a high de- 
gree of  happiness  and solid glory ;  for,  as the felicity of  the 
people  is  the end  of  government,  it  is also the surest foun- 
clation of  the throne.  See what has been  aIreadp said on thii 
subject. 
XXXV.  This  species of  Monarchy,  limited  by  a  mixed 
government, unites the principal advantages of  absolute Mmr- 
chy, and of  the Aristocratic  and popular governments ;  at the 
same time it avoids the dangers and inconveniences peculiar to 
each.  This is the happy temperament,  which we  h;rw  been 
endeavoring to  find. 
XXXVI.  The truth of  this remark has been proved by the 
experience of past ages.  Such was the gavernment of  Sparta. 
Lycurgus, knowing that each df  the three sorts of simple gov- 
ernments had very great inconveniences ;  that Monarchy easily 
fell  into  arbitrary  power  and  tyranny;  that Aristocracy de- 
generated into the oppressive government of  a few individuals ; 
and Democracy Into a wild and lawless dominion ;  thought  it 
expedient to combine these three governments in that of  Spatta, 
and mix them as it were into one,  so that they might  serve  as 
a remedy and counterpoise to each other.  This wise legislator 
was not deceived, and no republic preserved its laws,  customq 
and liberty, longer than  that of  Sparta. 
=XVII.  It may  be  said,  that  the government  of  the 
Romans,  ullder the republic, united  in  some measure, a3  that 
of Sparta, the three species of authority.  The consuls held the 
place  of kings,  the senate formed the  public counsel, and the 
people had also some share in the administration. 
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XXXVIII.  If modern examples are wanted,  is not England 
at present a proof of  the excellency of  mixed government? Is 
there a nation, evcry thing considered, that enjoys a higher de- 
gree of  prosperity or reputation  ? 
XXXIX.  The  northern  nations, which subverted the RO- 
man empire, introduced into the conquered provinces that spe- 
cies of  government, which was then called Gothic.  They had 
kings, lords, and commons ;  and experience  shows,  that  the 
states, which  have retained  that species of  government  have 
flourished more  than  those,  which have devolved  the  whole 
government into the hands of  a single person. 
XL. As to Aristocratic governments, we must first distinguish 
Aristocracy by  birth, from that,  which is elective.  The for- 
mer has several advantages, but is also attended with very great 
inconveniences.  It inspires the nobility with  pride, and efiter- 
tains, between the grandees and the people, division, contempt, 
and jealousy,  which are produc{ive of considerable evils. 
XLI.  But the latter has all the  advantages of  the  former, 
without its defects.  As there is no privilege of  exclusion, and 
as the door of  preferment iu open  to all  the citizens, we find 
neither pride nor  division  among them.  On  the  contrary a 
general emulation glows in the breasts of  all the members, con- 
verting every thing to the public  good, and contributing infin- 
itely to the preservation of  liberty. 
XLII.  Thus if  we  suppose an elective Aristocracy, in which 
the sovereignty is in the hands of  a council so numerous,  as to 
comprehend  the  chief property  of  the  republic, and never  to 
have any interest opposite to that of  the state ;  if  besides this 
counsel be  so small, as  to maintain order, harmony, arid secre- 
cy ;  if  it be chosen from among the  wisest, and most virtuous 
citizecs ;  and lastly if  its authority be limited and kept within 
rule;  there can be no doubt  but  such  a  government  is  very 
well adapted to promote the happiness of  a nation. 
XLIII.  The most  difficult point  in these goverments is to 
temper them in such a  manner, that,  while the  people are as- 
sured of their liberty, by giving them some share in the govern- 
ment,  these  assurances shall  not  bc  carried  too  far,  50 as to 
makc t5e government approach too near to Democracy ;  for the 
preceding  reflections  sufficiently  evince  the  inconveniences, 
which would result from this step. 
XLIV.  Let us therefore conclude, from this inquiry into the 
different forms of  government, that the best are either a limit- 
ed Monarchy, or  an Aristocracy tempered with Democracy,  by 
some privileges in f~vour  of  the body  of  the people. 
XLV.  It  is true there are always  come  deductions  to be 
made from  the  advantages,  which  we have ascribed to  those 
governments ;  but this is owing to the infirmity of  human nature, 
and not  to  the  establishments.  The constitution above des- 
cribed is  the most  perfect, that can be  imagined ;  and,  if  we 
adulterate it by our vices and follies, this is the fate of  all sub- 
lunary affairs ;  and since a choice must be made, the best is that, 
attended with the fewest inconveniences. 
XLVI.  In a word, should it still be asked,  which  govern- 
ment is best  ?  I would answer,  that every species  of  govern- 
ment is not equally proper  for every nation ;  and  that, in this 
point,  we must have a  regard to  the humor  and  character of 
the ~eople,  and to the extent of  the country. 
XLVII.  Great stareb can hardly admit of  republican govern- 
ments ;  hence a monarchy,  wisely limited,  wits them  better. 
But as to  states of  an ordinary extent, the most advantageous 
government for them is an elective  aristocracy, tempered with 
some privileges in favor of  the body of  the people. 
CHAP.  111. 
Of  the diferent  wayr of acquiring  sovereignfy. 
T  I.  HE  only just  foundation of  sovereignty is the con- 
sent, or will of the people.*  But as this consent may be given 
different ways, according to the different circumstances attend- 
ing it ;  we may distinguish the several ways of  acquiring  sov- 
ereignty. 
11.  Sometimes a  people are codstrained, by  force of  arms, 
to submit to the dominion of  a conqueror ;  at other times the 
" Ox  this subject see part i. chap vl 
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people,  of  their own accord, confer the supreme authority  m 
some particular person.  Sovereignty may therefore be acquir- 
ed either by force and violence, or in a free and volui~tary  man- 
ner. 
111.  These  different  acquisitiocs of  sovereignty  may agree 
in some measure to all sorts of  governments ;  but,  as they are 
most remarkable  in monarchies,  it shall be principally with res- 
pect to the latter,  that we shall examine this question. 
I. Of  conquest. 
IV.  Sovereignty is sometimes acquired by force,  or  rather is 
seized by conquest or usurpation. 
V.  Conquest is the acquisition of  sovereignty by the supe- 
riority of  a foreign prince's  arms, who reduces the  vanquished 
to submit to his government.  Usurpation is properly made by 
a  person  naturally  subject to him, from whom he wrests the 
supreme power ;  but custom often confounds these two terms. 
VI.  There are several remarks to be made oncdnq~est,  con- 
sidered as a method of acquiring  the sovereignty. 
I.  Conquest in itself  iq rather the occasioll of  acquiring the 
sovereignty, than the immediate cause of this acquisition.  The 
immediate cause is the consent of  the people, either tacit or  ex- 
pressed.  Without this consent the state of war always subsists 
between two enemies, and one is not obliged  to obey the other. 
All that can be said is,  that the consent of thevanquished is er- 
torted by the superiority of  the conqueror. 
VII.  2.  Lawful  conquest supposes,  that  the conquyor has 
had just reason to wage war against the vanquished.  Without 
this, conquest is by  no means of  itself  a just  title ;  for a man 
cannot acquire a sovereignty  over a natioll by  bare sei-  ~ure,  as 
over a thing, whichbelongs to no proprietor.  Thus when Alex- 
ander waged war against distant nations, who had never heard of 
his fame, certainly such a conquest  was  no more a lawful title 
to the  sovereignty over  those people,  than robbery is a lawful 
manner  of  becoming  rich.  The quality and  number of the 
persons do not change the nature of +e  action, the injury is the 
3ame,  and the crime equal. 
VIII.  But if  the war be just,  the conquest is also the same ; 
for,  in the first pI?ce, it is a natural consequence of the victory; 
and  the vanquished,  who deliver  themselves to the conqueror, 
only purchase tlfeir lives by the loss of their liberties.  Besides, 
the vanquished having,  through their own  fault, engaged in an 
unjust  war,  rather than  grant the satisfaction  they  owed,  are 
supposed to have tacitly consented to the conditions, which the 
conqueror should impose  upon  them, provided they were nei- 
ther unjust nor inhuman. 
IX.  3.  but what must we tliink of unjust conquests, and of 
submission,  extorted by  mere  violence ?  Can it give a lawful 
right? I answer,  we should  distinguish  whether the  usurper 
has changed the government  from a republic into a monarchy, 
or dispossesscd the lawful monarch.  In the  latter  case, he is 
obliged to restore the crown to the right owner, or to his heirs, 
till it  can  be  presumed tkat they have renounced their preten- 
sions, and this is always presumed,  when a considerable time is 
elapsed without their being willing or ab!e  to make any effort to 
recover the crown ? 
X.  The law of nations therefore admits of a kind of prescrip- 
tion with respect to sovereignty.  This is requisite for the in- 
terest and tranquillity of  societies ;  a long  and quiet possession 
of  the supreme power must establish the legality of it, otherwise 
there would never be an end of  disputes in regard to kingdoms 
and their limits ; this would be a source of perpetual quarrels, 
and there would hardly be any such thing, as a sovereign lawful- 
ly possessed of the supreme authority. 
XI.  It is indeed the duty of  the people,  in the beginning, to 
resisr the usurper with all their might,  and to continue faithflll 
to their prince ; but  if,  in  spite  of  their utmost efforts,  their 
sovereign is defeated,  and is no  longer able to assert  his right, 
they are obliged to no more, but may lawfully take care of their 
own preservation. 
XII.  The people  cannot live in a state of  anarchy,  and as 
they are not obliged  to  expose themsdves to  perpetual  wars, 
in  defence  of  the  rights  ol their  former  ~overeigns, their 
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case the sovereign dethroned ought  to rest  contented  with the 
loss of  his dominiocs, and consider it as a misfortune. 
XIII.  With regard to the former case, when the usurper has 
changed the republic into a monarchy ;  if  he gaverns with mod- 
eration and equity, it is sufficient,  that he has reigned peaceably 
for some time,  to affbrd reason to believe, that the people con- 
sent to  his dominion, and  to efface  what was  defective in  the 
manner of  his acquiring it.  This may be very well applied to 
the  reign  of  Augustus.  But if,  on the contrary,  the prince, 
who has made himself master of the republic, exercises his pow- 
er in a tyrannical manner,  and  oppresses  his subjests, they are 
not then  obliged  to  obey  him.  In  these  circumstances  the 
longest possession imports no more than a long continuation of 
injustice. 
2.  Of  the  election  of sowereigns. 
XIV.  But the most legitimate way of acquiring sovereignty 
is founded on  the free consent of  the people.  This is effected 
either by the way  af elertinn,nrhy  the right of succession ;  for 
which reason kingdoms are distinguished into  elective and  he- 
reditary. 
XV.  Election is that act, by which the people design or nomi- 
nate a certain person, whom they judge  capable of  succeeding 
the deceased  king,  to govern the state ; and,  so  soon  as  this 
person has accepted the offer of  the people, he is invested with 
the sovereignty. 
XVI.  We  may distinguish two sorts of elections, one entirely 
free and the other limited in certain respects ;  the former, when 
the  people can choose whom they think  proper, and the latter, 
when they are obliged for example to clloose a person of a cer- 
tain nation, a particular family, religion,  &c.  Among the an- 
cient Persians no man could be king,  unless  he  had  been  in- 
structed by the Magi." 
XVII.  The  time between the death of the king and the elec- 
tion of his successors is called an It~terre~num. 
XVIII.  During the Interregnum  the  state is,  as it  were, an 
See Cic de Divine lib.  i.  up. iv. 
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imperfect body without a head ;  yet the civil society is not dis- 
solved.  The sovereignty then  returns to the people, who, till 
they choose a new king to exercise it, have it even in their pow- 
er to change the form of government. 
XIX.  But it is a wise precaution to prevent the  troubles of 
an Interregnum, to nominate  beforehand those,  who during that 
time, are to hold the reigns of government.  Thus in Poland 
the archbishop of Gnesna,  with the deputies of great and  little 
Poland are appointed for that purpose. 
XX.  The persozs, invested with this employmant, are called 
Regentr  ofthe kingdom ;  and the Romans styled them Inierrege~. 
They are temporary, and as it were provisional magistrates, who, 
in the name  and by  the  authority  of  the people,  exercise rhe 
acts of sovereignty, so that they  are obliged to give an account 
gf their administration.  This may suffice for the way of  elec- 
tion. 
3.  Of  succession  to the  cvowra 
XXI.  The other manner of acqniring sovereignty is the right 
of  succession,  by which  princes, who have once  acquired  the 
crown, transmit it to  their successors. 
XXII.  It may seem at first,  that elective kingdoms have  the 
advantage over those, which are hereditary,  because,  in the for- 
mer, the subjects mqy  always choose a prince of merit, and ca- 
pable of governing.  However experience  shows, that, taking 
all things into the account, the way of  succession is more con- 
ducive to the welfare of the state. 
XXIII.  For,  I.  by this method we avoid the vast inconven- 
iences, both foreign and domestic, which  arise  from  frequent 
elections.  2.  There  is  less  contention  and  uncertainty with 
respect to the title of the successor.  3. A prince, whose crown 
is hereditary, all other circumstances being equal, will take great- 
er care of his kingdom, and spare his subjects more, in hopes af 
leaving the  crown to his children,  thau  if  he only  possessed it 
for life.  4.  A kingdom, where the succession is regulated, has 
greater stability and force.  It can form mightier projects, and 
pursue them more vigorously,  than if  it were electbe.  5. In 
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reverence, and they have reason to  hope, that  the  splendor of 
his  descent,  and the impressions of his  education, will inspire 
him with the necessary  qualities for holding the reigns of gov- 
ernment. 
XXIV.  The order  of  succession  is regulated  either by  the 
will of the last king,  or by that of  the people. 
XBV.  In kingdoms truly patrimonial, every king has a right 
to regulate the succession, and to dispose of the crown as he has 
a mind ;  provided the choice he makes of his successor, and the 
manner,  in which be settles the  state,  be not  manifestly  oppo- 
site to the public good,  which,  even in  patrimonial  kingdoms, 
is ever the supreme law. 
XXVr.  But if  the king, prevented perhaps by death, has not 
named his successor, it seems natural to tollow the laws or cus- 
toms, established in that country, concerning private inheritan- 
ces, so  far at least, as the safety  of  the state will admit.*  But 
it is certain that in those cases, the most approved and powerful 
candidate will always carry it. 
XXVII.  In kingdoms, which are not patrimonial, the people 
regulate the order of succession.  And.  although they may  es- 
tablish the succession as they please,  yet prudence requires they 
should follow the method most advantageous to  the state, best 
adapted to malntain order and peace, and most expedient to pro- 
mote the public security. 
XX(rII1.  The usual methods are, a succession simply hered- 
itary, which follows nearly the rules  of  common  inheritarlces ; 
and the lineal  succession, which receives more particular  limi- 
tations. 
5lX.  The good of the  state therefore requires, that a suc- 
cession simply hereditary should vary in several things from pri- 
vate inheritances. 
I.  The kingdom  ought  to  remain  indivisible,  aud  not be 
shared among several heirs in the same degree ;  for, in the first 
place, this would considerably weaken  the state, and  render it 
less propq to resist the attacks of a foreign  enemy.  Besides, 
the  subjects, having  different masters, would  no  longer be SO 
'  Sec  tbe Law of Nature  and  Nations,  book vii.  chap.  vii.  $  11. 
PoLmc  LAW.  75) 
closeIy united among themselves;  and  lastly  this might  lay a 
foundation for intestine wars, as experience has too qften evinc- 
ed. 
XXX.  2.  The crown ought  to remlin  in the  posterity of 
the first possessor, and not pass to his relations in a collateral line, 
and  much less  to those, who have only connexions of  affinity 
with him.  This is  no  doubt, the intention of  a people,  who 
have rendered the crown hereditary in any one farnlly.  Thus, 
unless it is otherwise determined,  in default of  the descendants 
of the first possessor,  the right of  disposing of the kingdom re- 
turns to the nation. 
XXXI.  3. Those only ought to be admitted to the succession, 
who are born of  a  marriage  conformable to the  laws of  the 
nation.  For this there are several reasons.  I.  This was un- 
doubtedly  the intention  of  the people when  they settled the 
crown on the descendants of  the king.  Z. The people  have 
not the same respect  for the king's  natural or base sons,  as for 
his lawful children.  3.  The father  of  natural children is not 
known for certain, there being no sure method  of  ascertaining 
the father of  a child,  born out of  wedlock 5  and yet  it  is  of 
the last  importance, that  there  should be no doubt  about the 
birth of  t;lose,  who are to reign,  in order to avoid the disputes 
which might embroil the kingdom.  Hence it is,  that,  in sev- 
eral countries, the queen is delivered in public,  or in the  pres- 
ence of  several persons. 
XXXII.  4.  Adopted children,  nut being of the royal blood, 
are also excluded from the crown, which ought to revert to the 
people so soon as the royal line fails. 
XXXIII.  5.  Among those,  who  are  in the same  degree, 
whether re;~Ily  or by representation, the males are to be prefer- 
red to the  females ;  because they  are presumed  more  proper 
for the command of  armies, and for exercising the other func- 
tions of  government. 
XXXIV.  6. Among several males or several females in the 
same  degree, the eldest ought to succeed.  It is birth,  which 
gives this right ;  for the crown being at the same time indivis- 
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a preference,  of  which the younger cannot deprive him.  But 
it is just,  that the eldest  should  give his  brothers  a  sufficien- 
cy  to  support  themselves  decently,  and  in  a  manner suita- 
ble to their rank.  What is allotted them for this plirpose is dis- 
tinguished by the name of  Appenmrge. 
XXXV.  7.  Lastly  we must observe,  that the  crown does 
not pass to the successor in consequence of  the pleasure of the 
deceased king, but by the will of  the  people,  who have settled 
it on the royal family.  Hence it follows,  that the inheritance 
of  the particular estate of  the king, and that of  the crown, are 
of a quite digerent nature,  and have no  connexion  with  each 
other ;  so that, strictly speaking, the successor may  accept of 
the crown, and refuse the private inheritance ;  and in this case 
he  is not obliged to  pay  the debts,  due upon  this  particular 
estate. 
XXXVI.  But  it is certain,  that  hanor  and equity  hardly  - 
permit a prince, who ascends the throne, to use this right ;  and 
that,  if  he has the glory of his royal house at heart, he will, by 
economy and frugality,  be enabled to pay  the debts of his pre- 
decessor.  But this aught oat to  hedone at  the expense of  the 
public.  These are the rules of  succession simply  hereditary. 
XXXVII. But since in this hereditary succession, where the 
next heir to the  deceased king is  called to the crown,  terrible 
disputes may happen  collcernisg the degree of  proximity, when 
those,  who remain,  are a little distant from the common stem ; 
several nations have established the lineal succession from branch 
to branch,  the rdles of  which are these following. 
I.  All those descended from the royal founder are account- 
ed so many lines or branches, each of  which has a right to the 
crown according to the degree of  its proximity. 
2.  Among  those of  this line, who are in the same degree, 
in the first place sex, and then age, gives the preference. 
3.  We  must not pass from one line  to another,  so  long  as 
there remains one of  the preceding, even though  there should 
be another line of  relations nearer  to the deceased king.  For 
example : 
F-  7  1  Lewis.  I 
LJ  1  Henry.  I 
L2 
A king leaves three sons, Lewis, Charles, and Henry.  The 
son of Lewis, who succeeds him, dies without children ;  Charles 
leaves a grandson ;  Henry is still living, and is the uncle of the 
deceased king;  the  grandchild  of  Charles  is  only his cousin 
german ;  and yet this grandchild will have the crown,  as being 
transmitted to him by >is grandfather, whose line has excluded 
Henry and his descendants,  till it be quite extinct. 
4.  Every one  has therefore a right to  succeed in his  rank, 
and transmits this right to his descendants, with the same order 
of  succession,  though he has never reigned himself;  that is te 
say, the right of  the deceased passes to the living, and 'that  of 
the living to  the deceased. 
5. If  the last king  has died without issue,  we make choice 
of  the nearest line to his,  and so on. 
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XXXVIII.  There are two principal kinds of  lineal  succes- 
sion, namely Cognutic and Apatir.  These  names come  from 
the Latin words  Cogmtd and Agnati, the  former of  which, in 
the Roman law, signifies the relations on the mother's  side, and 
the latter those, on the father's  side. 
XXXIX.  The  Cggnatic lineal succession is that, which does 
not exclude women  from the succession,  but  only calls them 
after the males in the  same line ;  so that,  when  only women 
remain, there is no transition made to another line,  but the suc- 
cession runs back to  the female again, in case the males,  who 
were superior or equal to them in other respects,  shall happen 
to fail with all their descendants.  This succession is also cal- 
led  Castilian.  Hence it follows, that the daughter of  the  son 
of  the last king is preferred  to  the son of  the daughter of the 
same prince, afid  the daughter of one of  his brothers to the son 
of  one of  his  sisters. 
XL.  The Agnatic lineal succession is that, in which only the 
male issue  of  males succeeds ;  so  that  women, and all those 
descending from  them,  are  perpetually  excluded.  It  is also 
called the French succession.  This exclusion  of women  and 
their descendants is principa!ly  established to hinder the crown 
from devolving to a foreign race, by  the marriage  of  princes- 
ses of  the blood royal. 
XLI.  These are the principal kinds of  succession in use, and 
mzy  be  tempered in  different manners by  the people ;  but 
prudence  directs  us  to prefer those,  which are subject to the 
least difficulty ;  and in this respect the lineal succession has the 
advantage over that,  which is  simply hereditary. 
XLII.  Several questions, equally curious and important,  may 
be started,  with regard to  the  succession of  kingdoms.  011 
this  subject the reader may consult Grotius."  We  shall only 
examine who has a right to decide  the disputes, that may arise 
hetween two or more  pretenders to a crown  ? 
I. If the kingdom be patrimonial,  and  disputes  arise after 
the death of the king, the best  method is to refer the cause to 
arbitrators  of  the royal family.  The welfare and peace of the 
kingdom recommended this conduct. 
2.  But if, in  kingdoms  established  by  the voluntary act of 
* The Right of war and peace, book ii. chap. rii, sect,  35, &c. 
the people,  the dispute arises wen in the king's  life time, he is 
not a competent judge  of  it ;  for then the people must have in- 
vested him with the power of regulating the succession accord- 
ing to his own pleasure, which is not to be supposed.  It there- 
fore belongs to the people to decide the dispute, either by them- 
selves or by their representatives. 
3.  The same holds true,  if the dispute does not arise till af- 
ter the death of the king.  In this  case it is  either necessary 
to determine which of  the pretenders is nearest to the deceased 
sovereign ;  and this is a matter of  fact,  which the people only 
ought to determine, because they are principally interested  in it. 
4.  Or the  point  is  to know what degree,  or line, ought to 
have the preference according to the erder of succession, estab- 
lish by the people ;  and then it is a matter of right.  Now who 
can determine better this point, than the people themselves, who 
have  established  the  order  of  succession ?  Otherwise  there 
would be no method  of  deciding  the  dispute but  by force of 
arms, which would  be entirely opposite to the good of  the so- 
ciety. 
XLIII.  But,  to avoid every perplexity of  this End, it would 
be proper  that  the  people  should, by a fundamental  law,  ex- 
pressly reserve to themselves the  right of judging  in the above 
cases.  What has been said is sufficient  on the different ways 
of acquiring sovereignty, 
CHAP.  IV. 
Of  tfie dferent  ways of losing  soveveigntp. 
I. L  ET us now inquire how sovereignty may be lost; and 
in this there  is no  great difficulty, after the principles  we have 
established on the ways of acquiring it. 
11.  Sovereignty may be lost by  abdication, that is,  when the 
reigning  prince renounces the sovereignty,  so far as it  regarch 
himself.  Of  this the history even of  latter ages  furnishes us 
with remarkable examples. 
111.  As  sovereignty derives its original from a covenant be- 
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king thinks proper  to renounce the supreme dignity, the people 
bve  not properly a right to constrain him to keep it. 
IV.  But such an abdication must not  be  made at an unsea- 
sonable juncture ;  as for instance when the ki~gdom  is likely to 
sink into a minority, especially if  it  be threatened with a war; 
or when the prince,  by his bad  conduct, has  thrown  the state 
into  a dangerous  convulsion,  in  which  he cannot  abandon  it 
without betraying his trust,  and ruining his country. 
V.  But  we  may safely  say,  that a prince very rarely  finds 
himself in such circumstances, as should engage him to renounce 
the crown.  However his affairs may be situated, he may ease 
himself  of  the drudgery of government, and still retain the su- 
perior  command.  A  king  ougLt to die upon the throne ;  and 
it is a weakness  unttrorthy of  him,  to divest himself of  his au- 
thority.  Besides, experience  has shown,  that abdication is too 
frequently attended with unhappy catastrophes. 
VI.  It is  therefore  certain, that a prince  may,  for himself* 
renounce the crown, or the right of  succession.  But there  is 
great doubt whether he can do it for 1;s  children. 
VII.  To  judge rightly of  this point, which has embarrassed 
30  many paliticians, we must  establish the following principles. 
I. Every acquisition of right or power over another, and con- 
sequently  of  sovereignty, supposes  the  coxent of  him,  over 
whom this right is to be acquired,  and  the  acceptance of  him, 
who is to acquire it.  Till this acceptance is settled, the inten- 
tion of  the former does not produce, in  favor of  the latter, an 
absolute and irrevocable right.  It is onlj a simple designation, 
which he is at liberty to accept or not. 
VIII.  2.  Let us apply these principles.  The princes of the 
blood royal, who have accepted the will of the pepple, by  which 
the crown has  been conferred  on them, have certainly thereby 
acquired an absolute  and irrevocable right, of  which they can- 
not be stripped without their consent. 
IX.  3.  W~th  regard to those,  who are not yet born, as they 
have not accepted the designation of  the people, they have not 
as yet acquired any right.  Hence it follows, that in relation to 
them,  this  designation  is  only an imperfect act, a kind of  ex- 
pectancy, the completion of which entirely depends on the will 
of the people. 
X.  4.  But it may be  said,  the  ancestors of  those, who are 
not yet born, have consented and stipulated for them, and conse. 
quently received the engagement of  the people  ifl their behalf. 
But this is ratheran argument infavor of renunciation,which  it ef- 
fectually establishes ;  for  as the right of those, who are not yet 
born, has no other foundation, than the concurrence of the will of 
the people and of  their ancestors, it is  evident that  this  right 
may be taken  from  them, without injustice, by thme very per- 
sons, from the single will of whom they hold it. 
XI.  5.  The single  will of a prince,  without  the consent of 
the  nation,  cannot  effectually exclude  his children  from  the 
crown,  to which the peopIe have called them.  In like manner 
the single will of  the people, without the consent of the prince, 
cannot deprive his children of  an expectancy,  which  their  fa- 
ther has stipulated  with the people for in their favor.  But,  if 
these two wills unite,  they may without doubt alter what they 
have established. 
XII.  6. It is true,  this renunciation  ought  not  to be made 
without a cause, and through inconstancy and levity.  Under 
these circumstances it cannot be  justifled,  and the good of the 
state  does  not  permit,  that,  without  necessity,  an  dteration 
should be made in the order of the succession. 
XIII.  7.  If, on the other hand, the nation be so situated, that: 
the renunciation of  a prince, or a princess,  is absolutely neces- 
sary to its tranquillity  and liappiness, then the supreme law of 
the public good, which has  established the ordzr of the succes- 
sion, requires it should be set aside. 
XIV.  8.  Let us add,  that it  is  for the general good of na- 
tions,  that such renunciations  be  valid,  the  parties  interested 
should not attempt to disannul them.  For there are times and 
conjunctures,  in  which  they  are  necessary for the welfare of 
the state ;  and  if  those,  with whom  we  are  treating, should 
come to think, that  the  renunciation  would  afterwards be set 
aside,  they certainly would have nothing to do with us.  Now 
this  must  be  productive  of  bloody  and  cruel  wars.  Gro- 
tius decides this question nearly in  the same manner.  The  re* 
der may  see what he says of  it." 
* Book ii, chap, vii,  26. apd beak ii. ohap. h, S re. 86  THE PRINCIPLES  OF 
XV.  9. Since  war  or  conquest is a  method  of  acquiring 
sovereignty, as we have seen in the preceding chapter,  it is evi- 
dently also a mean  of  losing it. 
XVI.  With regard  to  tyranny  and  the  deposing  of  sove- 
reigns, both  which are also ways of  losing the supreme power, 
as these two articles bear some relation to the duties of subjects 
towards  their sovereigns, we  shall  treat of  them in  the  next 
chapter more particularly, after we have considered those duties. 
CHAP. V, 
Of  the  dutiei  of rubjkti  in general. 
I.  ACCORDING to the plan  we have laid  down, we 
must  here  treat  of  the  duties  of  subjects.  Puffendorf has 
given us a clear and distinct idea of them, in the last chapter of 
his Dvtiei ofa Man  and a Cifizen.  pie  shall follow hina  step 
by  step. 
11.  The duties  of subjects are either  generai  or particular; 
and both flow from their state and condition. 
111.  All subjects have  this in common, that  they live under 
the same sovereign and the same government, and that they are 
members of the same  state.  From these relations the general 
duties arise. 
IV.  But as they have different employn~ents,  enjoy different 
nosts  in the state,  and  follow different professions ;  hence a17  X-- 
so arise their particular duties. 
V. It is also to be observed, that the duties of subjects sup- 
pose and include those of  man,  considered  simply as such, and 
as a member of  human society in general. 
VI.  The general  duties of  subjects  have,  for  their  object, 
either the governors of the state, or the whole body of the peo- 
ple, viz. their  country, or  the  individuals  among  their  fellow  - 
subjects. 
VII.  As to sovereigns and governors of the state, every sub- 
ject owes them that respect, fidelity, and obedience, which their 
character  demands.  Hence it  follows,  that  we  ought to be 
contented with the  pesent government, and to form no cabals 
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nor seditions, but to be attached to the interest of  the reigning 
prince more, than to that of  any other person ;  to pay him hon- 
or,  to think favorably of  him, and to speak with respect of  him 
and his actions.  We  ought even to have a veneration for the 
memory of good princes,  &c. 
VIII.  With respect to the whole body  of the state, a godd 
subject makes it  his rule  to prefer  the public welfare  to every 
thing else, bravely to sacrifice his fortune,  and his private inter- 
ests, and even his life,  for the preservation of the state ;  and to 
employ all  his abilities and his  industry to advance  the honor, 
and to procure the advantage of his native country. 
IX.  Lastly the duty  of  a subject to his fellow subjects con- 
sists in living  with them, as much as  he possibly can, in peace 
and  strict  unior?,  in  being  mild,  complaisant,  affable,  and 
obliging  to  each of  them, in creating no trouble by a rude or 
litigious behaviour, and bearing no envy or prejudice against the 
happiness of others,  &c. 
X.  As to the particular duties of subjects, they are connect- 
ed with the particular employments, which they follow in socie- 
ty.  We  shall here lay down  some general rules  in  regard  to 
this matter. 
I.  A subject ougllt  not  to  aspire  after  any public employ- 
ment, nor even to accept  of  it, when he is sensible,  that he is 
not duly qualified for it.  2.  He ought not to accept  of  more 
employments, than he can discharge.  3. He  should not use un- 
lawful means to obtain ~ublic  offices.  4.  It is even sometimes a 
kind of justice  not to seek after certain employments, which are 
not necessary to us,  and which may be as well filled by others, 
for whom they are perhaps more adapted.  5. He ought to dis- 
charge the several functions of  the employments he has obtain- 
ed,  with the utmost application, exactness, and fidelity. 
XI.  Nothing is more easy,  than to apply these general max- 
ims to the particular employments of society, and to draw infe- 
rences proper to each of  them ;  as for  instance, with  respect 
to ministers acd counsellors of  state, ministers of religion, pub- 
lic professors, magistrates and  judges,  officers in the army and 
soldiers, receivers of taxes, ambassadors, &c. 
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charges, whence they arise.  But as to the general duties, they 
mkist 60  long,  as  a person remains subject to the state.  Now 
a man ceases to be a subject principally three ways.  I. When 
he  goes to settle elsewhere.  2.  When he  is  banished  from a 
country for some crime and deprived of the rights of a subject. 
31  And lastly when he is reduced  to a necessity of s'ubmitting 
to the dominion of a conqueror. 
XIII.  It is  a right  inherent in  all  free  people,  that  every 
rna  should have the liberty of  removing out of  the common- 
wealth, if he thinks proper.  In a word, when a person becomes 
member  of  a  state,  he does not thereby  renounce the care of 
himself and his owl1 private affairs.  On the contrary, he seeks 
P powerful protection,  under the shelter of which he may pro- 
ewe to  himself  both the  necessaries and the conveniences  of 
life.  Thus the subjects of  a state cannot be denied the liberty 
of  settling  elsewhere,  in  order  to  procure  those  advantages, 
which they do not enjoy in their native country. 
XIV. On this occasion there are howzver certaid maxims of 
dtbty  and decency,  which cannot be dispensed with. 
I.  In general  a  man  ought not to quit  his  native country 
without the permission  of  his  sovereign.  But  his sovereign 
ought not to refuse it him,  without very important reasons. 
2.  It  would  be  contrary to the  duty of  a good subject to 
abandon  his  ~ative  country  at an unseasonable  juncture,  and 
when the state has a  particular  interest,  that he should stay at 
home.* 
3.  If the laws of  the  c0untl.y have determined any thing in 
&is  point, we must be determined by them ;  for we have con- 
sented to those laws in becoming members of the state. 
Xtr.  The Romans forced 20 person to continue under their 
government, and Cicerot highly commetlds this maxim,  calling 
it the surest foundation of  liberty,  which  consists  in being 
able to preserve or Fenounce our right,  as we think  proper." 
See  Orotiuo on  the  Righ:  of  War  and  Peace, book  ii.  chap. iv.  $  24. 
t 0 excellent  and  divine laws, enacted by our ancestors in  the beginning 6f 
rbe Romon empire-ht  no man change h~s  city against  his wiU,  nor  let him 
be compelled to stay in it.  These are the surest foundations of our liberty, that 
every one should have it in his power either te preserve  or  relinquish his right. 
W.  pro L.  Con  Balb.  cap.  ad&  Leg. XL  U& $ wen. dc cap. dirnin~f. 
et portlb. lib. 49. tit. IS. 
XVI. Some propose this question,  whether subjects can go 
out of the state in great companies ?  In this  point  Grotius and 
Puffendorf  are of opposite sentiments.*  As for  my own pzrt, 
I am of opinion, that it can hardly happen, that subjects should 
go out of  the state in large companies, except  in  one or other 
of these two cases ; either when the government is tyrannical, 
or when a multitude  of  people cannot subsist  in the country; 
as when manufacturers,  for example, or  other tradesmen,  can- 
not find the means of making or distributing their commodities. 
Under thes? circumstances,  the subjects may retire if they will, 
and they are authorized so to do by virtue of a tacit exception. 
If  the government be tyrannical, it is the duty of  the sovereign 
to change his conduct ;  for no  subject is obliged to live under 
tyranny.  If misery forces them to remove, this  is  also a rea- 
sonable exception against the most express engagements,  unless 
the sovereign  furnishes them  with  the  means  of  subsistence. 
But,  except in those cases, were the subjects to remove in great 
companies, without a cause,  and by  a kind of general desertipn, 
the sovereign may  certainly  oppose  their  removal,  if  he finds 
that the state suffers great prejudice by it. 
XVII.  A man ceases to  be a subject of the state,  when he 
is forever banished, in punishment for some crime.  For the mo- 
ment, that the state will not acknowledge a man to be one of its 
members, but drives hirr. from its territories, he is released from 
his engagements as a  subject.  The civilians call this ~unish- 
rnent a civil death.  But it is evident that the state, or sovereign, 
cannot  expel  a  subject  from  their  territories  whenever  they 
please,  unles  he has deserved  it  by  the  commission of  some 
mime. 
XVIII.  Lastly a man may cease to be a subject  by the su- 
perior force of an enemy, by which he is reduced to a necessity 
of submitting to his dominion ;  and this necessity is founded on 
the right, which every man has to take care of his own preserv- 
ation. 
* See Gtotiu~,  u6i rupr6and Puffendorf of the Law of Nature and Nations, book 
viii.  chap.  xi.  5  4. 
M THE PRINCIPLEI OF  POLITIC  LAW. 
CHAP.  VI. 
Of the inuiolalde rright~  of~ovet-eignty,  ofthe  depsing  af  sovereign$, 
of  the abrlse of the supreme power, and of tyranny. 
I. W  HAT we have said in the preceding chapter, con- 
cerning the duties of  subjects to their sovereigns, admits of  no 
difficulty.  We  are agreed in  general upon the rule,  that  the 
person of the  sovereign should be sacred and  inviolable.  But 
the question is whether this prerogative of the sovereign be such, 
that it is never lawful  for  the  people  to rise  against  him,  to 
cast him from the  throne,  or to change  the  form  of  govern- 
ment  ? 
11.  In answer to this  question,  I observe  in the first place, 
that the nature and end of  government lay an indispensable ob- 
ligation on all subjects not to  resist their sovereign, but to res- 
pect and obey  him, so long  as  he uses  his power with equity 
and moderation,  and does not exceed the limits of his authority. 
111.  It is tliis  obligation  to obedience in  the  subjects, that 
constitutes the whole force of civil society and government, and 
consequently the entire  felicity of  the state.  Whoever there- 
fore rises against the sovereign, or makes an attack upon his per- 
son or authority, renders himself manifestly guilty of the greatest 
crime, which a man can commit, since he endeavours to subvert 
the first foundations of the public felicity, in which that of  every 
individual is included. 
IV.  But if  this maxim  be  true with respect to  individuals, 
my we also apply it to the whole body of the nation, of  whom 
the sovereign originally hoids his authority ?  If the people think 
fit to resume,  or to change the form of government,why  should 
they not be at liberty to do it ?  Cannot they, who make a king, 
also depose him ? 
V.  Let us endeavour to solve this difficulty.  I therefore af- 
firm, that the people themselves, that is, the whole body of the 
nation,  have not a right  to depose  the sovereign, or to change 
the  form of  government,  without  any other reason than their 
own pleasure,  and purely from inconstancy or levity. 
YI.  In general the same reasons, which estabiish the necessi- 
ty of government and supreme authority in society, also prove, 
that  the government  ought  to be stable,  and that  the  peqle 
should not have the power of  deposing their sovereigns whenev- 
er,  through caprice  or levity,  they are  inclined so to  act,  and 
when they have no sound reason to change the form of  govern- 
ment. 
VII.  Indeed it would be subverriag all government, to make 
it depend on thk caprice or inconstancy of che people.  It  would 
be impossible for the state to be ever settled amidst those rev& 
lutions, which would erpose it so often to destruction ;  for we 
must either grant,  that the people cannot dispossess  heir sove- 
reign, and change the form  of  government ;  or we  must give 
them, in this respect,  a liberty without control. 
VIII.  An opinion, which saps the foundation of  all authori- 
ty, which destroys all power, and consequently all society, can- 
not be  admitted as a  principle of  reasoning, or  of  conduct in 
politics. 
IX.  The law of congruity or fitness is in this case of  the ut- 
most force.  What  should  we say  of  a minor, who,  without 
any other  reason, than  his caprice,  should  withdraw from his 
guardian, or change him at pleasure ?  The  present case is in point 
the  same.  It is with reason,  that politicians compare the peo- 
ple to minors ;  neither being capable of  governing themselves. 
They must be subject to tuition,  and this forbids them to with- 
draw from their authority, or to alter  the form of government, 
without very substantial reasons. 
X.  Not only the law of  congruity forbids the  people  wan- 
tonly to rise against their sovereign or the government;  but jus- 
tice also makes the same prohibition. 
XI.  Government and sovereignty are established by  mutual 
agreement betwixt the governor and the governed ;  and justice 
requires  that  people should  be  faithful  to their engagements. 
It is therefore the duty of the subjects to keep their word,  and 
religiously to observe their contract with their sovereign, so long 
as the latter performs his engagements. 
XII.  Otherwise the people would do a  manifest injustice to 
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ly acquired,  which  he has not used  to their prejudice,  and for 
the loss of  which they cannot indemnify him. 
=I.  But what must we think of  a sovereign, who,  instead 
of making a good use of  his authority, injures his subjects, neg- 
lects  the interest of  the state, subverts  the  fundamental  lawsa 
drains the people by excessive  taxes, which he squanders away 
in foolish and useless expenses, &c ?  Ought the person of  such 
a king to be sacred to the subjects ?  Ought they patiently to  sub- 
mit to all his extortions ?  Or can they withdraw  from  his 
thority  ? 
=V. To answer this question, which is one of the most del- 
icate in pplitics, 1  observe that  disaffected,  mutinous,  or sedi- 
tious subjects, often make things, highly innocent, pass for acts 
oi injustice in the sovereign.  The people are apt  to murmur 
at the most secessary taxes ;  others seek to destroy the govern- 
ment,  because they have not a share  in the administration.  In 
a word, the complaints of  subjects oftener denote the  bad hu- 
mour  and  seditious spirit of those, who make them, than  real 
disorder$ in the government, or injustice in  those, who govern. 
XV.  It were indeed to be wished, for the glory of sovereigns, 
that the complaints of  subjects  never had  juster  foundatiors. 
But history  and experience  teach  us,  that  they  are too often 
well founded.  Under  thew circumstances,  what is the duty 
of  subjects ?  Ought they patiently to suffer ?  Or may they re- 
sist their savereign ? 
XVI. We  must distinguish between  the extreme abuse  of 
sovereignty,  which degenerates  manifestly  into  tyranny, and 
tends to the intire ruin of  the subjects ;  and a moderate abuse 
cf it, which may be attributed to human weakness, rather than 
to an intention of  subverting the  liberty and  happiness of  the 
people. 
XVII.  In the former case, I think the  people have a right 
to resist their  sovereign, and even to  resume the  sovereignty, 
which they have given him, and which he has abused to excess. 
But, if  the  abuse he only  moderate, it is their  duty  to suffer 
something, rather than to rise in  arms against their sovereign. 
XVIII.  This  distinction  is founded on the nature of  man, 
and the nature and end of  governmeut,  The people must paw 
tiently beax tht: dght injustices of  their sovereign, or the mod- 
erate abuse of  his power,  because this is no more,  than a trib- 
ute due to humanity.  It is on this condition they haveinvest- 
ed him with the supreme  authority.  Kings  are men  as well 
as others,  that is to say, liable to be mistaken,  and, in some in- 
stances, to  fail in point  of  duty.  Of  this  the people  cannot 
be ignorant,  and on  this  footing they  have treated  with their 
sovereign. 
XIX. If,  for the smallest faults, the people had  a right  to 
resist or depose  their  sovereign,  no prince could maintain his 
authority,  and the community would be continually distracted ; 
such a situation would be directly contrary both to the end and 
institution of  government,  and of  sovereignty. 
XX.  It is therefore right to overlook the lesser faults of sov- 
ereigns, and to have a regard to the laborious and exalted ohe, 
with which they  are  invested for  our preservation.  Tacitus 
beautifully says ; "  We  must endure the luxury and avarice of 
"  sovereigns, as  we  endure  the barrenness  of  a soil, storms, 
"  and other  inconveniences of  nature.  There wilt be  vices as 
"  long as there are men ;  but these are not continual,  and are 
cc recompensed by the lntermlxrure of  better qualities."" 
XXI.  But if  the sovereign should push things to the last ex- 
tremity, so that his  tyranny becomes  insupportable,  and it  ap- 
pears evident, that he hab.formed  a design to destroy the liber- 
ty of  his subjects, then  they have  a  right ta  rise  against him, 
apd even to deprive him of the supreme power. 
XXII.  'rhis  I prove,  I.  by  tlle nature of  tyranny,  which of 
itself degrades the sovereign  of  his dignity.  Sovereignty al- 
ways supposes a beneficent power.  We  must indeed make some 
allowance  for  the  weakness  iaseparable  from humanity;  but 
beyond that,  and whe~  the people  are  reduced to the last ex- 
tremity,  there is no difference  between  tyranny  and  robbery. 
The one gives no  more right than the other, and we may law- 
fully oppose force to violence. 
XXIII.  2.  Men have  established  civil  society  and govern- 
ment, for their own  good ; to extricate themselves from trou- 
+  Quomodo sterihtatem, aut nimios imbres, et catera naturz mda, ita luxurn 
vel avarltlam domlnantium tolerate.  Vltla erunt donec homines :  sed neque hzt 
conunua, et melaorum zntervente pensantur,  Hl~t.  Lb. iv  cap. him. N. 6 POLITIC LAW.  94 
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bles, and to be rescued from the evils of a state of  nature.  But 
it is highly evident,  that,  if  the people were  obliged  to suffer 
every oppression from their sovereigns, and.never to resist their 
encroachments, they would be reduced to a far more deplorable 
state, than that, which they attempted to avoid, by  the institu- 
tion of  sovereignty.  It  can never surely be presumed, that this 
was the intention of mankind. 
XXIV.  3.  Even a  who have submitted  to an ab- 
solute government, have not  thereby  forfeited  the right of  as- 
serting their liberty, and taking care of  their preservation, when 
they find themselves reduced to the utmost  misery.  Absolute 
sovereignty in itself is no more, than the highest power of doing 
good ;  now the highest power of  procuring  the good of a per- 
son, and the absolute power of  destroying him at pleasure, have 
no connexion with each other.  Let us therefore conclude, that 
never any nation had an intention to submit their liberties to a 
sovereign in such a manner,  as never to have it in their power 
to resist him,  not even for their own preservation. 
XXV. "  Suppose,"  says Grotius,"  G one  had  asked those, 
who first formed the  civil laws, whether tbpy intended to im- 
'6  pose on all the subjects the fatal necessity of dying, rather than 
taking  up arms to  defend  th~mselves  against the unjust vio- 
cc  lence of  their  sovereign ?  I know  not  whether they would 
c'  have answered in the affirmative.  *It is rather reasonable to 
L'  believe they would have declared, that the people ought not to 
cc endure all manner of injuries, except perhaps when matters are 
c'  so situated, that resistance would infallibly produce very great 
troubles in the.state,  or  tend to  the ruin  of  many  innocent 
cc people." 
XXVI.  We have  already proved,+ that  no  person  can re- 
nounce his liberty to such a degree, as that here mentioned.  This 
would be selling his own life, that of  his children, his religion, 
in a word every  advantage he enjoys, which  it is not certainly 
in any man's  power to do.  This may be illustrated by the com- 
parison of  a patient and his physician. 
XXVII.  If therefore  the subjects  have a right to resist the 
* Book  i. chap, iv.  7.  N. Z. 
t $'art  i. chap.  vii.  N. 22.  &C. 
manifest tyranny even  of  an absolute prince,  they must,  for a 
stronger  reason,  have the same power with respect to a prince, 
~ho  has only a limited sovereignty, should he attempt to invade 
the rights and properties of his people." 
XXVIII.  We  must indeed patiently  suffer  the  caprice and 
austerity of our masters, as well as the bad  humor of  our fa- 
thers  and mothers ;  but,  as  Seneca says,  "  though  a  person 
ought to obey a father in all things,  yet  he is not obliged to 
"  obey him,  when his comnlands are of  such a nature,  that he 
ceases thereby to be  a father." 
XXIX. But it is here to be observed, that when we say the 
people  have a right  to resist a tyrant,  or  even to  depose him. 
we ought not, by the word people, to understand  the vile pop- 
ulace or dregs  of  a country,  nor the cabal of  a small number 
of  seditious persons,  but  the  greatest and most judicious  part 
of  the  subjects of  all orders  in the  kingdom.  The tyranny, 
as we have also observed, must be notorious, and  accompanied 
with the highest evidence. 
XXX.  We  may likewise  affirm, that,  strictly  speaking, the 
subjects are not obliged to  wait till the prince has entirely riv- 
etted their chains, and till he has put it out  of  their power  to 
resist hiill.  It  is high time to  think of  their  safety,  and to 
take proper  measures against their sovereign, when  they  find, 
that all his actions manifestly tend to oppress them, and that he 
is marching boldly on to the ruin of  the state. 
XXXI.  These are truths of  the last importance.  It is hi& 
ly proper they should be known, not only for the safety and hap- 
piness of  nations,  but also for the advantage of good and wise 
kings. 
XXXII.  l'hey, who are well  acquainted  with the frailty of 
human  nature,  are always diffident of  themselves ;  and, wish- 
ing only to discharge their duty, are contented  to have bounds 
set to  their authority, and by  such means to be  hindered  from 
doing what they ought to avoid.  Taught by reason and experi- 
ence, that the people love peace and good government, :hey  will 
never be afraid of  a general  insurrection, so long  as they take 
care to govern  with moderation, and hinder their officers from 
committing injustice. 
* Grotius on  the  Right  of Urx  and  Peace, book  i, chap, ir.  4  8. fl  THE PRINCIPLES OF  POLITIC LAW.  97 
mm.  Howeoer the abettors of  despatic pdv~er  m&  pas- 
sive obedience start several di&ulties  on this subject. 
First  Objeciim.  A revolt against  the  supreme power  in- 
cludes a contradiction ;  for if this power is  supreme,  there  is 
none superior to it.  By whom then shall it be judged  ?  If the 
sovefeigntjr still ifiheres in the people, they have not transferred 
their right ;  and if  they have  transferred it thq  are ao lofig~ 
masters  of  it. 
Anszver.  This  difficulty  supposes  the  point  in  question, 
namely, that the people have divested themselves SO far of their 
liberty,  that they  have given  full  power  to  the  sovereign to 
treat them as he pleases,  without having in any case resented to 
themselves the power of  resisting  him.  This is what IIO  peo- 
ple ever did, nor ever could do.  There is therefore  no  con- 
~idiction  in the present  case.  A power,  given  for a  certain 
end,  is  limitted  by that very end.  The  supreme  puwer  ac- 
knowledges none above itself,  so long as the sovereign has not 
forfeited his dignity.  But if  he has degenerated into a tyrant, 
he can  no bnger claim a  right,  which he has forfeited by his 
own miscondact. 
XXXfV.  Second  Objection,  But  who  shdl judge  whether 
&e  prince performs his duty, or  whether he go-rns  tyrannic- 
ady ?  Can the people be judges in their own cause  ? 
Atlswtr.  It certainiy belongs to those, who  have  given my 
person a power, which he had not of  himself, to judge wheth- 
er Ire uses it  agreeably to the end,  for which  it was conferred 
OR him. 
XmV. nird Objection.  We  cannot without imprudence 
grant this right of  judging  to the  people.  Political affairs arc 
ndt adapted to the capacity of  the vulgar, but are sometimes of 
sb delicate a nature,  that even persons of  the best sense cannot 
km  a right judgment of them. 
Anfwev.  In dubious cases, the presumption ought ever to  be 
in  fans of  the sovereign, and  obedience  is t5e  duq  of  sub- 
jects.  They ought ever to bear a moderate abuse of smereign- 
ty.  But in cases of  manifest tyranny,  eqery one is in a condi- 
tion to judge,  whether he is highly injured or not. 
XXXVI.  F~urth  objection.  But do we not  expm  the smte 
to perpetual revolutions, to anarchy, and to certain ruin, by mak- 
ing the  supreme authority  depend  on the opinion of the peoa 
ple,  and by  granting them liberty to rise on particular occasions 
against their sovereign ? 
An~weu,  This objection would be of  some force, if  we preb 
tended,  that the people had a right  to oppose  their  sovereign, 
or to change  the form  of  government, through  levity  or ca- 
price,  or even for  a  moderate  abuse of  the supreme  power. 
But no inconvenience will ensue, while  the  subjects  only  use 
this right with all the precautions, and in the circumstances  a- 
bove supposed.  Besides experience teaches us,  that  it is  very 
difficult to prevail on a nation to change a government, to which 
they have been accustomed.  We  are apt to overlook not only 
alight, but even very considerable mistakes in our governors. 
=VII.  Our hypothesis does not tend more than any oth- 
er, to excite disturbances in a state ;  for a people, oppressed by 
a tyrannical government, will rebel as frequently,  as those, who 
live  under  established  laws.  Let  the  abettors  of  despotic 
power cry up their prince as much, as they please, let them say 
the most magnificent things of hk sacred person, yet the people, 
reduced to the last misery,  will  trample  specious reasons 
under foot, as  soon  as  they can  do it  with an appearance  of 
success. 
XXXVIII. In fine, though the subjects might abuse the lib- 
erty, which we grant them,  yet less inconvenience would arise 
from this, than from allowing all to the sovereign, so as to let a 
whole nation perish,  rather than grant it the power of checking 
the iniquity of its gsvernors. 
CHAP. VIII, 
1.  1  HERE is a sort of  commerce, or reciprocal return of 
the duties of the subjects to the sovereign, and of his to them. 
Having treated of the former, it remains that we take a view of 
the latter. 
U.  From what has been  hitherto explained  concerning  the 
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nature of  sovereignty, its end, extent, and boundaries, tlie  duty 
of s6vereig~s  may easily be  gathered.  But since this is an af- 
fair of the last importance, it is necessary to say something more 
particular on it,  and to collect the principal heads of  it as it were 
into one vied. 
111.  The higher a sovereign is raised above the level of other 
men, the more ifiportant are his duties ;  if  he  can do a great 
deal of  good, he can also do a great deal of mischief.  It is on 
the good or evil conduct of  princes, that the happiness or mise- 
ry of  a  whole  nation  ot  people depends.  How hap~  is tile 
situation,  which,  on  all instances, furnishes occasions of  doing 
good to so many thousands ! but at the same time how dange- 
r-  is the post, which exposes every moment to the injuring of 
millions ;  besides the good,  which  pri~es  de,  svmetirhes ex- 
tends to the most remote  ages ; as the evib they commit are 
multip1ied  to latest po~erity.  This  sufficiently discovers the 
iirbportance of thcir d&ks. 
IV.  In order to have a proper knowledge af the duty of  sove- 
reigns, we need only attentively consider &B -  d  end of 
civil sacieties,  and the ebet~ise  of  the diffefent parts  of sove- 
reignty. 
V.  S.  The first general duty of  princes  is  carefully  to in- 
form tllemselves of  every  thing, that falls  under the  complete 
discharge of  their trust;  for a person  cannot  well acquit him- 
aeIf in thar, which he has not first rightly leanit. 
VI.  It is a great mistake to imagine, that the knowledge of 
gotrernment  is  an easy affair ;  on the contrary nothing is more 
difficult, if  princes would discharge their duty.  Whatever tal- 
ents or ger,ius they  may have  received from  nature, this is an 
employment, that requires the whole man.  The general rules 
of  governing well are few  in  number ;  but the difficulty is to 
make a just application of  them  to  times  and circumstances; 
2nd this demands the greatest efforts of  diligence  and  human 
prudence. 
VIT.  2.  When a pinoe is once convinced of  the obligation 
he is under to  inform himself  exactly  of all, that is  necessary 
for  the discharge  of  his trust,  and of  the difficulty of  getting 
this information, he will  begin with  removing every  obstacle, 
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which may oppose it.  At first it  is absolutely nece%ary,  that 
princes should retrench their pleasures apd useless diversions, so 
far as these may  be a hindrance to the knoyledge and practice 
of their duty.  Then  they ought  to  endeavour to  have wise, 
prudent, and experienced persons about them ;  and OPI  the Con- 
tqry to  remove flatterers,  buffoons,  ad  others, whose  whole 
merit consists in things,  that  are  frivolous and  unworthy the 
attention of  a sovereign.  Princes ought not to choose for fa- 
yarites those, who are most proper to  divert them, bpt such 
3re most  capable of  governing the state. 
VIZI.  Above all things, they cannot guard toomuch against 
flattery.  No  human condition has so great an occasioll for true 
and faithful advice, as that of kings.  And yet princes, corrupt- 
ed by flattery, take every thing,  that  is  free and ingenuous,  to 
be harsh and austere.  They are become so delicate, thqt eve- 
ry thing,  which is not an adulation, offends thenl.  But n~th- 
ing ought they to be  .W  gre'atly  ofrain of,  as  this  very  add* 
tion ;  since there are no  miseries,  into wllich they  not be 
hurried  by  its  poisonous  insinuation.  On the  contrary, the 
prince is happy, even if  he has ht  a single subject,  who is  so 
generous as to speak the truth to him ;  such a man is the tre;lst 
ure of the state.  Prudent sovereigns, who have  their true in? 
terests at heart,  ought  conti~ually  to  imagine, that court syc~- 
phants only regard themselves, and not their master ;  whereas p 
sincere counsellor, as  it were, forgets himself,  and  thinks only 
on the advantage of his master. 
IX.  3.  Princes ought  to use ali  possible  application to  un- 
derstand the constitution  of the state, and the natural temper of 
their subjects.  They ought not in this respect to be contented 
with a general and superficial knowledge.  They should -er 
into particulars, and  carefully  examine  into the constituti~  of 
the state,  into  its  establishment  and power, whether  ie be  dd 
or  of  late date, successive or elective, acquired by  legal metws 
or  by  arms 3  they  should  also  see how far  this jurisdiction 
reaches, what neighbours are about them, what allies, and what 
strength,  pnd  what  conve~iences  the  state  is  ptovided  with. 
Fer according to these considerations the scepter must be  sway- 
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X.  4. Sovereigns ought also to endeavour to excel in such vir- 
tues, as are  most necessary to support the weight of  so impor- 
tant a charge, and to regulate their outward behaviour in a man- 
ner worthy of their rank acd dignity. 
XI.  We  have already shown, that virtue in general consists in 
that strength of mind, which enables us not only to consult right 
reason on  all occasions,  but  also  to follow  her  counsels with 
case, and  effectually to resist  every thing  capable  of  giving us 
a contrary bias.  This single idea of  virtue is suflicient to show 
how necessary it is to all men.  But none have more duties to 
fulfil, none are more exposed to temptation, than sovereigns ;  and 
none of  course have a greater necessity for the assistance of vir- 
tue.  Besides, virtue in princes has this advantage, that it is the 
surest method of  inspiring their subjects with the like principles. 
For this purpose they need only show the way.  The example 
of the prince has a greater force than the law.  It is as it were 
a living law,  of  more efficacy than precept.  But to descend 
to particulars. 
XII.  The virtues most necessary to sovereigns are,  I. Piety, 
which is certainly the founddon of  all  other virtues ; but it 
must be a  solid and rational  piety,  free from  superstition  and 
bigotry.  In the high situation of  sovereigns,  the  only motive, 
which can most surely induce them  to the  discharge  of their 
duty, is the fear of  God.  Without that they will soon run in- 
to every vice,  which their passions dictate ;  and the people will 
becoxe the innocent victims of  their  pride,  ambition,  avarice, 
and cruelty.  On the contrary, we may expect every thing, that 
is good,  from a  prince,  who  fears and respects God,  as a su- 
preme Being, on whom he depends, and to whom he must one 
day give  an account of his administration.  Nothing can be so 
powerful a motive as this to engage princes to perform their du? 
ty,  nothing can so well  cure them of that  dangerous  mistake, 
that, being above other men, they may act as absolute lords, as 
if they were not to render an accouut of their conduct,  and be 
judged  in their turn,  after having passed sentence on others. 
XIII.  2.  The love of Equity  and Ju~tice.  The principal end 
3 prince was  made  for is to take  care,  that  every  one should 
have his right,  This  ought  to engage him to  study nat only 
the science of those great civilians, who ascend to the first prin- 
ciples of  law, which regulate human  society, and are the  basis 
as it were of government and politics ;  but also that part of the 
law,  which descends to the affairs of  particular persons.  This 
branch is generally left for the gentlemen of the long robe, and not 
admitted  into  the education  of  princes, though they are  evcry 
day to pass judgment  upon  the fortunes, liberties, lives, honor, 
and reputation of  their subjects.  Princes are continually talked 
to of  valour and liberality ;  but if  justice  do not regulate these 
two  qualities,  they  degenerate  into  the  most  odious  vices. 
Without justice  valour does nothing but destroy ;  and liberali- 
ty is only a foolish profuseness.  Justice keeps all in order, and 
contains within bounds him, who distributes it, as well as those, 
to whom  it is distributed. 
XIV.  3. Yclour.  But it must be  set in motion by  justice, and 
conducted by prudence.  A prince should expose his person to 
the greatest  perils,  as often as  it is necessary.  He dishonors 
himself more by being afraid of danger in time of war,  than by 
never taking the field.  'rh~  courage  nf  him, whn  commands 
others, ought not to be dubious ;  but neither ought  he  to run 
headlong into danger.  Valour can no longer be a virtue, than 
it is guided by prudence ;  without  this it  is a  stupid  contempt 
of life,  and a brutal ardor.  Inconsiderate valour  is always in- 
secure,  He, who is not master of  himself in dangers, is rath- 
er fierce than brave ;  if he does not fly,  lie is at least confound- 
ed  He loses that presence of mind, which would be necessa- 
ry for him  to give proper orders, to take advantage of opportu- 
nities, and to rout the enemy.  The true way of  finding glory 
is calmly to wait  for  the  favorable  occasion.  Virtue  is  the 
more revered, as she shows herself plain,  modest,  and averse to 
pride and ostentation.  In proportion as the necessity of expos- 
ing yourself to  danger augments,  your  foresight  and  courage 
ought also to increase. 
XV.  4.  Another  virtue,  very necessary in princes,  is to be 
extrcmely reserved in  discovering their  thoughts  and designs. 
This is evidently necessary to those, who are concerned in gov- 
ernment.  It includes a wise diffidence, and  an innocent  dis- 
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XVI.  5. A prince must,  above all things, accustom himself 
to moderate his desires.  For as he has the power of  gratifying 
than,  if  he once gives way to them, he will run to the  great- 
est excess, and, by destroying his subjects, will at last complete 
his own  ruin.  In order to  form  himself  to this moderation, 
nothing is more proper,  than to accustom himself  to patience. 
This is the most necessary of all ~irtucs  for those,  who  are 
to command.  A  nun must  be patient to become  master  of 
himself and others.  Impatience,  which seems to be  a  vigor- 
ous exertion of  tbe solll, is  only a.  weakness  and  inability  of 
suffering pain.  He, who cannot wait and suffer, is like a person, 
who cannot keep a  secret.  Both want resolution  to  contain 
themselves.  The more power an impatient man has, the more 
fatal his impatience will be to him.  He will not wait ;  he gives 
himself no time to judge ;  he forces every thing to please him- 
Sell: :  he  tears off the boughs, to gather  the fruit,  before  it is 
ripe ;  he breaks  down the gates, rather than stay till  they  are 
opened to him. 
XVII.  6.  Goodness and Clemenc~also  virtues very news- 
sary @ a prince.  His office is to  do good, and  it  is  for  this 
end the supreme power is lodged in his hands.  It is also prin- 
cipally by this,  that he ought to distinguish himself. 
XVIII.  7.  Liber-ality, well understood and well applied, is SO 
much the more  essential -to  a prince,  as avarice  is a  disgrace 
ta a person, whom it  costs  almost  nothing to be libelal.  TO 
take it exactly,  a king, as a king, has nothing properly his own ; 
for he owes his very self  to others.  But, on  the other  hand, 
no person ought  to be more careful in regulating the  exercise 
of this noble virtue.  It requires great circumspection, and sup- 
poses. in the prince, a just discer~lrnent  and a good taste to know 
how to bestow  and  dispense  favors  on proper  persons.  fie 
ought,  above all things, to use this virtue for  rewarding  merit 
and virtue. 
XIX.  But liberality has its bounds, eyen in the most opulent 
princes.  The state may be  compared to a family.  'The  want 
of  foresight,  profusion of  treasure,  and the  voluptuous  incli- 
nation of princes, who are masters of  it, do more mischief, than 
the most skilful ministers can repair. 
XX.  To reimburse his treasures, squadwed  away with0u.t 
necessity, and often in criminal excesses, he must have recour* 
to expedients,  which  are  fatal  to  the subjects and the  state. 
He  loses the  hearts  of  the people,  and  causes murmurs  and 
discontents, which are ever dangeroas, and of  which an enemy 
may  take  advantage.  These  are  incanveniences,  that  even 
common sense  might  point  out,  if  the  strong  propensity  to 
pleasure,  and the  intoxication of  power,  did  not often  extin- 
guish the light of  reason in princes.  To  what cruelty and in- 
justice  did not the extravagant  profusions uf  Ners carry him  ? 
A prudent  economy, on the comrary, supplies the deficiencies, 
of  the  revenue,  maintahs  families and states,  aad  preserves 
them in a flourishing condition.  By economy princes not on- 
ly have money in time of  need,  but also possess the heaits  of 
their subjects, who freely open their prses upon any unforeseen 
emergency, when they see that the  prince has been  sparing in 
his expenses ;  the  contrary  happens when he has  squandered 
away his treasures. 
XXI.  This is a general idea of the virtues most necessary to 
a sovereign, besides those, which are common to him with pri- 
vate people, and~f  which some are ihcluded  even in those, we 
have been mentioning.  Cicero follows almost the same  ideas 
in the enumeration he makes of the royal virtues.+ 
XXII. It is by the assistance of  these virtues, of  which we 
here  have  given an  idea, that sovereigns are enabled  to apply 
themselves with success to the functions of  government,  and to 
fulfil the different duties  of  it.  Let us say  something m 
particular on the actual exercise of  those duties. 
XXIII.  There is a general rule, which includes  all the  du- 
ties of  a sovereign, and by  which he Inay  easily  judge how to 
proceed under every circumstance.  Let  the ~afdy of the pq(e 
be  the suprt~e  law.  This  ought to be the chief end of  aH  his 
actions.  The supreme authority has been conferred  upon him 
with this view ;  and the fulfilling of it is the foundation  of his 
right and power.  The prince  is  properly  the  servatlt  of ale 
public.  He ought  as it were  to  forget himself,  in  order to 
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think only on the advantage  and good of  those,  whom he  govd 
erns.  He ought  not  to look upon  any  thig as  useful  to 
himself,  which  is  not  so to  the  state.  This  was the  idea 
of  the  heathen  philosophers.  They  defined  a  good prince 
one,  who endeavours to render  his subjects happy ;  and a tp- 
rant, on the  contrary, one,  who aims  only  at his own private 
advantage. 
XXIV.  The very interest of the sovereign demands, that he 
should  direct all his  actions to  the public  good.  By  such a 
conduct he wins the hearts of  his subjects,  and lays the foun- 
dation of solid happiness and true glory. 
XXV.  Where the government is  most despotic,  there sove- 
reigns are least powerful.  They ruin every thing,  and are the 
sole possessors of  the whole country ;  but then  the  state lan- 
guishes, because it  is exhausted of  men and money ;  and this 
first loss is the greatest  and  most  irreparable.  His  subjects 
seem to adore him,  and to tremble at his very looks.  But see 
what will be the consequence upon the least revolution ; then 
we find,  that this monstrous  power,  pushed to excess, cannot 
long endure,  because  it has  no  resource  in  the hearts of  the 
people.  On the  first blow,  the  idol  tumbles  down,  and  is 
trampled under foot.  The king, who,  in his prosperity, found 
not a man,  who durst tell him  the truth,  shall not find oce in 
his adversity, that  will  vouchsafe either  to excuse,  or  defend 
him against his enemies.  It is therefore equally essential to the 
happiness of  the people and of sovereigns, that the latter should 
follow no other rule in the manner  of  governing,  than that of 
the public welfare. 
XXVI.  It is not difficult,  from this  general  rule,  to de- 
duce those of  a more particular nature.  The functions of the 
government relate either to the domestic interests  of  the state, 
or to its foreign concerns. 
XXVII.  As for the domestic interests of  the state, the first 
care of the sovereign ought to be,  I. to form  his  subjects  to 
good manners.  For this  purpose  the  duty  of  supreme  rul- 
ers  is,  not only  to prescribe  good  laws,  by  which every one 
may know how he ought  to behave,  in order  to  promote the 
public good ;  hut especially to establish the most perfect man- 
uer of public instruction, and of the education of  youth.  This 
is the only method of making the subjects conform to the laws 
both by reason and custom, rather than  through fear of  punish- 
ment. 
XXVIII.  The first care of  a prince therefore ought to be to 
erect  public  schools  for the  education  of  children,  and  for 
training them betimes to urisdom and virtue.  Children are the 
hope and strength of a nation.  It is too late to  correct  them 
when they are spoiied.  It is  infinitely  better  to  urevent  the  - .- 
evil, than to be obliged  ,to punish  it.  The king,  who is the 
father of  all his people, is more particularly the father of  all the 
youth,  who  are  ds  it were  rhe  flowcr  of  tIie  whole  nation. 
And as it is in the flower, that fruits are prepared,  so  it  is one 
of the principal duties of the sovereign to take care of the edu- 
cation of youth,  and the instruction of  his subjects, to plant the 
principles of virtue early in their  minds,  and to  maintain  and  .  ~ 
confirm them in that happy disposition.  It is not laws and or- 
diaances,  but  .~  good  ~  morals,  that properly regulate the state, 
Hov. lib.  iii.  od. 24. v.  35, 36. 
And what are laws unless obev'd 
By  the same moral virtues they were made ?  F~ancis. 
Those,  who have hdd a bad education,  make  no  scruple to 
violate the best political  institutions ;  whereas they, who have 
been properly trained up, cheerfully conform to all good  in'stitu- 
tions.  In fine,  ilotliing is more conducive  to so good an  end 
in states,  than  to inspire  the people in the  earlier part  of life 
with the principles  of  the Christian  religion,  purged  from ail 
human invention.  For this religion  includes the  most perfect 
scheme of morality, the maxims  of  which  are  extremely well 
atldpted for promoting  the happiness of  societv. 
XXIX.  2. The sovrreign eight to establishgood  laws for the 
settling of  such affairs, as the subjects have most fiequellt occa- 
sion to transact with each other.  These laws ougiit to be just, 
equitable, clear, witi~out  ambiguity and contr'tdiction,  useful, ac- 
commodated to the condition and  the genius of  the people,  at 
lerst so f~r,  as the good  of  th2 state will permit,  that,  by their 
Q r 06  'SHE  PRINCIPLES OF  POLITIC  LAW.  *Q7 
means,  differences may be easily determined.  But they are not 
to be multiplied without necessity. 
XXX.  I said, that laws ought to  be accommodated to thecon- 
dition and genius of the people ;  and for this reason I have before 
dructed  observed,  that  the sovereign ought to be  thoroughly in- 
in this article ;  otherwise one of  these two inconveniences must 
happen,  either that the laws are not observed,  and then  it  be- 
comes necessary  to punish an infinite number of people,  whilz 
the state reaps no advantage from it ;  or that the authority  of 
the laws is despised,  and then the state is on the brink of  des- 
truction. 
XXXI.  I mentioned also,  that laws ou,nht not  toGe multiplied 
without nerusitj ;  for this would only tend to lay snares for the 
subject, and expose him to  inevitable punishments,  without any 
advantage to the society.  In fine it is of  great importance to 
regulate what relates  to the administration and ordinary forms 
of  justice,  so that every subject may have it in his power to re- 
cover his right,  without losing much  time, or be~ng  at  a great 
expense. 
XXXII.  3-  It would  be of  no use  to  make good  laws,  if 
people were suffered to violate them with impunity.  Sovereigns 
ought therefore to see them  properly  executed, and to  punish 
the delinquents without exception  of  persons,  according to the 
quality and degree of  the offence.  It is even son~etimes  proper 
to punish severely at first.  There are circumstances,  in which 
it is  clemency to  make such early  examples, as  shall stop the 
cGurse of  iniquity.  But what is chiefly  necessary,  and  what 
justice and the public good  absolutely require,  is,  that the  se- 
verity of  the  laws be exercised not only upon the  subjects  of 
moderate fortune and condition, but also upon the wealthy and 
powerful.  It would  be  unjust,  that  reputation, nobility,  and 
riches, should authorise any one to insult those, who are desti- 
tute of  these advantages.  The  populace  are  often  reduced 
by oppression to despair,  and their fury at last throws the state 
into copvulsions. 
XXXIII.  4.  Since  men  first  joined  in  civil  societies  to 
screen themselves from  the injuries and m~lice  of  others,  and 
to procure  a11  the sweets and pleasures,  which can  render life 
commodious and happy ; the sovereign is obliged  to hinder the 
subjects from wronging each other, to maintain order and peace 
jn  the community by a  strict execution of the laws, to the end, 
that  his subjects may obtain  the  advantages,  which  mankind 
can  reasonably  propose  to themselves by  joining  in  society. 
When the subjects are not kept within rule, their perpetual in- 
tercourse easily furnishes them  with opportunities  of  injuring 
one another.  But nothing is more contrary to  the nature and 
end  of  civil  government, than to permit subjects to do them- 
selves justice,  and, by their own private force, to  revenge  the 
injuries they think they have  suffered.  We shall here add  a 
beautiful pzssage  from Mr, de la  Bruiere  upon this  subject." 
"  What would it avail  me,  or any  of  my fellow subjects, that 
"  my sovereign  was successful  and  crowned  with  glory, that 
"  my country was powerful  and  the  terror  of  neighbouring 
"  nations,  if  I were forced to lead a melancholy and miserable 
"  life  under  the  burthen  of  oppression  and  indigence  ?  If, 
'' while I was secured from the incursions of  a foreign enemy, 
"  I found myself  exposed at home to the sword of  an assassin, 
"  and was less in danger of being robbed or massacred  in  the 
'6 darkest nights, and in a thick forest, than in the public streets ? 
'' If  safcty, cleanliness,  and good order, had not rendered  liv- 
ing in towns so  pleasant,  and had not  only furnished them 
with  the neccssaries,  but moreover with all  the sweets and 
conveniences of  life  ?  If being weak  and defenceless,  I were 
"  encroached upon in the country, by  every neighbouring great 
"  man  ?  If  so good  a provision  had not been made to protect 
"  me against his injustice ?  If  I had not at hand so many, and 
such excellent mastels, to educate my clliidren in  those ar:j 
'' and sciences, which will one day make their fortune ?  If the 
"  conveniency of commerce had not made good,substantial  stuffs 
for  my  cloathing,  and wholesome food for my nsurishment, 
a  bcth plentiful and cheap  ?  If, to conlude,  the care of my sov- 
cc  ereign had not given me reason to be  as well contented wit!: 
my fortune,  as  his princely  virtues must needs  make  hinl 
"  with his ? 
XXXIV.  5. Since  a prince  can  neither  see  nor do every 
thing himself, he must have the assistance  of  ministers.  But, 
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as these derive their yhole  authority  from their ma*er,  all the 
good or evil they do is rillally imputed to him.  It is therefore 
the duty of sovereigns to choose per3ons of  integrity and ability 
for the  employments,  with which they entrust  them.  They 
ought often to examine their conduct, and to punish  OT  recom- 
pense them, according to  their  merits.  111  fine,  they  ought 
never to refuse to lend a patient ear to the humble remonstranc- 
es and complaints of  their subjects, when  they  are  oppressed 
and trampled  on by ministers and subordinate magistrate*. 
XXXV.  6.  With regard  to  subsidies and  taxes, since the 
subjects arc not obliged to pay  them, but as they are necessary 
to defray the expenses of  the state, in war or peace ;  the  sove- 
reign  ought  to  exact  no more,  than  the  public  necessities, 
or the  signal advantage of the state, shall  require.  He ought 
also to see, that the  subjects be incommoded as little  as possi- 
ble by the  taxes laid  upon  them.  There  should be a  just 
proportion in the tax of  every individual, and there must be no 
exception or immunity,  which may turn to  the disadvantage of 
others.  The money  collected ought to be lald  out in  the ne- 
cessities of  the state,  and  not wasted  in luxury,  debauchery, 
foolish largesses, or vain magnificence.  Lastly  the  expenses 
ought to be proportioned  to the revenue. 
XXXVI.  7.  It is the duty of  a sovereign to draw no Curther 
supplies from  his subjects, than  he really  stands  in need  of. 
The wealth of  the subjects forms the strength of the state, and 
the advantage of  families and individuals.  A prince  therefore 
ought to neglect nothing, that can contribute to the preservation 
and increase of the riches of his people. Forthis  purpose he should 
see, that they draw all the profit they can  from their lands and 
waters,  and keep themselves always employed in some industri- 
ous exercise or  other.  He ought to further and promote the 
mechanic arts, and give all possible encouragement to commerce. 
It is likewise  his duty to bring his subjects  to a frugal method 
of living by  good  sumptuary laws, which may forbid superflu- 
ous expenses, and  especially those, by which the wealth of  the 
natives is translated to foreigners. 
XXXVB.  8.  Lastly,  it is equally the interest and duty of a 
supreme governor to guard against factions and eabals, whence 
seditions and civil wars easily arise.  But above all he ought to 
take care, that none of his subjects place a greater dependance, 
even under the pretext of  religion, or any  other  power,  either 
within or without the realm, than on his lawful sovereign.  This 
in general is the law of  the public good in regard to the domes- 
tic interests, or internal tranquillity of the 6we. 
XXXVIII. As to foreign  cqncerns, the  principal duties  of 
the king are, 
q. To  live in peace with hia neighbours, a8 much as he pos- 
oibly can. 
2.  To  conduct  himself  with  prudence in regard to the alli- 
ances and treaties, he makes with other powers. 
3.  To  adhere faithfully to the treaties he has made. 
4.  Not to suffer the courage of his subjects to be enervated, 
but,  on the contrary, to maintain and augment it by  good discb 
pline. 
5. In due and seasonable time to make the preparations ne- 
cessary to put himself in a posture of defence. 
6.  Not to undertake any unjust or rash war. 
7- Lastly, even in times of  peace to be very attentive to the 
designs and n~otiono  of his neighbours. 
XXXIX,  We shall say no more of the duties of  sovereigns. 
It is sufficient  at present to have pointcd out the general princi- 
ples,  and collected the chief heads.  What we have to say here- 
after, concerning the different parts of  sovereignty, will give the 
reader a more distinct idea of  the particular  dutics attel~ding  it. 





A more gorticirlar exantinotion uf the  e.rsential tarts of ravereignty. 
or of the dfe~ent rights of the sovereign, with respect to  the inter- 
MI ad~ninistratiori  of the  state, such  as tht legislative power,  the 
supreme power in matters of religion,  the right of injicting PUN- 
ishmenk, nnd that, which the sovereign has over the ~una  Rcipub- 
licaz,  or t6r g~~;(J  ~onsazned  in  t6. .~tmr'o?zwenl.. 
CHAP.  I. 
Of  the legisIative power,  and the civil  Lws,  which  arire fm  it. 
I. W  E have hitherto  explained what relates  to the na- 
ture of civil society in general, of government, and of  sovereign- 
ty,  which is the soul of  it.  Nothing  remains  to compleat the 
plan we laid down, but more particularly to examine the differ- 
ent parts of  sovereignty, as well those, which directly regard the 
internal administration of  the state, as those,  which relate to its 
interests abroad, or to its concerns  with foreign powers, which 
will afford us an opportunity of  explaining the  principal  ques- 
tions relating to those subjects;  and to this purpose we cie$gn 
this and the subsequent part. 
11.  Among the essential parts of  sovereignty, we have given 
the first rank to the  legidative power,  that is to  say, the right, 
which the sovereign  has of  giving laws to his subjects, and of 
directing  their  actions,  or of  prescribing the manner, in which 
they ought  to  regulate  thew conduct ;  and it is from this the 
civil  laws are derived.  As this  right of  the sovereign  is as it 
were the  essence of  sovereignty, order requires that we should 
begin  with thc explication of  whatever relates to it. 
111.  We  shall not here repeat  what  we have elsewhere said 
of the nature of  laws in general ;  but supposing  the principles 
we have established on that head, we shall only examine the na- 
ture and extent  of  the legislative power in society, and that of 
the civil laws and decrees of the  sovereign thence derived. 
iV.  Civil  laws then are  all those ordinances, by which the 
sovereign binds his subjects.  The assemblage or body of those 
ordinances  is what we call the Civil Law.  In fine civil juris- 
prudence is that science or art, by  which the  civil laws are not 
only established, but explained  in  case  of  obscurity,  and  are 
properly applied to human  actiom. 
V.  'l'he establishment of  civil society ought to be  fixed so, as 
to make a sure and undoubted provision for  the happiness  and 
tranquillity of  man.  For this purpose it was  necessary to  es- 
tablish ;l  constant  order, and this could only be done  by  fixed 
and determinate laws. 
VI.  We have already observed,  that it was necessary to take 
proper measures to render the  laws  of  nature  as  effectual,  as 
they ought to be,  in  order  to promote  the happiness of  socie- 
ty ;  and this is effected by  means of  the civil laws. 
For, I. They serve to make the laws of nature better known. 
2.  They give tliem a  new degree of  force,  and render the 
observance of them more secure, by means of their sanction, and 
of  the punishments, which the sovereign  inflicts on those,  who 
despise and violate them. 
3.  There are several tgings,  which  the  law  of  nature  pre- 
scribes only in a general and indeterminate manner;  so that the 
time, the manner, and  the application to pcrsons, are left to the 
prudence  and discretion  of  every individuzl.  It was however 
necessary, for  the  order  and  tranquillity  of  the  state, that all 
this matter shou!d  be  regulated;  which  is  done  by  the  civil 
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4.  They also serve to  explain any  obscurity, that m&),  arise 
ia the maxims of the law of  nature. 
5.  They qualify or restrain, in vadous ways,  the use of tl~osc 
tights, which every man naturally possesses. 
6.  Lastly they determine the forms, that are to be observed, 
and the precautions, which ought to be taken, to retltler the dif- 
ferent engagements,  that people enter into with each other,  ef- 
fectual and inviolable ;  and they ascertain the manner, in which 
a man is to prosecute his rights in the civil court. 
VIE.  In order therefore to form a just idea of the civil laws, 
we must say, that, as civil society is no  other, than natural  so- 
ciety itself, qualified or restrained by the establishment of a sove- 
reign, whose business it is to maintain peace and order ;  in like 
manner the civil  laws are  those of nature,  perfected in a man- 
am &table  to the state and advantages of society. 
VIII.  As this is the case,  we may  very properly  distinguish 
two sorts of  civil  laws.  Some are such with  respect  to their 
a~th~ritp  only, and others with regard to their original.  To  the 
former class we refet  all the natural laws, which serve as  rules 
in civil courts, and which  are also confirmed by a new sanction 
of the sovereign.  Such are all laws, which determhe the crimes, 
that are to be punished by the civil justice ;  and the obligations, 
spon which an action may commence in the civil court,  &c. 
As to the civil laws, so called because of their  original, these 
are arbitrary decrees, which, for their foundation, have only the 
will of the sovereign, 2nd suppose certain human establishments ; 
or which regulate things relating to the particular advantage of 
the state, though indifferent in themselves and undetermined by 
the law of nature.  Such are the laws, which prescribe  &c  ne- 
cessary forms in contracts and testaments, the manner of proceeda 
ing in courts ofjusticc, &c. But it must be observed, that all thosc 
regulations should  tend  to the good of  the state, as  well as of 
individuals ;  so that they are properly appendages to the law of 
nature. 
IX.  It is of  great  importance carefully to distinguish, in the 
civil laws, what  is natural and  essential  in them, from what  iu 
~lp  adve~~titious. Those laws  of  nature,  the  observnncc  of 
which  is  esset;tially  conducive to the peace  ancl  tranqni;lity of 
mankind, ought certainly tc, have the force of  law in a11  states ; 
neither is it in the power  of  the prince to abrogate them.  As 
to the others, which do not so ~sserltidlly  interest the happiness of 
society, it is not always expedient to give them the farce of  lxw, 
Secause the controversies about the violation of them would of- 
ten be very perplexed and intricate, and likewise lay  a  founda- 
tion for an infinire number of  iitigious suits.  Besides, it wa5 
proper to give the gooJ 2nd  virtuous an opporcu:lity of  distin- 
guishing themselves by  the practice of  those duties, ;he  violation 
of which incurs &IO human  penalties. 
X.  What we 5ave said oi  the naturc of civil laws suficient- 
ly shows, that tliougil the  legislative be  a  Jupfveme, yet it is not 
an ar6itrary power;  but on the contrriry, it is limited in  seve- 
ral respects. 
I.  And as the sovereign holds the legislative power uriginal- 
1y  of  the will of each rn:mb-r  of tE,= socizty, ir is evident,  that 
no man can confer 011  aricther a right, which he has not himself ; 
and conseq~eritly  the li'gislative  power  cannot be  extended be- 
yond this limit.  The sovereign therefore can neither command 
nor forbid ony other actions, dian such as  are  &er  voluntary 
or possible. 
2. Besides, the natural laws clispose of hunian actions anteced- 
ently to the civil laws, and men cannot recede from the author- 
ity of the former.  Therefore as those primitive laws limit the 
power of the sovereign, he can determine nothing so as to bind 
the subject,  contrary to  what they either expressly comm:lnd or 
forbid. 
XI.  But we must be careful not to confound two things en- 
tirely distinct, I mean the State of Nature  and the Laws ofNa- 
ttrre.  The primitive and  natural  state  of  man may admit of 
different chdnges and  modifications,  which are left to the dis- 
posal of  man, and have nothing contrary to  his obligation and 
duties.  In this respect, the  civil  laws  may  produce  a  few 
changes in the natural state, and consequently make some reg- 
ulations, unknown to the law of  nature, without containing any 
thing contrary to that law, which  supposes the state of  liberty 
in its full extent, but nevertheless permits mankind to limit and 
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restrain  that  state, in tbe manner,  which appears most to  their 
advantage. 
XII.  We  are however far from being of the opinion of those 
writers,"  who pretend that it is impossible the civil laws should 
be repugnant to that of  nature, because,  say they, there is  tlothing 
either  just or  unju~t  antecedently to the establishment of  those laws. 
What we have  above advanced,  and the principles we have es- 
tablished in the whole course of  this work,  sufficiently  evince 
the absurdity of  this opinion. 
XIII.  It is as ridiculous to assert,  that  before the establish- 
ment of  civil laws and society,  there was no rule of  justice,  to 
which mankind were subject,  as to pretend that truth and rec- 
titude depend on the  will of  man, and  not  on the  nature  of 
things.  It would have even been impossible for mankind to found 
societies of  any  durability,  if,  antecedently  to those  societies, 
there had  been neither justice  nor injustice,  and  if  they  had 
not, on the contraiy,  been persuaded,  that it was just  to  keep 
their word, and unjust to break it. 
XIV.  Such in gencral is the extent of the legislative power, 
and the nature of  the civil  IIWS,  by whicll that power exerts it- 
self.  Hence it follows, that the whole force of  civil laws con- 
sists in two things, namely in their Justice  and in their Author- 
;iy. 
XV.  The authority of the laws consists in the  force,  given 
them by the person,  who, being invested  with  the  legislative 
power,  has a right to enact those laws ;  and in the Divirle Will, 
which commands us to obey him.  With regard to the justice 
of  civil laws, it depends on their relation  to the good order of 
society, of which they are the rule, and on the particular advan- 
tage of establishing them according as different conjunctures may 
require. 
XVI.  And since the sovereignty,  or right  of  commanding, 
is naturally  founded on a ben6cient Power, it necessarily follows 
that the Authority and Justice of laws are two characteristics es- 
sential to their nature,  in default of which they can produce no 
real obligation.  The power of  the  sovereign  constitutes  the 
Hobbes. 
authority of  his laws, and his beneficience permits him~to  make 
none,  but such as are conformable to equity. 
XVII. However certain and incontestable these general prin- 
ciples may be, yet we ought to take  care not to abuse them in 
the application.  It is certainly essential  to every law, that,  it 
be equitable and just;  but we must not  thence conclude,  that 
private  subjects have a  right  to refuse  obedience  to the com- 
mands of  the sovereign, under  a pretence,  that  they  do  not 
think them altogether just.  For,  besides that some  allowance 
is to be made for human infirmity, the opposing the  legislative 
power,  which constitutes  the whole safety of  the  public,  must 
evidently tend to  the  subversion of  society ;  and subjects are 
obliged to suffer the inconveniences, which may arise from some 
unjust laws, rather than expose the  state to ruin by their diso- 
bedience. 
XVIII.  But if the abuse of the ligislative power proceeds to 
excess, and to the subversion  of  the fundamental principles of 
the laws of nature, and of  the duties,  which it enjoins, it is cer- 
tain that,  under such  circumstances,  the  subjects  are,  by the 
laws of  God,  not  only authorized, but  even obliged  to refuse 
obedience to all laws of this kind. 
XIX.  But this is not suflicient.  That the laws may be able 
to impose a real obligztion, and reckoned just  and  equitable, it 
is  necessary  the  subjects should have a perfect  knowledge  of 
them ;  now they cannot of  themselves  know  the civil laws, at 
least those of  an  arbitrary nature ;  these are in some  measure 
facts  of  which the people may  be ignorant.  The  sovereign 
ought therefore  to declare his will,  and to adinirlister  laws and 
justice,  not by arbitrary and hasty decrees, but by mnture rcgu- 
lations,  duly promulgated. 
XX.  These principles  furnish us  with a reflection of  great 
importance  to sovereigns.  Since the  first  quality of  laws is, 
that  they be known,  sovereigns ought  to publish them in  the 
clearest manner.  In particular it is absolutely necessary,  that 
the laws be written in the language of  the country ;  nay,  it is 
proper that public professors should no:  use a foreign language 
in their lectures on jurisprudence.  For what can be more re- 
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perfectly known,  than  to make  use of  ldws,  written in a dead 
language,  which the generality of  the people do not understand, 
and to render tlie knowledge of  those ldwv attainable only in that 
language 7  I cannot help saying, that this is an absurd practicec 
equally  contrary to the glory  of sovereigns, and to the  advan* 
tage of subjects. 
XXI. If we therefore suppose the civil laws to be accompaal 
nied with conditions  abovcmentioned,  they  have  certainly the 
force of obliging the subjccts to obberve them.  Every individ- 
ual is bound to submit  to their regulations so long, as they in- 
clude nothing contrary  to  the divine  law, whether  natural  on 
revealed ;  and this not  only from a dread  of  th.e  punislunents, 
annexed to the violation of  them,  but also  from a  principle of 
conscience, and in  consequence  of  a  maxim  of  natural  law, 
which commands us to obey our lawful sovereign. 
XXII  In order rightly to comprehend this effect of the civil 
laws, it isto be observed, that the obligation, which they impose, 
extends not only to external actions, but also to the inward sen- 
(iments.  The sovereign, by prescribing  laws to  his sqbjects, 
proposes to render them wise and virtuous.  If  he commands a 
good action, he is willing it should be done from principle ;  and 
when he forbids a crime, he not only prohibits the external ac- 
tion, but also the design or intention. 
XXIII.  In fact man,  being a free  agent,  is  induced to act 
only in consequence of  his judgment,  by  a determination  of hie 
will.  As this is the case,  the most  effectual mean,  which  the 
sovereign can employ to procure the public liappiness and tran- 
quillity, is to work  upon the mind,  by  disposing the hearts of 
his subjects to wisdom and virtue. 
XXIV.  Hence it is, that public establishments are formed for 
the education of youth.  Academies and professors are appoint- 
ed for this purpose.  The end of  these institutions is to inform 
and instruct mankind,  and to make them early acquainted with 
the rules of a liappy and virtuous life.  Thus the sovereign, by 
means of  instruction,  has an effectual method of  instilling just 
ideas and notions into the minds of  his subjects ;  and by these 
means  his  authority  has  a  very  great  influence upon  the 
internal  actions,  the  thoughts,  and  inclinations  of  those, 
who are sub$cted  to the direction of hi LW,  so far at least, ac 
ths nature of  the thing will permit. 
XXV.  We  shall close  this chapter with the  discussion of a 
question,  which naturally presents itself in this place, 
Some ask whdxr  a subject cm  innocently execute the unjuet 
comrnands of  a wereign, or ii  he ought not rather to rduee 
absoluteIy to obey him, even at the bard  of  his life I Puh 
dorf seems to answtr this  question  with o kind  of  hesitation, 
but at length he declares for the opinion of Hobbee in the fob 
louring  manner.  We must  distinguish, says h,  whether the 
sovereign comm~nds  us in our own nome to do an unjust action, 
which may be accounted our own ;  or whether he ordere us to 
perform it in his name, as instruments in the execntion of  it,and 
as an action which he accounts his own.  In the latter case, he 
pretends, that we may without scruple execute theaction,ordercd 
by the sovereign, who is  then to be considered  as the only au- 
thor of it.  Thus, for example, soldiers ought  tct  execute  the 
orders of  their princq because they; do not  act  in  their  own 
name, but as instruments and in the name of their master.  But, 
on the contrary, it is never lawful to do in our name an action, 
that our conscience tells us is unjust or criminal.  Thus for in- 
stance a judge,  whatever orders he  may have from the  prince, 
ought never to condemn an innocent person, nor a witnees  de- 
pose agzinst the truth. 
XXVI.  But, in my opinion, this distinction does not remove 
the difficulty ;  far in whatever  manner we pretend that a sub- 
ject  acts in those cases,  whether in his own name,  or in that of 
his prince, his will concurs in some manner or other to the un- 
just and criminal action,  which he executes by order of the sove- 
reign.  We  must therefore impute either both aetiano partly to 
him, or else neither in  any degree. 
XXVII. The surest way then  is  to distinguish  between  a 
case, where the prince commands a thing evidently unjust,  and 
where the matter is doubtful.  As to the farmer, we must gen- 
erally,  and without  any restriction, maintain,  that the greatest 
menaces  ought never  to induce  us,  even by  the  order  and 
in the name of the sovereign, to do a thing, which  appears ta 
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excusable in  the sight  of  man for  having  been  overcome by 
such a severe trial,  yet  we shall not  be  so before  the Divine 
tribunal. 
XXVIII. Th  us a parliament, for iaqtance, commanded by the 
prince to register an edict manifestly unjust, ought certainly to 
refuse it.  'I'he  same I say of  a minister of  state, whom a prince 
would oblige to execute a tyrannical or iniquitious order ;  of an 
ambassador,  whose master  gives  him  instructions contrary to 
honor and justice ;  or of  an officer,  whom the sovereign should 
command to kill a person, whose innocence is as clear as noon- 
day.  In those cases  we should  nobly exert our  courage, and 
with all our might resist  injustice, even at the peril of  our lives. 
It  is Getter to obey  God  than man.  For in  promising  obedience 
to the sovereign,  we could never do it but on condition, that he 
should not order any  thing  manifestly  contrary to the laws of 
God,  whether natural or revealed.  To  this purpose tliere is a 
beautiful passage in a tragedy  written by  Sophocles.  " I did 
'c  not believe,"  says A~~rigor~e  ro  Creon knlg of 'l'hebes,  cc  that 
the edicts of  a mortal man, as you are, could be of such force, 
as to  supersede the laws of  the gods themselves, laws not writ- 
'<  ten indeed, but certain and immutable ;  for they are not of yes- 
"  tkrday or today,  but established  perpetually and forever, and 
"  no one knows when they began.  I ought not therefore, for 
"  fear of any man,  to expose myself, by violating them,  to the 
punishment  of  the gods."" 
XXIX.  But,  in cases where the matter is doubtful, the best 
resolution is certainly to obey.  The  duty of obedience, being a 
clear obligation, ought to supersede all  doubt.  Otherwise, if 
the obligation of the subjects to comply with the commands of 
their sovereign permitted  them  to suspend their obedience,  till 
they  were convinced  of  the  justice  of  his  commands;  this 
would manifestly  annihilate the authority of  the prince,  and sub- 
vert all order and government.  It would  be  necessary,  that 
soldiers, executioners, ond other inferior officers of  court, should 
understand politics  and the civil law,  otherwise they might es- 
cuse themselves from their  duty of  obedience,  under  the pre- 
tence, that they are not sulliciently  convinced of  the justice of 
* SophocL A~tigon,  ver.  473,  &c. 
the orders given them ;  and this would  render the prince inca- 
pable of exercising the functions of government.  It  is therefore 
the duty of the subject to obey in those  circumstances ;  and if 
the action be unjust in itself,  it cannot be imputed to him,  but 
the whole Slame falls on the sovereign. 
XXX.  Let us here  collect  the  principal  views,  which the 
sovereign ought to have in the enacting of laws. 
I.  He  should pay  a regard to those primitive rules  of  jus- 
tice,  which  God himself has established, and take care, that his 
laws be perfectly  conformable to those of the Deity. 
2.  The laws should  be of  such a nature, as to be easily fol- 
lowed and observed.  Laws, too difficult  to be put  in execu- 
tion,  are apt to shake the authority of the magistrate, or to lay a 
foundation for insurrections. 
3.  No iaws ought to be made in regard  to  useless  and un- 
necessary things. 
4.  The laws ought to be  such,  that the subjects may be in- 
clined to observe them rather of their own accord, than through 
necessity.  For this reason the sovereign should only make such 
laws, as are evidently useful ;  or at least he should explain and 
make known to the sub.j>cts the reason  and motives,  that have 
induced him to enrrc:  them. 
5.  He  ought not to be easily persuaded to change the estab- 
lished laws.  Frequent  changes  in  the  laws  certainly lessens 
their authority,  as well as that of  the sovereign. 
6. The prince ought not to grant dispensations without very 
good reason ;  otherwise he weakens the laws, and lays a foun- 
dation for jealousies,  which are ever prejudicial to the state and 
to individuals. 
7.  Laws should be so contrived, as  to be  assisting  to each 
other, that is to say, some should be preparatory to the observ- 
ance of  others, in order  to  facilitate their execution.  Thus, 
for example, the  sumptuary  laws,  which  prescribe  bounds to 
the expences of  the subject, contribute greatly to the execution 
of those ordinances,  which impose  taxes and  public contribu- 
tions. 
8.  A prince, who would  make new  laws,  ought to be par- 
ticularly attentive to time and conjunctures. 180  THE PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITIC LAW.  121 
On this  principally  depends the success of a new law, and 
the manner, in which it is received. 
9.  In fine,  the most effectual step a sovereign  can  take ID 
enforce his laws is  to conform  to  them  himself,  and to  show 
the first example, as we have before observed. 
CHAP.  II. 
Of the  right  of  judging  the doctrines, taught i~  dote  1  afthe 
care which the soweign caught  to take tofwm tbe manners ofhis 
~ubjectr. 
I.  I  N the eriumeration of the essefitial parts of sovereignty, 
we have comprehended the right of  judging  of  the  doctrines, 
taught in the state, and particularly  of  every  thmg  relating to 
religion,  This is one of  the most considerable prerogatives of 
the sovereign,  which it  behoves  him to exert according to the 
rules of  justice  and prudence.  Let us endeavour to show the 
necessity of this prerogative, to establish its foundations, and to 
point out its extent and boundaries. 
11.  The  first duty of the sovereign ought to be to take all pas* 
sale pains to form the hearts and minds of  his people.  In vain 
mld  it be for  him  to enact the best laws,  and  to prescribe 
rules of conduct  in every  thing relative  to the  good of  soci- 
ety, if  he did not moreover  take proper  measures  to  convince 
his peopre of the justice and  necessity  of  those  rules,  and of 
the advantages naturally arising from  the strict  observance  of 
them. 
111.  And indeed  since the principle of all human actions is 
rhe will, and the acts of the will, depend on the ideas we form 
of good and evil, as  well as of  the rewards  and  punishments, 
which  must follow those acts,  so that every  ane is determined 
by  his own judgment  5  it is evident, that the sovereign ought to 
take care,  that hi subjects be properly instructed from their in- 
fancy, in  all those principles, which can form them to an hon- 
est and sober life, and in such doctrines, as are agreeable to the 
end and institution of society.  This is the most effectual mean 
of 5iducing men to a ready and sure obedience, and of forming 
their manners.  Withogt this the laws would not have a suf- 
ficient force to restrain the subject within the bounds of  his du- 
ty.  So long as men do not obey the laws from principle, their 
submission is  precarious and uncertain : and they will be  ever 
ready to withdraw  their obedience,  when  they  are  persuaded 
they can do it with impunity. 
lV. If  therefore  people's  manner of  thinking, or  the ideas 
and opinions commonly received,  and to which they are accus- 
t~med,  luve so much influence on their conduct, and so strong- 
ly contribute either to the good or evil of  the state ; and if  it 
be the duty of the mvereign  to attend to this article, he ought 
to  neglect  nothing,  that  can  contribute  to  the  education  of 
youth, to the advnncement of the sciences, and to the  progress 
of truth.  If this be the case,  we must needs grant him a right 
of judging of the doctrines publicly  taught, and  of  pmcribing 
aIL  those,  which  may  he opposite to the public good and tran- 
quillity. 
V.  It belongs therefore  to  the sovereign alme to establish 
academies and public schools of all kinds,  and to authorize the 
respective professors.  It is his business to take care, that noth- 
ing be taught in them under any piaerr, sontrary to the funda- 
mental maxims of  natural law, to the principles of  religion  or 
good politics ;  in a word, nothing capable of producing impres- 
sions prejudicial to  the happiness of the state. 
VI.  But  sovereigns ought  to be  particularly. delicate,  as to 
the manner of  using this prerogative, and not to exert it beyond 
its just bounds, but to use it only according to the rules of jus- 
tice and prudence, otherwise great abuses will follow.  Thus a 
 articular point or article may be misapprehended, as detriment- 
al  to  the  state, while, in the  main, it no way  prejudices,  but 
rather  is  advantageous to  society;  or  princes,  whether  of 
their own accord, or at the instigation of  wicked ministers, may 
arect inquisitions with respect to the most indifferent and even 
the truest opinions, especially in matters of  religion. 
VII.  Supreme rulers cannot therefore be too much on their 
gwrd, against suffering theinselves to  he  imposeci on by  wick- 
ed men,  who under a pretext  of public  good  and  tranquillity 
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S-ek only their own particular interests, and who use their utmmc 
efforts to render opinions  obnoxious,  only with  a  view to ruin 
men of  greater probity than themselves. 
VIII.  The advancement of  the scierces and the progress of 
truth require, that a reasonable liberty should  be granted to all 
those, who busy themselves  in such laudable pursuits, and that 
we shoulrl not  condemn a man as a cri~ninal,  merely  because, 
on certain subjects, he has ideas different from those commonly 
received.  Besides a diversity  of  ideas  and  opinions is so far 
from abstr~cting,  that it rather facilitates the progress of  truth ; 
provided however that sovereigns take proper measures to oblige 
men of lettzrs to keep within the  bounds  of moderation,  2nd 
that just respect,  which  mankind  owe  to  one  another ;  and 
that they  exert their authority in checking those, who grow too 
warm in their disputes,  and break through all rules of  decency, 
so as to injure, calumn;ate, and render suspected, every one, that 
is not in their way of  thinking.  We  must admit, as an indu- 
bitable maxim,  that truth is of  itself very advantageous to man- 
kind,  and to society ;  that no true opinion is contrary to peace 
and good order;  and that all those notions,  which, of  their na- 
ture, are subversive of  good order, must certainly be false ;  oth- 
erwise we must  assert,  that peace  and concord  are repugnant 
to  the laws of  nature. 
CHAP.  111. 
qthe  power  of the sovrr~ign  in matters af  veligiow. 
I.  THE  power ol  the wvereig~l,  in matters of religion, is 
of  the last importance.  Every one knows the Asputes,  which 
have long subsisted  on this  topic  between the emplre and  the 
priesthood ;  and low fatal the consequences of  it have  been to 
states.  Hence it is equally necessary,  both  to sovereigns  and 
subjects, to form just  ideas on this article. 
11.  My opinion is,  that the supreme authority in  matters of 
religion bught necessarily to belong to  the  sovereign;  and  the 
hllowing are my reasons for thisassertion. 
111.  I observe,  I. that if  the interest of society requires, that 
laws should be established in relation to human affairs, that is to 
things,  which  properly  and  directly  interest  only  our  tern- 
poral  happiness ; this  same  interest  cannot  permit,  that  we 
should altogether neglect our spiritual concerns, or those, which 
regard religion,  and leave them without any regulation.  This 
has been acknowledged in all ages, and among all nations ;  and 
this is the origin of the civil Law properly so called, and of the 
sacred or eccleshsticalLaw.  All civilized nations have establish- 
ed these two sorts of law. 
IV.  But, if matters of  religion, have in several respects, need 
of  human regulation,  the right of  determining them in the last 
resort  can belong  only .to the sovereign. 
Fzrst  Pro$  This is incontestably proved by  the very nature 
of sovereignty,  which is no more than the  right of  determining 
in the last  resort, and consequently admits  of  no  power in the 
spciety it governs either superior  to,  or exempt from its juris- 
diction ; but embraces,  in its full extent, every thing,  that caa 
interest the happiness of the state,  both  ~acved  and profane. 
V.  The nature of  sovereignty  cannot permit any  thing sus- 
ceptible of  human direction, t~ be withdrawn  from its authori- 
ty ;  for wh4  is withdrawn from the authority of  the sovereign 
must either be left independent, or subjected to some other per- 
son different from the sovereign himself. 
VI.  Were no rule  established  in  matters  of  religion,  this 
would  be throwing it into a confusion and disorder,  quite con- 
trary to the good of society, the nature of  religion, and the views 
of  the Deity, who is the author of  it.  But,  if  we submit these 
matters to an authority independent of that of the sovereign, we 
fall into another inconyeniency ;  since thus we establish, in the 
same society,  two sovereign powers, independent of  each other ; 
which is not  only incompatiue with the nature of  sovereignty, 
but a contradiction in itself, 
VII.  And indeed,  if  there  were several  sovereigns  in  the 
same society, they might also give contrary orders.  But who 
does not perceive,  that opposite orders, with respect to thesame 
affair, are manifestly  repugnant to the nature of things, and can- 
not have their effect,  nor pxoducc  a real obiigation ?  How would POLITIC  LAW.  I  &S 
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it be  possible .for  instance, that a man,  who receives  &%rent 
orders at the same  time  from two superiors, such as to repair 
to the  camp  and  to  go toclntrch, should  be  obliged to obq 
bath ?  If  it be said, &at hs  is not obliged to cor-?Iy  with both, 
thm  must therefore be  some subordination of the  one to the 
other,  the  inferior  will  yield  to  the  superior,  and  it d 
not be true, that they arc both sowreign and inaepcndent.  We 
may here very properly apply the words of  Christ.  P4c rnan cafi 
Jerve two  maJtws.  And  n  kingddm disidcd againtt  its~lf  cannot 
~torrd. 
VIII.  Gdcond Fro$  I dm  my second proof from the end of 
civil society and smreignty.  The end of  sovereignty is cer- 
tainly the happiness of  the people, and the preservation of  the 
state,  Now,  as teligion may several ways either injure or .ben- 
efit the state, it follows, that the sovereign haa a right over re- 
ligion, at least so far as it can depend onhuman directian.  He, 
who has a right to the end, has  undonbtedly  a  right also to the 
ms. 
IX.  Now, that  religion  mLy  several  ways injure or benefit 
the state, we have already  proved  in the first  voltmm  of  this 
work. 
1.  All men have  constantly  acknowledged  that the  Deity 
rinbs his favours to .a atate depend principally on  the  cm,  which 
the sovereign takes to  indu& his  subjects  m honor and  serve 
him. 
2.  Religion can of itself contribute greatly to render mankind 
more obedient to the laws, more artached to their country, and 
mow honest towards one another. 
3.  The doctrines and ceremonies of religion have a consider- 
able influence on the momls of  people, and on  the public happi- 
ness.  The ideas,  which  mankind imtnid of rhe Wiy,  have 
often n~hled  them to  the rnxt preposterous forms of worship, and 
prompted them to sacrifice human victims.  They have wen, 
from those false ideas, drawn arguments in justification &.trice, 
cruelty, and  licentiousness ; as we may see by reading the an- 
cient poets.  Since religion therefore has so mvchinRuence wer 
th  happiness or misery of society, who can doubt but it is sub 
ject to the direction of  the sovereign ? 
X.  Tbirifp~df.  What we have been a%rming  evinces, that 
it  is incumbent on  the mereign t~ make religion, which includes 
the most valuable  interests of  mankind,  the principal object of 
his care and application.  He ought to promote the eternal, as 
well as the  present  and  temporal  happiness of  his  subjects. 
This is therefore a poim properly subject to his ju&diction. 
XI. Fourth Pro$  In fine we  can  in  general acknowlede 
only two sovereigns,  God and the prince.  The sovereignty of 
God is a transcendent,  universal,  and  absolute supremacy,  tb 
which even primes themselves are subject ; the sovereignty of 
the prince holds the second rank,  and is subordinixie to that df 
God, but in such a manner, that the prince has a right to regu- 
late every thing, which interests the happiness d  society, and by 
its nature is susceptible of human direction. 
XII.  Afrer having thus established the right of the sovereign 
in matters of  religion, let us examine into the extent and bounds 
of  this  prerogative;  whereby it will appear, that these bounds 
are not different from those, which the sovereignty admits in ali 
other matters.  We have already observed, that  the power of 
the sovereign extended to every thing susceptible of  human di- 
rection.  Hence it follows, that the first boundary we  ought to 
fix to the authority of the sovereign, but which indeed is so ob- 
vious,  as hardly needs  mentioning, is,  that  he can  order noth- 
ing impossible in its nature,  either in religion, or any thing else ; 
as for example to Yly  into the air, to believe contradictions, &c. 
XIII.  The second boundary, but which does not  more par- 
ticularly interest religion, than every thing else, is deduced from 
the divine laws;  for it is evident, that,  all human authority be- 
ing subordinate to that of  God,  whatever the Deity hasdeimmin- 
ed by  some law, whether naruvd or positive,  cannot be changed 
by  the sovereign.  This is the foundation of that maxim, P ir 
better to obey  God than man. 
XIV.  It  ia in consequence of these principks, that no human 
authority can for example, forbid the preo&ing  of  the gospel, 
M. the use of  the  saadments,  nor  establish  a  new  article of 
faith,  nor  introduce  a  new  worship;  for God  having given 
us a rule of  religion, and forbidden us to alter this rule, it is not in 
the power of  man to do it ;  and it would be absurd to imagine, i a6  THE PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITIC LAW.  IS7 
that any person whatever can either believe or  practice a thing 
as conducive to his salvation, in opposition to the divine decla4 
ration. 
XV.  It is also on the footing of  the  limitations here estab- 
lished that the sovereign  cannot lawfully assume to himself  an 
empire over consciences, as if  it were in his power to impose the 
necessity of believing such or such  an article  in matters of  re- 
ligion.  Nathre itself  and the divine laws are equally contr.iry 
to this pretension.  It is therefore no less absurd than impious 
to endeavour to constrain consciences, and to propagate religion 
by  force of  arms.  The natural punishment of  those,  who are 
in an error,  is to be  taught."  As  for the rest,  we must leave 
the care of the success to God. 
XVI.  The authority of the sovereign, in matters of  religion, 
cannot therefore extend beyond the bounds we have assigned to 
it ;  but these are the only bounds, neither  do I amagine it pas- 
sible to think of  any others.  But what is principally to be ob- 
served is, that these limits of  the sovereign power, in matters of 
religion, are not different from those, he ought to acknowledge 
h  every other matter s  on the contrary,  they  are  precisely the 
same;  and equally agree with all the parts  of  the sovereignty, 
Wig  no less applicable to common subjects than to those of re- 
ligion.  For example, it would be no more lawful for a father 
to neglect  the  education of  his  childrelt,  though  the  prince 
should order him to neglect it, than it would be  for pastors or 
Christians  to  abandon the  service of  God,  even if  they had 
been commanded so to do by  an impious sovereign.  The rea- 
son of  this is, because the law of  God prohibits both, and this 
law is superior to all human authority. 
XVII.  However, though  the power of the sovereign, in mat- 
ters of  religion, cannot change  what God  has determined, we 
may affirm, that those  very things are, in  some measure, sub- 
mitted to the authority of  the sovereign.  Thus  for  example 
the prince has certainly a right to remove the external obstacles, 
which may prevent the observance of  the  laws of  God, and to 
make such an observance easy.  This is even one of his principal 
duties.  Hence  also arises  his prerogative  of  regulating  th 
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functions of  the clergy and the circumstances of external wor- 
sh'ip,  that  the whole may be performed with greater  decency, 
so far at least, as the law  of  God has  left these things to hu- 
man direction.  ln a word it is certain, that the supreme mag- 
istrate may also give an additional degree of  force and  obliga- 
tion to the divine  laws, by temporal rewards  and punishments. 
We  must therefore acknowledge the right of  the  sovereign in 
regard to refigion, and that this right cannot belong to any pow- 
er on earth. 
SVIII.  Yet the defenders  of  the rights  of  the  priesthood 
start many difficulties on this subject, which it will be proper to 
answer.  If  God, say they, delegates to  men  the authority he 
has over his church, it is rather to his  pastors and  nzinisters of 
the gospel, than eo  sovereigns and magistrates.  The power of 
the magistrate does not beIong to the essence of thechurch.  God, 
on the contrary,  has  established  pastors over  his church,  and 
regulated the  functions  of  their  ministry ;  and  in their oflice 
they are so far from being the vicegerents of sovereigns, that they 
are not even obliged to pay  them an unlimited obedience.  Be- 
sides, they exercise  their  functions on the sovereign, as well 2s 
on private persons  S  and  the scripture, as well as church histo- 
ry, attribute a right of  government to them. 
Answer.  When they say,  that  the power  of  the magistrate 
does not belong to the essence of  the church, they would explain 
themselves more properly, if  they said, that the church may sub 
sist, though there were no magistrates.  This is  true, but we 
cannot hence conclude, thzt the magistrate has no authority over 
the church ;  for, by the same reason, we might prove, that mer- 
chants, physicians, and every person else,  do not depend on the 
sovereign ;  because it is not essential  to merchants,  physicians, 
and mankind in  general, to be governed by magistrates.  How- 
ever reason and scripture  subject them to the superi~r  powerr. 
XIX.  2.  What they add is very true, that God has establish- 
ed pastors,  and regulated their functions,  and that in this qual- 
ity they  are  not  the  vicegerents of  human  powers ;  but it is 
easy to convince them by  examples, that they can draw no con- 
sequence from this to the prejudice of the supreme  authority. 
The  function of a physician is  from God, as the Author of  na- THE PRfNCrPLES  OF  POLITIC LAW.  1  29 
tvre 9  and that d e pasts is derived dso  from the Deiiy, as 
the  Author of  religii  This  however  daes not  hinder  the 
physician from  having  a  dependance on  the sovereign.  The 
same may be said of  agriculture,  commerce,  and  a11  the arts. 
Besidas, the  judges bold their oilices and places from the prince, 
yet the?  do not recsiw 41  the rules they are to Mtow from him 
It is God,  himself,  who urders them  to  take nc bribe, and to 
do di  through hatred or favor, &c.  Nothing  more is  re- 
quisite to show how unjust a consequence it is to pretend, that 
Erecause  a thing is established by God, it should be independent 
of  the sovereign 
XX  g,  But,  say they, pastars are nat always obliged to obey 
rhe  supreme  magistrate.  We  agree, but we  have  ohservecl, 
drat  this cm only take pke  in matters ditectly  opposite to the 
Ins  of  God ;  md we hsve  &awn, that  tbis  rLght  is  inherent 
in  every  perm in  cmmon affak,  as  well  as  in xeligion* 
dtonseqwntly does  not  derogate from the authwitg of  the 
wvereip. 
XXI.  4.  Neither ean  we  deny, that  dle pzstoral  functions 
are  werciscd  on kings ;  sot ady  as membas of  the church, 
but also  in  partiwls  as possessed of  the regal  power.  But 
this proves nothing ;  for what  functioo is  the,  that does not 
regard &e  sovereign ?  b  pattieular does the physician less  ex- 
exxise bis pd4i1  on the prince, than on other people ?  Does 
he sat eqwlly prescribe far him a  rsgimaa and the  medicines 
rwcessary for his health ?  DoRs  mt  the office  of  a caunoek 
qard  also the sovereign, and even in his quality of  chiif mag- 
hate  ?  and yet whwver thought of  exemptix those persons 
fiom a sttbjection to the supreme avthority  2 
XXII.  5. But lastly, say they, is it nat ccstain, that scripture 
ard ancient history  aseribe  the government of  the  church  to 
pastors? Thii is  a130 true, but we need ~nly  examine into the 
mure of  athe  government, bdongiing to  the ministem d  reli- 
to  be cmvind, that  it does  nor at all diminish the an- 
thority af  the scwereigtt, 
XXIH  There is a government of skple drectiDa, and a g~v- 
emmeat of  ~~~y~  The former consists  in  giving  counsel, 
or teaching.  eh6 des, which  ou&  t~  be  foNowd.  But  it 
supposes no authority in him,  who governs ;  neither does it re- 
strain the liberty of those, who are governed, except in as much 
as the laws, inculcated on that occasion, imply  an obligation of 
themselves.  Such is the government  of ~h~sicians  concerning 
health, of lawyers with regard to civil affairs,  and of counsellors 
of state with respect to politics.  The opinions of those persons 
are not obligatory in regard to indifferent things ;  and in neces- 
sary affairs they are  not binding of  themselves,  but only  SQ far, 
as they inculcate the laws established by nature,  or by  the sove- 
reign, and this is the species of government belonging to pastors. 
XXIV.  But there is also a government of jurisdiction  andau- 
tbority, which implies the  right  of establishing regulations,  and 
really obliges the  subject.  This government,  arising from the 
sovereign authority,  obliges by the nature of the authority itself, 
which confers the power of compuIsion.  But it is to be remark- 
ed,  that real  authority is inseparable from the right of  compel- 
ling and obliging.  These are  the criterion by which alone it 
may be  distinguished.  It is this  last species  of  government, 
which we ascribe to the sovereign 3  and  of  which  we affirm, 
that it does not belong to pastors." 
XXV.  We  therefore say, that the government, belonging to 
pastors, is that of  counsel,  instruction,  and  persuasion, whose 
entire fofce and authority consists in the word  of  God,  which 
they ought to teach the people ;  and by no means in a person- 
al authority.  Their power is to declare the orders of  the Deity, 
and goes no farther. 
XXVI.  If  at present  we  compare these difTerent  species of 
government we shall easily perceive, that they are not opposite to 
each other,  even  in matters  of  religion.  'The  government of 
simple direction, which we give to pastors,  does not clash with 
the sovereign authority ;  on the contrary,  it may find an advan- 
tage in its-aid  and  assistance.  Thus there is  no contradiction 
in saying, that the sovereign governs the  pastors,  and  that,  he 
is also governed by  them, provided we attend  to the  different 
species'of government.  These ate the general principles of this 
important doctrine,  and it  is  easy to  apply them to  particular 
cases. 
* See the gospel according  to St  Luke,  chap. xii. ver.  14.  first  epistle to &p 
Corinthians, chap. X.  vu; 4. Ephes. chap. vr, ver, 17,  Philip. iii. ver  20 
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CHAP.  IV. 
Of  the power of  the ~overeign  over the live$ ~d fdut~~  4 his JU~ 
ject~  in criminal cm. 
I. T  HE principal end of  civil  government and society is 
to secure to mankind all their natural advantages, and especially 
their  lives.  This end necessarily requires,  that the  sovereign 
should have some right over the lives of  his subjects, either in 
an indirect tnilnner, for the defence  of  the state, or in  a  direct 
manner,  for the punishment of  crimes. 
11.  The power of the prince  over the lives of  the subjects, 
with respect to the defence of the state, regards the right of war, 
of  which we shall treat  hereafter.  Here we  intend  to  speak 
only of  the power of  inflicting punishments. 
111.  The first question,  which presents itself, is to know the 
origin and  foundation of  this part of  the  sovereign power ;  a 
which  cannot  be  answered  without  some  difficulty. 
Punishment,  it is said, is an  evil, which  a person  suffers  in a 
compulsive way.  A nian cannot  punish himself;  and conse- 
quently it seems, that individuals  could not transfer to the sov- 
ereign a right, which they had not over  themselves. 
IV.  Some civilians pretend,  that,  when a  sovereign inflicts 
punishments on his subjects,  he does it by virtue of  their  own 
consent ;  because,  by submitting  to  his authority,  they  have 
promised to acquiesce in every thing, he should do with respect 
to them ;  and in particular  a subject, who determines to  com- 
mit a crime,  consents thereby to suffer the punishment,  estab- 
lished against the delinquent. 
V.  But it seems difficult to determine the right  of the sov- 
ereign on a presumption of  this nature,  especially with  respect 
to capital punishments ;  neither is it necessary to have recourse 
to this pretended consent of  criminals, in order to establish the 
vindictive  power.  It is better to say, that the right af punish- 
ing malefactors derives its origin from that, which every individ- 
ual originally had in the society of  nature,  to repel  the injuries, 
committed against himself, or  against the  members  of the so- 
ciety ; which right  has  been  yielded  and transferred  to  the 
sovereign. 
VI.  In a word the right  of  executing  the laws  of  nature, 
and of  punishing those, who  vidate them,  belongs  originally 
to society in general, and to each individual in particular ;  other- 
wise the laws,  which nature and reason impose on man,  would 
be  entirely useless in a state of  nature, if nobody had the pow- 
er of  putting them in execution, or of  punishing  the violation 
of them. 
VII.  Whoever violates the laws of  nature  testifies  thereby, 
that  he tramples on the maxims of  reason and  equity,  which 
God has prescribed for  the common  safety ;  and thus  he be- 
comes an enemy of  mankind.  Since  therefore every n:an  has 
an incontestable right to take care of  his own preservation  and 
that of  society, he may,  without doubt,  inflict on such a person 
punishments,  capable of  producing repentance in him,  of hin- 
dering him from committing the like crimes for the future, and 
even of  deterring others by his example.  In a word, the same 
laws of  nature, which  prohibit vice,  do  also confer a right  of 
pursuing the perpetrator of  it,  and of  punishing him in a  just 
proportion. 
VIU.  It is true,  in  a  state of  nature,  these  kinds of  chas- 
tisements  are not inflicted  by  authority, and the criminal might 
happen  to shelter himself  from  the  punishments,  he llas  to 
dread from  other  men,  or even  repel their  attacks.  But the 
right of  punishment,  is  not  for that either less real,  or  less 
founded.  The difficulty of  putting  it  in execution  does  not 
destroy it.  This was one of  the inconveniences of  the primitive 
state, which men have efficaciously remedied by  the  establish- 
ment of sovereignty. 
IX.  By following these principles, it is easy to comprehend, 
that the right  of  a  sovereign to punish crirhes is no other, than 
that natural right which human society and every individual had 
originally to eyecute the law of nature, and to take care of their 
own safety.  This natural right has been yielded  and transfer- 
red to the sovereign,  who,  by  means of  the  authority,  with 
which he is invested,  exercises it in  :uch  a  manner, that it  is 13%  THE PRINCIPLES OF  POLITIC LAW.  I33 
difficult for wicked men to evade it.  Besides, whether we caIl 
this natural right of punishing crimes the vindicative power, or 
whether we refer it to a kind of  right ofwar, is a matter of in- 
difference, neither does it  change its nature on that account. 
X.  This is the true foundation  of  the right of the sovereign 
with respect to punishments.  Thig being granted, I define pun- 
ishment an evil,  with which the prince threatens those, who are 
disposed  to violate his  laws,  and which he really it~flicts, in a 
just proportion, whenever they  violate  them,  independently of 
the reparation of the damage, with a view to some future good, 
and finally for the safety and peace of  society. 
XI.  I say,  I. that punishment is an evil, and this evil may be 
of  a different nature,  according as it affects the life of a person, 
his body, his reputation, or his  estate.  Besides, it is indifferent 
whether this evil consists  in  hard and  toilsome labour,  or in 
suffering something painful. 
XII.  I add in the second place, that it is the ~overeign,  who 
awards  punishments ;  not  that  every  punishment  in genet'al 
supposes sovereignty, but  hecause we  are here speaking of  the 
right of  puaishing in society, and as the bracch of the supreme 
power.  It is therefore the sovereign alone, who is empowered 
to  award punishments  in society ;  but individuals  cannot  do 
themselves  justice,  without  encroaching  on  the rights of  the 
prince. 
XIII. I say, 3. with which the sovereign threatem,  &c.  to de- 
note  the chief intention of the prince.  He threatens first, and 
then  punishes,  if  menaces  be  not  sufficient  to  prevent  the 
crime.  Hence it also appears, that  punishment  ever supposes 
guilt,  and consequently  we ought  not to  reckon  among  pun- 
ishments, properly  so called,  the  different evils,  to which men 
are exposed, without having a~tecedently  committed  a crime. 
XIV.  I add, 4.  that punishment is  inflicted indcper~dentl~  of 
the reparation  of  the damage to show, that these are two things 
very distinct, and ought  not to be confourided.  Every  crime 
is attended with two obligations ;  the first is to repair the inju- 
ry committed ;  and  the second, to suffer the punishment ;  the 
delinquent ought  to satisfy both.  It is also to be  observed on 
this  occasion,  that the right  of  punishment  in  civil society is 
transferred to  the magistrate, who  may by his  own  authority 
pardon a criminal;  but this is not the,case  with  respect to the 
right of  satisfaction  or  reparation  of  damages.  The magis- 
trate cannot acquit the  offender in this  article,  and  the injured 
person always retains his right ;  so that he  is  wronged,  if  he 
be hindered from obtaining due satisfaction. 
XV.  Lastly,  5. by saying, that  punishment is injicted with a 
view to  some  good;  we  point out  the  end,  which  the  prince 
ought to propose to himself in inflicting punishments,  and  this 
we shall more particularly explain. 
XVI.  The sovereign,  as such, has not only a  right,  but  is 
also obliged to punish crimes.  The use  of  punishment  is so 
far from being contrary to equity, that it is absolutely requisite 
for the public tranquillity.  The supreme power would be use- 
less, were it not invested with a right, and armed with a force, 
sufficient to deter the wicked by the apprehension of  some evil, 
and to make them suffer that  evil,  when  they  injure  society. 
It was even necessary, that this power should extend  so far, as 
to make them suffer  the greatest of natural evils, which is death ; 
in order  effectually  to repress the  most  daring audaciousness, 
and, as it were, to balance the different degrees of human wick- 
edness by a sufficient counterpoise. 
XVII.  Such is the right of the sovereign.  But if  he has a 
right to punish, the criminal must be also under some obligation 
in this respect ;  for we cannot possibly conceive a right without 
an obligation corresponding to it.  But wherein does this obliga- 
tion of  the  criminal  consist ?  Is he obliged to betray himself, 
and voluntarily expose himself to punishment?  I answer, that 
this is not necessary for the end, proposed in the establishment of 
punishments ;  nor can we reasonably require that a man should 
thus betray himself;  but this  does not hinder him from being 
under a real obligation. 
XVIII.  I. It is certain, that when there is a simple pecuniary 
punishment, to which a man has  been lawfully condemned, he 
ought to pay it, without being forced by the magistrate ;  not on- 
ly prudence  requires  it, but also the rules of justice, according POLITIC LAW.  '35 
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to  which we are bound  to repair  any  injury we have commit- 
ted,  and to obey lawful judges. 
XIX.  2.  What relatrs to corporeal, and especially to capital 
punishments,  is  attended with greater difficulty.  Such is our 
natural fondness for life,  and aversion ta  infamy, that a criminal 
cannot be under  an obligation  of  accusing himself voluntarily, 
and presenting himself to punishment ;  and indeed neither the 
public good, nor the rights of  the person, entrusted with the su- 
preme authority, demand it. 
XX.  3.  In consequellce  of  this  same  principle, a criminal 
may  innocel~tly  seek  his  safety in flight, and is not obliged to 
remain in prison,  if he perceives the doors open, or if  he can ea- 
sily force them.  But it is not lawful  for  him to procure  his 
liberty \y  the commission of  a new  crime,  as  by  cutting  the 
throats of the jailors,  or by killing those sent to apprehend  him. 
XXI. 4.  But in fine  if  we  suppose,  that  the  criminal  is 
known, that  he  is  taken,  that he cannot make his escape from 
prison,  and that,  after a mature examination or trial, he is con- 
victed of  the crime,  and  consequently condemned  to  condign 
punishment ; he is in this case certainly obliged to undergo the 
punishment,  and to acknowledge the lawfulness of  his sentence ; 
so that there is no injury done him, nor can he reasonably com- 
plain of any one but himself ;  much less can he withdraw from 
punishment by violence,  and  oppose  the  magistrate  in  the 
exercise of his right.  In this properly consists the obligation of 
the criminal with respect to panishment.  Let  us now inquire 
more particularly into the end,  the sovereign ought to propose 
to himself in inflicting them. 
XXII.  In general it is certain,  that the prince never ought to 
inflict punishments  but with a view  to some public advantage. 
To  make a man  suffer merely because he has done a thing,  and 
to attend only  to what has passed,  is a piece  of  cruelty,  con- 
demned by  reason;  for after all it  is  impossible  that  the fact 
should be undone.  In short the right of  punishing is a part of 
sovereignty ;  now sovereignty is founded ultimately on a  benefi- 
cent power.  It follows  therefore,  that, even when  the chief 
ruler makes use  of  his power of the  sword, he ought to aim at 
some advantage  or future good,  agreeebly to what is required 
of him by the wry nature and foundation of  his authority. 
XXII. The principal  end  of  punishment is therefore  the 
welfare cf society ;  but as there map be different  means of  ar- 
riving at this end, according  to different circumstances, the sove- 
reign hlso,  in inflicting punishments,  proposes different and par- 
ticular  views,  ever s-ubordinate, and all finally reducible  to  the 
principal end aboveme~tioned.  What we have said agrees with 
the observation of  Grotius."  "  In punishments we must either 
''  have the  good  of  the criminal  in  view,  or  the advarrtage 
"  of  him, whose interest it was that the crime should not  have 
"  been committed,  or the good of all indifferently." 
XXIV.  Hence  the sovereign sometimes proposes to correct 
the criminal, and make him lose  the vicious habit, so as to cure 
the evil by its contrary, and to takc away the sweets of the crime 
by the bitterness of  the  punishment.  This panishment, if the 
criminal is reformed by  it,  tends to the public good.  But, if 
he should persevere in his wickedness, the sovereign must have 
recourse to more violent remedies, and even to death. 
XXV.  Sometimes the chief ruler proposes to deprive crimi- 
nals of the means of committing new crimes ;  as for example by 
taking from the111 the arms,  which they might use,  by shutting 
them  up in prison, by banishing them, or even by putting them to 
death.  At the same time he takes care of  the public safety, not 
only  with respect to the criminals themselves, but also with re- 
gard to those, inclined to  commit  the like  crime, in  deterring 
them by those examples.  For this reason, nothing is mote agree- 
able to the end of  punishment,  than  to  inflict it  with  such a 
solemnity, as is most proper to make an impression on the minds 
of the vulgar. 
XXVI.  All these particuiar  ends of punishment ought to%e 
constantly  subordinate, and referred to the principal end, name 
ly the safety of the public ;  and the sovereign ought to use them 
all as means of  obtaining that end ;  so that he should not hare 
recourse to the most rigorous punishments,  till those of  greater 
lenity are insufficient to procure the pu5lic tranquillity.. 
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XXVII.  But here a question arises, whether all actions, con- 
trary to the laws, can be lawfully punished ?  I answer, that the 
very end of punishment,  and the constitution of human nature, 
evince there may be actions, in themselves evil,  which however 
it is not necessary for human justice to punish. 
XXVIII.  And, I.  acts purely internal,  or  simple  thoughts, 
which do not discover themselves by any  external acts prejudi- 
cial to society ;  for example the agreeable  idea of a bad action, 
the desire of committing it,  the design of it without proceeding 
to the execution,  &c.  All these are not subject to the severity 
of human punishment,  even though it should happen,  that they 
are afterwards discovered. 
XXIX.  On this subject we must however make the follow- 
ing remarks.  The first is, that  if  this kind of  crimes be not 
subject to human punishment, it is because the weakness of man 
does not permit,  even for the good of society, that he should be 
treated with the utmost rigour.  We  ought to have a just  re- 
gard for  humanity in  things,  which  though bad in themselves, 
do  not  greatly affect  the  public order  and tranquillity.  The 
second remark,  is, that, though  acts purely internal are not sub- 
ject  to  civil  punishment,  we  must  not  for  this  reasan  con- 
clude, that  these acts are not under  the  direction  of  the civil 
laws.  We  have before established the contrary."  In a word 
it is evident, that the laws of nature expressly condemn such ac- 
tions,  and that they are punished by the Deity. 
XXX.  2.  It would be too severe to punish every peccadillo ; 
since human frailty, notwithstanding the greatest caution and at- 
tention,  cannot avoid a multitude of slips and infirmities.  This 
is a consequence of  the toleration due to humanity. 
XXXI. 3.  In a word, we must necessarily leave unpunished 
those common vices,  which  are  the  consequences of  a general 
corruption ;  as for instance ambition,  avarice,  inhumanity,  in- 
gratitude, hypocrisy, envy, pride, wrath, &c.  For if  a sovereign 
wanted  to punish such dispositions with rigor,  he would  be  re- 
duced to the necessity of reigning in a desert.  It is sufficient 
to punish those vices,  when they prompt men to enormous and 
overt acts. 
Chap.  i.  5  rr, 8Ct. 
ZXII. It is not even always necesrary to punish crimes in 
themselves punishable, fsr there are  cases,  in which  the sove- 
reign may pardon j  and of  this we may judge by  the very .end 
of punishment. 
XXXIII.  TIre  public good is the ultimate end of all punish- 
ment.  If therefore there are  circumstances, in which by  par- 
doning as much M more advantage is  procured, than by punish- 
ing,  then there  is no obligation to punish,  and the sovereign e- 
ven ought to show clemency.  Thus if  the crime be concealed, 
or be  only known to  a  few, it is not  always  necessary,  nay it 
would sonletimes be dangerous to make it public by punishment ; 
for many abstain from evil,  rather from their ignorance of vice, 
than from a knowledge and  love of  virtue.  Cicero  observes, 
with regard to Solon'~  having no law against parricide, that this 
silence of  the legislator has been looked upon as  a great mark 
of  prudence;  for  as  much as  he  made  no prohibition  of  a 
thing, of  which there had been yet no example, lest, by  speak- 
ing d it,  he should seem to give the  people a  notion of  com- 
mitting it, rather than deter them from it. 
We  may also consider the personal services, which the crim- 
inal, or some of his family, have done to the state,  and wheth- 
er he can still be of great advantage to it,  so that the  impr&s- 
sion made by the sight of  his punishment be  not likely to pro- 
duce m much good, as he himself is capable of doing.  Thus at 
sea, when the pilot has committed a  crime, and there  is none 
on board capable of  navigating the ship;it  would be destroying 
all those in the vessel to punish him.  This example may also 
be applied to the general of  an army. 
In a word the public  advantago,  which is the true  measure 
of  punishment,  sometimes requires,  that  the sovereign  should 
pardon, because of  the great number of  criminals.  The pru- 
dence of government demands, that the  justice,  established for 
the preservation of  society, should  not be  exercised in  such a 
manner, as to subvert the state. 
XXXIV.  All crimes are not equal, and it is but equity there 
should be a due proportion  between the crime and the punish- 
ment.  We  may judge of  the grearness of  a  crime in general 
by  its object, by the  intention and  malice of  the criminal and 
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by the  prejudice arising to society from it ;  and  to this latter 
consequence the two others must be ultimately referred. 
XXXV.  According  to the dignity  of  the object the action 
is more or less criminal.  We  must place in the first class those 
crimes, which  interest society in general ;  the next are  those, 
which disturb the order of civil society ;  and last  of  all those, 
which relate to individuals.  The  latter  are  more or less hei- 
nous, according to the value of  the thing,  of  which  they  de- 
prive us.  T'nus he,  who slays his father, commits a rhore hor- 
rid murder, than if  he had killed a stranger.  He, who insults 
a magistrate is more to blame than if  he had insulted his equal. 
A person, who adds murder to robbery,  is more guilty than he, 
who only strips the traveller of  his  money. 
XLXVI.  The greater or less degree of  malice also contri- 
butes very much to  the enormity of  the crime, and is to be de- 
duced from several circumstances. 
I.  From  the motives,  which  engage mankind to commit  a 
crime,  and which  may be more or less easy  to  resist.  Thus 
he, who robs or murders in  cold blood,  is more culpable than 
he,  who yields to the violence of  some furious passion. 
2.  From the particular  character of  the criminal, which, be- 
sides the  general  reasons,  ought to  retain  him  in  his duty : 
"  The higher a man's  birth is, says Juvenal, or the more exalted 
"  he is in dignity, the more enormous is the crime he commits.* 
"  This takes place  especially with respect  to  princes, and  so 
"  much the more,  because  the  consequences of  their bad  ac- 
"  tions are fatal to the state, from the number of persons,  who 
"  endeavor to imitate them."  This is  the  judicious  remark 
made  by Cicer0.j-  The same observation may also be applied 
to magistrates and clergymen. 
*  Omnc animi witium tanto consfectiu~  in  se 
Crimcn habct, guanfo major, guipeccat, hddur. 
-More  public scandal vice attends, 
As he ie  great and noble. who offends. 
Juv. Sat. viii. 140, x4r.  t DC  Leg. lib. iii. cap. 14.  Nec enim tantum mali est peccare principes quan- 
quam est magnum hoc per seipsum malum ;  quantum illud, quod permulti imita- 
tores principum existunt ;  quo perniciosius de  republica merentur  vitiosi prin- 
cipes,  uod non  selum vitia concipiunt ipsi, sed ea infundunt in civitatem.  Ne- 
que Qm  obsunt, quad ipsi coriurnpuntur, sed etiam quad conurnpunt ;  pluque 
exempio, quam peccato, nocent. 
3.  We  must  also consider  the circumstances  of  time  and 
place, in which the crime has been committed,  the  manner  of 
committing it,  the instruments used for that purpose,  &C. 
4.  Lastly we are to consider whether the criminal has made 
a  custom  of  committing such  a crime, or if  he  is but rarely 
guilty of  it, whether he  has  committed it of  his  own accord, 
or been seduced by others,  &c. 
XXXVII. We may easily  perceive that  the  difference of 
these circumstances interests  the happiness  and tranquillity  of 
society,  and  consequently  either  augments or  diminishes the 
enormity of the crime. 
XXXVIII. There  are therefore crimes less or greater  than 
others ;  and consequently they do not all deserve to to be pun- 
ished with equal severity ;  but  the kind and  precise degree of 
punishment  depend on  the prudence  of  the sovereign.  The 
following are the principal rules, by  which he ought to be direct- 
ed. 
X.  The degree of  punishment ought ever to be  proportion- 
ed to the end of inflicting it, tbat is, to repress the insolence and 
malignity of  the wicked, and to procure the internal peace and 
safety of the state.  It is upon this principle, that we must aug- 
ment or diminish the rigour of  punishment.  The punishment 
is too rigorous,  if  we can by  milder means obtain the end pro- 
posed ;  and, cm the contrary,  it is too  moderate, when  it has 
not  a force  sufficient  to produce these effects,  and when the 
criminals themselves despise it. 
2.  According to this principle, every crime may be punished 
as the public good requires,  without considering whether there 
be  an equal or less punishment for another crime,which in itself, 
appears more or less heinous.  l'hus  robbery, for instance, is of 
its own nature a less crime than murder ;  and yet highwaymen 
may, without injustice, be punished with death,  as well as mur- 
derers. 
3.  The  equality, which the sovereign ought ever to observe 
in the exercise of  justice, consists in punishing those alike, who 
have trespassed alike ;  and in not pardoning  a person, without 
very good reason, who has  committed  a crime,  for which 0th- 
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4-  It mt  be  also observed,  that  we  cannot  multiply the 
kinds and degrees  of  punishment in inJnitzim ;  and, as there b 
no gwter punishment  than  death, it is  necessary,  that cerlai~ 
crimes, though  unequal  in themselves,  should be equally  sub- 
ject to capital punishment.  All,  that can be  saids is, that death 
may be more or less terrible, according as we employ a milder 
or shortcr method to deprive a person of life. 
5.  We ought,  as much as possible,  to incline to the rnerciftil 
side, when there are not strang reasons for the contrary.  This 
is the second  part of  clemency.  The first consists in a total 
exemption from punishment,  when  the good of  the state  per- 
mits it.  This is also one of the rules of  the Roman law." 
6. On  the contrary, it  is sometimes necessary and convenient 
to heighten the punishment,  and to set such an example, as may 
intimidate  the bewicked,  when the evil can be  prevented only bg 
violent remedies.? 
7.  The same punishment  does  not  make the  same impres- 
sion on ali kinds of  people,  and consequently has ~t  the same 
force to deter them from vice.  We  ought therefore to consid- 
er, both iz the general penal sanction and  i11. the application of 
it, the person of  the criminal, and in  that  all those qualities af 
age,  sex,  state,  riches, strength,  and the like, which may either 
increase or diminish the sense of  punishment.  A particular fine, 
for instance, will distress a beggar,  while it is nothing to a rich 
man.  The  same mark of  ignominy will be very mortifying to a 
person of honor and quality, which would pass for a trifle with 
a vulgar fellow.  Men have more strength to support punish- 
ments  than women,  and full grown people more than those of 
tender years,  &c.  Let us also observe, that it  belongs  to  the 
justice and prudence of  government, always to follow the order 
of  judgment  and of the judiciary  procedure in the infliction of 
punishmsta  This is necessary, llor only that we may not cow 
mit injustice in  an affair  of  such importance,  but also that the 
soveeign  may be secured against  all  suspicion  of  injustice ai~d 
* In  pmalibus causis, bonignus interpretandurn  est.  gib. CV. 9  z. l?.  de Reg. 
Jar.  Vid sup. 5 33. 
t Nmnmqaun evenit, ut aliquorem maleficiorum supplicia exacerbantur, ~UO- 
ties nimirum, multi8 personis grassantibus, exemplo opus tit.  Lib. xvi  5  10 & 
partiality.  However  there  are  somatis  extraordinary  and 
pressing circumstances, where the good of thestate ad  he pub- 
lic safety do not petmit us exactly to observe all the fmmdities 
of the criminal procedure ;  and provided, in those circumstan- 
ces, th  crime be  duly  proved,  the sovereign may  judge sum- 
marily, and without delay punish a criminal, whose punishment 
cannot be deferred without imminent danger to the state.  Last- 
ly it is also a rule of prudence, that if we canmot,chastise a crim- 
inal without exposing the state to great danger,  the  sovereign 
ought not only to grant a pardon, but also to  do it in such a tnan- 
ner, that it may appear rather to be the effect of clemetlcy than of 
wces~ity. 
XXXIX.  What we have said relates to punishments, inflicted 
for crimes,  of which a person is  the  sole  and  proper  author. 
With respect to crimes committed by several, the following ob- 
servations may serve as principles. 
I.  It is certain that those, who are really accomplices in the 
crime, ought to be punished in proportion to the share they have 
in it, and according as they ought to be  considered as principal 
causes, or subordinare ad  collateral instruments.  In these ca- 
ses, such persons suffer rather for their own crime, than for that 
of another. 
2.  As for crimes committed by  a body or community,  those 
only  are really culpable, who have given their actual consent to 
them ; but they, who have been of  a contrary opinion, are ab- 
solutely innocent.  Thus Alexander, having given orders to sell 
all  the Thebans after the  taking of  their  city,  excepted those, 
who,  in  the  public  deliberations, had  opposed  the breaking of 
the alliance with the Macedonians. 
3.  Hence it is,  ahat, with respect  to crimes committed by a 
multituck,  reasons of  state and humanit7 direct, that we should 
principally  punisl~  those, who  are ringleaders,  and  pardon the 
rest.  The severity of the sovereign  to  some will  repress die 
audaciousness of the most resolute ;  and his clemency to others 
will gain him the hearts of the multitude." 
4.  If the  ringleaders  have  sheltered themselves by flight, or 
otherwise, or if  they have  all  an  equal share in the crime, we 
* Quimil, Declam. cap.  vii.  p, m. %37. 14%  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF 
must have recourse t0.a decimation,  or  other means, to punish 
some of them.  By this method the terror reaches all, while bat 
few fall under the punishment. 
XL.  Besides, it is a certain and inviolable rule, that no per-, 
son can be lawfully punished, for the crime of  another, in which 
he has had no share.  All merit and demerit is entirely perso- 
nal and  incommunicable ;  and  we have no right to punish any 
but those, who deserve it. 
XLI.  It sometimes  happens however, that innocent persons 
suffer on the account of the crimes of  others ;  but we must make 
two remarks  on this subject. 
I.  hot every  thing, that occasions uileasiness, pain,  or loss 
to a person, is properly a punishment ;  for example when sub- 
jects  suffer some grievances from the  miscarriages  and  crimes 
of  their prince, it is not in respect  to them a punishment, but 
a misfortune. 
The second remark is, that these kinds of  evils, or  indirect 
punishments, if  we may call them so, are inseparable from the 
constitution of  human affairs. 
XLII.  Thus if  we  tke  effects  of  a  person, his 
children  suffer  indeed  for  it ; but  it  is  not  properly  a 
punishment  to  them,  since those  effects  ought to  belong  to 
them only  on supposition that  their father had kept  them  till 
his death.  In a  word we must  either  almost entirely abolish 
the use of  punishments,  or  acknowledge, that these  inconven- 
iences,  inseparable from the constitution  of  human affairs,  and 
from  the particular relations, which  men  have  to each  other, 
have nothing in themselves unjust. 
XLIII.  Lastly it is to be observed,  that there  are crimes so 
enormous,'so  essentially affecting in regard to society, that the 
public good authorises the sovereign to take the  strongest pre- 
cautions against them, and even, if  necessary,  to make part  of 
the punishment fall on  the persons most dear to the  criminal. 
Thus the children of traitors, or state criminals, may be exclud- 
ed from  honors  and preferments.  The father is severely punish* 
ed by this method, since he sees he is the cause, why the persons 
dearest to him are reduced to live in obscurity.  But this is not 
properly a punishment in regard to the clddren j  for the sover- 
eign, having  a right to give  public  employments to  whom he 
pleases, may,  when the public  good requires it,  exclude  even 
persons,  who have done nothing to render themselves unworthy 
of  these preferments.  I  confess that this is  a hardship,  but 
necessity authorises it, to the end that the tenderness of  a par- 
ent for his offspring may  render him  more cautious to under- 
take nothing  against  the state.  But  equity  ought  always to 
direct those judgments,  and to mitigate them according to cir- 
cumstances. 
XLIV.  I am not of opinion, that we can exceed these bounds, 
neither does the public good require it.  It is  therefore  a real 
piece of  injustice, established among several nations, namely to 
banish or kill the children of  a tyrant or traitor,  and sometimes 
all his relations, though they were no accomplices in his crimes. 
This is sufficient to give us a  right idea of  the  famous law of 
ArcadiusX the Christian emperor. 
CHAP.  V. 
Of the p-  aJ  mergns  over the born  Retpublica¶ w the 
goods  cc~rtnined  in the commonwealth. 
I.  THE  right of  the sovepign over the goods, contained 
in the commonwealth,  relates either to the  goods  of  the sub- 
ject,  or to those, which belong to the commonwealth itself,  ao 
such. 
11.  The right of  the prince over  the goods  of  the  subject 
may  be established two  different ways ;  for  either it may  be 
founded on the very nature of  the  sovereignty, or on the  par- 
ticular manner in which it was acquired. 
111.  If  we suppose, that a chief  ruler possesses,  with a full 
right of property, all the goods contained in the commonwealth, 
and that he has collected as it were his own subjects, who orig- 
inally hold their estates of him, then it is certain,  that the sov- 
ereign has as absolute a power over those estates, as every mas- 
ter of  a family has over his own patrimony ;  and that the sub- 
jects cannot elljoy or dispose of  those goods  or estates,  but so 
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far  as rb  sovereign  permits.  In these  circurll.stances,  wliile 
the sovereign has remitted nothing of  hi  right by  irrevoc&Ie 
grants, h&  subjects possess th;r estates in a prariaw mamer, 
revocable at pleasure, whenever tbe prince thisks fit ;  they can 
only  supply  themselves with sustenance  and &er  necessaries 
fram them.  In tbie case the  sovereignty is accompanied wLh 
a right of absolute property. 
IV.  But,  I.  this  manner  of establishing  the power of  the 
sovereign over  the goods, of  the subjects  cannot be  of  great 
use ;  and  if  it has sometimes  taken  place,  it  has only  been 
among  t&e  oriental nations,  who easily submit to a despotic gov- 
ernment. 
2.  Experience teaches us,  that this absolute dominion of  the 
sovereign over the gwds of the subject does not tend to the ad- 
vantage  of the  state.  A  modern  traveller  observes, that the 
countries,  where  this propriety of  the prince prevails,  however 
beautiful  and fertile of  themselves, become daily more desolate, 
poor,  and barbarous ;  or that at least they are not so flourishing, 
as most of the kingdoms of  Europe, where the  subjects possess 
their estates as their own property,  exclusive of the prince. 
3  The supreme power  does not of itself  require,  that  the 
prince should have this absolute dominion over the estates of his 
subjects.  The property of individuals is prior to the formation 
of states, and there is no  reason,  which  can induce us to sup- 
pose,  that those individuals entirely transferred to the sovereign 
the right they had over their own estates ;  on the contrary, it is 
to secure a quiet and easy  possession of  their  properties,  that 
they have instituted government and sovereignty. 
4.  Besides, if  we should suppose an absolute sovereignty ac- 
quired  by  arms,  yet this  does  not  of  itself  give an arbitrsry 
dominion over the property  of  the  subject.  The same is true 
even of  a patrimonial sovereignty,  which  confers a right of  al- 
ienating the crown ;  for this right of the sovereign does not hin- 
der the subject from enjoying his respective properties. 
V.  Let us therefore  conclude, 'that  in general  the right of 
the prince over the goods of the subjects is  not an absolute do- 
minion over their properties, but a right foumded on the nature 
and end of  sovereignty, which  invests  lrim  with  the  power of 
disposing of those estates in different manners, for the benefit of 
individuals, as well  as of  the state, without depriving the sub- 
jects  of  their right to their  properties,  excep in cases where it 
is absolutely necessary for the public good. 
VI.  This being  premised, the  prince,  as  sovereign,  has a 
right over the estates of  his subjects  principally in three  differ- 
ent manners. 
The first consists in regulating, by wise laws,  the use,  which 
every  one  ought  to  make of  his  goods and estate, for the ad- 
vantage of  the state and that of  individuals. 
The second, in raising subsidies and taxes. 
The third, in using the  rights of  sovereign  or trrlnrcendental 
property.* 
VII.  To  the first head we must reduce all sumptuary lawr, by 
which bounds are set to unnecessary expenses, which ruin fami- 
lies and consequently impoverish the state.  Nothing is  more 
conducive to the happiness  of  a nation, or more worthy of the 
care of the sovereigh, than to  oblige  the  subjects  to economy, 
frugality, and labor. 
When luxury has once prevailed in a nation, the evil becomes 
alinost incurable.  As too great authority spoils kings, so luxu- 
ry poisons a whole people.  'The  most  superfluous things are 
looked upon as necessary, and new necessities are daily invented. 
Thus families are ruined, and individuals disabled from contrib- 
uting to the expenses necessary for the public good.  An indi- 
vidual, for instance, who spends only three fifths of his income, 
and pays oile fifth for the  public service, will not hurt himself, 
since he lays up a fifth to increase his stock.  But if  he spend 
all his income, he either cannot pay  the taxes, or he must break 
in upon his capital. 
Another  inconvenience  is, that not only the estates of indi- 
viduals are squandered away by luxury, but, what is still worse, 
they are generally carried abroad into foreign countries, in pur- 
suit of  those things, which flatter luxury and vanity. 
The impoverishing of individuals produces another evil for the 
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more  inclined  to marriage, when a moderate  expense  is  suffi- 
cient for the support of a family. 
This the emperor Augustus was very sensible of;  for when 
he wanted  to reform  the manners  of  the Romans,  among the 
various edicts, which he either made or renewed, he reestablish- 
ed both  the sumptuary law, and that,  which obliged people to 
marry. 
When luxury is once introduced,  it  soon becomes a general 
evil, and the contagion insensibly spreads from the first men of the 
state to the very dregs of the people.  The  king's relations want 
to imitate his magnificence ;  the nobility, that of  his  relations ; 
the gentry or middle sort of people,  endeavour to equal the no- 
bility ;  and the poor would  fain pass for gentry.  Thus every 
one living beyond his income,  the people are ruined,  and all or- 
ders and distinctions confounded. 
History informs us,  that  in all  ages  luxury has been one of 
the causes, which has more or  less contributed to the ruin and 
decay even  of  the  most powerful states, because it sensibly en- 
ervates courage, and destroys virtue.  Suetonius  observes, that 
Julius Czsar invaded the liberties of  his country only in conse- 
quence of  not knowing how to pay the debts, he had contracted 
by his excessive prodigality, nor how  to  support  his expensive 
way of living.  Many sided with him,  because  they  had  not 
wherewith to supply their  luxury,  to  wliich they  had been ac- 
customed,  and they were in hopes  of getting  by the  civil wars 
enough to supply their former extravagance." 
We  must  observe  in fine,  that,  to  render  the  sumptuary 
laws more effectual,  princes and magistrates ought,  by the ex- 
ample of  their  own  moderation,  to put  those  out of  counte- 
nance, who  love  extravagance, and to  encourage the prudent, 
who would easily submit to follow the pattern of a good econ- 
omy and honest frugality. 
VIII.  To  this right of the sovereign of  directing the subjects 
in the use of  their estates and  goods, we must also reduce the 
laws against gaming  and prodigality, those, which set bounds to 
grants,  legacies,  and testaments ;  and in fine those against idle 
*  See  fall.  ad  Cawr.  de  Repub.  ordinand. 
and  lazy  peopIe, and against persons,  who suffer their  estates 
to run to ruin, purely by  carelessness and neglect. 
IX.  Above all, it is of great importance to use every endeav- 
or to banish  idleness, that  fruitful source of  disorders.  The 
want  of  a useful  and  honest  occupation  is the fouridation of 
an infinite nunrber of  mischiefs.  The human mind cannot re- 
main in a state of inaction, and, if it be not employed on some- 
thing good, it  will inevitably apply itself  to something bad,. as 
the experience of  all ages demonstrates.  It  were therefore to 
be wished, that there were laws against idleness,  to prevent  its 
pernicious effects;  and  that no  person  was permitted  to  live 
without  some honest  occupation either  of  the mind or  body. 
Especially young people, who aspire after political, ecclesiastical, 
or military employments, ought not to  be permitted  to pass, in 
shameful idleness, the time  of  their  life most  proper  for  the 
study  of  morality,  politics,  and religion.  It is obvious that a 
wise prince may, from  these reflections,  draw  very  impartant 
instructions for government. 
X.  The second manner, in which  the prince can dispose of 
the goods or estates of  his subjects, is, by demanding  taxes  or 
subsidies of  them.  That the sovereign has this right will evi- 
dently appear,  if  we consider, that taxes are  no  more than  a 
contribution, which individuals pay to the state  for the preser- 
vation and  defence of  their lives and properties, a contribution 
absolutely necessary both for the ordinary and extraordinary cs- 
penses of  government, which the sovereign neither can or ought 
to furnish out of  his own  fund.  He must therefore, for  that 
end and purpose, have a right to take away part of  the goods of 
the subject by way  of  tax. 
XI.  Tacitus  relates  a  memorable  story  on  this  subject. 
'S  Nero, he says,  once thought to abolish all taxes,  and to make 
"  this  magnificent  grant  to  the  Roman  people;  but  rhe 
'c  senate moderated his ardour ;  and, after  having cornmended 
"  the emperor for his generous design, they told him,  that the 
"  empire would inevitably fall,  if  its foundations were sapped ; 
"  that  most  of  the  taxes  had  been  established  by  the  con- 
"  suls and tribunes  during  the  very  height  of  liberty  in  the 
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"  supplying the immense expenses necessary for the support of 
"  SO great an empire." 
XII.  Nothing is then generally more unjust ad  unreasona- 
ble, than the complaints  of  the  populace,  who  frequently  as- 
cribe their misery  to taxes, without reflecting,  that these are, on 
the contrary, the foundation of the tranquillity and safety of  the 
state, and that they cannot refuse to pay them without prejudic- 
ing their own interests. 
XIII.  However the end and  prudence  of  civil  government 
require not only,  that  the people should not be overcharged in 
this respect,  but also that the taxes should be rai'sed  in as gentle 
and imperceptible  a manner as possible. 
XN. And I. the subjects must be equally charged, that t!ley 
may have no just reason of  complaint.  A burden, equally sup- 
ported by all, is lighter to every individual ;  but, if a considera- 
ble number release or excuse themselves,  it becomes much more 
heavy and insupportable to the rest.  As every subject equnlly 
enjoys the protection of  the government,  and th2 safety, which 
it procures;  it is just that they should all contribute to its MP- 
port in a proper equality. 
XV.  2.  It is to be observed however,  that this equality does 
not consist in paying equal sums of money,  but in equally bear- 
ing the burden,  imposed for the good of  the state ;  that is, thpre 
must be a just  proportion  between the burden of  t'ie  tax and 
the benefit of peace ; for  though  all equally enjoy  peace,  yet 
the advantages, which all reap from it,  are not equal. 
XVI.  3.  Every man ought therefore to be taxed il:  propor- 
tion to his income,  both in ordinary and  extraordinary  exigen- 
cies. 
XVII.  4.  Experience shows,  that  the best  method of rais- 
ing taxes is to lay them on  things,  daily consumed in life. 
XVIII.  5.  As to merchandizes imported, it is to be observ- 
ed, that, if  they are not necessary,  but only subservient to lux- 
ury, very great duties may justly be  laid on them. 
XIX.  6.  When foreign merchandizes consist of such things, 
as may grow, or be manufactured at home,  by the industry and 
application  of  our  own people,  the imposts ought to be raised 
higher upon those articles. 
XX.  7.  With regard to the  exportation of  commodities of 
our  own growth, if  it be the interest  of  the  state,  that they 
should not go  out of  the country,  it may be right to raise the 
customs upon them ;  but on the contrary, if it is for the public 
advantage,  that thy  should be sent to foreign markets, then the 
duty of  exportation ought to be  diminished, or absolutely taken 
away.  In some  countries,  by  a wise piece of  policy,  rewards 
are given to  the subjects, who export such comn~odities,  as are 
in too great plenty, and far surpassing  the wants of  the inhab- 
itants. 
XXI.  8.  In a word, in the application of  all these maxims, 
the sovereign must attend to the good of trade, and take all prop- 
er measures to make it flourish. 
XXII.  It is unnecessary to observe, that the right of  the sov- 
ereign, with respect to taxes, being founded on the wants of the 
state, he ought never to raise them, but  in proportion to those 
wants ;  neither should he employ them,  but with that view, nor 
apply them to his own private  uses. 
XXIII.  He ought also to attend to rht candurt of the  o& 
cers, who collect them,  so as to hinder  their  importunity and 
oppression.  Thus Tacitus commends a very wise edict of  the 
emperor Nero, "  who ordered,  that  the magistrates of  Rome 
"  and of  the ~rovinces  should  receive  complaints  against 
'' publicans at all times,  and regulate them on the spot." 
XXIV.  The sovereign or  transcendenlal property,"  which, as 
we have said, constitutes the third part of  the sovereign's  pow- 
er over the estates of  his subjects,-consists  in the right of mak- 
ing use of every thing,  the subject possesses, in order to answer 
the necessities of  the state. 
XXV.  'Thus  for example,  if  a  town is  to be  fortified,  he 
may  take the gardens,  lands,  or houses of  private subjects,  sit- 
uated in the place,  where the ramparts or ditches are to be rais- 
ed.  In sieges he may beat down houses  and  trees  belonging 
to private pcrsons to the end,  that the enemy may not be  shel- 
tered by them, or the garrison  incommoded 
XXVI.  There are great disputes among politicians, concern- 
ing this transce7iJemtcrlpraperty.  Some absolutely  will not  ad- 
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mit of  it ;  but the dispute turns more upon the word, than the 
thing.  It is certain,  that  the  very nature of  sovereignty au- 
thorises a prince, in case of  necessity, to make use of- the goods 
and fortunes of  his  subjects ;  since  in conferring the supreme 
authority upon him, they have at  the same time  given him the 
power of  doing  and  exacting  every thing necessary  for  the 
preservation and advantage of  the state.  Whether this be cal- 
led transcendtntal property,  or by some other name, is altogether 
indifferent, provided we are agreed about the right itself. 
XXVII.  To say  something  more particular concerning this 
transcendental property,  we  must  observe it to be a maxim  of 
natural equity,  that, when contributions  are to be raised for the 
exigencies of  the state, and for the preservation of some partic- 
ular  object by persons,  who  enjoy it  in common,  every  man 
ought to pay  his quota, and should not be forced to bear more 
of  the burden, than another. 
XXVIII.  But since it may happen, that  the pressing wants 
of  the state, and particular circumstances,  will not  permit  this 
rule to be literally followed, thorc-ie a necessity, that the sover- 
eign should have a right to deviate from it, and to seize on the 
property of a private subject, the use of which, in the present cir- 
cumstances,  is  become  necessary  to  the public.  I-Ience  this 
right takes place ocly  ill  case  of  a  necessity  of  state,  wllicli 
ought not to have too great an extent, but  should be tempered 
as much as possible with the rules of  equity. 
XXIX.  It is therefore just in that case,  that the proprietors 
should be indemnified, as near as possible, either by their fellow 
subjects, or by  the exchequer.  But ii  he subjects have volun- 
tarily exposed themselves, by building houses in a place,  where 
they are to be pulled down in time of  war, then the state is not 
in rigour obliged to indemnify them, and they may be reasona- 
bly thought to have consented to this loss.  This is suficient for 
what relates to the right of  the sovereign over the estates of the 
subject. 
XXX.  But, besides  these rights, the  prince has also origin- 
ally a power of  disposing of  certain places, called pr~blic goods, 
because they belong to the state as such.  But, as these public 
goods are not all of  the same kind, the right of  the  sovereign 
in this respect also varies* 
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XXXI.  There  are  goods,  intended for the  support  of  the 
king and the royal family, and others ,to defray the expenses of 
the  government.  The former are called the crown  lands, or 
the patrimony of the prince ;  and the latter the public treasure, 
or the revenue ,of  the state. 
XXXII.  With regard  to the  former, the sovereign has the 
full and entire  profits, and may dispose of  the revenues, arising 
from them, as he absolutely pleases.  So  that what he lays up 
out of  his income makes an accession to his own private patri- 
mony,  unless  the laws  of  the land have determined otherwise. 
With regard to other public goods,  he  has only the simple ad- 
ministration of them, in which he ought to propose only the ad- 
vantage  of the state, and to express as much  care and fidelity, 
as a guardian with respect to the estate of hi$ pupil. 
XXXIII.  By these principles we may judge to whom the ac- 
quisitions  belong,  which a prince  has  made  during his reign; 
for if  these acquisitions arise from the goods, intended to defray 
the public expense, they  ought certainly  to accrue to the pub- 
lic,  and not to the prince's private patrimony.  But if a king has 
undertaken  and supported  a war at his own expense, and with- 
out engaging or charging the state in the least,  he may lawfully 
appropriate  the acquisitions, he has made in such an expidition. 
XXXIV.  From the principles here established it follows al- 
so, that the sovereign cannot, without the consent of the people 
or their representatives, alienate the least part either of the pub- 
lic patrimony,  or of  the crown lands,  of which he has only the 
use.  But we must  distinguish  between  the  goods themselves 
and the profits or produce of them.  The king may dispose of 
the revenues or profits, as he thinks  proper,  though he cannot 
alienate the principle. 
XXXV.  A prince indeed, who has a right of laying taxes if 
he thinks meet and just,  maj, when the necessities of  the com- 
monwealth require it, mortgage a part of the public patrimony. 
For it is the same thing to the people,  whether they give money 
to prevent  the  mortgage, or it be  levied upon them afterwards 
in order to redeem it. 
XXXVI.  This however is to be understood upon supposition, 
that things are not otherwise regulated by the fundamental laws 
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XKXVII.  In  respect  to the  alienation  of  the  kingdom, or 
some part of it, from the principles hitherto established, we may 
easily form a judgment of the matter. 
And  I.  if there be any such thing, as a patrimoninl kingdom, 
it is evident that the sovereign may alienate the whole, and still 
more so, that he may transfer a part of it.* 
XXXVIII. 2.  But,  if the kingdom be not possessed as a pat- 
rimony, the king cannot by his own authority,  transfer or alien- 
ate any part of it ;  for then the consent of the people is  neces- 
eary.  Sovereignty  of itself does not imply the right of  aliena- 
non,  and as  the people cannot take the crown from the prince 
against his  will,  neither has the  king a power  of  substituting 
another sovereign in his place with~ut  their consent. 
XXXIX.  3.  But  if  only a part of  the kingdom is to be al- 
ienated, besides the approbation of the king and that of the peo- 
ple, it is necessary, that the inhabitants of  the part,  which is to 
be  alienated, should also consent ;  and  the latter seems to  be 
the most  necessary.  It is to no purpose,  that the other parts 
of  the kingdom agree to the alienation of this province, if  the in- 
habitants themselves oppose 3.  The right of  the plurality of 
suffrages does not  extend so far, as to cut off from the body of 
the state those, who have not once violated their engagements, 
nor the laws of  society. 
XL.  And indeed it  is evident,  that  the  persons,  who first 
erected the commonwealth, and those, who voluntarily came into 
it afterwards,  bound themselves, by mutual compact, to form a 
permanent body or society, under one and the same government, 
so long at least, as they inclined to remain in the territories of the 
same atate ;  and it is with a view to the advantages, which ac- 
crued to them in  common from this reciprocal union, that  they 
first erected the state.  This is the foundation of their compacts 
in regard to government.  Therefore they cannot, against their 
will, be deprived  of  the right,  they  have acquired,  of  being 2 
part of a certain  body  politic,  except  by way of  punishment. 
Besides, in this case,  there is an obligation, corresponding  to the 
above right.  The state, by virtue of the same compact, has ac- 
quired a right over each of its members, so that no subject can 
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put himself  under a foreign  government, nor  disclaim the  au- 
thority of  his natural  sovereign. 
XLI.  4.  It is however to be observed, that there are two gen- 
eral exceptions to the principles here  established, both  of them 
founded on the right and privileges, arising from necessity.  The 
first is,  that,  though  the body of  the state has not the right of 
alienating  any  of  its  parts,  so as to oblige  that  part,  against 
its will,  to  submit to a new master,  the state however may be 
justified in abandoning one of its parts, when there is ari evident 
danger of  perishing if  they continue united. 
XLII.  It  is true that  even  under  those  circun~stances,  the 
sovereign cannot directly oblige one of his towns or provinces to 
submit to another government.  He  only has a power to withdraw 
his forces,  or abandon the inhabitants ;  but they retain the right 
of defending themselves if  they can ;  so that,  if  they find they 
have strength sufficient to resist  the  enemy, there is no reason 
why they should not;  and, if  they succeed, they may erect them- 
selves into a distinct commonwealth.  Hence the conqueror be- 
comes the  lawful sovereign of  that particular country  only  by 
the consent of the inhabitants, or by their swearing allegiance to 
him. 
XLIII.  It  may be said, that,  properly speaking, the state or 
the sovereign do not alienate, in  this case,  such a part, but only 
renounce a society, whose engagements are at an end by  virtue 
of a tacit exception, arising from necessity.  After all it would 
be in vain for the body to persist in defending such a part,  since 
we suppose it unable to preserve or defend itself.  It is there- 
fore a mere  misfortune,  which must  be suffered  by  the aban- 
doned part. 
XLlV  5. But, if this be the right of  the body with respect 
to  the  part, the part has  also,  in like  circumstances,  the same 
right with regard  to  the body.  Thus we  cannot condemn a 
town, which,after having made the best resistance it could, choos- 
es rather to surrender to the enemy, than be pillaged and expos- 
ed to fire and sword. 
XLV.  In a word, every one has a natural right to take care of 
his own preservation by  all possible means ;  and it is principal- 
ly  for the better  attainment of  this end, that men have entered 
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into civil societies.  If therefore the state can no longer defend 
and protect the subjects,  they are disengaged from the ties they 
were under,  and resume their  original right of  taking  care  of 
themselves independently of the state, in the manner they think 
most proper.  Thus things  are  equal on both  sides ;  and the 
sentiment of  Grotius,  who refuses the body  of  the state, with 
respect  to the part,  the same  right,  which  he grants the part, 
with respect to the body, cannot be maintained. 
XLVI.  We shall conclude  this chapter with two  remarks. 
The first is,  that the maxim,  which some politicians inculcate so 
strongly, namely,  that the goods, appropriated to the crown, are 
absolutely unalienable,  is not true,  except on the terms,  and  a- 
greebly to the principles here established.  What the same pol- 
iticians add,  that an alienation,  succeeded bya peaceable posses- 
sion for a long course of  years, does not hinder a  future right 
ta what belonged to the  crown, and  the  resumption of  it  by 
main force,  on the first occasion, is  altogether unreasonable. 
The second  observation is,  that, since it is not lawful for  a 
king independently of the  will of  the people or of  their repre- 
sentatives,  to alienate the whole or any  part of  his kingdom,  it 
is not right for him  to  render it  feudatory to another prince 
for this is evidently a kind of  alienation. 




In which are considered the dferent  rights of sovereignty with yes- 
pect to foreign  states ;  the right of war and every  thing relating 
a it ;  ptrlic treaties, and the right of  nmbassadors. 
CHAP.  I. 
Of  war in general,  ondfivst of  the right  of  the sovereign,  in thi~ 
respect,  over his subjec~~. 
I.  WHATEVER has  been  hitherto  said  of  the  es- 
sential  parts  of  sovereignty  properly  and  directly  regards 
the internal administration of  the state.  But,  as the happiness 
and prospertg of  a  nation  demand  not  only,  that order  and 
peace should be  maintained at  home,  but also,  that  the state 
should be protected from the insults of enemies abroad, and ob- 
tain all the advantages it can from other nations ;  we shall pro- 
ceed  to examine those parts  of  sovereignty,  which directly re- 
gard the safety and external advantages of  the state,  and discuss 
the most essential questions relating to this  subject. 
11.  To  trace things from their original we must first observe, 
that mankind being  divided into several societies, called states or 
natiorzs,  those political bodies, forming a kind of  society  among 
themselves,  are  also subjected  to those  primitive  and general 
laws,  which  Gocl has given to  all manlrind, and  consequently 
they are obliged to practise certain duties towards each other. 
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properly cailcd  the law  of  notions ;  and these  are  no  more, 
than the laws of nature, which men,  considered  as members of 
society in general,  ought to practise  towards each other ;  or, in 
other words,  the  law of  nations  is  no more, than the general 
law of  sociability, applied  not to individuals,  composing a socie- 
ty,  but to men,  as forming different  bodies, called Jtates or na- 
tion~. 
IV.  The natural state of nations, with respect to each other, 
is certainly that of  society and peace.  Such is the natural and 
primitive state of one  m.in  with respect to another ;  and what- 
ever alteration mankind may have in regard to their original state, 
they cannot,  without violating  their  duty,  break in  upon  that 
state  of  peace  and society, in  which nature has placed  them ; 
and which by her  laws she  has  so  strongly recommended  to 
their observance. 
V.  Hence proceed  several maxims of  the  law of  nations ; 
for example,  that  all  states ought  to look  upon themselves as 
naturally eaual and independent, and to treat each othcr as such 
on all occasions.  Likewise that they ought  to do no injury to 
any other, but, on the  contrary,  repair  that,  which they  may 
have committed.  Hence also arises their right of endeavouring 
to provide  for their  safety  and  happiness,  and  of  employing 
force and arms against those, who declare themselves their enemies. 
Fidelity  in treaties and alliailces, and the respect due to ambas- 
sadors,  are  derived  from the same principle.  This is the idea 
we ought to form of  the law of  nations in general. 
VI.  We  do not  here propose  to enter into  all the political 
questions, which may be started concerning the law of  nations ; 
we shall only examine the following  articles,  which, being  the 
most considerable, include almost all the  rest, I mean the 1-ight 
of war, that of  treaties and alliunces,  atid that of  ambassadors. 
V1.I.  The subject of the right of  war, being equally  impor- 
tant and extensive,  merits  to be treated  with  great exactness. 
We  have  already observed, that  it is a fundamental  maxim  of 
the law of nature and nations,  that  individuals and states ought 
to live in a state of union and society ;  that they  should not in- 
jure each other, but on the contrary should mutually exercise the 
duties of humanity. 
VIII.  Whenever men practise these duties,  they  are said  to 
be in a state of  peace.  This state is certainly the most agreea- 
ble to our nature,  as well as the most capable of promoting hap- 
piness ; and  indeed the law of  nature was intended chiefly to 
establish and preserve  it. 
IX.  The state opposite to that of  union and peace is what we 
call  war, which, in the most general sense,  is no more than the 
state of  those,  who try  to  determine their  differences  by  the 
ways of  force.  I say  this is the most general sense, for,  in a 
more limited significltion, common use has restrained the word 
war to that, carried on between sovereign  powers.' 
X.  Though a state of peace  and mutual benevolence is cer- 
tainly  most  natural  to rnan  and  most  agreeable  to  the  laws, 
which ought to  be his  guide,  war  is nevertheless permitted in 
certain circumstances, and sometinles necessary both for individ- 
uals  and nations.  'l'his  we have suficiently shown in the sec- 
ond part of  this  work,  by  establishing the rights,  with which 
natur? has invested mankind for their own preservation,  and the 
means they may lawfully employ for attaining that end.  The 
principles of  tllis kind, which we have established  with respect 
to particulars,  equally,  and even for stronger reasons,  are appli- 
cable to nations. 
XI.  The law of  God no less enjoins a whole nation to take 
care of  their preseivation, than it does private men.  It is there- 
fore just,  that they should employ force against those,  who, de- 
claring themselves  their enemies,  violate  the law  of  sociability 
towards  them,  refuse them their due,  seek to deprive  them  of 
their advantages,anleven  to destroy them.  It  is therefore for the 
good of  society,  that people should be able to repress the malice 
and efforts of those, who subvert the foundations of  it;  other- 
wise  the  human  species would become the victims  of robbery 
and licentiousness.  For the right of  making war is, properly 
speaking, the most powerful means of  maintaining peace. 
XII.  Hence it is certain that the  sovereign, in whose hands 
the interest  of  the whole society is lodged, has a right to make 
war.  Rut, if  it be so,  we  must of  course allow him  the right 
of  employing the several neans necessary  for that end.  In a 
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word,  we  must  grant him the  power of  levying  troops,  and 
obliging them to perform the most dangerous duties even at the 
peril of their lives.  And this is one branch of  the right of  lie 
and death, which manifestly belongs to the sovereign. 
XIII.  But as the strength and valour of  troops depend, in a 
great measure,  on  their  being  well  disciplined, the  sovereign 
ought, even in times of  peace, to train the subjects up to mar- 
tial exercises,  to the end that  they, when occasion requires,  be 
more able to sustain the fatigues, and perform the different du- 
ties of  war. 
XIV.  The obligation,  under which  subjects are  in this res- 
pect, is  SO rigorous and  strong,  that,  strictly speaking,  no  man 
can be exempted from taking up arms,  when his country calls on 
him for assistance ;  and his refusal would be a justreason not to tol- 
erate such a person any longer in the society.  If in most gov- 
ergments there are some subjects exempted from military exer- 
cises, this impunity is not a privilege, that  belongs to  them by 
right;  it is only a toleration, that has no force, but when  there 
are troops sufficient for the defence of  the commonwealth, and 
the persans, to wham it is granted, tollow some other useful and 
necessary  employment.  Excepting this case, in time of  need 
all the  members of  the state ought to take the field, and none 
can be lawfully exempted. 
XV.  In consequence  of these principles,  military discipline 
should be very rigorous ;  the smallest neglect, or the least fault, 
is often of the  last importance,  and for that reason  may  be se- 
verely punished.  Other judges make  some allowance for the 
weakness of  human nature,  or the violence of  passions ;  but in 
a counsel of  war,  there is  not  so much  indulgence ; death  is 
often inflicted on a soldier, whom the dread of  that very evil has 
induced to quit his post. 
XVI.  It is therefore the duty of  those,  who are once enlist- 
ed,  to  maintain  the post,  where the general has placed them ; 
and to fight bravely,  even though they run a risk of  losing their 
lives.  To  conquer or die  is the law of such engagements ;  and 
it is certainly much better  to  lose  one's  life gloriously, by en- 
deavouring to destroy that of  the enemy,  than to die in a cow- 
ardly manner.  Hence some judgment  may be formed of what 
we ought to think of  those captains of ships, who,  by  orders of 
their superior, blow themselves  up into  the air, rather than fall 
into the hands of  the enemy.  Suppose the  number of  ships 
equal on both  sides,  if  oce of  our vessels is taken the  enemy 
will have two more than we ;  whereas if  one of  ours is sunk, 
they will have but  one more ;  and  if  the vessel, which wants 
to take ours,  sink with it, which often happens, the  forces will 
remain equal. 
XVII.  In regard to the question, whether subjects are oblig- 
ed to take up arms, and serve in an unjust  war, we must judge 
of  it by the principles already established at the end of  the first 
chapter of  the third part, which treats  of  the Iegislntive  power. 
XVIII.  These  are the obligations of  subjects with  respect 
to war and to the defence of government ;  but this part of the 
supreme power being of  great importance, the utmost  precau- 
tion is required in the sovereign to exercise it in such a manner, 
as may prove advaritageous  to the state.  We  shall here point out 
the principal maxims on this  article of  politics. 
XIX.  First then it is evident,  that the force  of  a state, with 
respect to war, consists chiefly in the number of  its inhabitants; 
sovereigns therefore ought to neglect  nothing,  that  can  either 
support or augment the number of  them. 
XX.  Among the  other means,  which may be used  for this 
purpose,  there are  three of  great  efficacy.  The first is easily 
to receive  all strangers  of  good  character,  who want to settle 
among us ;  to let them taste the  sweets  of  government ;  and 
to make them share the advantages of  civil  liberty.  Thus the 
state is filled  with  the subjects, who bring with them the arts, 
commerce,  and riches;  and among whom we may,  in  time of 
need, find a considerable  number of  good  soldiers. 
XXI.  Another thing, conducive to the same end,  is to favor 
and encourage marriages,  which  are the  pledges of  the state ; 
and to make good laws for this purpose.  The mildness of  the 
government  may,  among other things, greatly contribute to in- 
cline the subjects to join  together in wedlock.  People,  loaded 
with taxes, who  can hardly,  by their labour,  find  wherewithal 
to supply the wants of  life and the public charges,  are not  in- 
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XXII.  Lastly another mean, very proper for maintaining and 
augmenting the number of inhabitants, is liberty of  conscience. 
Religion is one of  the greatest  advantages of  mankind,  and all 
men view it in that light.  Every thing, tending to deprive them 
of  this liberty, appears insupportable.  They cannot easily ac- 
custom themselves to a government, which tyrannizes over them 
in this article.  France,  Spain,  and  Holland  present  us  with 
sensibie proofs of the truth of  these observations.  Persecutions 
have deprived  the  first  of  a great part of  her inhabitants ;  by 
which means slie has been considerably weakened.  The  second 
is almo~t  unpeopled ;  and this depopulation is occasioned by the 
barbarous  and  tyrannical establishment,  called the Inquisition ; 
an establishment equally affronting to God and pernicious to hu- 
man society, and which has made a kind of desert of one of the 
finest countries in Europe.  The third, in  consequence of  an 
entire liberty of  conscience,  which she offers to all the world, is 
considerably improved even amidst wars 2nd disasters.  She  has 
raised herself,  as it were, on the ruin of  other  nations,  and  by 
the number of  her inhabitants. whn hzve hmueht  power,  com- 
merce,  and riches  into  her  bosom,  she enjoys a high degree of 
credit and prosperity. 
XXIII.  The great number of inhabitants is therefore the prin- 
cipal strength of a country.  But for this end,  the subjects must 
also be inured betimes to labor, and trained to virtue.  Luxury, 
effzminacy, and pleasure, impair the body, and enervate the mind. 
A prince thkrefore,  who desires to put the military establishment 
on a proper footing, ought to take particular  care of the educa- 
tion of  youth, so as to procure his subjects the  means of  form- 
ing themselves, by a strict discipline,  to bodily exercises, anti to 
prevent luxury and pleasure from debauching their manners, or 
weakening their courage. 
XXIV.  Lastly one of the most effectual means of having good 
troops is to make them observe the militirry order and discipline 
with all possible  care  and  exactness ; to  take particdar  care, 
that the soldiers be punctually paid ;  to see that the sick be prop- 
erly looked after, and  to furnish them with the assistance, they 
stand in need of;  lastly, to preserve among them a knowledge 
of religion  and  of  the  duties it prescribes,  by proc!iring  them 
the means 05  instruction.  These are the principal  malrims, 
which good  policy  suggest3  to sovereigns, by means of  which 
they  may  reasonably  hope always  to find good troops among 
their subjects,  such as shall be disposed to spill the last drop of 
their blood in defence of  their cauntty. 
CHAP. 11. 
Of  the  caum of  war, 
I. I  F war be sometimes lawful, and even necessary,  as we 
have  already demonstrated,  this is to be understood  when it is 
undertaken  only  for just  reasons,  and  on  condition, that the 
prince,  who undertakes it,  proposes,  by that method, to obtain 
a solid and lasting peace.  A war may therefore be either just 
or unjust, according to the cause, which has produced it. 
11.  A war is just if undertaken for just reasons ;  and unjust 
if it be entered into  without a cause, or at least without a  just 
and sufficient motive. 
111.  To  illustrate the mamr,  wc T,  4th  Grotius,  distin- 
guish between the justifying reasons, and the motives of the war. 
The former are those,  which render,  or  seem to render,  the war 
just with respect to the enemy, so that, in taking up arms against 
him,  we do not think we do him injustice.  The latter are the 
views of interest, which determine a prince to come to an open 
rupture.  Thus,  in  the war of Alexander  against Darius,  the 
justifying reason of tbe former was to  revenge the injuries,  which 
the Greeks had received from the Persians.  The motives were, 
the ambition, vanity, md avarice of that conqueror, who took up 
arms the more cheerfully, as the expeditions of  Xenophon  and 
Agesilaus made him conceive great hopes of success.  The  jus- 
tifying reason of the second  Punic war was a dispute about the 
city of Saguntum.  The motive was an old grudge, entertained 
by the  Carthaginians  against the  Romans  for  the hard terms, 
they were obliged to submit to,  when reduced to a low condition 
ad  the encouragemeat given them by t$c mcoea 06 their anha 
in Spain. 
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IV.  In a war perfectly just,  the justifying  reasons must not 
only be lawful, but also must be blended with the motive ;  that 
is,  we must never undertake a war but from the necessity of de- 
fending ourselves against an insult, of recovering our undoubted 
right,  or of obtaining satisfaction for a manifest injury. 
V.  Thus a war may be vicious or unjust, with respect to the 
causes, four different ways. 
I.  When we undertake it without any just reason, or so much 
as an apparent motive  of advantage, but only from a fierce and 
brutal fury,  which delights in blood and slaughter.  But it may 
be doubted whether we can find an example  of so barbarous a 
war. 
VI.  2.  When we attack  others only  for our own interest, 
without their having done us any injury ;  that is, when we have 
no justifying  causes ;  and these  wars  are, with respect to the 
aggressor, downright robberies. 
VII.  3.  When we have some motives, founded on justifying 
causeg but which have still only an apparent equity, and when 
well examined, are found at the bottom to be unlawful. 
VIII.  4.  Lastly, we mq  say that a war is also unjust,  when, 
though we  have  good justifying  reasons,  yet  we undertake it 
from other motives, which have no relation to the injury receiv- 
ed ;  as for instance, through vain glory, or the desire of extend- 
ing our dominions, &c. 
IX.  Of these  four  sorts of  war,  the undertaking of  which 
includes injustice, the third and last are very common ;  for there 
are few nations so barbarous as to take up arms without alledg- 
ing some sort of justifying reasons.  It is not difficult to discover 
the injustice of  the third ;  as to the fourth, though perhaps ve- 
ry common, it is not so much unjust  in itself,  as with respect 
to the view and design of the person, who undertakes it.  But 
it is very difficult  to convince him of  it, the motives being gen- 
erally impenetrable, or at least most princes taking great care to 
conceal them." 
X.  ~iom  the principles  here established  we may conclude, 
See the  explication of  these principIes in Budeut's Jurisprud. 
sect.  28,  &C. 
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that  every  just war must be made,  either to  defend ourselves 
and our property  against those, who endeavour to injure us by 
assaulting our persons,  and by taking away  or ruining our  es- 
tates ;  or to constrain others to yield up  to us what they ought 
to do,  when we haie a  perfect right to require  it of  them ;  or 
lastly to obtain satisfaction for the damages, we have injurious- 
ly sustained, and to force those,  who did the injury, to give se- 
curity for their good behaviour. 
XI.  From  this we easily conceive  what the causes  of  war 
may be.  But  to illustrate the  subject  still further,  we  shall 
give some examples of  the principal unjust causes of war. 
I.  Thus, for example, to have a just reason for war, it is not 
sufficient, that we are afraid of  the growing power of  a neigh-. 
bour.  A11  we can do, in those circumstances, is innocently to 
try to obtain real caution, that he will attempt nothing against US 
and to put ourselves in a posture of defence.  But acts of ~OS- 
tility are not permitted,  except  when necessary ;  and they are 
never necessary so long, as we are not morally certain, that the 
neighbour we dread has nor only the power, but also  the incli- 
nation to attack us.  We  cannot for instance justly  declare war 
against a neighbour, purely because he orders citadels or fortifi- 
cations to be erected, which he may sometime or other employ 
to cur prejudice. 
XII.  2.  Neither does utility alone give the same right as ne- 
cessity, nor is it  sufficient to render a war lawful.  Thus,  for 
example,  we are not allowed to take up arms  with  a view to 
make ourselves masters of  a  place, which lies conveniently for 
us,  and is proper to cover our frontiers, 
XIII.  3.  We must say the same of  the desire of -changing 
our former settlements, and of  removing from marshes and dee- 
erts to a more fertile soil. 
4.  Nor is it less unjust to invade the righte and liberty  of  a 
people,  under a pretext of  their not being ss polished in  their 
manners, or of  such quick understanding as ourselves.  It wae 
therefore unjust in the Greeks to treat  those, whom they called 
Barbarians, as their natural  enemies,  on  account  of  the  di- 
versity of their manners, and perhaps because  they did TIO~  ap- 
pear  to be so ingenious as themselves. 364  THE PRINCIPLES OF 
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XW.  g.  It would  ala be an unjust  war  to take up arms 
against a nation, in order to bring them under subjection, under 
pretence of its being their interest to be governed by us.  Though 
a thing be advantageous to a person,  yet this does not give us a 
right to compel him  to  it.  Whoever  h3s the use  of  reason 
ought to have the liberty of  choosing what  he  thinka advanta- 
geous to himself 
XV.  We must  also observe, that  the  duties, which nations 
ought to practise towards each other, are! not all equally obliga- 
tory, and that their deficiency in this respect does not always lay 
a foundation for a just war.  Among nations, as well as individ- 
uals, there are duties attended with a rigorous and perfect obliga- 
tian,  the violation  of which implies an irzjury propevly  so called ; 
and duties of an imperfect obligation, which  give to another on- 
ly an  imperfect right.  And  as we cannot, in .a dispute  be- 
tween  individuals,  have  recourse  to courts of  law to recover 
what in  this second manner is  our due ;  so neither can we,  in 
contests between  different  powers, constrain them by  force  of 
arms. 
XVI.  We must  however except from this rule the cases of 
necessity, in which the impe$ct  is changed into thepe$ect  right 
so that, in those cases the refusal of  him,  who will not give us 
our due, furnishes us  with a just reason  for war.  But  every 
war,  undertaken on account of the refusal of  what a nun is not 
obliged ky the laws of humanity  to grant, is unjust. 
XVII.  To  apply these  principles we  shall give some exam- 
ples.  The right of  passing orer the lands  of another is really 
founded on humanity,  when we design to  use  that  permission 
only on a lawful account;  as when  people,  expelled their own 
county, want to settle elewhere ;  or when, in the prosecution 
of a just war,  it is necessary to pass through  the territories of a 
neutral  nation,  &c.  But this is  only an  office  of  humanity, 
which ia  not due to another  in virtue of  a perfect and rigorous 
right, and the refusal of it does not authorise a nation to challenge 
it In a forcible manner. 
XVIII.  Grotius however, examining this question, pretends, 
U &at  we are not only obliged to grant a passage over our landa 
@ to a small number  of men  unarmed, and from whom we have 
ronsequentig nothing to fear 3  but moreover that we cannot 
'4  refuse it to a large army, notwithstanding the just apprehension 
6'  we may have, that this passage will do us a considerable inju- 
ry, which is likely  to  arise either  from  that army  itself,  or 
6'  from those,  against  whom it  marches ;  provided, continues 
he,  I. that this passage is asked on a just accotmt.  2.  That 
it is asked before an attempt is  made to pass by  force." 
XIX. This author then pretends,  that under  those  circum- 
stances, the rzfusnl authorises us to have recourse to arms, and 
that we may  lawfully procure by force, what we could not ob- 
tain by  favor, even though the passage may be had  elsewhere bg 
taking a larger circuit.  He adds, a  That the suspicion of  dan- 
"  ger from  the passing of a great number of  armed men is not 
"  a sutlicient reason to refuse  it, because good precaution6 maf 
be taken  against  it.  Neither  is  the fear of provoking that 
"  prince,  against whom the other marches his army, a sufficient 
reason for refusing him pasage, if  the latter has a just reason 
"  for undertaking  the war." 
XX-  Grotius founds his opinion on  this reason, that the es- 
tabiishment  of  property  was  e~+mlly made  with  the  tacit 
reservation  of  the  right  of  using  the  propert7  of another in 
time  of  need,  so  far  as  it can  be done without injuring the 
owner. 
XXI.  But I cannot embrace  the opinion of  this  celebrated 
writer ;  for, I.  whatever may be said, it is certain, that the right 
of  passing  through  the  territories  of  another  is not a perfect 
right,  the execution of which can be rigorously demanded.  I£ 
a private person is not obliged to suffer another to pass through 
his ground,  much less is a nation obliged to grant a passage to 
a foreign army, without any compact or co~eseion  intervening. 
XXII.  2.  The great inconveniences, which may follow such 
a permission, authorizes  this refusal.  By  granting such a pac 
sage, we run a risk of  making our own country the seat of war, 
Beaides, if  they, to  whom  we grant  this passage, are repulsed 
and vanquished, let the reasons they had for making war be ev- 
er so just,  yet will not the enemy revenge himself upon us,  who 
did not hinder those troops from invading him ?  But farther, sup- 
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war, we cannot favor one to the prejudice of the other, without 
giving  this  other a sufficient reason to look upon us as enemies, 
and as defective in that part  of our duty,  which we owe to our 
neighbours.  It would  be in  vain,  on this occasion, to distin- 
guish between a just and an unjust war,  pretending that the lat- 
ter gives a right of refusing the passage,  but the former obliges 
us to grant it.  This distinction does not remove the difficulty ; 
for, besides  that it is  not always  easy to decide whether a war 
be just or unjust, it is a piece] of  rashness to thrust in our arbi- 
tration between two armed parties, and to intermeddle with their 
differences. 
XXIII.  3.  But  is there nothing to fear from the troops, .to 
whom the  passage is granted ?  The  abettors of  the  contrary 
opinion agree there is, for which  reason they allow, that many 
precautions ought  to be observed.  But whatever precautions 
we may  take, none of  them can  secure us against  all  events ; 
and some evils and losses are irreparable.  Men, who are always 
in arms, are easily tempted to abuse them,  and to commit out- 
rages, especially if  they be numerous, and find an opportunity of 
making amm&lerable  HOW  often have we seen foreign 
armies ravage and appropriate to themselves the estates of  a Reo- 
ple,  who  have  called them to their assistance ?  3Jor  have the 
most solemn treaties  and oaths been  able  to  deter them  from 
this black  perfidiousness."  What then  may we  expect  from 
those, who are under no such strict engagement ? 
XXIV.  4.  Another observation we may  make, which  is  of 
great use in politics, that almost all states have this in common, 
that  the further we  advance into  the  heart of  a country,  the 
weaker  we  find  it.  The Carthaginians, otherwise  invincible, 
were  vanquished  near  Carthage  by  Agathocles  and  Scipio. 
Hannibal affirmed, that the Romans could not be cmquered ex- 
cept in Italyi  It is therefore dangerous to lay open this secret to 
a multitude oE  foreigners,  who, having  arms at hand, may  take 
&vantage  of  our weakness, and make us repent 01 r imprudence. 
XXV.  5. To this we must add, that in evely state there  are 
almost always mutinous and turbulent spirits, who are ready to 
stir up strangers either against their  fellow  citizens, their sove- 
P  JW. lib. iv.  cap.  4  & 8 and  Liv. lib.  vii.  cap, 38. 
reign, or their neighbours.  These reasons sufficiently prove, that 
all the precautions, which  can  be taken, cannot secure us from 
danger. 
6. Lastly we may add the example of a great many nations, 
who have been very ill requited for  letting foreign  troops  pass 
through their country. 
XXVI.  We  shall  finish the examination of this question by 
making two remarks.  The first  is, that it is evident  from the 
whole of  what has  been said, that this is a matter of prudence ; 
and that, though we are not obliged to grant a passage to foreign 
troops,  and the safest way  is to refuse it,  yet when we are not 
strong enough  to  resist those,  who want the pass at any  rate, 
and by resisting we must involve ourselves in a troublesome war, 
we  ought  certainly to  grant a passage ; and the  necessity, to 
which we are reduced, is sufficient justification  to  the prince, 
whose territories those troops are going to invade. 
XXVII. My second remark is,that,if  we suppose on one hand, 
that the war, which the prince, who demands a passage through 
our country,  makes,  is  just  and  necessary,  and, on the other, 
that we have nothing to fear either from him, who is to pass, or 
him, against whom he marches ;  we are then indispensably oblig- 
ed to grant a passage.  For if  the law of  nature obliges every 
man to assist thcse,  whom he sees  manifestly oppressed, when 
he can do it without danger  and with  hopes of  success, much 
less ought he to be a hinderance to such, as undertake their own 
defence. 
XXVIII.  By  following the  principles  here  established, we 
may judge of the right of tratsporting merchandizes through the 
territories of  another.  This is also  an  imperfect  right, and a 
duty of  humanity,  which obliges us to grant it to others;  but 
the obligation is not rigorous, and  the  refusal cannot  be a just 
reason for war. 
XXIX.  Truly  speaking the laws of humanity indispensably 
oblige us to grant a passage to such foreign commodities, as are 
absolutely necessary for life, which our neighbours cannot pro- 
cure by themselves, and with which we are not  able to furnish 
them.  But, except in this case,  we may have good reasons for 
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try.  Too great a resort for  strangers  is someti~nes  dangerous 
to a state ;  and besides, why should not a sovereign procure to 
his own subjects that profit, which would otherwise be  made by 
foreigners, by  means of the passage granted them 3 
W. It is not however contrary to humanity to require toll 
or custom for foreign commodities, to which a passage is grant- 
ed.  This is a just  reimbursement  for  the expenses,  the sove- 
reign is obliged to be at in repairing the high roads, bridgee, har- 
bors,  &c. 
XXXI. We must reason in the  same manner in  regard  to 
commerce in general between  different states.  The same may 
be said of  the right  of  being supplied with wives by our  neigh- 
bours;  a refusal on their side,  though  there be great plenty of 
women among them does not authorise us to declare war. 
XXXII.  We  shall here subjoin  something concerning wars, 
undertaken on account of  religion.  The law of  nature, which 
permits a man to defend his life2 his hbstance, and all the oth- 
er advantages, which  he enjoys,  against the attacks  of  an un- 
just  aggressor, certainly grants him the liberty also of  defending 
himself  against those, who would,  as it were by force, deprive 
hi  of  his  religion,  by hindering  him from  professing that, 
which he  thinks the best,  or by  constraining  him to  embracc 
that,  which he thinks to be fdlse. 
XXXIII.  In a word, religion is one of the greatest blessings 
man can enjoy, and includes his most essential interests.  Who- 
ever opposes him in this  respect  declares  himself his enemy ; 
and consequently he may justly use forcible methods to repel the 
injury,  and to  secure himself  against  the  evil  intended  hiin. 
It is  therefore  lawful,  and  even jwt,  to take up  arms,  when 
we  are attacked for the cause  of  religion. 
XmV.  But, though we are allowed to defend ourselves in 
the cause of  religion, we are not permitted  to make war in or- 
der to propagate that, which we ~rofess,  and to constrain &we, 
who have some principle or practice different from ours.  The 
one is a necessary: consequence of  the  other.  It is not lawful 
to attack  him,  who has a right to defend himself.  If  the de- 
fensive war is just,  the offensive must be  criminal.  The very 
nature of  religion does  not  permit,  that vioknt XW~S  skould 
be wed  for 'its  propagation ;  it consists in internaI persuasion. 
The right of  mankind, in regard to the propagation of religion, 
is to inform and instruct those, who are in error, and to use the 
 oft and gentle methods of  conviction.  Men must be persuaded, 
and not compelled.  To act otherwise is  to commit a robbery 
rim  them ;  a ;obbery  so much the more  criminal, as those,  whb 
corn~nit  it, endeavour-to justify themselves  by  sacred authority. 
There is  therefore  no  less  folly,  than impiety, in sqch a con- 
duct. 
XXXV.  In particular  nothing is more contrary to the  spirit 
of  Christianity,  than to employ the force of  arms for the propa- 
gation of our holy religion.  Christ, our divine master, instructed 
mankind,  but never treated  them with vjolence.  The Apostles 
followed his  example ; and  the  enumeration,  which  St. Paul 
makes of .the arms he employed for the conversion of  mankind, 
is an excellent lesson to Christians. 
XXXVI.  So far is a simple difference of opinion, in matters 
of religion  from  being a just reason  for pursuing,  by  force of 
arms, or disturbing In  the least those,  whm  we think in an er- 
ror ;  that,  on  the contrary,  such as act in this manner,  furnish 
others with a just  reason for making war against them,  and of 
defending those, whom they unjustly oppress. Upon whichocca- 
sion the following question occurs, Whether  protestant princes may 
rwt, with a pod censcience, enter into a confederacy to  destroy the Inqui- 
$&m,  andoblige the powers, who sufer it in  their dominions, to disarm 
that cabal, under which Christianity haf so  long groamed, and which, 
under arjcalse pretence  to  zeal and piety, exercises a tyranny most horri- 
ble in itseh5 and most  contrary to human nature ?  Be that as it may, 
it is at least  certain, that  never would  any hero  have subdued 
monsters more furious and destructive to mankind, than he who 
could accomplish the design of purging the earth of these wick- 
ed men, who so  impudently and cruelly abuse the specious show 
of religion, only to procure yherewith to live in luxury and idle- 
ness,  and  to  make both princes  and  subjects  dependant  on 
them. 
XXXVII. These are the principal  remarks, which occur on 
the causes of  war.  To  which let us add, that as we ought not 
* :,  Cor.  chap. vi. ver, 4,  &c.  and  chap.  X.  rer.  4 
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to make war,  which  of  itself is a very  great evil, but to obtain 
a solid peace, it is dbsolutely necessary  to consult  the rules or 
prudence  before  we undertake it,  however  just it may other- 
wise  appear.  We must,  above  all  things, exactly  weigh the 
good or evil, which we may bring upon ourselves by it.  For, if  in 
making war there  is reason  to fear, that we shall draw greater 
evils on ourselves, or those, who belong to us,  than the good we 
can propose from it ;  it is better to put up with the injury, than 
to expose ourselves to more  considerable evils,  than  that,  for 
which we seek redress by  arms. 
XXXVIII.  In the  circulnstances here  mentioned  we may 
lawfully make war,  not only for ourselves, but also  for others ; 
provided that he, in whose favour we engage, has just reason to 
bke up arms, and that we are  likewise  under some  particular 
tie or obligation to  him,  which authorises  us to treat  as ene- 
mies those, who have done us no injury. 
XXXIX.  Now among those,  whom  we  may and ought to 
defend, we must give the first place to  such, as depend on the 
defender ;  that is, to the subjects of  the state ;  for it is princi- 
pally with this  view of  protection,  that men,  before  independ- 
ent, incorporated  themselves into  a  civil society.  Thus the 
Gibeonites having submitted themselves to the governmmt of the 
Israelites,  the latter took up arms on  their  account, under  the 
command of  Joshua.  The Romans also proceeded in the same 
manner.  But  sovereigns  in these cases ought  to observe the 
maxim we have established in sect.  37.  They ought to beware, 
in taking up arms for &me  of  their subjects,  not t~  bring  a 
greater inccnvenierrcy on the body of  the state.  The  duty of 
the sovereign regards  first  and  priricipally  the interest of  the 
whole, rather than that of  a part ;  and the gredter  the part is, 
the nearer  it approaches to the whole. 
XL.  2.  Next to subjects come our allies, whom we are ex- 
pressly  engaged by  treaty  to assist in  time of need ;  and this, 
whether they have put themselves intirely under our protection, 
and so depend upon it ;  or  whether assistance be agreed upotl 
for mutual security. 
XLI.  But the war must be  justly  undertaken by our  ally; 
for  we  cannot  innocently engage  to  help any one in a war, 
which  is  manifestly unjust.  Let us  add here,  that we may, 
even without prejudice ta the treaty,  defend our  own subjects 
 refera ably  to our allies,  when there is no possibility af assisting 
them both at the same time ;  for the engagements of a govern- 
ment to its subjects always supersede  those,  into which it  em 
ters with strangers. 
XLIL  As to what Grotius says, tliat we are  not obliged to 
assist an ally,  when there is no hope of success ;  it is to be un- 
derstood in this manner.  If we see  that our united  forces are 
not  sufficient to oppose the  enemy, and that our  ally,  though 
able to treat with him 011  tolerable terms is yet  obstinately beut 
to expose himself  to  certain ruin ;  we are not  obliged, by the 
treaty of  alliances, to join  with him in so extravagant ant1  des- 
perate an attempt.  But then it is also to be  considered,  that 
alliances would become useless,  if,  in virtue of  this union,  we 
were not obliged to expose ourselves to some danger,  or tosus- 
tain some loss in the defence of  an ally. 
XLIII.  Here it may be enquired,  when several of  our allies 
want assistance, which ought to be helped first, and preferable to 
the rest  ?  Grotius answers, that, when two allies unjustly make 
war upon  each other, we ought  to  succow neither of  them ; 
but if  tlie cause of  one ally be just,  we must  not  only  assist 
him against strangers,  but also againsr anorher of our allies, un- 
less there be  some  clause in a treaty,  which does not 
permit us to defend the  former against the latter,  even though 
the latter has committed the injury.  In fine, that if  several of 
our allies enter into  a league against  a common  foe,  or make 
war separately against particular enemies, we must assist themall 
equally, and according to veaty ;  but when  there  is no posi- 
bility of assisting them all at awe, we mustgive the preference 
to the oldest confederate. 
XLIV.  3.  Friends,  or those, with  whom  we are united by 
particular  ties of  kindness  and  affection,  hold  the  third rank. 
For tbugh  we have  not promised  them assistance, determined 
by a formal treaty ;  yet the nature of  friendship itself implies a 
mutual engagement to help each other, so far as the stricter ob. 
ligations the friends are under will permit ;  and the concern for 
each other's  safety ought to be much stronger, than that,  which 
is  demanded by the simple connedon.of humanity. XLV.  I say that we may .take up arms foraur Mends, wh 
ere engaged in a jjust war;  for  we are not under a strict  &I~c 
gatim to assist, them ;  and  this  condition  ought to be  under- 
stood, if we can do it easily, and without any great inconvenience 
to ourselves. 
XLVI.  4.  In fine we day affirm, that the singie relation, in 
which all  mankind stand to  each other, m consequence of their 
common nature  and society,  and which foms the most exten- 
sive connexioll, is suKicient to  authorise us in  assisting  those, 
who are unjustly oppressed ;  at least if  the injustice be consider- 
able, and manifest, and the party injured call us to its assistance ; 
so that  we act rather in its name,  than in our own.  But even 
here we must make this remark, that  we have a tigk to succm 
fhe distressed purely from humanity, but that we are not under 
a strict obligation of  doing it.  It is a duty of  imperfect oMiga- 
tion,  which binds us only so far,  as we can .practise it, without 
bringing a considerable incowenience  upon  ourselves ;  for, all 
circumstances being equal, we may and even ought to prefer our 
own preservation to that of another. 
ZVII. It is another question, whether we  can undertake2 
WQZ in defence of the subjects of a foreign prince against his in- 
vasions and oppressions, merely from dn:  principle of humanity ? 
I answer, that  this is permitted only  m cases,  where the tyran- 
ny is risen to sucha height, that the subjects themselves may law- 
fully tale up arms, to shake off the  yoke of the tymt, accord- 
ing to the principles already established. 
XLVIII.  It is .true, that since the  institution of  civil  socie- 
ties, she sovereign has acquired a peculiar right over his subjects, 
in+rtae  ofwhich he can punish them, and no other power has 
any  business  to interfere.  But it is  no less certain, that this 
right h&  its bounds, and that it cannot be lawfully  exercised, 
except when  the sub'ects  are really culpable, or at least when 
their innocence is du  6'  ions.  Then the presumption ought to be 
in favor of the sovereign, and a foreign  power has no right  to 
intermeddle with what passes in another state. 
XLIK.  But if  the tyranny be arrived at its greatest height, if 
the oppression &manifest  as when a Busiris or Phalaris oppress 
their subjects in  so cruel a mavner,  as must be condemned by 
erery nasonxbk mn  living ;  we mmrat reb  the subjects, thw 
appressed, the protection of  ttn lm  of aocielp.  Every mm, 
trs sd,  has a right to claim the assistance af othet  men,  when 
he is really in necessity ; and every one  ie  oblipc!  to  give  it 
him, when he cm,  by the laws of  humanity.  Now it is certain, 
that we neither do,  nor  can  nemunce  thoee  laws, by  entering 
into society, whichcould never have been established to the prtz- 
judice of  human nature;  though we may be  justly wppposed 
to have engaged not to implore a foreign aid  for slight injuries, 
or wen for great ones,  which affect only a few persons. 
But when ail the subjects, or a considerable part  d  them, 
groan unh  the oppression of  a vant, the subjects, on the one 
band, reenber hto  the several rights of  natural liberty, which au- 
dmrizes them to seek assistance wherever they cam  find it ;  and, 
on the otha hand,  those,  who  are in a condition of  giving it 
them, without any msiderabie damage to themselves,  not only 
may,  bat ought to do atl they can to delicxr the oppress4 from 
the single consideration of pi9  and humanity. 
L. Et  appecus indeed,  from ancient and modem history, that 
the desire d  invading rh  -+,c  d  is  C&,=,,  caed 
those pretexts ;  but  the bad  usc of  a  thing, does not hinder it 
from being just.  Pirates  navigate the was, and  robbers wear 
swords, as well  as other people. 
CHAP. 111. 
-  Of  i&e  dge~mt  kids  of  war. 
I BMDES  the division abouementioned of  war i&  just 
and unjust, there  are  several others, which it is proper now to 
consider.  And  first war  is distinguished  into  afenrkve  and & 
fenJive. 
11.  Defensive wars are those,  undertaken for the defence of 
our persons, or the preservation of  C~UT  propestiee.  Offensire 
wars are those,  which are  made to  constrain others  ko  give us 
our due, in vir~ue  af  a perfect right we have to exact it of  them 
or to obtain satisfaction for a damage unjustly done us, and to 
force them to give caution for the future. 
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with the former distinction ;  as if every defensive war were just, 
and, on the contrary, every offensive war unjust.  It  is the pres- 
ent custom to  excuse the most unjust  wars, by  saying they are 
purely defensive.  Some people think, that all unjust wars ought 
to be called offensive, which is not true ;  for if  some offensive 
wars be just,  of  which thefe is no doubt,  there are also defen- 
sive wars unjust ;  as when we defend ourselves against a prince, 
who has had sufficient provocation to attact us. 
IV.  2.  Neither are we to believe,  that he,  who first injures 
another,  begins by  that an offensive war,  and that the other, who 
demands satisfaction  for the  injury, is always upon  the  defen- 
sive.  There are a great many unjust acts, which may kindle a 
war, and yet are not the urar ;  as the ill treatment of a prince's 
ambassador, the plundering of  his  subjects,  &c.  If therefore 
we  take  up  arms to  revenge  such  an unjust act,  we  com- 
mence  an  offensive, but  a  just  war;  while  the  prince,  who 
has done the  injury, and will not give satisfaction, makes a de- 
fensive, but an unjust war.  An offensive war is therefore un- 
just only, when  it  is  undertaken without a lawful cause ;  and 
hen  defensiv~  an other occasions might be  un- 
just,  becomes just. 
V.  We must therefore affirm in general, that the first, who 
takes up arms, whether justly or unjustly,  commencesa~  offen- 
sive war;  and he,  who opposes him,  whether with or without 
a reason, begins a defensive war.  Those,  who look upon  the 
word  offen~ivt' war  to  be  an odious term, as always implying 
something unjust ;  and who on the contrary,  consider a defen- 
sive war as inseparable from equity, confound ideas, and perplex 
a thing which of  itself  seems  to  be  sufficiently clear.  It is 
with princes as with private persons.  The plaintiff, who com- 
mences a suit at law, is sometimes in the wrong, and soGetimes 
in the right.  It is the same with the defkdant,  It is wrong 
to refuse to pay a sum, which is justly due ; and it is right to 
forbear paying what we do not owe. 
VI.  In the third place,  Grotius  distinguishes war into pri- 
vate, public,  and mixed.  Public  war he  calls  that,  which  is 
made on both sides by  the authority of  the  civil power.  Pri- 
vate ww, that which is made between private persons,  without 
any public authority ;  and  lastly mixed  war,  that,  which,  on 
one side is carried on by public authority,  and on the other,  by 
private persons. 
VII.  We  may observe concerning  this division,  hat, if  we 
take the word war in the most general and extensive sense, and 
understand  by it UN taking up  armr with a view to decide a par- 
rel,  in contradistinction to the way of  deciding a  di&rence  by 
recourse to a common judge,  thcn  this distinction  may be ad- 
mitted ;  but custom seems to explode it, and has restrained the 
signification of  the word war to  that,  carried on between sov- 
ereign pomra  In civil society privzte persons have not a right 
to make war.  And as for the state of nature,  we have already 
treated of  the  right,  which men have  in that state to defend 
and preserve their  persons and  properties ;  so  that as  we are 
here treating only  of  the right  of  sovereigns,  with regard to 
each other,  it is properly public, and not private war,  that falls 
under our present consideration. 
VIII.  4.  War is also distinguished  into  ~olemn  acceyding te 
the lazus of nations,  and nof solemn.  To  render a war solemn two 
things are requisite ;  th  ~SI,  tkit it be mxde by the authorhy 
of  the sovereign ;  the second, that it be accompanied with cer- 
tain  formalities, as  a formal declaration,  &c.  but of  th'  1s  we 
shall treat more fully in  its proper place.  War not solemn is 
that,  which is  made  either  without  a formal  declaration,  or 
against mere private persoos.  We shall here only hint at this 
division, deferring a more particular examination  of  it,  and an 
enquiry into its effects, till we come to treat of  the formalities, 
which usually precede war. 
IX.  But a question is moved, relating to this subject, which 
is, whether a  magistrate, properly  so  called,  and as such,  has 
power of  making war  of  his  own accord ?  Grotius answers, 
that, judging independently of  the civil laws, every  magistrate 
seems to have as much right,  in case of  resistance, to take up 
arms in order to  exercise his jurisdiction,  and to see his  com- 
mands executed, as to defend the people, entrusted to his care. 
Puffendorf, on the contrary, takes the negative,  and passes cen- 
sure on the opinion oi Grotius. 
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beween  them  being  ntmly abmt  words.  Gqotias  fixes m 
more vague and genewl hfm ta tha  trtrrn W.*  Accmd'mg to 
him  therefore,  when a subordinate magistrate taks  ap asms to 
maintain  his &pity,  atrd  to rodurn  those  to reason,  who 
&se  to aubmit to him,  he is  supposed to act wkh the appto- 
hation of the  m-gn  ;  wfw,  hy entrasring hh  with the sham 
in &  gosermnenc of  th  state,  has at the urn the  inueated 
him  with  the  pawer necessary  tr~  exercise it,  And  thm the 
qtrastion  is onty,  whether every  nagismte, as such, need,  on 
dris maJian, an mprm  order hm  the sovereign ;  and wheth- 
er the c~aetitIltion  of  civil sockties in general require it,  inde. 
pmdesrtlr of  the laws of  each particular state ? 
XI-  Wcw if  a magistrate can have recourse to snms far the 
radacrioll p£ me  pnsn, af  two,  tom,  or may, wb  either 
duse to dey hi,  m attempt  to hinder  the exercise  of  his 
jarisdictim,  why  may he not use the same means ~gainst  fifty, 
a hundred, a thousand ?  &c.  The gcearer the number the dis- 
abdient, the more he will havcs  occasion for  force to overcome 
their resistance.  Now  this is what Gratitius includes under the 
term wnr. 
=I.  Puffenderf agrees to this in the main ;  but he pretends 
that this coercive pawer,  which belongs to a magistrate over dk 
abediant subje-  is not a right of war ;  war seeming to be in- 
tirely berween equals, or at least,  such as  pretend  to equality. 
The idea c#  Puff~dorf  ig catainly more tegubr, and agreeable 
to custm ;  but it  is evident,  that the  cfiEerence  between hiin 
aad emtius consists  only  in the greater or less extent,  which 
each of  them gives to the word war. 
Xfi .  If  it  be objected, ir is  dangerous  to leave so much 
power to n wbwdinate magistrate ;  this map  be  me  ;  but then 
it prow  only, that the  prudence of  legislators  requires  they 
sfiould set bounds in this respect  to rhe  power  of  rnagistraces, 
in order to prevent  an itmconveniency, which  shodd otherwise 
&  fmm  the institution of  magistracy. 
XJV.  But  t~  judge of  the power of  the magistrates,  W of 
genanls atrd leadem, in respect to  war,  properly  SO  cdkb, and 
which is carded on against a  foreign enemy,  we  need ody to 
attend to their commissions;  for it is evident, that they cannot 
lawfully undertake  any  xct  of  hostility of  their own head, and 
without  a formal  order  of the  sovereign, at  least  reasonably 
presumed, in consequence of  particular circumstar,ces. 
XV.  Thus, for example, a general, sent upon an expedition 
with an unlimited authority,  may act against  tIie enemy ofTea- 
sively, as well as defensively, and in such a manner, as he shall 
judge most advantageous ; but he can neither levy n new war, 
nor make peace of his  own  head.  But if  his power be limit- 
ed, he ought never to pass  the bounds  prescribed, unless he is 
unavoidably reducecl to it by  the necessity  of  selfdefence ;  for 
whatever he does in that  case is  supposed to  be with the con- 
sent and approbation of  the sovereign.  Thus, if  an admiral has 
orders to be  upon the defensive, he may, notwithstanding  such 
a restraint, break  in upon the enemy's  fleet, and sink and burn 
as many of  their  ships, as  he can, if they come to attack him. 
All, that he is forbidden,  is to challenge the enemy first. 
XVI.  In general  the  governors  of  provinces  and cities, if 
they have troops untler  their  command,  may by their own au- 
thority defend themsclvcs against an enemy, who attacks them ; 
but thy  ought not to carry the war into a foreign country, widi- 
or:  zn express order from their sovereign. 
XVII.  It was in virtue of this privilege,arising from necessi- 
ty, that Lucius Pinnrius,* governor of  Enna in Sicily for the Ro- 
mans,  upon certain information, that the inhabitants designed to 
revolt to the Carthaginians, put them all to the sword, and thus 
preserved the  place.  But, except in the like case of  necessity, 
the  inhabitints of  a town have no right to take up  arms in or- 
der to obtain satisfaction for  those  injuries,  which  the  prince 
neglects to revenge. 
XVIII.  A mere presumption  of  the  will  of  the  sovereign 
wou!d  not even be  sufficient to excuse a governor, or any other 
ofncer, who should undertake a war, except in case of necessity, 
without either a general or particular  order.  For it is not suf- 
ficient  to know what  pdrt  the  sovereign would  probably act, 
if lie were consulted,  in such a particular posture of  affairs ;  but 
it should  rather be considered in general, what  it is probable a 
* Liyv, lib.  xxi.  cap. xviii. 
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prince  would desire should  be  done  without  consulting  him, 
when the matter will bear some delay, and the affair is dubious. 
Now certainly sovereigns  will never consent, that their minis- 
ters should, whenever they think proper, undertake without their 
order,  a thing of  such importance, as an offensive war, which is 
the proper  subject of the present inquiry. 
XIX.  In these  circumstances,  whatever part  the  sovereign 
would  have  thought proper  to act, if  he had been consulted ; 
and whatever success  the war,  undertaken without  his orders, 
may have had ;  it is left to the sovereign whether he will rati- 
fy,  or condemn the  act of  his  minister.  If  he ratifies it, this 
approbation renders the war solemn, by reflecting back, as ir were, 
an authority upon it, so that it obliges the whole commonwealth. 
But if  the sovereign  should condemn the act  of  the governor, 
the hostilities committed by the latter ought  to pass  for a sort 
of robbery, the fault of which by no means affects the state, pro- 
vided the governor is delivered up, or punished according to the 
laws of  the country, and proper satisfaction be made for the dam- 
ages sustained. 
XX.  We  may  further observe, that in civil societies, when a 
particular  member has done an injury to a stranger, the govern- 
or of  the commonwealth is sometimes responsible for it,  so that 
war may be  declared against  him  on  that  account.  But  to 
ground this kind of imputation, we must necessarily suppose one 
of  these two things, sufferance,  or reception ;  viz.  either that 
the sovereign has suffered this harm to be done to the  stranger, 
or that he afforded a retreat to the criminal. 
XXI.  In the former case it  must be  laid down as a maxim, 
that a sovereign, who, knowing the crimes  of  his  subjects, as 
for exan~pl?,  that they  practise piracy on strangers ;  and being 
also able  and obliged to  hinder  it,  does  not hinder  it, renders 
himself criminal, because he has consented to the bad  action, the 
commission of  which  he has permitted,  and consequently fur- 
nished a just reason of  war. 
XXII.  The two  conditio~is  abovementioned,  I  mean  the 
knowledge and sufferance of the sovereign, are absolutely neces- 
sary, the one not being sufficient without the other, to commu- 
nicate any share in the guilt.  Now it is presumed, that a sove- 
reign knows what his subjects  openly and frequently  commit ; 
and as to his power of hindering the evil, this likewise is always 
presumed,  unless the want of it be clearly proved. 
XXIII.  The other way,  in  which a sovereign  renders him- 
self guilty of the crime of  another, is by allowing a retreat and 
admittance to the criminal, and, screening him from punishment. 
Yuffendorf pretends, that  if  we are obliged to deliver up a crim- 
inal, who takes shelter among us,  it is rather in virtue  of  some 
treaty on this head, than in consequences of  a common and in- 
dispensable obligation. 
XXIV.  But Yuffendorf I think has, without sufficient reasons, 
abandoned the  opinion  of  Grotius, which  seems  to be better 
founded.  The principles of  the latter, in regard to the present 
question, may be reduced  to these following. 
I.  Since the establishment of civil societies, the right of  pun- 
ishing public offences, which every person, if not chargeable him- 
self with such a crime, had in the state of nature, has been trans- 
ferred to the sovereign, so that the latter alone hath the privilege 
of  punishing, as he  thinks proper.,  he  transgressions of  his 
subjects, which properly interest the public. 
XXV.  But this right of  punishing crimes is not so exclusive- 
ly theirs, but that either public bodies or their governors have a 
right  to procure  the  punishment of  them  in  the  same man- 
ner,  as the laws  of  particular  coqntries allow  private people 
the prosecution of  crin~es  before the civil tribunal. 
XXVI.  3.  This right is still stronger with respect to crimes, 
by which they are directly injured,  and which they have a per- 
fect right of punishing,  for the support of  their honor  and safe- 
ty.  In such circumstances the state, to which the criminal re- 
tires, ought not to obstruct the  right, that belongs to the other 
power. 
XXVII.  4.  Now  as  one price  does  not generally permit 
another to send armed  men into his territories,  upon the score 
of exacting punishment  (for this would indeed be attended with 
terrible inconveniences) it is reasonable the sovereign, in whose 
dominions the offender lives, or has taken shelter, should either 
punish  the  criminal  according  to his demerits, or deliver him 
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This is that delivering up, of which we have so many examples 
in history. 
XXVIII.  5. The principles here laid  down concerning the 
obligation  of  punishing  or  delivering  up, regard not only the 
criminals, who  have  always been  subjects of  the  government 
they now  live under,  but  also those,  who after the conlmission 
of a crime, have taken shelter in the country. 
XXIX.  6.  In fine  we must  observe, that  the right  of  de- 
manding fugitive delinqi~cnts  to  punishment  has  not for some 
ages last past been insisted upon by  sovereigns, in inost parts of 
Europe,  except in  crimes against the state, or  those of  a  very 
heinous  nature.  As to less  crimes,  they  are connived  at on 
both sides, unless it is  otherwise agreed on by  some particular 
treaty. 
XXX.  Besides  the kinds  of.war,  hitherto  mentioned,  we 
may also distinguish  them into  perfert  and imperjct.  A per- 
fect war is that, which entirely interrupts the tranciuillity of the 
state, and  lays a  foundation  for all possible  acts  of hostility. 
An imperfect war,  on the contrary, is that, which  does not en- 
tirely interrupt the peace,  but only  in  certain  particulars,  the 
public tranquillity  being in other respects undisturbed. 
XXXI.  This last species of  war is geceraily cklled reprisals, 
of the nature of  which nre shall give  here some account.  By 
reprisals then we incan that  i~nptrfct  kind  war, or those  octr 
cf  hostility,  which  sovereizus  cxcvcisc  ngoinst  each  other,  or, 
with  thcir  consent,  their  subjects,  by  seizing  the  kerso~s cr 
e$ects  of  the subjects of  afitign cornmsnwral:h,  that rrfirs~~h  to 
dg us justice;  with a  view  to  obtain scrurity,  and to recovei- cur 
right,  and  in  cnre of  refusal, to dci  jrrstice  to our-selves, without 
any other interruption ofthe public  tuanquilli~y. 
XXXII.  Grotius pretends, that reprisals  are not founded on 
the law of  nature and necessity,  but only on a kind of  arbitra- 
ry law of  nations,  by which most of them have agreed, that the 
goods  belonging to  the subjects of  a foreign state should be a 
pledge or security, as it were, for what that state, or the gover- 
nor of  it, might owe us, either directly and in their own names, 
or by rendering themselves responsible for the actions of others, 
upon refusing to administer justice. 
XXXIII.  But this is far from being an arbitrary right, found* 
ed upon a pretended law  of  nations,  whose existence we can- 
not prove,  depending on the greater or less extent of custom no 
way binding in the nature of  a law.  The right we here speak 
of  is a  consequence of the constitution  of  civil societies, and an 
application  of  the maxircs of the law of  nature to that  consti- 
tution. 
XXXIV.  During the  independence of  the  state of nature, 
and before the institution of  civil  government,  if  a person  had 
been injured,  he could come  up011 those only,  who  had done 
the wrong, or upon their accomplices ;  because there was then 
no tie between men, in virtue of which a person might be deem- 
ed to have consented,  in some manner, to what others did even 
without his participation. 
XXXV.  But since civil  societies have  been  formed, that is 
to say,  communities,  whose members are all united together for 
their common  defence,  there has  necessarily  arisen  thence  a 
conjunction of  interests and wills ;  which is the reason, that as 
the society or  the  powers, which govern it,  engage to  defend 
each  other against  every  insult;  so  each individual  may  be 
deemed to  have engaged to answer for  the condcct of the so- 
ciety, of which he is dmember, or of the powers, which govern it. 
XXXVI.  No human establishment  can supersede  the obli- 
gation of that general arid inviolable law of nature, that the dam- 
age sue  have done to on~thev  shoclM  be repaired ;  except those, who 
zre thereby injured, have manifestly renou:lced  their right of de- 
manding  reparation.  And when  such establishments  hinder 
those,  who are injured, from obtaining satisfaction so easily, as 
they might without them, this  difficulty  must  be made up,  by 
furnishing the persons interested with aH  the other possible meth- 
ods of  doing themselves justice. 
XXXVIE.  Now it is certain, that  societies,  or  the powers, 
which govern them, by being armed with the force of  the whole 
body,  are  sometimes  encouraged  to  laugh  with  impunity  ar: 
strangers, who come to deinand their due ;  and that every sub- 
ject contributes,  one way or other,  to enable them to act in this 
manner ;  so that he may be supposed in some mensure to consent 
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no other manner of  facilitating,  to injured  strangers, the prose- 
cution of  their rights,  which is rendered difficult by the united 
force of  the whole body,  than to authorise them to come upon 
all those, who are members of  it. 
XXXVIII.  Let us therefore conclude,  that, by the constitu- 
tion of  civil societies, every subject, so long as he continues such, 
is responsible to strangers for  the  conduct of  the  society, or of 
him,  who governs it ;  with this clause however, that he may de- 
mand indemnification,  when  there  is any fault  or injustice on 
the part of  his superiors.  But if  it should be any man's  mis- 
fortune to be disappointed of this indemnification,  he must look 
upon it as one of  those inconveniences, which,  in a civil state, 
the constitution of  human affairs renders almost inevitabie.  If 
to all  these we add the reasons, alledged  by  Grotius,  we shall 
plainly see, that there is no necessity  for supposing a tacit con- 
sent of the people to found the right of  reprisals. 
XXXIX.  As reprisals are acts of  hostility, and often the pre- 
lude or forerunner of a complete and ~erfect  war, it is plain that 
none but the sovereign can lawfully use this right,  and that the 
subjects can make no reprisalLhut  hy  his order and authority. 
XL.  Besides it is  proper,  that  the wrong or injustice done 
us, and which  occasions the reprisals, should be clear  and evi- 
dent, and that the thing  in  dispute  be  of  great  consequence. 
For if  the injury be  dubious, or of  no importance, it would be 
equally ulijust  and dangerous to proceed to this extremity,  and 
to expose ourselves to all the calamities of an open war.  Nei- 
ther ought we to come to reprisals, before we have tried, by the 
ordinary means, to obtain justice for the injury committed.  For 
this purpose  we must apply to  the prince, whose subjects have 
done us the injustice ;  and if the prince takes no notice,or refus- 
es satisfaction,we may then make reprisals,  in order to obtain it. 
XLI.  In a word,  we must not have recourse to reprisals, ex- 
cept when all the ordinary means of obtaining  satisfaction have 
failed ;  so that, for instance, if  a subordinate  magistrate has re- 
fused  us justice,  we are not permitted to use reprisals before we 
apply to the sovereign himself,  who will ~erhaps  grant us satis- 
faction.  In such circumstances, we may  therefore either de- 
tian the subjects of  a foreign state, if  they withhold ours ;  or we 
may seize their goods and effects.  But whatever just reason we 
may have to make reprisals,  we can never directly, and for that 
reason  alone,  put those to death, whom we have  seized  upon, 
but only secure them, and not use them ill, till we have obtain- 
ed satisfaction ;  so that, during all that time,  they are  to be con- 
sidered as hostages. 
XLII.  In regard to the  goods, seized by the right of repris- 
als,  we must take care of  them till the time,  in which satisfac- 
tion ought to be ii~ade,  is expired ;  after which we may adjudge 
them  to  the crehitor,  or  sell  them for  the  payment  of  the 
debt j  returning to him, from whom they were taken,  the over- 
plus,  when all charges are deducted. 
XLIII.  We  must also observe, that it is qot permitted to use 
reprisals,  except with regard to subjects, properly so called,  and 
their  effects ;  for as  to  strangers, who  do but pass  through a 
country, or only come to make a short stay in it,  they have not 
a sufficient  connexion  with  the  stlte,  of  which  they are only 
members but for a time,  and in an imperfect manner;  so that 
we cannot  indemnify  ourselves by them, for the loss we have 
sustained by any  natlve of  tAe com-m-f, and  by the refusal of the 
sovereign to render us justice.  We must further except ambas- 
sdors, who are sacred persons,  even in the height of war.  But 
as to women,  clergymen, men of  letters,  &c. the law of  nature 
grants them no privilege  in this case, if  they have not otherwise 
acquired it by virtue of some treaty. 
XLIV.  Lastly, some political writers distinguish those wars, 
which are  carried  on between  two or  more  sovereigns,  from 
those of  the subjects against  their governors.  Rut it is plain, 
that, when subjects  take  up arms against their prince,  they ei- 
ther do it for just reasons, and according to the principles estab- 
lished in this work,  or without a just  and lawful cause.  In the 
latter case, it is rather a revolt or insurrection, than a war, prop- 
erly so called.  But if the subjects have just reason to  resist the 
sovereign, it is strictly a war ; since, in such a crisis,  there are 
neither sovereign nor subjects, all dependance and obligation hav- 
ing ceased.  The two opposite  parties  are  then in a state of 
nature and equality, trying to obtain justice by their own prop- 
er strength,  which constitutes what we understand properly by 
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CHAP.  IV. 
Of  the  things,  which  ought  to  precede  war. 
I.  HomTEvER just reason we may have  to make war, 
yet,  as it isevitably brings along with it an incredible number of 
calamities, and oftentimes acts of injustice, it is certain, that we 
ought not to proceed too easily to a dangerous extremity, which 
may perhaps prove fatal to the conqueror himself. 
11.  The following are the measures,  which prudence directs 
to be observed  in  these circumstances. 
I.  Suppbsing the reason of  the war just in itself,  yet the dis- 
pute ought to be about something of great consequence ;  since 
it is better even  to relinquish part of  our right, wl;en  the thing 
is not considerable, than to have recourse to arms to defend it. 
2.  We  ought to have at least a probable appearance of  suc- 
cess;  for it would be  a  criminal temerity,  to expose ourselves 
to certain  destruction,  and to  run into a  greater,  in  order  to 
avoid a lesser evil. 
3. Lastly, there s!;ould  be a real necessity for taking up arms ; 
that is,  we ought not to have recourse to force ;  but when  we 
can employ no milder method of recovering our right, or of de- 
fending ourselves frorn the evils,  with which we are menaced. 
111.  These measures are  agreeable not  only to the  princi- 
ples of  prudence,  but also to the fundameiital maxims of socia- 
hility,  and the love of peace;  maxims of no lessforce with res- 
pect to nations,  than  individuals.  By these a  sovereign  must 
therefore  be necessarily  directed ;  justice obllges him to it,  in 
consequence cf  the very nature and end of goverilment.  Fot, 
as he ought to take particular  care of  the state,  and of  his sub- 
jects,  he should not expose them to the evils,  with which  war 
is attended, except in the last extremity,  and' when there is no 
other expedicnr: left but that of  arms. 
IV.  It is nc;t therefore sufficiedt, that the war  be  just in it- 
self, with respect to the enexy ;  it must also be  so with respect 
ts oursel~es  and our  subjects.  Plutarch  informs  US,  CC  that, 
M amorlg the anciellt Romans, when the Feciale? had determin- 
ct  ed,  thzt a war might be  justly  undertaken,  the senate  after- 
"  wards examined whether it would be advantageous to engage 
in it." 
V.  Now among the methods of deciding differences between 
nations without  a war, there are three most considerable.  The 
first is an amicable conference between the contending parties ; 
with respect  to which Cicero  judiciously  observes,  "  that this 
cc method of  terminating a difference by  a discussion of  reasons 
c'  on both sides is  peculiarly  agreeable to the nature  of  man j 
"  that force belongs to brutes,  and that we never ought to have 
c'  recourse to it,  but when we cannot redress our grievances by 
any other method." 
VI. The  second way of terminating a difference between those 
who have not a common judge,  is to put the matter to arbitra- 
tion.  The more potent indeed often neglect  this method, but 
it ought certainly  to be followed by those,  who have any regard 
to justice  and peace ;  and it is a way,  that  has  been taken by 
great princes and people. 
VII.  The third method, in fine, which may be sometimes US- 
ed with success, is that of casting lots.  I  say we may some- 
timx  use this way ;  for it is not always lawful to refer the issue 
c!  a difference, or of a war,  to the decision of  lots.  This meth- 
od cannot be taken,  except when  the dispute  is about a thing, 
in which we have a full property,  and which we n~ay  renounce 
whenever we please.  But in general, the obligation of the sover- 
eign to defend the lives, the honor, and the religion of his subjects, 
as also his obligation to maintain the dignity of  the state,  are of 
too strong a nature t3 suffer him  to renounce  the most natural 
and most probable means of his own security, as well as that of 
the public,  and to refer his case to chance, which in its nature 
is entirely precarious. 
VIII.  Eut if upon due examination he, who has been unjust- 
Iy attacked,  finds himself so weak, that he has no probability of 
making  any  considerable resistance, he may  reasonably decide 
the difference by way of  lot, in order to avoid a certain, by ex- 
posing himself to an uncertain danger ;  which,  in this  case,  is 
the least of two inevitable evils. 
IX.  There is also another  method,  which  has some relation 
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to lots.  This consists in single combats, which  have often been 
used to terminate  such differences,  as  were likely to produce a 
war between two nations.  And indeed, to prevent a war, and 
its concomitant  evils, I see no reason,  that can  hinder  us from 
referring matters to a combat between a certain number of  men, 
agreed  upon by both parties.  History furnishes us with seve- 
ral examples of this kind,  as that  of Turnus and Eneas, Mene- 
laus and Paris,  the Horatii and the Curiatii. 
X.  It is a cpestion of  some importance,  to know whether it 
be lawful thus to expose the interest of a whole state to the fate 
of those combats ?  It appears on the  one  hand, that  by  such 
means we spare the effusion  of human blood,  and abridge  the 
calamities of war ;  on the other hand, it promiseth fairer,  and 
looks like a better veqture,  to stand the shock even  of  a bloody 
war,  than by one blow to risk the liberty and safety of the srate 
by a decisive combat ;  since, after the loss  of  one or two bat- 
~!es,  the  war  may  be  set  on  foot  again, and a third perhaps 
may prove successful. 
XI.  However it may be  said, that, if  otherwise there is  no 
prospect of  making a good end of  a war,  and if the liberty  and 
safety  of  the state are  at stake;  there seems to be  no reason 
against taking this step, as the leas;  of two evils. 
XLI. Grotius, in examining this question, pretends that these 
combats are not reconcileabie to internal justice, though they are 
approved by the ex~ernal  right of nations ;  and that private per- 
sons  cannot  innocently expose their lives, of  their own accord, 
to the hazard of a single combat, though such a combat may be 
innocently permitted by the state or sovereign,  to prevent great- 
er mischiefs.  But it has been  justly  observed,  that the argu- 
ments,  used  by this great man,  either  prove  nothing at all, or 
prove at the same time,  that it is never lawful to venture one's 
life in any combat whatever. 
XIII.  We  may  even affirm, that Grotius is not very consis- 
tent with  himself,  since he permits this kind of combats, when 
otherwise there  is the greatest  probability,  that he,  who prose- 
cutes an unjust cause,  will be victorious,  and thereby destroy a 
great number of  innocent persons.  Fcr this exceptioli evinces, 
that the thing is not bad in itself,  and  that all the harm,  which 
can be in this case,  consists in exposing  our own  life,  or that 
of others, without necessity,  to the hazard of  a single combat. 
The desire  of  terminating,  or  preventing  a  war,  which has 
always terrible consequences, even  to the victorious,  is so com- 
mendable,  that it may excuse,  if  not entirely justify  those,  who 
engage either themselves  or others even imprudently in a com- 
bat of this kind.  Be this as it may,  it is  certain that  in such 
a case those, who combat by the order of the state,  are entirely 
innocent ;  for  they are  no more  obliged  to examine whether 
the state acts prudently or not, than  when  they are sent upon 
an assault,  or  to fight a pitched  battle. 
XIV.  We  must  however observe,  that  it was a foolish su- 
perstition  in those people,  who looked upon a set combat, as a 
lawful  method of determining all differences,  even between in- 
dividuals,  from a persuasion,  that the  Deity  gave  always the 
victory to tlle good cause ;  for  which reason they  called this 
kind of combat the judgment  of  God. 
XV. But if after having used all our endeavours to terminate 
differences  in  an  amicable  manner,  their  remains no further 
hope, and we are absolutely constrained to undertake a war, we 
ought first to declare it in form. 
XVI.  This declaration of  war,  considered in  itself,  and in- 
dependently  of  the pxticular  formalities of  each people,  does 
not simply belong to  the law of  nations, taking this word in the 
sense of Grotius, but to the law  of  nature itself.  Indeed pru- 
dence and natural equity  equally require,  that,  beiore we take 
up arms against  any state, we should try all amicabIe  methods 
to avoid coming to such an extremity.  We  ought then to sum- 
mon  him,  who has injured  us,  to make a  speedy satisfaction, 
that we may see whether he will not have regard to himself, and 
not put us to the hard  necessity of  pursuing our right by force 
of  arms. 
XVII.  From what has been said it  follows,  that this decla- 
ration takes place only in ofensive  wars; for, when 1%-e  are ac- 
tually attacked, that  alone gives  us reason to believe,  that the 
enemy is resolved not to listen  to an accoml:~odation. 
XVIII.  From this it also follows,  that we ought no:  to com- 
mit acts of hostility immediately upon declaring war, but should 188  THE PRINCIPLES OF 
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wait so long at least,  as we can without doing ourselves a  pre. 
judice,  until he,  who has done us the injury, plainly refuses to 
give us satisfaction,  and  has  put himself in a condition to re- 
ceive us with braver7 and resolution ;  otherwise the decldratioil 
of  war would be only a vain ceremony.  For we ought to neg- 
lect no means to convince  all the  world, and  even the enemy 
himself,  that it is only absolute necessity, that obliges us to take 
up arms for  the recovery or defence of  our  just rights ;  after 
having tried every other method,  a~d  given the enemy full time 
to consider. 
XIX.  Declarations of  war are  distinguished into  co?zdifional 
and ab.rolrrte.  The cortditional is  that, which is  joined  with  a 
solemn demand  of  restitution,  and with this condition, that if 
the injury be not repaired,  we shall do ourselves justice by arms. 
The absoLute is that, which includes no condition ;  and by which 
we absolutely  renounce the friendship  and  society of  him,  a- 
gainst whom we declare  war.  But every  declaration of  war, 
in whatever manner it be made,  is of  its own nature condition- 
al ;*  for we ought always to be disposed to accept of  a reason- 
able satisfaction,  so soon as the  emmy oKma it j  and on this 
account some  writers reject this distinction  of  the declaration 
of  war into conditional and absolute.  But it may nevertheless 
be maintained, by supposing that  he,  against whom war is de- 
clared purely and simply, has already  shown, that  he  had  no 
desigii to spare us the neccssity  of  taking up arms against him. 
So far therefore  the declsrstion may, at least as to the fora of 
it, be pure and simple, without any prejudice to the disposition, 
in which we ought always to be, if  the enemy will hearken to 
reason.  But this relates to the conclusion,  rather than the com- 
mencement of  a war;  to the latter of which the distinction of 
conditional and absolute declarations properly belongs. 
XX.  As  soon as war has been declared  against a sovereign, 
it is presumed  to be declared at the same time  not only against 
all his subjects, who,  in conjunction with him,  form one nloral 
person ;  but also against  all  those,  who shall  afterwards  join 
him,  and who,  with respect to  the  principal enemy, are to be 
looked  upon only as allies,  or adherents. 
See above, numb. xviii. 
XXI.  As to the formalities,  observed by different nations in 
declaring war they are all arbitrary in themselves.  It is there- 
fore a matter of  indifference, whether the declaration be made 
by envoys; heralds, or letters ;  whether the sovereign in person, 
or to his subjects,  provided the sovereign cannot plead ignorance 
of  it. 
XXII.  With respect to the reasons why a solemn denuncia- 
tion  was required into  such a war,  as by the law of  nations is 
called just ;  Grotius pretends it was, that the people might  be 
assured, that the war was not undertaken by private authority, 
but by the consent of  one or  other of  the nations,  or of their 
sovereigns. 
XXIII.  But this reason of Grotius's seems to  be insufficietlt ; 
for are we more assured,  that  the war is  made  by public au- 
thority,  when a herald for instance comes to declare it with cer- 
tain  ceremonies,  than we should be,  when we see an army up- 
on our frontiers, commanded by a principal person of the state, 
and ready to enter our country ?  Might it not more easily hap- 
pen,  that one, or  a few  persons,  should assume the  character 
of herald,  than that a single man should,  of his own authority, 
raise  an  army, and march  at the held of  it  to  the  frontiers, 
without the sovereign's knowledge ? 
XXIV.  The truth is,  the principal  end of  a declaration  of 
war, or at least what has  occasioned its institution,  is to let all 
thc world know,  that there was  just  reason  to  take up arms, 
and  to signify to the enemy himself,  that it had been,  and still 
was, in his  power to avoid it.  The declarations of  war,  and 
the  manifestos  published by  princes,  are marks of  the due re- 
spect they  have  for each  other,  and  for  society in general,  to 
whom by  such means they give an account of  their conduct,  in 
order to obtain the public approbation.  This appears particu- 
larly by the manner in which the Romans  made those denuncia- 
tions.  The person sent for this purpose  took the gods to wit- 
ness, that the nation,  against whom they had declared war,  had 
acted unjustly,  by refusing to comply with what law and justice 
required. 
XXIV.  Lastly it is to be observed, that we ought not to  con- 
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made in favor of  the subjects  of  the prince,  who  declares the 
war,  and to inform them,  that they are hencefoith to look  up- 
on such a nation,  as their enemy, and to take their measures ac- 
cordingly. 
CHAP.  V. 
Genwnl ryl~  to know  what is allowable  in war. 
I  I.  I'  is not enough,  that a  war be undertaken  with jus- 
tice, or for a lawful reason, and that we observe the other con- 
ditions hitherto ~nentioned;  but we  ought  also,  in  the prose- 
cution of  it,  to be  directed by  the principles  of justice,  and 
humar,ity,  and not  to carry  the  liberties  of  hostility  beyond 
those bou~ds. 
11.  Grotius, in treating this subject, establishes three general 
rules,  as so many principles,  which serve to explain the extent 
of  the rights of  war. 
111.  The Jirst  is,  that every  thing, which has a  connexion 
morally  pecessary with  the end of  the war, is permitted, and 
no more.  For it would be to no purpose to have a right to do 
a thing,  if  we could not make use  of  the  necessary means to 
bring it about.  But,  at the same time, it  would not be  just, 
that, under a pretence of  defending our right,  we should think 
every thing lawful, and proceed  without any manner of  neces- 
sity, to the last extremity. 
IV.  The second rule.  The right we have against an enemy, 
and which we pursue by arms,  ought not to be considered  only 
with respect to the  cause, which gave rise to the war ;  but al- 
so with respect to the  fresh  causes,  which happen afterwards, 
during the prosecution of  hostilities;  just  as in courts of  law, 
one of the parties often acquires  some new right before the end 
of  the suit.  This is the foundation of  the right we have to act 
against those, who  join  our enemy,  during the course  of  the 
war, whether they be his dependants or not. 
V.  The third  yule,  in  fine, is,  that  there  are a great many 
things, which,  though otherwise unlawful, are yet permitted in 
war, because they are inevitable consequences of it, and happen 
contrary to our  intention, otherwise there would never be  any 
way of making war without  injustice ;  and  the most innocent 
actions would be  looked  upon  as criminal, since there  are but 
few,  from which some evil may not accidentally arise,  contrary 
to the intention of  the  agent. 
VI.  Thus for  example,  in  recovering  our own, if  just  so 
much, as is precisely our  due, callnotbbe had,  we have a right 
to take more,  but under the obligation  of returning the value of 
the overplus.  Hence  we  may  attack a ship  full  of  pirates, 
though there may be women,  or children or other innocent per- 
sons on board we must needs be exposed to the danger of being 
involved in tile ruin of those,  whom we may justly  destroy. 
VII.  This is the extent of  the right we have against an en- 
emy,  in consequence of  a state of war.  By a state of war that 
of society is abolished ;  so that whoever declares himself my en- 
emy gives me liberty to use violence against him itt iniitum, or 
so far, as I please ;  and that not  only  till I have  repulsed  the 
danger,  that threatened  me,  or till I have recovered,  or forced 
from  him,  what  he either  unjustly  deprived me of, or refused 
to pay me, but till I have further  obliged  him to give me good 
security for the futdre.  It  is not therefore always unjust to re- 
turn a greater evil for a less. 
VIII. But it is also to be observed, t!lat  though these maxims 
are true according to the strict right of war, ye:  the law of hu- 
manity fixes bounds to this right.  That law directs us to consid- 
er, not only whether such or such acts of hostiiiry may,  without 
injury, be committed against an enemy;  but also whether they 
are worthy of a humane or generous conqueror.  Thus, so far as 
our own defence and future security will permit, we must mod- 
erate the evils, we inflict  upon an  enemy, by  the principles of 
humanity. 
IX.  As to the manner of  acting lawfully against an enemy, 
it is evident that violence  and terror are the proper  characteris- 
tics of  war,  and the method most  commonly  used.  Pet it is 
also lawful to employ stratagem and artifice, provided it be with- 
out treachery, or  breach of  promise.  Thus we  may  deceive 
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never to violate our compacts or engagements with him,  as we 
shall show more particularly hereafter. 
X.  By this we niay judge  of  the right of  stratagems ;  nei- 
ther is it to be doubted but we  may innocently  use  fraud and 
artifice,  wherever  it is  lawful  to  have  recourse  to  violence 
and force.  The former means have even the  advantage  over 
the latter in this,  that they ate attended wifh less mischief,  and 
preserve the lives of  a great many innocent people. 
XI.  It  is true some nations have  rejected  the use of  strata- 
gem and deceit in  war ;  this however  was  not  because  they 
thought them unjust, but  from a certain magnanimity,  and of- 
ten  from a confidence in their  own strength.  The  Romans, 
till  very near the end of  the second  Punic war,  thought it a 
point of honor to use no stratagem agairisc their enemies. 
XII.  These are the  principles  by which we  may judge  to 
what degree the ld~a  of hostility rudy be carried.  TO  which let 
us add, that most  nations  have fixed  no bounds  to the rights 
which the law of nature gives us to act against an enemy ;  and 
the ~ruth  is,  it is very difficult to determine precisely how far it 
is proper to extend acts of  hostility even  in the most legitimate 
wars,  in defence of our persons,  or for the reparatiou of  damag- 
es,  or for obtaining  caution for the future ;  especially as those, 
who engage in war,  give each other, by  a kind of  tacit  agree& 
mrnt, an entire liberty to moderdte or augmcnt  the violence  of 
arms,  and to exercise a11  acts  of  hostility,  as  each shall think 
proper. 
XIII.  And here  it is to be  observed,  that though  generals 
usually punish their soldiers, who  have carried acts of  hostility 
beyond the orders prescribed;  yet this is not because they sup- 
pose the enemy is injured, but becsuse it is ne~essary  the gene- 
ral's  orders should he obeyed, and that military discipline should 
be strictly  observed. 
XIV.  It is also in consequence of these principles,  that those 
who,  in a just and solemn war, hue  pushed slaughter and plun- 
der  beyond  what the law of nature permits,  are not generally 
looked upon as murderers or robbers, nor punisl~ed  as such.  The 
custom of  nations is to leave this point to the conscie~ice  of thc 
persons  engaged in a war,  rather  than  involve  themselves  in 
troublesome broils, by taking upon them to condemn either party. 
XV.  It may be even said, rhat this custom of  nations is foutud- 
rd on the principles of the law of nature.  Let us suppose, that, 
in the independence of the  state of nature, thirty heads of fami- 
lies, inhabitatits  of  the same country,  should have entered into 
a league to attack or repulse a bady, composed ~f other heads of 
families.  I say,  that neither during that war, nar after it is fin- 
ished,  those of  the  same  country, or elsewhere,  who  had  not 
joined the league on the  either side, ought, Qr could  punish,  as 
murderers or robbers, any of the two parties, who should happen 
to fall into their hands. 
XVI. They could not do it  during the war,  for that would 
be espousing the quarrel  of  one of the parties 3  and since thet 
continued neuter  in the beginning,  they had clearly renounced 
the right of interfering with what should pass in the war.  Much 
less could they intermeddle after  the  war is over ;  because, as 
it could not be ended without dome accommodation or treaty of 
peace,  the parties  concerned were  reciprocally discharged from 
all the evils, they had done to each other. 
XVll.  The good of society also requires, that we should fola 
low these  maxims.  For if  those,  who continued neuter,  had 
still bten authorised to take cognizance of  the acts of  hdstility, 
exercised in a foreign war,  and consequently to punish such, as 
they believed  to  have  committed  any injustice,  and to take up 
arms on that account;  instead of one war, several might have 
arisen, and proved a source of  broils and troubles.  The more 
wars became frequent, the more necessary it was, for the tran- 
quillity of  mankind, not to espouse  rashly other people's  puar- 
rels.  The  establishment of civil societies bnly rendered the prac- 
tice of  those rules more necessary ;  because acts of  hostility then 
became, if  not more  frequent, at least  more extensive,  and at- 
tended with a greater  number of evils. 
XVIII.  Lastly  it is to be observed,  that a11  acts of hostility, 
which can be lawfully committed against an enemy, may be ex- 
ercised  eitherin his territories, or in ours, in places subject tono 
jurisdiction,  or at sea. 
XX. This does not hold good in a neutral country ;  that is 
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to say, whose sovereign has taken no share in the war.  In  such 
countries,  we cannot  lawfully exercise  any  acts  of  hostility; 
neither on the persons  of the enemy, nor on their effects ;  not 
in virtue of any right of the enemy themselves, but  from a just 
respect to the sovereign, who,  having taken neither side, lays US 
under a necessity of  respecting his jurisdiction,  and of  forbear- 
ing to commit any  acts of  violence in his territories.  To  this 
we may add,  that the sovereign,  by continuing neuter, has tacit- 
ly engaged not to suffer  either party  to commit  any hostilities 
within his dominions. 
CHAP.  VI. 
Of  the rights, which war  gives over the persons  of  the  enemy, and 
of their extetlt  and bounds. 
.# 
I. W  E shall now enter into the particulars of  the differ- 
ent rights, which war gives over the enemy's  person and goods ; 
and to begin  with the former. 
I.  It is certain, that we  may  lawfully kill an enemy;  I say 
lawfully,  not only according  to  the terms  of  external  justice, 
which passes for such among all nations,  but also according to 
internal justice,  and the laws of conscience.  Indeed the end of 
war necessarily  requires, that we should have this power, other- 
wise it would be in vain to take up arms,  and the law of  nature 
would permit it to no purpose. 
11.  If we consulted only  the custom of  countries,  and what 
Grotius calls the law ofnations, this liberty of killing an enemy 
would  extend  very  far;  we might say that it had no bounds, 
and  might ever1 be exercised on innocent persons.  However, 
though it be certain, that war is attended with numberless evils, 
which in themselves are acts of injustice,  and real cruelty, but, 
under particular  circumstances, ought rather to be considered as 
unavoidable  misfortunes ;  it is  nevertheless true, that the right, 
which war gives over the person  and  life of an enemy,  has its 
bounds ;  and that there are measures to be observed, which can- 
not be innocently neglected. 
111.  In general we ought to be directed by the principles, es- 
tablislicd in the preceding chapter,  in judging of  the degress, to 
which the liberties of war may be carried.  Ihe  power we have 
of taking away the life of  an enemy, is not therefore unlimited ; 
for,  if we can attain the legitimate end of war, that is  'f  ,  I  we can 
defend  our lives  and  properties,  assert our  rights,  and  recov- 
er satisfaction  for damages sustained,  and good sureties for the 
future, without taking away the life of the enemy, it is certain 
that justice and humanity directs us to forbear it, and not to shed 
human blood unnecessarily. 
N.  It  is true,  in the application of  these rules to particular 
cases, it  is sometimes very difficult, not to say impossible, to fix 
precisely  their  proper extent  and bounds;  but it is certain  at 
least,  that we ought to come as near to them as possible,  with- 
out prejudicing our real interests.  Let us apply these principles 
to particular cases. 
V.  I.  It is often disputed,  whether the  right of  killing  an 
enemy regards only those, who are actually in arms ;  or wheth- 
er it extends indifferently to all  those in the  enemy's  country, 
subjects or foreigners ?  My answer is, that with respect to those, 
who are  subjects,  the  point is incontestable.  These are  the 
principal  enemies,  and  we  may  exercise  all acts  of  hostility 
against  them, by virtue of the state of war. 
VI.  As to strangers,  those,  who settle in the enemy's  coun- 
try after a war is begun, of which they had previous notice, may 
justly  be looked upon as enemies,  and treated  as such.  Uu!  in 
regard to such as went  thither before the war,  justice  and hu- 
manity require thst we should give  then1 a  reasonable time to 
retire ;  and  if they neglect that opportunity,  they are account- 
ed enemies. 
TTIJ. 2.  With regard to old men, women, and children, it is 
certain,  that the right of war does not of  itself require,  that we 
should  push hostilities so fat,  as to kill them ;  it is therefore a 
barbarous cruelty to do so.  I  say, that  the  end of  war does 
not require this of  itself ;  but if women  for  instance exercise 
acts of hostility,  if,  forgetting  the  weakness  of their  sex,  they 
usurp the offices of men,  and take up arms zgainst  us, then,  we 
are certainly excused  in wailing ourselves  of the rights of  war 
against them.  It may  also be  said,  that when the heat of ac- 
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against the order  of  their superiors, to colvlmit  ;tees  of  inhu. 
panity, as, for example, at the siege of a town, which, by an ob- 
stinate resistance,  has  irritated  the troops ;  we  ought to look 
upon  those  evils rather  as  misfortunes,  and  the  unavoidable 
consequences of w4r,  than  as  crimes,  that deserve to be pun- 
ished. 
VIII.  3.  We  must reason almost in the same manner, with 
respect to prisoners  of  war.  We  cannot, generally  speaking, 
put them  to  death,  without  being  guilty  of  cruelty.  I  say 
generally  speaking;  for  there  may  be  cases  of  necessity. so 
pressing, that  the care  af  our own  preservation obliges  us to 
proceed te extremities, w&~h  in any ather circumstances would 
he absslutely criminal. 
IX.  In general even the laws of war require, that we cihou14 
abstain from slaughter as much as possible, and not shed human 
blood without necessity.  We  ought not therefore directly and 
deliberately to kill prisoners of war, nor those, who ask quarter, 
or surrender themselves, much kss ald men,  women,  and chil- 
dren ;  in general  we  should  spare  all those,  whose age and 
profession render  hem unfit  to carry arms, and who have  no 
other  share  in the war,  than  being  in  the enemy's country. 
It is easy also to canwive, that the rights of  war do not extend 
ss far, as to authorise the outra~es,  committed upon the  honoy 
ad  chastity of  women ;  for  this contributes nothing either ta 
our defence or  safet~  0r to the syppart of  our rights j  but an- 
ly serves to satisfy the brutality of  the soldiers.* 
$.  Again a question is here started, whether in cases, where 
it is lawful to kill the enemy, we may  nat, for that purpme, use 
41  Ends of  wns  indiserently I I answer, that to consider rhe 
thi~g  in itelf, md  in an abstract  manner, it is no matter which 
way we kill an  enemy, whether by  open force, or  by  fraud and 
stratagem;  by  the sword or by  pois~n. 
SZ.  It is however cenain, that according to  the idea and cus- 
tom of civilized nations, it is iaoked upon as a base act of cowar- 
&e,  not only to cause any poisonous draught to be  given to the 
memy,  but also  to  poison  wells, fouatains, springs, rivers,  ar- 
rows, darts, bdlets, or other weapons used against hlm.  NOW 
it is dicient, that this custom of lookiag on the  use  of poison 
t Glotiur, lib.  iii, capiv.  sect.  19. 
a  criminai is received smang the nations at variance with us, to 
s~ippose  we cowply with it, wbw, in the beginning af the war, we 
do not declare, that we are at liberty to act atkrwise, and leave 
it to our enemy's crption  to da the same, 
XII. We  may so mach the mare suppsse this tacit agwement, 
as humanity ad  the interest of  both parties equally require it; 
e3pecially since wars are become so freqwnt, and  often U+ 
dertakerl an such slight oaasiono ;  and since the human  mind, 
ingenious in inventing the means to  hurt, has so greqtly multi- 
plied  those,  which am authorized by  custonl, and  looked urn 
as honest.  Besides it is beyond all  doubt,  that,  when we can 
obtain the  sane end by  milder  and  more  humape  meagqrma 
which prewe  tile lives of  many, and  particularly of  those, iq 
whose preservation human  society is  interested,  humanity  di- 
rec49,  that we shsuM take this cwrse. 
XIII.  Thqse  are  therefore  just  precautions,  which  men 
ought  to  follow  for their  own  advantage.  It is for the corn 
mon benefit  vf  aaakiud,  that dangers should not he  augment- 
ed without  ed.  In particular the  pubiif  is interested  in tk 
preservation of  the lives of  kings,  generals of armies, and other 
persons of the firsr  rank, on  whose safety that of  societies gen- 
erally depends.  For ii  the lives of these persons are in gre&er 
safety, than thme of others, when attacked only by arms j  they 
are, on the other hand,  more in danger of poison,  &c.  and they 
would be eve7 day exposed to  perish in  this  manner, if  they 
were not protected  by  a regard  to some sQrt of  law, or estab 
lished custom. 
XIV.  Let us add in  fine, that all nations, that ever pretend- 
ed to justice  and generosity,  have followed these maxim$.  The 
Roman  consuls,  in a letter they wrote to Pyrrkus,  info~wing 
him, that one af  his people had offe~ed  to poison Ern,  sa3, ths 
it was the interest of all ilatiorts not to set such examples. 
XV.  It is likew-he disputed,  whether  we may  lawfully send 
a person to  assassinate an enemy ?  I answer,  I,  that he,  who 
for this purpose employs only some of  his own pews  may Bo 
it justly.  When it is  lawful to kill an  enemy, it is no mattev 
whether those employed are many or few in number.  Sir hun- 
did  hcdatawniuas, with Leanidas, cratered the enemy's  t~+ POLITIC  LAW.  I99 
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and went directly to the  Persian king (Xerxes's) pavilion ;  and 
a smaller  number might  certainly have  done the same.  The 
famous attempt of  Mucius  Scevola is commended by  all anti- 
quity ;  and  Porsenna himself,  whose  life  was  aimed  at,  ac- 
knowledged this to be an act of  great  valor. 
XVI.  But it is  not so  easy to  determine  whether we may 
for this purpose employ assassins, who, by  undertaking this task, 
must be guilty of  falshood  and treason ;  such as subjects with 
regard  to their sovereign, and soldiers to their general.  In this 
respect there are, in my opinion, two points to be distinguished. 
First whether we do  any  wrong,  even to  the  enemy himself, 
against whom we employ traitors ;  and secondly whether,, sup- 
posing we  do him no wrong, we  commit  nevertheless a bad 
action. 
XVII.  3.  With regard to the first  question, to consider the 
thing itself, and  according to the rigorous law of  war, it seems, 
that, admitting the war to be just, no wrong is done to the ene- 
my,  whether we take advantage of  the opportunity of a traitor, 
who freely offers himself, or whether  we seek for it,  and bring 
it about  ourselves. 
XVIII.  The state  of  war, into  which  the  enemy  has put. 
himself, and which it was in his own power to prevent, permits 
of  itself every  method, that can be  used against him ;  so that 
he has no  reason to complail~, whatever we do.  Besides, we 
are no more obliged,  strictly  speaking, to respect  the right he 
has over his  subjects, and the  fidelity they owe  him  as such, 
than their  lives and  fortunes,  of  which  we  may certainly de- 
prive them by  the right of war. 
XIX.  4. And yet I believe, that this is not sufficient to ren- 
der an assassination, under such circumstances, entirely innocent. 
A sovereign, who  has the least tenderness of  conscience, and is 
convinced of the justice  of his cause, will not endeavour to find 
out perfidious  methods to  subdue his enemy,  nor be  so ready 
to embrace those, which may  present themselves to him.  The 
just confidence he has in the protection of heaven, the horror he 
conceives ht  the traitor's  perfidy,  the dread of becoming his ac- 
complice, and of setting an  example, which  may  fall  again on 
himself and otllers, will make him despise and reject all the ad- 
vantage, he might propose  to himself from such means. 
XX.  5. Let  us also add,  that such means canilot always be 
looked  upon as entirely innocent,  even with respect to the per- 
son, who  employs  the assassin.  The state of  hostility, which 
supersedes  the  intercourse  of  good  offices,  and  authorizes  to 
hurt, does not therefore dissolve all ties of humanity, nor remove 
eur obligation to avoid,  as  much  as possible, the  giving  room 
for some bad  actions of  the  enemy, or  his  people ;  especially 
those, who of  themselves have  had  no part  in the  occasion of 
the war.  Now every  traitor certainly conimits an action equal- 
ly shameful and criminal. 
XXI.  6. We  must therefore conclude with Grotius, that we 
can never in conscience seduce or solicit the subjects of an en- 
emy to commit treason,  btcause that is positively  and directly 
inducing them  to  perpetrate  a henious crime, which otherwise 
would,  in  all  probability,  have  been  very  remote  from  their 
thoughts. 
XXII.  7.  It is  quite  another thing, when we only take ad- 
vantage of  the occasion  and the dispositions,  we find in a per- 
son, who has no need to be  solicited to commit treason.  Here I 
think the infamy of  the perfidy does not fall on him, who finds 
it entirely formed in the  heart  of  the traitor;  especially if  we 
consider, that, in this  case  between  enemies,  the  thing,  with 
respect to which  we take advantage  of  the bad  disposition of 
another,  is of  such a nature, that  we may  innocently and law- 
fully do it ourselves. 
XXIII.  8. Be that  as it may,  for the reasons above alledged, 
we ought not  to  take advantage of  a treason,  which offered it- 
self, except in an extraordinary case,  and from a kind of neces- 
sity.  And though  the  custom of  several  nations has nothing 
obligatory in itself, yet as the people, with  whom we are at va- 
riance, look upon the very acceptance of  a certain  kind of per- 
fidy to be unlawful, as that of  assassinating one's  prince or gene- 
ral,  we are reasonably supposed to comply with it by  a tacit con- 
sent. 
XXIV. 9. Let us observe however, that  the law of nations 
allows some difference between a fair and legitimate enemy, and 
rebels, pirates, or highwaymen.  The  most  religious  princes 
make no difficulty to propose even rewards to those,  who will BOO  THE PRINCIPLES  OF  POLITIC LAW.  20 I 
betray such persons ;  and the public odium of  which men 
of  this  stamp  lie  under, is the cause,  that  nobody  thinks  th 
measure hard, or blames the conduct of the prince in using eve& 
y method to destroy them. 
XXV.  Lastly it is permitted to M1  an enemy  wherever we 
find him, except in a neutral country ;  for violent means are not 
suffered in a civilited  society, where  we  ought to  implore the 
assistcmce of  the magistrate.  In the time of  the second Punic 
war,*  sewn Catthaginian galleys rode in a harbor, belonging 
Gyphax, who was then in peace both with the Romans and Car+ 
thagifiians, and Sc~pio  came  that  way  with  two  gallcys  only. 
The Catthaginians immediately  prepared to attack  the Roman 
galleys, which they might easily have taken before they had en- 
tered the pott ;  but, being forced by a strong wind into the har- 
bor, before  the Carthaginians  had time to  weigh anchor,  they 
durst  not attack them,  because it was in a neutral  prince's  ha- 
ven. 
=I.  Ifere it may be proper to say sobething concerning 
prisoners of  war.  In former times it was a custom, almost uni- 
versally established, that thoee, who  were  made  prisoners in a 
just and solemn war, whether they hall surrendered themselves, 
or been taken  by  main  force, became  slaves the moment the7 
were  conducted into dome  place, depet~dant  on the conqueror. 
And this right  was  exercised on  all persons  whatsoever, even 
on  those,  who  happened unfortunately  to be  in  the enemy's 
oountry,  at the time the war suddenly broke out, 
XXVII.  Further,  not  only  the  prisoners  themselves,  but 
their posterity were  reduced  to the same condition ;  that is to 
say,  those born of r woman after she had been made a slave. 
XXVIII.  The effects of such a slavery had no bounds ;  ev- 
ery thing  was permitted to a master  with  respect to  his slave, 
he had the power of  life and death  over him,  and all, that the 
slave possessed, or tbuld  afrerv.+ards  acquire,  belonged of right 
to the master. 
XXIX. There is some  probability,  that  the reason aid end, 
for  which nations had established this custom of making slave6 
in war,  was prit~cipallp to induce  the  captors to  abstain from 
Livy, tib'  aviii. cap.  ttii. numb. I*, b W. 
from  slaughter,  from  a  view of  the  advantages  they  reaped 
from then slaves.  Thus historians observe, that civil wars were 
more cruel  than others,  the general  practice in  that case being 
to put the prisoners to the sword, because they could not make 
slaves of  them. 
XXX.  But Christian  nations  have generally  agreed among 
themselves to abolish the custom of making their prisoners yield 
perpetual  service to the  conqueror.  At  present it is  thought 
sufficient to keep those, that are taken in war, till  their ransom 
is p.ud,  the estimation of  which depends on the will  of the con- 
queror,  unless there be a  cartel, or  agreement,  by which it is 
fixed. 
CHAP.  VII. 
Of  the rig hi^ of war over the goods  of an mmp 
I.  S to  the goods of  an enemy,  it  is certain  that  the  A 
state of war permits us to carry them off,  to ravage, to spoil, or 
even  entirely  to destroy  them  4  for,  as  Cicero  very  well ob- 
serves,*  It  zs  tz3f cont~ary  to the law Of nature to pltrndpr  a person, 
whom W:  inay lawfully kdI.  And all those mischiefs, which the 
law of  nations  allows  us to do to the enemy,  by ravaging and 
wasting his lands and goods, are called spoil or plunder. 
IT.  This right of  spoil, or plunder,  extends in general  to all 
things belonging to  the enemy ; and the law of nations, prop- 
erly  so  called,  does not  exempt even  sacred  things;  that is, 
things consecrated either to the true God, or to false deities, and 
designed for the use of  religion. 
111.  It is true the practices  and  customs  of  nations do not 
agree in this respect ; some  having  permitted  the  plunder of 
things sacred and religious,  and others having looked upon it as 
a ~rofanation.  But  wh~tever  the customs of  different people 
may be,  they  can never  constitute the  primitive rule of right. 
In order therefore to be  dssured of the right of war in regard to 
this article, we must have recourse to the law of  nature and na- 
tions. 
Cic.  de  Off. lib. iii.  cap,  vi. 
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IV. I observe then, that things sacred are nof  in themserves 
different from those we can profane.  The former differ from 
rhe latter only by the religious use,  to which they were intend- 
ed.  But this application or use does not invest the things with 
the quality of holy and sacred,  as an intrinsic and indelible char- 
acter. 
V.  The things thus  consecrated  still  belong  either  to  the 
state, or to the sovereign ;  and there is no reason why the prince, 
who has devcted them to  religious purposes,  may not afterwards 
apply them  to the uses of  Iife ;  for they,  as well as  all  other 
public matters, are at his disposal. 
VI.  It is therefore, a gross superstition to believe, that by the 
consecration, or destination of  those things to the service of  God, 
they change master,  and belong no more to men, but are entire- 
ly withdrawn from human commerce, and the property of  them 
is transferred to God.  This is a dangerous superstition, owing 
to the ambition of the clergy. 
VII.  Wk  must  therefore consider  sacred things as  public 
goods,  which belong to the state or sovereign.  AI1 the liberty, 
which the right  of  war  gives over the  goods belonging to  the 
state, it also gives with  respect to things  calkd sacred.  They 
may therefore be spoiled or wasted by the enemy,  at least so far 
as is necessary  and conducive to the design of the u.ar ;  a limi- 
tation not at all peculiar  to the  plunder  of  sacred or religious 
things. 
VIIL.  For,  in  general,  it certainly is not  ldw6ul to plunder 
for plunder's  sake, but it is just and innocent only, when it bears 
some relation to the design of  the war ;  that is,  ud~en  an advan- 
tage directly accrues from it to ourselves, by appropriating those 
goods, or at kast, when by  ravaging and destroying them, we in 
semi.  measure  weaken  the  enemy.  It  would be a madness 
qudlly brutal and criminal to do evil to another without a pros- 
pect of  procuring some good, either directly or indirectly, to our- 
selves.  It very seldom happens for instance, that  after the tak- 
ing of  towns, there is any necessi~  for ruining temples,  statues, 
m other public or private structures ;  we should therefore gene- 
tally spare all these,  as well as the tombs and sepulchres. 
SX. It may however be obseived,  with respect to things sac- 
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red, that they who believe they contain something divine and in- 
violable, are really  in the  wrong to  meddle  with them  at 211 ; 
but this  is only because they would  then act against their con- 
science.  And here, by the way,  we may take notice of  a rea- 
son, given to clear the Pagans of the imputation of sacrilege, even 
when  they  pillaged  the  temples  of  the  gods,  whom they ac- 
knowledged  as such ;  which  is,  they  imagined,  that,  when a 
city was taken, the guardian deities of that place quitted,  at the 
same time,  their temples ancl  altars ;  especially after those  dei- 
ties, with every thing else, that was  sacred,  had been invited out 
with certain ceremonies.  This is excellently described by Coc- 
ceius, in his dissertation De  Evocutione  Sa.-rorum. 
X.  The learned Grodus furnishes us with wise reflections on 
this subject, to persuade  generals to behave with moderation  in 
regard to  plunder, from  the  advantages,  which may accrue to 
themselves from such a conduct.  And first he says,  "  by these 
"  means we  take  from  the enemy one  of  the most powerful 
"  weapons,  despair.  Besides, by  spariug  the emmy's country, 
'' we give room to believe,  that we are pretty confident  of vic- 
''  tory ;  and clemency  is of  itself proper to soften and engage 
"  the minds of  men.  All  which  may  be  proved  by  several 
illustrious examples." 
XI.  Besides the power, which war gives to spoil and destroy 
the goods of an enemy, it likewise  confers a right of  acquiring, 
appropriating, and justly  retaining  the  goods, we  have taken 
from him, till the  sum due to us is  paid,  includiug the expen, 
ces of  the war,  in  which his  refusal of  payment  engaged us j 
and whatever else we think necessary to secure .to  ourselves,  by 
way of  caution, from the enemy. 
XII.  By the law of nations,  not only he,  who makes war for 
a just  reason, but also every man, in a just war, acquires a pro-p 
erty in what he takes from the enemy, and that without ru!e  or 
measnre,  at least as to the external effects, with which the righf 
of  property  is  accompanied ;  that  is  to  say,  neutral  nations 
ought to regard the two parties at war,  as lawfgl proprietors  of 
what  they  can  take  froin  each  other  by force of arms ;  the 
state of  neutrality  not  permitting  them  to espouse either side, 
or to treat either oi  the contending powers  as a1 usurper,  pm 
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XIII.  'This is  generally true,  as well  with respect  to move. 
ables, as immoveables,  so long  as they are in the possession  of 
him,  who  has  acquired  them by  the  right  of  war.  But if 
from the hands of  the  conqueror  thzy  have  passed  into the 
power of a  third,  there is  no reason, d they are immovedbles, 
why the ancient  owner should not  try  to  recover  them from 
that third, who holds them of  the enemy, by what title soever ; 
for he has as good a  right against the new possessor, as against 
the enemy himself. 
XIV.  I said,  ij-  they  are  immoaeatles ;  for  with respect to 
moveable effects, as they may  easily be transferred by commerce 
into the hands of  the subjects of  a neutral state,  often without 
their knowing that they  were taken in war ;  the  tranquiliity  of 
nations,  the good of  commerce,  and even the state  of  neutrali- 
ty require, that  they should ever  be reputed lawful prize,  and 
the property of the person,  of  whom we hold them.  But the 
case is otherwise with reqpect to irnlnoveables, they  are such in 
their own nature ;  and those to whom a state, which has taken 
them from an enemy, would  resign  them, cannot be ignorant of 
the manner,  in which it possesses them. 
XV.  Here a  question  arises, when is it that things are said 
to be taken by the right of  war, and justly  deemed to belong to 
him,  who is in  possession  of  them  ?  Grotius  answers as  a 
civilian, that a man  is deemed to have  taken  moveabie  things 
by the right of war so soon,  as they  are secured from  the pur- 
suit of  the  enemy ;  or  when  he has  made  hiniself  master of 
them in such a manner, that  the first owner has lost all proba- 
ble hopes of recovering them.  Thus says he,  at sea ships and 
other things are not said to be  taken,  till they are brought into 
some port or harbour belonging  to us,  or to some  part of the 
sea,  where aur fleet rides ;  for it is only  then,  that the enemy 
begins to despair of recovering his propel ty. 
XVI.  But,  in  my  opinion,  this  manner  of answering the 
question is altogether arbitrary.  I see no reason why the priz- 
es, taken from the enemy, should  not  become  our property so 
soon, as they are  taken.  For  when  two nations are at  war, 
both of them have all the requisites for the acquisition of  prop- 
erty, at the very moment,  they take a prize.  They have an in- 
tention to acquire a  title of just property,  namely the  right of 
war ;  and they are  actually in possession of  the thing.  But if 
the principle, which  Grotius supposes,  were to be allowed,  and 
the prizes taken from the enemy were net deemed  a lawful ac- 
quisition, till they are transported  to a place of  safety, it mould 
follow,  that the booty,  wi~ich  a  small  number of  soldiers has 
taken in war,  may  be retaken from them by a stronger body of 
troops of the same party,  as st4  belonging to the enemy, if  this 
stronger body of troops has attacked the other  before  they had 
conveyed their booty to a place of  safety. 
XVII.  The latter circumstance is therefore altogether indif- 
ferent with resprct to  the  present  question.  The greater  or 
less difficulty t5e  enemy  may find, in recovering what has been 
taken from him, does  not hinder the  capture from actually be- 
longing  to the conqueror.  Every enemy, as such, and so long 
as he  continues such, retains the will to recover what the oth- 
er has taken from him ;  and  his  present inability only reduces 
him to the necessity  of  waiting for a mole favourable opportu- 
nity, which he stiil  seeks and desires.  Hence, with respect to 
him, the thing ought no more to be  deemed  taken, when in a 
place of  safety, than when he is still in a condition of pursuing 
it.  All, that can be said, is, that in the latter case,  the posses- 
sion of the  conqueror  is not so secure as in the former.  The 
truth is,  this distinction has been invented oniy to establish the 
rules of  the right of postiiminy, or the manner, in which the sub 
jects of  the state, from whom sonething has been taking in war, 
reenter upon their rights;  rather than to determine the time of 
the acquisition of things,  taken by one enemy from another. 
XVIII.  This seems to be the determination  of  the  law  of 
nature in regard  to this point.  Grotius observes also,  that,  by 
the customs established  in his time, it is sufficient, that the prize 
has  been  twenty  four  hours  in the enemy's  possession, to ac- 
count it lost.  Thumus, in the year  1595, gives us an example, 
that this custom was observed also by land.  The town of Liere 
in Brabant havicg been taken and retaken the same day, the plun- 
der was  returned  to the inhabitants, because  i:  Iind  not  been 
twenty four hours in the hands of the enemy.  But this rule was 
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in general we may  observe, that every sovereign has a right to 
establish such rules, in regard to this point,  as he thinks proper, 
and to make  what  agreement  he  pleases  with  other  powers. 
There have  been  several  made at different times,  between the 
Dutch and Spaniards, the Portuguese and the northern states. 
XIX.  Grotius applies these principles  dso to lands ;  they are 
not to be  reputed  lost  so soon, as they are seized on ;  but for 
this  effect they are to be secured with fortifications, that, with- 
rout  being forced,  they cannot be repossessed  by the first owner. 
But to this case we may also apply the reflections already made. 
A territory belongs  to an enemy as soon, as he is master of it; 
and so long, as he continues in possession of it.  The  greater or 
less precaution to secure it, is nothing to the purpose. 
XX.  But be thig as it may,  it is to be observed,  that, during 
the whole time of the war, the right we acquire over the things 
we have taken from the enemy, is of force only with respect to 
a third disinterested party ; for the  enemy himself  may retake 
what he has  lost, whenever  he  finds  an opportunity,  till  by  ;r 
treaty of peace he has renounced all his pretensions.. 
XXI.  It is also certain,  that  in order to appropriate a  thing 
by  the  right  of  war, it must belong to the enemy ;  for things 
belonging to people,  who are neither his  subjects, nor animated 
with the same spirit  as  he against  us, cannot be  taken  by  the 
right of  war,  even though they are found in the enemy's country. 
But if  neutral strangers furnish our enemy with any  thing,  and 
that with a design to put him into a condition of  hurting us, they 
may be looked uponsas taking part with our foe, and their effects 
may consequently be taken by the right of  war. 
XXII. It is however to be observed, that in dubious cases il 
is always to be presumed,  that  what  we  find  in  the  enemy's 
country, or in their ships, is deemed to belong to them ;  for be- 
sides that this presumption  is very  natural,  were  the  contrary 
maxim to take place,  it would  lay  a  foundation  for an infinite 
number of frauds.  But this presumption however reasonable in 
itself,  may be destroyed by contrary proofs. 
XXlIL  Neither do the ships of friends become laurful prizes, 
though some of  the enemy's  effects are found in them,  unless it 
is  done by the conseiit of  the  owners ;  who  by  that etep  seem 
to violate the neutrality, or friendship,  and give us a just right to 
treat them as an enemy. 
XXIV.  But in general  we must observe,  with respect ro aU 
these  questions,  that  prudence  and  good  policy  require, that 
sovereigns should come  ro some agreement among  themselves, 
in order to avoid the disputes, which may arise from those differ- 
ent cases. 
XXV.  Let us also take notice of a consequence of the princi- 
ples here established ; which is, that when we have taken things 
from the enemy, of which he had stripped another by the right 
of war,  the former possessor cannot claim them. 
XXVP.  Another question is,  whether things,  taken in a pub- 
lic and solemn war, belong to the state, or to the individuals, wha 
are members of  it,  or to those, who made the  Srst  seizure ?  I 
answer, that, as the right of war is lodged in the sovereign alone, 
and undcrtaken by his authority, ever); thing taken is originally 
and primarily acquired to him, whatever hands it first falls into. 
XXVII.  However, as the war is burdensome to the subjects, 
both  equity  and  humanity  require, that  the  sovereign should 
make them partake of the advantages, which may accrue from it. 
This may be  done  either by assigning to  those,  who may  take 
the field,  a  certain pay from the public,  or by sharing the booty 
among them.  As to foreign troops, the prince is obliged to give 
them no more than their pay ;  what he allows them above that, 
is pure liberality. 
XXVIII.  Grotius, who examines this question at large,  dis- 
tinguishes between  acts of  hostility  truly  public,  and  private 
3cts that are done upon  the occasiotl of a public  war.  By the 
latter,  according to him, private persons acquire to  themselves 
principally, and directly, what they take from the enemy ;  where- 
as by  the  former,  every thing taken belongs to the whole body 
of the people,  or to the sovereign.  But this decision has been 
justly  criticised.  As  all public war is  made by  the authority 
of the people, or of their chief, it is from this source wp  must orig- 
inally derive whatever right individuals may have to things taken 
in war.  In this case  there must always be an express  or tacit 
coilsent of the sovereign. 
XXIX  It is also to  be observed,  that iu treating this point Bag  THE PRINCIPLES  OF  FQLITIC  LAW. 
Gtrgiw has  conf~unded  different things.  The  question does not 
telate to the law of  nations,  properly so called ;  for in what-- 
uc  manner that  law is understood,  and whatever  it be founded 
m, it ought to relate to the affairs in dispute between two differa 
ent states.  Now  whether  the  booty belongs to the mereign 
who  makes war,  or  to the genes&% a  to the soldiers, or to oth- 
er persons, that is nothing to the memy,  nor to other states.  If 
what is  taken be a good  prize, h  is  ef  sdl  consequence to 
the enemy, in whose, hands it remains.  With rep8  to neunrl 
people, it is sufficient that such of  them, as have purchased,  er 
any other way  acquired a movable  thing taken in war,  cannot 
be molested, or  prosecuted  upon'that account.  The truth is, 
the regulations and  customs, relating  to this  strbject are not of 
public  right ;  and  their conformity,  in  maq countries,  im- 
plies no more than a civil right, 'common  to mm1  nations sep; 
arately. 
XXX,  As for what in particular relates to thQ acquisition of 
i&orpsreal  things by  the  right  of war, it is to be  observed, rhat 
they do not become our property, except we are in possession of 
the subject, in which they inhere.  Now the subjects, they inhere 
in, are either things or persons,  We  often annex, for instan*, 
to certain lands, rivers, ports,  and towns, p?rdcular rights, which 
always follow them, whatever possessors they come to ;  or rath- 
er those,  who  possess them,  are thereby  invested with certain 
rights over other things and persons. 
XXXI.  The rights,  which belong directly and immediately to 
persons,  regard  either  other  persons,  or only  certain  things. 
Those,  which are  annexed  to persons over  other persons, are 
not obtained but with the  consent of  the  persons  themselves ; 
who  are  supposed  not  to  have  given  a  power  over them to 
any man promiscuously, but to some cerrain person.  Thus, for 
imance,  though a king happens to be  made a prisoner of war, 
hi enemies have not therefore acquired his kingdom  with him. 
XXXII.  But with respect to personal rights over things, the 
bare seizure of  the person of  the enemy is not a sufficient title 
to the property of  all his effects, unless we redly take possession 
of  those effects at the same time.  This may  be illustrated by 
the example given by Grotius  and PufTendorf.  Alexander the 
Great, having destroyed the  city  of  Thehes,  made a present to 
the Thessalonians of  an instrument, in which the latter acknowl- 
edged that they owed thc Thebans a Iiudred talents. 
XXXIII.  'These are the  rights, which war gives us over the 
effects  of  the enemy.  But  Grotius  pretands,  that the right, 
bp which we acquire things taken in war, is  so proper and pe- 
culiar to a solemn war, declared in form, that it has no force in 
others, as in civil wars,  &c.  and that  in the latter, in particular, 
there  is no change  of  property,  but in virtue of  the sentence 
of  a judge. 
XXXIV.  We  may  observe however  on  this point,  that in 
most civil wars  no  con~mon  judge  is  acknowledged.  If  the 
state is monarchical, the dispute turns either upon  the succes- 
sion  to the  croupn or  upon  a  considerable  part of  the  state's 
pretending, that the  king  has  abused his pawer, in  a manner, 
which authorizes the subject to take up arms against him. 
XXXV.  In the former case,  the very nature  of  the  cause, 
for which the  war  is undertaken,  occasions tlie  two parties of 
the state to form as  it were two distinct bodies,  till  they come 
to agree upon a chief  by some treaty.  Hence with respect to 
the two parties, which  were at war,  it is on such a treaty,  that 
the  i-ight depends,  which persons may  have to  that, which has 
been taken on either side ; and  nothing hinders, but this right 
may be left on the same  footing, and admitted  to take place in 
the same manner,  as in public  wars between two states always 
distinct. 
XXXVI.  As to other nations, who were not concerned in the 
war,  they have no more authority to examine the validity of  the 
acquisitions, than they liave to be judges of  a war, made between 
two different stntes. 
XXXVII.  The other case, I mean an insurrection of  a con- 
siderable part of  the state against the reigning prince, can rarely 
happen, except  when  that priiice has given room  for  it,  either 
by tyranny, or by  the violation  of  the fundamental laws of  the 
kingdom.  Thus the  government  is  then  dissolved, and  the 
state is actually divided into two distinct and independent bodies ; 
so that we are to form  here the same  judgment,  as in the for- 
mer case. 
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XXXVIII.  For much stronger reasons does this take place in 
the civil wars of a republican state ;  in which the war, immedi- 
ately of  itself destroys the sovereignty,  which  subsists solely in 
the union of  its members. 
XXXIX.  Grotius seems to have derived his ideas on this sub- 
ject  from the  Roman  laws j  for  these decreed, that prisoners 
taken in s  civil war could not be reduced to slavery.  This was, 
as Ulpian the civilian"  remarks, because  they looked upon a civ- 
il war not properly as a war,  but  as a civil dessensiotz ;  for adds 
he a real war is made between those,  who are enemies,  and an- 
imated with a hostile  spirit,  which prompts them to endeavour 
the ruin of each other's  state.  Whereas in a civil war, howev- 
er hurtful it often  proves  to the nation,  the one party wants to 
save itself  in one manner,  and the other in another.  l'hus  they 
are not enemies,  and every person of the two parties remains al- 
ways a citizen of  the state so divided. 
XL.  But all this is a supposition,  or fiction  of  right, which 
does not hinder what I have  been saying from being true,  and 
from taking place in general.  And if  among  the  Romans,  a 
person  could not appropriate to himself  the prisoners taken in a 
civil war,  as real  slaves,  this was  in  virtue of a particular law, 
received  among them, and not on accoupt of any  defect of  the 
conditions  or formalities,  which  according to Grotius, are re- 
quired by the law of nations,  in a public or solenln war. 
XLI.  Lastly as to the wars of robbers and pirates,  if  they do 
not produce the effects abovementioned, nor give to those pirates 
a right of appropriating what they have taken,  it is because they 
are robbers,  and enemies to mankind, and consequently persons 
whose acts of violence arc manifestly unjust, which authorizes all 
nations to treat them as enemies.  Whereas, in other  kinds of 
war, it is often difficult to judge on which side the right lies ;  so 
that the dispute continues,  and  ought to  continue,  undecided, 
with respect to  those,  who are unconcerned in the war. 
* Lib.  xxi.  sect.  1.  & de  Capt.  & revers. 
CHAP.  VIII. 
Of  the  right  cf ~overeignty,  acquired  over  the  conquered. 
B  I.  ESIDES the effects of war, hitherto mentioned, there 
remains one more, the most important of all, and which we shali 
here consider ;  I mean the  right  of  sovereignty,  acquired  over 
the conquered.  We  have already remarked, that when explnin- 
ing the different  ways of  obtaining the supreme power, that in 
general it may  be acquired  either in  a  violent manner, and  by 
the right of conquest,  &c. 
11.  We  must however observe, that war or conquest, consid- 
ered in itself, is not properly the cause of  this acquisition ;  that 
is,  it is not  the  immediate origin of  sovereignty.  For the su- 
preme power is founded on the  tacit or  express consent of  the 
people, without  which  the state  of  war  still subsists ;  for me 
cannot conceive how there can be an obligation to obey a person, 
to whom we have promised  no subjection.  War then is prop- 
erly speaking, no more than the occasion of  obtaining the sove- 
reignty ;  as the conquered choose rather to subnit to the victor, 
than to expose themselves  to total destruction. 
111.  Besides,  the acquisition  of  sovereignty  by the right of 
conquest cannot, strictly speaking, pass for laurful, unless the war 
be just  in itself,  and the end proposed  au~horizes  the conqueror 
to carry things to such extremity, as to acquire the supreme pow- 
er over  the vanquished ;  that is to say,  either our enemy must 
have no other means of  paying what he owes US,  and of  indem- 
nifying us for the damages he has committed ;  or our own safety 
must absolutely  oblige  us to make  him  dependent on  us.  In 
such  circumjtances,  it is certain, that the  resistance of  a van- 
quished enemy, authorizes us to push the acts of  hostility against 
him so far, as to reduce him entirely under our power;  and we 
may,  without injustice,  take advantage of the superiority of our 
arms to extort from him the consent,  which he ought to give us 
of his own accord. 
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the right of  conquejt is grounded.  Hence we may  conclude, 
that if, upon this foundation, we were to judge  of the different 
acquisitions of  this nature, few of  them would be found well es- 
tablished ;  for it rarely happens,  that the vanquished are reduced 
to such extremity, as  not to  be  able to satisfy the just  preten- 
sions of  the conqueror, otherwise than by submitting themselves 
to his dominion. 
V.  Let us however observe, hat the interest and tranquillity 
of  nations require, that we  should  moderate  the rigor  of  the 
principles, above established.  If he, who has constrained anoth- 
er, by the superiority of  his arms, to submit  to his dominion, had 
undertaken  a war manifestly unjust,  or if  the pretext,  on which 
it is founded, be visibly frivolous in the judgment of  every  rea- 
sonable person,  I freely confess, that a sovereignty,  acquired in 
such circumstances, would be unjust ;  and I see no reason, why 
the vanquished  people  should be  more obliged  to keep  such a 
treaty., than a man who  had  fallen into  the  hands  of  robbers, 
would be under an obiigation to pay, at their demand, the money 
he had promised  them for the ransom of  his life and liberty. 
VI.  But  if  the  conqueror had undertaken a war  for  some 
specious reason,  though perhaps at the  bottom not strictly just, 
the common interest of mankind requires, that we should observe 
the engagements, we h~ve  entered into with him, though extort- 
by a terror in itself unju~t  ;  so long at  least, as  co new reason 
supervenes,  which may  lawfully  exempt  us  from  keeping  our 
promise.  For,  as the  law  of  nature directs,  that societies, as 
well as individuals,  should lahor for th3lr preservation,  it obliges 
us,  for this reason, not  indeed  to  consider  the acts of  hostility 
committed by an unjust conqueror, as properly  just,  but to look 
upon the engagement of an express, or tacit  treaty,  as neverthe- 
less  valid.  So  that  the  vanquished  cannot  be released from 
observing it,  under the pretext of  its being caused  by  an unjust 
fear, as he might otherwise do, had he no regard to the advanta 
ges accruing from it to mankind. 
VII.  These consideritions will have still a greater weight,  if 
we  suppose,  that the conqueror, or his posterity, peaceably en- 
joy the sovereignty, which he has acquired by  right of  conquest, 
a~d  besides, that  he govern the vanquished  like a humme and 
generous prince.  In such circumstances, a  long possesion, act 
companied with an equitable government, may legitimate a con- 
quest,  in its beginning and principle the most  unjust. 
VIII.  Thcre  are  modern  civilians,  who  explain  the  thing 
somewhat differently.  These maintain,  that  in a just  war the 
victor  acquires a full right of sovereignty  over  the  vanquished, 
by the single title of  conquest, independeritly of  any convention ; 
and even though the victor  has  otherwise obtained  all the satis- 
faction and indemnification,  he could require. 
IX.  The principal  argument,  these writers make use  of, is, 
thdt otherwise the conqueror could not be certain of  the peace- 
able  possession  cf  what he has taken,  or forced  the conquered 
to givc him, for his just pretensions ;  since they might retake it 
from him, by the same right of war. 
X.  But this reason proves only, that the conqueror,  who has 
taken  possession  of  the  enemy's  country,  may  comma.nd in it 
while he holds it, and not resign it, till he has good  security, that 
he shall 0btai.n or possess, without hazar.?,  what  is necessaryfor 
tile satisfaction  and indemnity, which he has a right to exact by 
force.  But the end of a just war does not always demand, that 
the conqueror should acquire an absolute and perpetual right of 
sovereignty over the conquered.  It is only a favorable occasion of 
obt~ining  it ;  and for that purpose,  there must always be an er- 
press or tacit consent of the  vanquished.  Otherwise, the ate 
of  war  siill subsisting,  the sovereignty  of  the conqueror has no 
other title,  than that of force, and lasts no longer,  than the van- 
quished are unable to throw off the yoke. 
XI.  All that can be said, is,  that neutral powers,  purely be- 
cause they are such,  may and ought to look  upon the conqueror, 
as the lnwful  possessor  of  the  sovereignty,  even  though thq 
should believe the war unjust on his side. 
XII.  The sovereignty, thus  acquired  by the right uf  war, i.s 
generally of the absolute kind.  But sometimes the vanquished 
enter  into certain  conditions with the conqueror,  which  limit, 
in some measure the pourer he  acquires over  them.  Rc  this 
as it my,  it is certain,  that no conquest ever  authorises a prince 
to  govern  a  people  tyranrucally ;  since,  as  we h~ve  befo~e 
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those, who  have  surrendered ; for even the  very  intention of 
government, and the laws of  nature,  equally conspire to Idy  the 
conqueror  under  an  obligation,  of  governing those,  whom he 
has subdued, with n~oderation  and equity. 
XlII.  There are therefore  sever~l  precautions to be used in 
the exercise of  the sovereignty, acquired over the varlquished ; 
such for instance was  that  prudent  moderstion of  the ancient 
Romans,  who confounded,  in  some  measure,  the  vanquished 
with the victors, by hastening  to incorporate  them with them- 
selves,  and  to make them sharers of their liberty and advantag- 
es.  A piece  of  policy doubly  salutary;  which,  at the  same 
time,  that  it rendered  the  condition of  the  vanquished  more 
agreeable,  considerably strengthened  the power and empire  of 
the Romans.  "What would our empire now have been,"  says 
Seneca, "  if  the vanquished had  not been intermixed with the 
"  victors, by the effect of  a sound pdicy ?"  Romulus, our found- 
* er,"  says Claudius in Tacitus, "  was very wise with respect to 
"  most of  the  people he subdued,  by making those,  who  were 
his enemies,  the same day citizens." 
XIV.  Anorller  ~noderatlon  In  victory consists  in  leaving to 
the conquered, either kings  or  people,  the  sovereignty,  which 
they enjoyed, and not  to cha~ge  the form of  their government. 
No better  method  can be taken  to secure a conquest ;  and of 
this we have  several  examples  in ancient history,  especially in 
that of the Romans. 
XV.  But if  the conqueror cannot,  without  danger to him- 
self, grant all these advantages to the conquered ;  yet things may 
be so moderated,  that some part  of  sovereignty shall  be left to 
them,  or to their kings.  Even when we strip the  vanquished 
entirely  of  their  independency,  we  may still leave  them their 
own laws,  customs,  and magistrates,  in  regard  to  their public 
and private affairs, of  small importance. 
XVI.  We  must not, above all things, deprive the vanquished 
of the exercise of  their religion,  unless  they happen to be con- 
yinced of  the truth of  that, which the conquerer professes.  This 
complaisance is not onlyof itself very agreeable to the vanquish- 
ed, but the conqueror is absolutely obliged to i~ and he cannot, 
without  tyranny,  oppreps them  in this article.  Not  that  he 
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ought not to try  to bring the vanquished  to the  true  religion ; 
but he should  only use such means, as are proportioned  to the 
nature of  the  thing,  and  to the  end  he  has  in  view ; and 
such,  as have in themselves nothing  violent,  or contrary to hu- 
manity. 
XVII.  Let us obseive  lastly,  that not  only  humanity, but 
prudence also,  and even the interest of  the victor,  require that 
what we have been  saying, with  respect  to a vanquished peo- 
ple should be strictly practised.  It is an  important  maxim in 
politics,  that,  it  is more difficult to keep, than to conquer prov- 
inces.  Conquests  demand  no more  than  force,  but justice 
rnlist  preserve  them.  These are the principal things to be ob- 
served, in respect  to the different effects of war,  and to the most 
essential questions relative to that subject.  But as we have al- 
ready had  occasion to make mention of  the article of neutrality, 
it will not be improper to say something more particular about it. 
I.  There is a general and a particular  neutrality.  The gene- 
ral is,  when,  without being allied to either  of  the two enemies 
at war, we are disposed to render to each the good offices, which 
cvery nation is naturally obliged to perform  to other states. 
11.  The particular neutrality is,  when we are particularly en- 
gaged to be neuter by some compact,  either tacit or express. 
111.  The lattempecies of neutrality  is either full and entire, 
when we behave alike towards both parties ;  or limited, as when 
we favour one side more than the other. 
IV.  We cannot lawfully constrain any person  to enter into 
a particular neutrality ;  because every one is at liberty to make, 
or not to make,  particular treaties, or alliances ;  or at least, they 
are not bound to do it,  but by virtue of an imperfect obligation. 
But he, who has undertaken a just war, may oblige other nations 
to observe an exact and general neutrality ;  that  is to say, not 
to favor his enemy more than himself. 
V.  We  shall give here  Jn abstract, as it were,  of the duties 
of neutral nations.  They are obliged equally to put in practice, 
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as conditional,  whether  these impose a ~erfect,  or onIy an im- 
perfeet obligation. 
VI.  If  they do  the one any office of humanity,  they ought 
not to refuse the like to the other, unless there be some manifest 
reason, which engages them  to  do something  in  favor of  the 
one,  which the other had otherwise no right to demand. 
VII.  But they  are  not  obliged to do offices of  humanity to 
one party, whe~l  they evpose themselves to great danger, by re- 
fusing them to the  orher, who  has as  good  a right  to demand 
them. 
VIII.  'fhey  ought not to  furnish either  party  with things, 
which serve to exercise acts of  hostility,"  unless they  are au- 
thorized to do it by some particular engagenlent ;  and in regard 
to those,  which are of  no  use in  war, if  they supply  one side 
with them, they  must also  the other. 
IX.  They ought to use all their endeavours to br'ing matters 
to an accommodation, that  the injured  party  may obtain satis- 
isfaction, and the war be brought to speedy conclusion. 
X.  But if  they  be under  any particulxr  engagement,  they 
should punctually fylfil it. 
XI.  011  the other side, those, who are at war,  must  exactly 
observe,  towards neutral  nations,  the laws  of  sociability, and 
not exercise  zny act of  hostility  against them, nor  suffer their  -  - 
country to be plundered. 
XII.  They may  however, in case of  necessity,  take posses- 
sion of  a plac-,  situated in  a  neutral country ;  provided, that, 
as soon as the danger  is over, they restore it to the right own- 
er, rid make liim satisfaction for the d~mages,  he has received. 
CHAP.  IX. 
Of  public  treatirr  in geneml. 
m 
I.  I HE subject of  public treaties constitutes a considera- 
ble part of  the law of nations, and deserves to have its principles 
L Those commodities, which serve to  exercise acts of hostility,or are particu- 
larly  useful  in war,  and in which  the  commerce of  neutral with  bell~gerent 
nations  is  forbidden by the laws  of  war, are  dcnminated contraband  goods. 
On  this  subject  see  Grotius de Jure  Belli  et Pacis, Itb. 111.  cap. I.  Aleo  Vat- 
tel's Law of N?rioso, b. 111,  ch. VII. 
and rules explained with  some  exactness.  By public  treaties, 
we mean  such  agreements  as can be made only by public au- 
thority, or those, which sovereigns, considered as such, make with 
each other, concerning things, whidh directly concern the welfare 
of the state  This is  what distinguishes these agreements,  not 
only from  those, which individuals  make with each other,  but 
also from the contracts of kings in regard to their private affairs. 
11.  What we have before observed, concerning the necessity 
of introducing convefitions betwixt private men, and the advan- 
tages arising  from  them,  may be applied to nations and  differ- 
ent states.  Nations may, by means of treaties, unite themselves 
more particularly into a society, which shall  reciprocally assure 
them of seasonable assistance, either for the necessaries and con- 
veniences of life, or to provide for their greater security upon the 
breaking out of  a war. 
111.  As this is the case, sovereigns are no less obliged, than 
individuals, inviolably to keep their word, and be faithful to their 
engagements.  The law of nations renders this an indispensable 
duty;  for it is evident, that, were it otherwise,  not only public 
treaties would be useless to states, but moreover, that the viola- 
tion of  these would throw them into a state of diffidence and con- 
tinual war ;  that is to say, into the most terrible situation.  The 
obligation therefore of sovereigns, in this respect, is so much the 
stronger, as the  violation of  this duty has more dangerous con- 
sequences, which interest the public felicity.  The sanctity  of 
an oath, which generally accompanies solemn treaties, is an ad- 
ditional  motive to engage princes to observe them with the ut- 
most fidelity ;  and certaitily nothing is more shameful for  swe- 
reigns, who  so rigorously punish such of  their subjects, as  fail 
in their  engagements,  than  to  sport with  treaties  2nd public 
faith,  and to  look upon  these only, as the  means  of  deceiving 
each other. 
The  reyal word  ought therefore  to be  inviolable and sacred. 
But there is reason  to apprehend, that if  princes are not more 
attentive to this point, this expression will soon degenerate into 
an opposite sense, in the same manner as formerly Cartbaginbn 
was taken for perfidy. 
* Punica fides. 
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IV.  We  must likewise observe, that the several principles, al- 
ready established concerning the validity of conventions in gen- 
eral, agree to public treaties,  as well as the contracts of individ- 
uals.  In both, therefore, there must be a serious consent,  prop- 
erly declared, and exempt  from error, fmud, and violence. 
V.  If treaties,  made  in  those circumstances,  be  obligatory 
betweell the respective  states or sovereigns, they are also bind- 
ing with regard  to the subjects  of  each  prince  in particular. 
They oblige as compacts between the contratting powers ;  but 
they have no force of laws with respect  to the subjects consid- 
ered as such ;  for it is evident, that  two sovereigns,  who con- 
clude a treaty,  lay their subjects thereby under an obligation of 
doing nothing contrary to it. 
VI.  There are  several  distinctions of  public treaties ;  and 
I.  some turn simply on things, to which we were before oblig- 
ed  by  the law of  nature ;  and others  superadd  some particu. 
Iars to the duties of  natural law. 
VII.  Under the former head we may rank 111  those  treaties, 
by which we are purely an4  simply  engaged to do no injury to 
others, but, on the contrary, to  perform all the duties of humanity 
towards them.  Among civilized nations, who  profess  to fol- 
low the laws of  nature, such heaties are not necessary.  Duty 
alone is sufficient,  without  a formal engagement.  But among 
the ancients,  these  treaties were thought expedient,  the com- 
mon opinion being, that they  were obliged to observe the laws 
of humanity only to  fellow subjects, and  that they might con- 
sider all strangers as  foes, and treat them  as such,  unless  they 
had entered into some engagement to the contrary ;  and of this 
we have many  instmces  in history.  The profession  of  free- 
booter,  or private,  was 110 way shameful among several nations ; 
and the word h0~ti.r~  which the Romans used  to express an en- 
emy, originally signified no more than a stranger. 
VIII.  Under the second  kind I comprehend all  those com- 
p~cts  by which two nations enter into some new, or more par- 
ticular obligation ;  as when  they formally engage to things,  to 
which they were not bound, but in virtue of an imperfect obli- 
gation,  or even to which they  were no ways before obliged. 
IX  2.  Treaties, by  which  we engage  to  something more 
than what we  are obliged to, in virtue of the hw  of  nature,  are 
also of  two Lids ;  some equal, others unequa1. 
3.  Both are made either in time of war, or in full peace. 
X.  Equal treaties are those, contracted with an entire equali- 
ty on both sides ;  that is to say, when not only the engagements 
and promises  are equal  on  both sides,  either purely  and  sirn- 
ply,  or in proportion to the strength of  each contracting party ; 
but also,  when they engage on  the same footing ;  so that nei- 
ther of the parties is in aAy respect  inferior to the other. 
XI.  These treaties are made either with a view to commerce, 
or to  confederacy  in  war, or  in  short  to any  other  matters. 
With respect to commerce,  for example, by stipulating, that the 
subjects,  on  either  side,  shall be  free  from all custom or toll, 
or that no more shall be  demanded of  them, than of  the natives 
of the  country,  &c.  Equal treaties, or leagues relating to wrr, 
are,  when we  stipulate for example,  that each shall furnish the 
other an equal number of  troops,  ships, and other things j  and 
this in all kinds of wdr, defensive as well  as offensive, or in de- 
fensive only,  &c.  Lastly,  treaties  of  equality  may also  turn 
upon any  other  matter;  as  when it is  agreed,  that one shall 
have no forts on  the other's  frontiers ;  that one shall not grant 
protection to the  other's  subjects, in  some criminal  cases, but 
order them to be skzed and sent back ;  that one shall not give 
the other's  enemies passage through  his country,  and the  11ke. 
XII.  What  we  have  been  saying  suaciently  shows  the 
meaning of  unequal  treaties.  And thebe are, when the prom- 
ises are either unequal, or such as lay harder conditions  on one 
of  the parties,  than on  the other.  The inequality of  the things 
stipulated  is sometimes  on the side of  the most powerful  con- 
federate, as when he promises  his assistance to the other, with- 
out  rrquiring the like ;  and sometiines on the  side of the infe- 
rior confederate, as when he engages to do more for the  strong- 
er, than the latter promises  in return. 
XIII.  All the conditions of  unequal treaties  are not of  the 
same nature ;  some there are, which, thoilgh burdensome to the 
inferior  ally, yet  leave the  sovereignty  intire;  cxhers  on  the 
contrary, include a diminution  of  the independence,  and soye- 
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Thus, in the treaties between the  Romans,  and the Cartha- 
ginians,  at  the end of  the second Punic war, it was stipulated, 
that the  Carthaginians  should not begin  any war, without the 
consent  of  the  Roman  people ; an  article,  which  evidently 
diminished the sovereignty of  Carthage,  and  made her depen- 
dent on Rome. 
But the  sovereignty  of  the  inferior  ally  continues  intire, 
though he engages, for example, to pay the other's  army, to de- 
fray the expences of  the war, to dismantle some towns, to give 
hostages,  to look upon all those as friends or enemies, who are 
friends or enemies to the other, to have no forts, or strong holds 
in certain parts, to avoid sailing in  particular seas, to acknowl- 
edge the preeminence of the other, and,  upon  occasion, to shew 
reverence and honor to his  power and majesty,  &c. 
XIV.  However,  though these,  and  other similar conditions, 
do not diminish the sovereignty, it  is  certain that such treaties 
of inequality  are often  of so  delicate a  nzture,  as to  require 
the greatest circumspection;  and that if  the prince,  who is su- 
perior to the other in  dignity,  surpasses  him also  considerably 
in strength ad  power,  it is  to be feared, that the  former will 
gradually acquire an  absolute  sovereignty  over him,  especially 
if the confederacy be perpetual. 
XV.  4.  Public treaties are also divided into real and personal. 
The latter are  those,  made with  a  prince pureIy  in regard  to 
his person,  and expire with him.  The former are such, as are 
made rather with  the  whole  body  of the state,  than with the 
king or government, and which consequently outlive those, who 
made them and oblige their successors. 
XVI. TO  know which of  these two classes  every treaty be- 
longs to,  the following rules may be laid  down. 
I.  We  must first attend to the form and phrase  of the trea- 
ty,  to its clauses, and  the views  proposed  by  the  contracting 
parties.  Utrum nutem in rfm, an in personam factum  est,  non mi- 
nuf ex verbis,  quam  ex  merrte  convenienthm  ~stimandum  est.* 
Thus, if there be an express clause,  mentioning,  that the treaty 
is perpetual,  or for a certain  number of  years,  or for the good 
of the state, or  with the king for  him and  his  successors, we 
may conclude,  that the treaty is real. 
*  Leg.  vii. sect. viii ff. de Pactia 
2.  Every treaty, made  with a  republic, is in its own nature 
real, because the subject,  with whom we contract it, is  a thing 
permanent. 
3.  Though the  government  should happen  to  be  changed 
from a republic into :I  monsrchy,  the treaty is still in force, be- 
cause the body is still t5e same, and has only  another chief. 
4.  We  must however  make  an  exception  here,  which  is, 
when it appears that the preservation of the republican govern- 
ment was the true cause  of  the treaty;  as when two republics 
enter into an alliance, by  which they agree to assist one anoth- 
er,  against such, as shall  endeavour by  force to alter their con- 
stitution, and deprive them of their liberties. 
5.  In case of  doubt every public  treaty, made with a king, 
ought to be deemed real, because in dubious cases,  the king is 
supposed to  act  as  chief,  and for the good  of the state. 
6.  Hence it follows,  that as, after the change of  a democra- 
cy into a monarchy, the treaty is  still in force,  in regard to the 
new sovereign;  so  if  the government,  from a monarchy,  be- 
comes a republic,  the treaty made  with the  king  does not ex- 
pire,  unless it was manifestly personal. 
7.  Every treaty of  peace is real in its own nature, and ought 
to be kept by the successor;  for  so  soon as  the conditions of 
the treaty have been  punctually fulfilled,  the  peace effectually 
cfhces  the  injuries,  which excited  the war,  and restores  the 
nations to their natural situation. 
8.  If  one of the  confederates has  fulfilled  what the treaty 
obliged him to, and the  other  should  die  before  he performs 
the engagements on his part, the successor of  the deceased king 
is obliged either intirely to indemnify the  other party  for what 
he has performed, or to fulfil his predecessor's  engagement. 
9.  But if nothing is executed on either part, or the perform- 
ances on both  sides are equal, then if  the treaty  tends directly 
to the personal  pdvantage  of  the king, or his  family,  it is evi- 
dent,  that so soon as he dies, or his  family is extinct, the trea- 
ty must also expire. 
10. Lastly we must observe,  that it is grown into a custom 
for successors to renew,  at least in general terms,  even the trea- 
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more strongly bound to observe them, and may not think them- 
selves dispensed  from that obligation,  under a pretext  that they 
have ditierent ideas  concerning the interests  of  the state, from 
those of their predecessora. 
XVII.  Concerning treaties,  or alliances, it is often disputed, 
whether they may  be lawfully  made  with  those,  who do  not 
profess the true religion  ?  I answer,  that by the law of nature 
there is no diiiiculty in  this point.  The right  of  making alli- 
ances is .common to  all men,  and  has  nothing opposite to  the 
principles of  true  religion ;  which is  so far  from condemning 
prudence and humanity,  that it strongly recommends  both." 
XVIII.  To  judge  rightly  of  the causes,  which  put an end 
to public treaties,  we must carefully attend to the rule  of con- 
ventions in general. 
I.  A treaty concluded for a certain  time,  expires at the end 
of the term  agreed on, 
2.  When a  treaty is once expired, it must not be supposed 
to be tacitly renewed;  for a  new  obligation is not  edsily pre- 
sumed. 
3.  And therefore, if,  after  the  treaty expires,  some acts are 
continued, which seem corlfo~ma'ole  to the terms of  the preced- 
ing alliance,  they  ought  rather to  be  looked upon,  as simple 
marks  of  friendship and benevolence,  than as a tacit renovation 
of the treaty. 
4.  We  must  however  make this exception, unless such acts 
intervene, as can bear no other construction,  than that of a  ta- 
cit  renovation of  the preceding compact.  Thus, for example, 
if one ally  has  engaged to pay another a certain sum annually, 
and after the  expiration  of the term  of  the alliance,  the same 
sum  be  paid  the  following year, the alli~nce  it, tacitly  renew- 
ed for that year. 
5.  It is in the nature  of  all colnpacts  in general, that when 
one of  the parties violates  the engagements,  into which he had 
entered by treaty, the other  is freed,  and may refuse  to stand 
to the agreement ;  for generally  each article of  the  treaty has 
the force of a condition,  the  want of which renders it void. 
6. This is generally the case, that is to say,  when there is no 
agreement otherwise ;  for  sometimes  this  clause  is  inserted, 
that the  violation  of  any single article of  the treaty  shall  not 
break lt intirely ;  to the end, that neither party should fly from 
their engagements  for  every  slight offence.  But he who,  by 
the action of  another,  suffers  any damage, ought to  be  indem- 
nified in some shape or another. 
XIX.  None  but the sovereign  can make  alliances and trea- 
ties, either by himself, or by his ministers.  Treaties concluded 
by ministers  oblige  the  sovereign and the state, only when the 
ministers  have been duly  authorized to  make them,  and have 
done nothing contrary to their  orders and  instructions.  And 
here it may be observed,  that among  the  Romans the word 
fedus,  a public  cotnpact,  or  solemn agreement,  signified  a  treaty 
made by order of  the sovereign power,  or  that had been after- 
wards ratified ;  but when public  persons,  or ministers of  state, 
had promised something relating to the sovereign power,  with- 
Out  advice and command from it,  this was  called  ~ponsio,  or a 
simple promise and engagement. 
XX.  In general it is  certain,  that when  ministers,  without 
the order of  their sovereign,  conclude a treaty  concerning pub- 
lic affairs, the latter is not obliged  to stand to it ;  and the min- 
ister,  who has entered into the negociation without instructions, 
may be ~unished  according to the exigency of  the case.  How- 
ever there may be circumstances,  in which a  prince  is obliged, 
either by the rules of  prudence,  or  even those of  justice  and 
equity, to ratify a treaty, though concluded without his orders. 
XXI.  When a  sovereign is  informed  of  a treaty,  made by 
one of  his  ministers without  his orders,  his  silence alone does 
not imply a ratijcotion> unless it be accompanied with some act, 
or other circumstance,  which cannot well bear another explica- 
tion.  And much more,  if  the agreement was made upon con- 
dition  af its being ratified by the sovereign,  it is of no force till 
he has ratified it in a formal manner. 
4 g,  Orstius  on  war and peace, book ii. chap. XV.  sect. 8, p, 10 XI, 1%. THE  PRINCIPLES OF 
CHAP.  X. 
Of  compacts made with an enemy. 
I. A  MONG  public  compacts,  those,  which  suppose cr 
state of  war, and are made  with an  enemy,  deserve particular 
attention.  Of these there are two kinds ;  some,  which  do nor 
put an  end to the war, but only moderate or suspend the  acts 
of hostility ;  and others, which end the war entirely.  But be- 
fore we consider these compacts in particular, let us inquire in- 
to the validity of  them  in general. 
Whether we ought  to  keep  our faith  given to  an enemy  ? 
11.  This  question is  certainly one of  the most  curious and 
important, belonging to the law of nations.  Grotius and Puffen- 
dorf are not agreed in this point.  The  former maintains, that 
all compacts, made  with an enemy, ought  to be  kept  with an 
inviolable fidelity.  But  Puffendorf is  somewhat dubious with 
resppct to those compacts, which leave us in state of  war, with- 
out a design to  remove it.  Let us  therefore  endeavour to es- 
tablish some principles, by  means of  which we may determine 
with respect to these two opinions. 
111.  I  observe,  I. That  though  war of  itself  destroys  the 
state of  society between  tw  J nations, we  must not thence con- 
clude that it is subjected to no law, and that all right and obliga- 
tion are absolutely at an end between enemies. 
2.  On the contrary, every  body  grants that there is a right 
of  war,  obligatory of itself,  between  enemies, and which they 
cannot violate, without being  defective in their duty.  This is 
what we have  proved  before by  showing, that  there  are just 
and unjust wars ;  and that, even in the justest, it is not allowa- 
ble to push  acts of  hostility to  the  utmost  extremity, but that 
we ought  to keep  within certain  bounds;  and  consequently, 
that there are things unjust and  unlawfil,  even with respect to 
an enemy.  Since therefore war does not,  of  itself, subvert all 
the laws of  society, we cannot  from  this alone conclude, that, 
because two  nations are at war with  each  other, they are dis- 
pensed from  keeping their word,  and  from  fulfilling  the en- 
gagements they have made with each other,  during the course 
of  the war. 
3.  As war is in  itself a very great evil, it is the common in- 
terest of nations not to deprive  themselves  voluntarily  of  the 
means, which prudence  suggests to moderate  the rigor, and to 
suspend the  effects  of it  On the contrary,  it is their duty to 
endeavour  to procure  such  means,  and to  make use  of them 
upon occasion ;  so far at least,  as  the  attainment of the law- 
ful end of war will permit.  Now there  is  nothing  but public 
faith, that can procure to the parties, engaged in  war,  the liber- 
ty to take breath 3  nothing but this can  secure to  towns,  that 
have surrendered,  the several rights, which they  have  reserved 
by capitulation.  What advantage would  a nation gain, or rath- 
er, what is it  they would not lose,  if  they were to have no re- 
gard to their faith, given to an enemy, and ii  they looked upon 
compacts, made in, such  circumstances,  only as  the  means of 
circumventing  one  another ?  Surely  it is  not to  be  supposed 
that the law of  nature approves of maxims so manifestly oppo- 
site to the common good of  mankind.  Besides, we ought npv- 
cr to wage war, mereiy for the sake of it, but only through ne- 
cessity, in order to obtain a just  and reasonable satisfaction, and 
a solid peace ;  whence it evidently follows, that the right of  war 
between  enemies cannot extend  so far,  as  to render hostilities 
perpetual,  and to create an invincible obstacle to the reestablish- 
tnent of  the public tranquiliity. 
4.  And yet this would  certainly be the  consequence, if  the 
law  of  nature did not lay us under an indispensable obligation 
of  performing  whatever agreement  we  have voluntarily  inadc 
with  the  enemy  during  the  war ;  whether  these agreements 
tend only to suspend, or moderate acts of  hostility, dr whether 
they are  designed to make them teas? entirclg, and to reestab- 
lish peace. 
For in  short  there are only  two  ways  of  obtaining peace. 
The first is the total and entire destruction  of  our enemy ;  and 
the second is the entering into articles of  treaty with him.  If  - 
therefore  treaties  and compacts,  made between enemies, were 
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not in themselves sacred  and inviolable, there would be no other 
means of  procuring a solid peace,  than carrying on the war to 
the  utmost  extremity,  and  to the  total  ruin  nf  our  enemies 
But who does not see that  a principle,  which tends to the des- 
tr~ictio~l  of  mankind,  is  directly contrary to the law of  nature 
and nations, whose principal end is the preservation and happi- 
ness of  human society ? 
5.  There is no distinction, in this respect,  between  the dif- 
ferent treaties,  that we may enter into with an enemy ;  for the 
obligation,  which the  laws of  nature lay upon us,  to observe 
them inviolably  relates as  well to  those,  which do  not put an 
end  to the war,  as to those,  which  tend  to  reestablish peace. 
There is  no medium,  and  we must  lay it  down  as a general 
rule,  that all  compacts  with  an enemy are  obligatory,  or that 
hone of  them  are really  such. 
And indeed, if  it were lawful for instance to breaka solemn 
truce, and to detain, without any reason for it, people, to whom 
we had given passports,  &c. what harm would  there be in cir- 
cumventing an  enemy,  under a  pretext of  treating of  peace  ? 
When we enter into a negociation of this kind, we are still ene- 
mies;  and it is properly but a kind  of  truce,  which we  agree 
to, in order to see if  there be any  means of  conling to an  ac- 
commodation.  If  the  negociations  prove  unsuccessful,  it  is 
not then a  new war,  which we  begin,  since  the  differences, 
that occasioned  our taking up arms,  are not yet adjusted ;  we 
only continue the acts of hostility,  which  had been suspended 
for some time ;  so that  we could no more rely on the enemy's 
sincerity, with respect to compacts,  which  tend to  reestablish 
peace,  than to those,  whose end is  only to suspend, or moder- 
ate acts of  hostility.  Thus distrusts would be continual, wars 
eternal, and a solid peace unattainable. 
6.  The more frequent unnecessary wars are become, throug!l 
the avarice and ambition of  sovereigns,  the  more a  steady ad- 
herence to  the principles,  here established, is indispensably  ne 
cessary for the interest  of  mankind.  Cicero  therefore  justly 
affirms, thzt there is a right of war, which ought to be observ- 
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ed between the contending parties,  and that the enemy  retains 
certain rights,  notwithstanding the war.* 
Nor is  it  sufficient to say,  as  Puffendorf does,  that it is a 
custom,  which,  among others, has obtained among civilized na- 
tions,  out of particular respect to military bravery,  that all com- 
pacts made  with  an enemy ought  to be  looked upon as valid. 
He  should also have  added,  that this is an indispensable duty, 
that justice  requires it,  that it  is not in the power of  nations to 
establish things on another  footi~lg,  and that they cannot justly 
deviate from the rules, which  the  law of  nature prescribes,  in 
&is  case,  for their common advantage. 
IV.  It will not be difficult, by  means  of the principles here 
established, to answer the argumetlts, by which Puffendorf pre- 
tends to show,  that all compacts,  made with an enemy, are not 
of themselves obligatory.  We  shall be content with absenting, 
I.  that those arguments  prove  nothing,  because they prove tao 
much,  &c. and 2.  all,  that can  be  concluded  from  them,  is, 
that we  ought  to act prudently,  and take  proper  precautions 
before we  pass our word,  or enter into  any engagement  with 
an enemy;  because  mankind  are apt  to break  their promises 
for their own interest,  especially when  they have to deal with 
people,  whom they hate,  or by whom they are hated. 
V.  But it wi!l  be said, is it not a principle of  the law of na- 
ture,  that all conventions and treaties, extorted by injustice and 
violence,  are  void of  themselves ;  and  consequently,  that he, 
who has been  forced to make them  against  liis will, may law- 
fully break his word,  if  he thinks he can  do it with safety ? 
Violence and force are the characteristics  of  war ;  and it is 
generally  the conqueror,  that  obliges the  vanquished to treat 
with him, and by the superiority  of  his  arms, constrains them 
to accept the conditions he proposes to  them,  whether the war 
he has  undertaken  be  just  or  not.  How then is it possible, 
that the law of  nature and nations should declare treaties,  made 
in those circumstances,  to be sacred and inviolable  ? 
I answer, that however true the principle,  on which this ob- 
jection is founded, may be  in itself, yet  we cannot apply it,  in 
all its extent, to the present  question. 
Bst ctiarn jut  6elIicvni ;  f;drrpurjurisjurandi wpe cum bP/tc seruanda.  Off. lib. iv 
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The cornman  interest of mankind requires,  that  we should 
ln~ke  some  difference  between  promises,  ertortect by  fear, a- 
mong private persons,  and  those,  to  which a  sovereign prince 
or people  is  constrained, by  the  superiority of  the  arms of  a 
conqueror,  whose  pretensions were unjust.  The law  of  na- 
tions then makes an exception  here to  the  general  rule of the 
law of  nature, which disan~iuls  conventions, extorted by  unjust 
fear;  or,  in  other words, the law  of  nations holds for just  on 
both sides that dread  or apprehension, which  induces enemies 
to treat with each other, during the course of  a war;  for oth- 
erwise, there would be no method,  either of moderating its fury, 
er of  putting a final period  to  it,  as  we have already demon- 
strated. 
VI.  But, that nothing may be omitted, relating to this ques- 
tion, we shall add sometl~ing  for the further illustration of what 
we have  been saying. 
First then, it is necessxy I think to distinguish here,  wheth- 
er he, who by the superiority of  his arms has compelled his en- 
emy to treat wit11 him, had undertaken the war without reason ; 
or whether he could  alledge some specious pretext  for it.  If 
the conqueror had  undertaken the war  for some plausible rea- 
son, though perhaps unjust  at  bottom, then  it is  certainly  the 
interest of mankind,  that the law of nations should make us  re- 
gard the treaties, concluded in such circumstances,  as valid and 
obligatory ; so that  the  conquered  cannot  refuse  to  observe 
them under  a  pretext,  that they  were  extarted  by  an  unjust 
fear. 
But if we suppose, that the war was undertaken without rea- 
son, or if  the motive alledged be manifestly  frivolous or unjust, 
as Alexander's  going to subdue remote nations, who had  never 
heard of him,  &c.  as such a war is a down right robbery, I con- 
fess I do not think the vanquishcd more obliged to  observe the 
treaty, to which they were  compelled,  than a man, fallen  into 
the  hands  of  theives,  is  bound  to  pay  a  sum  of  money, 
which he had promised them,  as  a  ransom  for  his  life or  lib- 
erty. 
VII.  We  must also add, as a very necessary remark,  that even 
supposing  the war was undertaken  f~r  some apparent and rea- 
sonable cause,  if the treaty, which the conqueror imposes on the 
vanquished, includes some  condition manifestly  barbarous,  and 
entirely contrary to humanity ;  we cannot, in those circumstanc- 
es,  deny the  vanquished a right of receding from their  engage- 
ment, and of beginning the war afresh, in order to  free themselves, 
if  they can,  from  the hard  and  inhuman  conditions,  to which 
they were subjected,  by the abuse their enemy nldde of  his vic- 
tory, contrary to  the laws of  humanity.  The justest  war does 
not authorize  the conqueror to keep no measures, or to use all 
liberties with respect to the vanquished ;  and he cannot reason- 
ably complain of  the breaking of a treaty, the conditions of  which 
are both unjust in themselves,  and full of barbarity and cruelty. 
VIII.  The Rolnan history furnishes us with  an  example to 
this purpose,  which deserves  our notice. 
The Privernates had been several times  subdued by the Ro- 
mans,  and as often revolted ;  but their  city was at last retaken 
by  the  consul  Plautius.  In these  distrcssctl  circumstances, 
they sent ambassadors to Rome to sue for peace.  Upon a sen- 
ator's  asking them what punishment they thought  they deserv- 
ed ;  one of them answered,  thut, which  i~ due  to men, .roBo think 
themselvrs  ~ocrthy f  iiberty.  Then the counsel  asked  them, 
whether there was any room  to  hope, that  they would observe 
the peace,  if  their faults were pardoned ?  "  The peace shall be 
perpetual  between us, replied  the  ambassador, and  we shall 
a  faithfully observe it, if  the conditions you lay upon us are just 
cc and  reasonable ;  but  if  they are  hard and dishonorable,  the 
pezce will not be of long continuance,  and we sh311 very soon 
break  ir." 
Though some of  the  senators were offended  at this answer, 
yet most of them approved of it, and said, that it was worthy of 
a man, and of a man, wvho was born free ;  acknowledging there- 
fore the rights of  human nature, they cried out, that those alone 
deserved to be citizens of Rome, who esteemednothing in com- 
parison of liberty.  Thus the  very persons,  who  were  at  first 
threatened with  punishment, were admitted to the privilege  of 
citizens, and obtained the conditions they wanted ;  and :llc gen- 
erous refusal of the Privernates to co~nply  wit11 the  tcrills  of a 
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ed into a state, which at that time could boast of  the bravest, and 
most virtuous subjects in the universe." 
Let us therefore conclude, that 3 due medium is to beobserv- 
ed ;  that we ought inviolabl  jr  to observe  treaties made with an 
enemy, and that no exception of an unjust fear should authorise 
us to  break our promise,  uniess  the war was a downright rob- 
bery,  or the conditions  imposed on us were highly unjust, and 
full o:  barbarity and cmeity. 
IX.  There is still another case, in  which  we may avoid the 
crime of  perfidiousness,  and  yet  not  perform  what we  have 
promised to an enemy ;  which is, when a certain condition, sup- 
posed to be  t!ze  basis  of  the engagement,  is wanting.  This 
is a consequence of  the very  nature of  compacts;  by  this prin- 
ciple, the infidelity of one of  the contracting parties sets the oth- 
er at liberty ;  for, according to the common rule, all the articles 
of  the  same  agreement  are included  one in  the other, in the 
manner of a condition, as  if  a person  were  expressly to say, I 
will do  such or  ~uch  a  thiflg,  provided jou  do  JO or  so.* 
CHAP. XI. 
Of  cotnpact~ with  an  enemnj,  which do  not  put  an  end  to 
the  war. 
I. A  MONG those compacts, which leave us in a state of 
war,  one of the principal is a truce. 
A truce is  an  agreement, by  which  we  engage to forbear 
all acts of hostility  for some time, the war still continuing. 
11.  A truce is not  therefore  a peace,  for the war continues. 
But if  we agree,  for instance,  to certain  contributions  during 
the  war, as these are granted only to prevent acts  of  hostility, 
they  ought  to  cease  during  the  truce ;  since,  at  that  time, 
such acts are not lawful.  And on the contrary,  if it be agreed, 
that any particular thing is to take  place  in time of  peace,  the 
time of  truce is  not included. 
111.  As every truce leaves  us in a state  of  war,  it  follows, 
that after  the 'term  is expired, there  is  no necessity  that war 
Livy lib. viii, cap, xx, xxi. 
t  See  above. 
slzould be declared  again ;  because we do not commence a new 
war, but  only continue tliat,  in which we werc already engaged. 
IV.  This principle,  that the  war  renewed  after  a  truce is 
not a new war,  may  be  applied  to several  other  cases.  In a 
treaty of  peace,  concluded between the bishop of Trent and the 
Venetians it was agreed, that each party  shozrld  be  put  in posses- 
sion of  what they enjojtri befare the last zuar. 
in the beginning  of  this war the bishop had taken the castle 
from the Venetians,  which they afterwards retook.  The bishop 
refused  to give it  up,  under a pretext  that it had been retaken 
after several truces,  which had been made.during the  course of 
that war.  The dispute  was evidently to be  decided in  faror 
of  the Venetians. 
V.  There are truces of  several kinds. 
I.  Sometimes,  during the  truces,  the armies on  both sides 
are in the field,  and  in motion ;  and these are generally limit- 
ed to  a few days.  At other  times the parties lay  down  their 
arms, and retire to their own  countries ;  and  in this  case the 
truces are of  longer  duration. 
2.  There is a general  trzrcc  for all the territories and domin- 
ions of both parties ;  and a particular  truce restrained to partic- 
ular places ;  as for example, by sea, and not by  land  &c. 
3.  Lastly  there is an absolute,  indeterminate,  and  general 
truce,  and  a  truce  limited and  determined  to certain things ; 
for example to bury  the  dead, or, if  a  besieged  town has ob- 
tained  a truce only to be sheltered from certain attacks, or from 
particular acts of  hostility,  such as ravaging  the country. 
VI.  We  must  also observe,  that,  strictly speaking, a  truce 
can be made only  by express agreement ;  and  that  it  is  very 
difficult  to  establish a  treaty  of  this kind on the footing of  a 
tacit convention,  unless  the facts  are such  in themselves,  and 
in their circumstances,  that  they  can  be  referred  to  no  other 
principle,  than to  a sincere design  of  suspending acts of  hos- 
tility for a time. 
Thus,  though  for a time we abstain  from acts  of  hostility, 
the enemy cannot from that alone conclude, that we have  con- 
sented to a truce. 
VII.  The nature  of  a truce  sufficiently  shanrs w3at the 4- 
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I. If  the truce be general  and absolute,  all acts of  hostifitf: 
ought, generally speaking,  to  cease,  both with respect  to  per- 
sons  and things ;  but  this  should  not  hinder  us,  during the 
truce, to raise new troops,  erect magazines, repair fortifications, 
&c. unless there be some  formal  convention to  the  contrary ; 
for these are not in themselves  acts  of  hostility,  but  defensive 
precautions,  which inay be taken in time of  peace. 
2.  I:  is a violation of  the truce  to seize on  any place,  pos- 
sessed by the enemy, by  corrupting the  garrison,  It is  also 
evident, that we cannot  justly,  during  a truce, tdke  possessior? 
of  places  descrted by the enemy,  but  really belonging to him, 
whether  the  garrison  were  withdrawn  before  or  after  the 
truce. 
3.  In consequence hereof, we must restore those things  be- 
longing to the enemy, which during the trucc have  accidentally 
fallen into our hands,  even though they had been formerly  our 
property. 
4.  During a truce, it is allowed to pass  and rcpass from one 
place to another, but without any train or attendance, that may 
give umbrage. 
VIII.  And here it may be asked,  whether they who, by any 
unexpected and  inevitable accident,  are found  unfortunately  in 
the enemy's  country, at  the expiration of  a  truce,  can be de- 
tained prisoners, or ought to have tht. liberty of retiring ?  Gro- 
tius and3Pufendorf maintain, that by the right of  war we may 
detain tlieln as prisoners ;  but Grotius adds, that it is certainly 
more humnne and generous,  not to insist on  such a  right.  I 
am of  opinion,  that it  is the consequence of  a treaty of truce, 
that we shoald set such persons  at liberty ;  for since,  in virtue 
of  tf:dt  engagement,  we are obliged to grant them free  egress 
and rcgress during  the time  of  the truce ;  wc  ought  also  to 
grant them  the s-lme permission  after the truce is expired,  if  it 
appears manifestly that a  superior force, or an unexpected acci- 
dent, has hhdered them from making use of  it during the time 
agreed upon.  Otherwise, as these accidents may happen every 
day,  suc!~  a permiss;on  would  often  become a snare to makc  a 
great many people  fall i~ito  thc hands of  thc enemy.  Suc!~  dre 
the princip~l  ckTccts  cf  an a5solutc an:!  gcncr'll  trucc. 
m.  With regard to a particuldr truce,  determined ta certain 
things, its effects are limited by the particular nature of the agree- 
ment. 
L.  Thus, if a truce be granted  only  for  burying  the  dead, 
we owght not to undertake any thing new,  which may  alter our 
~ityation  ;  for instance,  we cannot, during that time,  retire in- 
to n more secure post, nor intrench ourselves,  &c.  for he,  who 
has granted a short  truce  for  the interment  of  the dead,  has 
granted it for that  purpose  only,  and there is no reason to ex- 
tend it beyond  the case  agreed  on.  Hence it follows,  that if 
he,  to whom such a truce has been allowed,  should take advan- 
tage of  it to intrench  himself,  for example, or  for some other 
use, the other party would have a right to prevent him by force. 
The former could not complain ;  for it never could be redson- 
ably pretended,  that a  truce, which was allowed  for the inter- 
ment of the dead, and restrained to that single act, gives a right 
to undertake,  and carry on any  other thing undisturbed.  The 
only obligation it imposes on the person,  who has granted it, is, 
not  forcibly  to  oppose  the  interment  of  the  dead;  though 
Puffendorf indeed is of  a contrary opinion." 
2.  It is in consequence of  the same  principles,  that if  we 
suppose that by the truce persons only, and not things, are pro- 
tected from  acts of  hostility ;  in this case, if  in order  to  de- 
fend our goods we wound any person,  it is not a breach of the 
truce ;  for when the security of  persons,  on both sides is agreed 
on,  the  right  of  defending  against  pillage  is  also  reserved. 
And hence the security of  persons is not general, but  orlly for 
those,  who go and come witllout design to take any thing from 
the enemy,  with whom such limited truce is made. 
X.  Every truce obliges the contracting parties from the mo- 
ment the agreement  is concluded.  But  the subjects 00 both 
sides are under no obligation  in this respect, till  the truce has 
been solemnly notitied.  Hence it follows,  that, if  before this 
notification  the  subjects  commit  any  acts  of  hostility,  or do 
something contrary  to the truce, they are  liable to no  pueish- 
meut.  The powers however,  who have  concluded  the  truce, 
See the law of nature and nations book, viii. chap, vii. sect 9. 
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aught to  indemnify those,  who  have  suffered and  to  restore 
things,  as much as possible, to their former state. 
XI.  Lastly if  the  truce should happen to be violated on one 
side, the other is certainly  at liberty to proceed to acts of  hos- 
tility,  without any new declaration.  Yet  when  it is  agreed, 
that he, who first beaks the  truce,  shall pay  a  certain  fine,  if 
he pays the fine, or suflers the penalty, the other has not a right 
co begin acts of  hostility,  before  the  expiration  of  the  term. 
But besides the penalty stipulated, the injured party has  a right 
to demand an  indemnification  of  what he has suffered by the 
violation of  the truce.  It  is to be observed  however, that the 
xtions of  private persons do not break a truce,  unlcss the sov- 
ereign has some hand in them,  either by order, or by approba- 
tion ;  and he is supposed to approve what has been done,  if  he 
will  neither punish,  nor deliver  up the offender, or if  he refus- 
cs to restore the things taken during the cessation of  arms. 
XII.  Safe conducts are also  compacts  made  between ene- 
mies, and deserve to be considere'd.  By a safe conduct we un- 
derstand a  privilege,  granted to some persons  of  the enemy's 
pdrty,  without a cessation  of  arms ;  by  which he has free pas- 
sage and return,  and is in no danger of  being molested. 
XIII.  The several questions relating  to safe conduct may be 
decided,  either  by the naturc of  the  privilege  granted,  or by 
the general rules of  right interpretation. 
I.  A safe  conduct  granted to  soldiers extends not only  to 
inferior oficers, but also to those, who command in chief;  be- 
cause the natural and ordinary use of  the word has determined 
it so. 
2.  If  leave be given  to go to a certain  part, it  implies one 
also to return, otherwise  the former permission would be often 
useless.  'l'here  may however be cases,  in which the one does 
not imply the other. 
3.  He, who has had leave to come,  has not, generally speak- 
ing,  liberty to send another in his  place ;  and, on the contrary, 
he,  who has had  a pcrmision  to  send another  person,  cannot 
come himself ;  because these are two ditierent things,  and  the 
permission ought to  be  naturally restrained  to the person him- 
self,  to whom  it was  granted ;  for perhaps it would  not  have 
Seen given to anothcr. 
4.  A father, who has  obtained  a  passport,  cannot take his 
son with him,  nor a husband his wife. 
5. As  to servants,  though  not  mentioued,  it  must be pre- 
sumed alfbwable to take one or two,  or evcn  morc,  according 
to the quality of  the person. 
6. In a dubious case,  and generally speaking, licence to pais 
freely does not cease by  the death of him,  who has granted it ; 
the successor however may  for good reasons revoke  it;  but ia 
such a case the person,  to whom the passport has been granted 
ought to have notice given him, and the necessary time allowed 
him for betaking  himself to a place of  safety. 
7.  A safe conduct,  granted during pleasure, imports of itself 
a continuation of  safe conduct, till expressly revoked ;  for oth- 
erwist the will  is supposed to  subsist still the same,  whatever 
time may be  elapsed ;  but such a  safe conduct  expires,  if the 
person,  who has given it,  is  no  longer  in  the employment,  in 
virtue of  which he was empowered to grant such security. 
XIV.  The redemption  of  captives  is  also a coinpact often 
made,  without  putting an end  to thc war.  The antient  RO- 
mans  were  very  backward  in  the  ransoming  of  prisoners. 
'Their practice  was  to examine whether those,  who were taken 
by the enemy, had observid the laws  of  military disipline,  and 
consequently,  whether they  deserved to  be  ransomed.  Bug 
the  side of  rigour generally prevailed,  as most  advantageous to 
the republic. 
XV.  Yet in general it  is more agreeable, both to  the good 
of  the state and to humanity, to  ransom prisoners unless experi- 
ence convinces  us,  that  Et  is necessary  to use  that severity  to- 
wards them,  in order to prevent or redress greater evils, which 
would otherwise be unavoidable. 
XVI.  An  agreement  made  for the  ransom  of  a  prisoner 
cannot be  revoked,  under  a  pretext,  that he is  found  to be 
much richer  than we imagined 5  for  this circumstance,  of  che 
prisoner's  being more or less rich, has no relation to the engage- 
ment ;  so that  if  his  ransom  were to be settled by his worrH 
that condition should have been specified  in the contract. 
XVII. As prisoners of war are not now made slaves, the cap 
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money,  or  &her things) which a ptisonet. lms  fouhd means  to 
conccal, certainly remain his property, and he may  consequent- 
ly make use of  :hem  to pay  his ransom.  The enemy cannot 
takc possession of what they know nothiiig of ;  and the prisoner 
lies under no obligation  t~ make  a discovery of  an  his effects. 
XVIII.  There is atso  another  question, whether the heir of 
a prisoner of  war is  obliged  to pay the ransom, which the de- 
ceased had agreed upon ?  The  answer is easy,  in  my opinion. 
If the prisoner died in captivity,  the  heir owes nothing, for the 
promise  of  the  d~eased  was  made upon  condition,  that  he 
should  be set  at  liberty ;  but if  he was set  at  liberty  before 
he died, the heir is certainly chargeable with the ransom. 
XIX.  One question more is whether a prisoner,  who was re- 
leased un  condition of  releasing  another, is  obliged to return 
to prison,  if  Che  other  dies before  he has obtained  his release- 
ment ?  I  answer,  that the released  prisoner  is not  obliged  to 
return  into custody,  for that  was not  stipulated in the agree- 
ment ;  neither is  it  just  that  he  should enjoy his  liberty  for 
nothing.  He  must therefore give  an  indemnification,  or pay 
the full value of  what he Could not perform. 
CHAP.  XIT. 
Of  compacts tnade during t&e ~vur,  by  ~ubordinhte  power.f,  as gen- 
rals of armir~,  or other commanders. 
I.  ALL,  that  has been hitherto said,  concerning tom- 
pacts  between  enemies,  relates  to  those  made  by  sovereign 
powers.  But since princes do not always conclude such agree- 
ments  themselves,  we must now inquire into treaties  made  by 
generals, or other inferior commanders. 
11.  In order to know whether these engagements oblige the 
-mereign, thefollowing principles will directs us. 
I.  Since every person  may enter into an engagement,  either 
,by fhhself  or by another, it is plain  that the sovereign is boulld 
by the compacts made by his ministers or officers, in consequence 
of  the full powers and orders expressly given them. 
2.  He, who gives a man a certain power,  is reasonably  sup- 
posed to have given him whatever is  a  necessary  ConRquence 
and appendage of  that power,  and without which  it cannot bti 
exercised.  But he is  not supposed to  have gtanted  him  any 
thing further. 
3.  If  he,  who has had  a commission to treat, has kept within 
the bounds of  the power annexed to his  ofice, though he acts 
contrary to his private instructions,  the sovereign is to abide by 
what he has done 5  otherwise  we could  never  depend  on  en~ 
gagements contracted by  proxy. 
4.  A  prince is also obliged by the &t of  his  ministers and 
officers, though done without his ordefs, if  he  has ratified  the 
engagements they have made, either by an express consent, and 
then there is no difficulty,  or in a tacit manner ;  that is to say, 
if,  beir7g informed  of  what  has  passed,  he yet permits things 
to be done,  or does them  hiltlself,  which cannot be reasonably 
referred to any other cause,  than the intention of  executing the 
engagcrnent  of  his  ministers,  though  contracted  without his 
participation. 
5.  The sovereign may also be obliged to execute the engage- 
ments contracted by  his  ministers without  his orders,  by  the 
law of  nature,  which forbids us to enrich ourselves at another's 
expense.  Equity requires, that in such circumstances we should 
exactly observe the conditions of the contract,  though conclud- 
ed by ministers,  who had not full powers. 
6.  These are the general principles of natural equity, in vir- 
tue of  which sovereigns may be more  or less obliged to  stand 
to  the agreement  of  their ministers.  But  to  what has been 
said,  we must  add this general  exception, unless  the laws and 
customs of  the country have regulated it otherwise,  and these 
be sufficiently khown to the persohs,  with whom the agreement 
is made. 
7.  Lastly, if  a  public minister exceeds his commission,  so 
that he cannot  perform what he has promised,  and his master 
is not obliged to it,  he himself  is certainly bound to indemnify 
the person,  with whom he has  treated.  But  if  there  shoul'd 
be any  deceit on  his part,  he may be punished  for it,  and  hid 
person,  or his goods, or both nre liable to be seized,  in order to 
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111.  Let us apply these  general principles to  particular  ex- 
amples. 
I.  A commander in chief  cannot  enter  into a treaty,  that 
regards the causes and consequences of  the war ;  for the pow- 
er of  making war,  in whatever extent it  has been  given,  does 
not imply the power of  finishing it. 
2.  Neither does it  belong to generals to  grant truces  for a 
considerable space of  time ;  for I, that does not necessarily  de- 
pend on their commission.  2.  The thing is of  too great conse- 
quence to be  left intirely  to their  discretion.  3.  And  lastly 
circumstances are nQt generaily so pressing,  as not  to admit of 
time to consult  the sovereign ;  which  a general ought  to do, 
both in duty and prudence,  as  much as posshle,  even with re- 
spect to things, which he has a power to  transact of  himself. 
Much less  therefore can  generals conclude  those  kinds  of 
truces,  which  withdraw all  the appearance  of  war,  and come 
very near a real peace. 
3.  With respect to truces of  a short duration, it is certainly 
in the power of  a general to make them ;  for example to bury 
tbe dead,  &c. 
IV.  Lieutenant  generals,  or  even  inferior  commanders, 
may also m~ke  particular truces,  during the attack, for instance, 
of  a body of  the enemy intreached, or in the siege  of  a town ; 
for this being often very  necessary,  it  is reasonably  presumed, 
that such a power inust needs be included in the extent of  their 
commission. 
V.  But a question here arises, whether thse  particular  tru- 
ces oblige only  the officers,  who granred  them, rtnci  the troops 
under their command, or  whether they bind  the other oiiicers, 
and  even  the ccmmander  in chief  ?  Grotius decldres  for the 
first opinion, though the second appears to me :he  best  fouud- 
ed ;  for  X.  since we suppose, that it is in consequence  of  <he 
tacit consent of  the sovereign,  that such a truce has beeh grdnt- 
ed by an inferior commander,  no other oacer, whether equal or 
superior,  can break the agreement,  without indirectly wounding 
the authority of  the soveregin. 
2,  Besides, this  would lay a foundation  for fraud and  dis- 
trusts,  which might tend  to render the use of  truces, so neces- 
oary on several occasions,  useless and impracticable. 
VI.  It does not belong to a general to release petsons takea 
in war, nor to dispose  of  conquered sovereignties and lands. 
VII.  But it is  certainly  in the power of  generals to grant, 
or leave things,  which axe  not  as get actually possessed ;  be- 
cause  in war many cities, for example, and often men,  surren- 
der themselves,  upon  condition  of  preserving  their  lives  and 
liberties,  or  sometimes  their  goods ; concerning  which  the 
present circumstances do not commonly allow time sufficient to 
consult the sovereign.  Inferior commanders ought also to have 
this right,  concerning things within the extent of their commi* 
sion. 
VIII.  In fine,  by  the  principles  here established,  we may 
easily judge  of  the conduct of  the  Roman people,  with  res- 
pect to  Bituitus king of  the Arverni,  and  to the affair of  the 
Caudine Forks. 
CHAP.  XIII. 
Of  compacts mode with an enetny  by private perfinj. 
I.  IT  sometimes happens  in war,  that  private  person:, 
whether  soldiers  or others,  make  compacts  with  an  enemy. 
Cicero justly  remarks,  that,  if  a private  person,  constrained by 
necessity,  has promised  any thing to the  enemy, he ought reli- 
giously to keep his word." 
11.  And inded all the principles  hitherto established  mani- 
festly  prove  the  justice  and necessity of  this duty.  Besides, 
unless this be allowed,  frequent obstacles would  be  put to lib- 
erty, and an occasion given  for massacres,  &c. 
111.  But, though these compacts are valid in themselves,  yet 
it is evident, that no  private person has a right to alienate pub- 
lic property ;  for  this  is not  allowed  even  to generals of  ar- 
mies. 
IV.  With respect to the actions and effects of each individu- 
al, though the covenants made with the enemy  on these affairs 
may sometimes be prejudicial to the state,  they are binding  ne- 
vertheless.  Whatever  tends  to avoid  a greater  evil, though 
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detrimental in itself, ought to be considered  as  a public good ; 
as for exlmple, when we promise to pay  certain contributions to 
prevent, pillage,  or the burning of  $aces,  &c.  Even the laws 
of  the state cannot without  injustice, deprive individuals of  the 
right of providing  for their own safety, by imposing too burden- 
some an obligation  on the subjects, intirely repugnant to nature 
and reason. 
V.  It is in consequence of these principIes,  that we think a 
captive bouad to perform the promise he has made of  returning 
to  prison.  Without  this  he  would not be  suffered  to  go 
home ;  and it  is  certainly  better for  hfm,  and for the  state, 
that he sl~ould  have this permission for a time, than that he re- 
main  alw~ys  in  captivity.  It was therefore to fulfil his duty, 
that Regulus returned to Carthage,  and surrendered himself in- 
to the harlds of  the enemy." 
VI.  TVe  must judge,  in like  manner,  of  the  promise,  by 
which a prisoner  engages not to  Gear  arms against the releaser.  In 
vain would  it be objected,  that such an engagement  is contra- 
ry  to the duty, we owe to our country.  It is no way  contrary 
to the duty of  2 good citizen to  procure his liberty by promis- 
ing to forbear a thing, which it is in t!le  enemy's power to hin- 
der.  His country loses nothing by that, but rather gains ;  since 
a prisoner so long as he is not released,  is as useless to it,  as if 
he were re.11ly dead. 
VII.  If  a prisoner has promised  not  to make his escape, he 
oug?lt certainly to keep his  word ;  even  thou~h  he was in fet- 
ters wile:!  he mdde it.  But  if  a  person  has given his word, 
on condition that he should not be confined in that manner,  he 
may break it, if  he be laid in irons. 
VIII.  Bxt here some will ask, whether private men, upon re- 
fusing  to perform wht  they have promised  to the enemy, may 
be compelled to it by the sovereign ?  I answer, certainly ;  oth- 
erwise  it would be  to no purpose,  th~:  they  were bound by  a 
promise,  if  no one could  compel them to perform it. 
Cicer. de ORic. lib, iii.  cap. xxir. 
CHAP.  XIV. 
Of public comports,  wbi~h  put an end to  war. 
I.  CoMPAcTs, which put an  end  to war,  are either 
principals  or acces~ories.  Principals  are those, which terminate 
the war,  either by  themselves,  as  a treaty of peace;  or by a 
consequence of  what  has been agreed  upon,  as when the end 
of  the war is referred to the decision of lot,  to the success of a 
co~bat,  or to the judament  of  zn arbitrator.  Accessories  are  -  - 
such, as are sometimes joined  to the principal compacts  in or- 
der to confirm  them,  and  to  render  the execution  of  them 
more certain.  Such are hostages,  pledges,  and guarantees. 
11.  We  have already treated of single combats agreed on by 
both parties,  and of  arbitrators,  considered as means of  hinder- 
ing or terminating a war ;  it now only remains,  that we speak 
of  treaties of  peace. 
111.  The first question, which presents itself  on this subject 
is 1- heth her compacts, which terminate a  war, can be disannull- 
ed  by  the exception  of  an  unjust  fear,  which  has  extorted 
them  ? 
After  the  principles  above  established  to  show,  that  we 
ought to keep our faith given to an  enemy, it is  not necessary 
to prove this point again.  Of all public conventions, treaties of 
peace are those,  which a  nation ought  to look  upon,  as  most 
sacred and inviolable, since nothing is of greater importance to 
the repose and tranquillity  of  mankind.  As  princes and  na- 
tions have no common judge to take cognizance of  their differ- 
ences,  and to decide conccrrling  the justice  of  a war, we could 
never depend on a treaty of  peace,  if  the cxception  of  an un- 
just fear was in this case to be generally admitted  1  say gen- 
emlly,  for when the injustice of  the conditions of  the peace is 
highly evident, and  the unjust conqueror abuses his victory  so 
far,  as  to impose  the hardest,  cruelest,  and  most  intolerable 
conditions on the vanquished,  the law of  nations cannot author- 
ise such tr~aties,  nor lay an obligation cn the vanquished tame- 
ly io submit to them.  Let us also  add,  that,  though the  law 
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of  nations ordains,  that,  except  in the  case  here  mentionedl 
treaties of  peace are to be  faithfully observed,  and  cannot  be 
disannulled,  under a pretext of  an unjust constraint ;  it is nev- 
ertheless  certain, that the conqueror  cannot in conscience  take 
t5e advantage of  such a treaty,  and that he is obliged by  inter- 
nal justice,  to restore  all that he has taken in  an unjust war. 
IV  Another question is,  whether a sovereign, or a  state, is 
obliged  to  observe  treaties  of  peace,  which they  have  made 
with their rebellious subjects  ?  I answer,  I. that when a sove- 
reign has reduced rebellious subjects by  force of arms, he may 
dedl with them as he sees best,  2.  But if  he has entered into 
an  accommodation with them,  he is  thereby  supposed to have 
pardoned them what is past ;  so that he cannot  lawfully refuse 
to keep his word,  under a pretext that he has given it to rebel- 
Kous subjects.  This obligation is so much the more inviolable, 
as princes are apt to give the name of  rebellion to a tesistalice, 
by which ,he subject only maintains his just righta, and opposes 
the violation of  the  most essential engagements of  sovereigns. 
History furnishes but too many examples of  this kind. 
V.  None but he,  who has the power of  making war,  has a 
r~ight  to terminate it by  a treaty  of  pedce.  In a word,  this Is 
an essential part of  sovereignty,  But can a king, who is a pris- 
oner, make a treaty of  pedce,  which shall be valid, and binding 
to a nation  ?  I think not, for there  is  no probdbility,  that  the 
people  would  have  conferred  the  supreme power  upon  one, 
with a right to exercise it, even in  matters of  the greatest  im- 
portance,  at a time,  when he is riot master of  his own person. 
But with respect to contracts,  which a king, though a prisoner, 
has made concerning what belongs to him  in private, they are 
certainly valid,  according  to the  principles  established 5n rhe 
preceding  chapter.  But what  shall we  say of  a king,  who is 
in exile 2  If he has no dependence upon any person,  it is un- 
doubtedly in his power to make peace. 
VI.  To know for certainty what things  a  king  can dispose 
of by  a treaty of peace,  we need  only  consider the nature  of 
the sovereignty, and the manner, in  which he possesses it. 
I.  In  patrimonial  kingdoms,  considered in themselves,  no- 
thing hinders but that the monarch may alienate the wvereign- 
ty, or  a part of it. 
a.  But princes, who hold the sovereignty only in an usufruc- 
tuary manner,  cannot by any treaty alienate  it, either in whole 
or in part.  'To  render  such  alienations  valid,  the  consent of 
the body of the people,  or of  the states of the  kingdom  J  i  S 
cessary. 
3.  With respect to the crown domains, or the  goods of th* 
kingdom, it is  not generally  in the power of  the  swereign to 
alienate  them. 
4.  With regard to the  effects of  private  subjects,  the sove- 
reign,  as such, has a transcendental or supereminent right over 
the goods and  fortunes of  private  men ;  consequently  he may 
give them up,  as often as the public  advantage or necessity rec 
quires it;  but with this consideration,  that the  state ought to 
indemnify  the subject for the loss he has  sustained beyond his 
own proportion. 
VII.  For the  better interpretation of the articles of a treaty 
of peace, we need only attend to the  general rules  of interpre- 
tation,  and the intention of the contracting parties. 
I. In  all the trelties of peace,  if  there  be no clause to  the 
contrary,  it is  presumed that the parties hold themselves recip- 
rocally discharged  from  all damages,  occasioned  by  the  wdr. 
Hence the clauses of general  amnesty  are only for the greater 
precaution. 
2.  But the debts between individuals,  contracted before  the 
war, and the  payment  of  which  could not  be exacted during 
the war,  are not  to be  accounted  forgiven  by  the  treaty  of 
peace. 
3.  Unknown injuries,  whether  committed before or during 
the  war,  are  supposed  to be  comprehended  in  the  general 
terms, by  which we forgive the enemy the evil he has done  us. 
4.  Whatever  has  been  taken  bince  the  conclusion of the 
peace must certainly be  restored. 
5. If the time be  limited, in which  the conditions of peace 
are  to  be  performed,  it  must  be interpreted  in  the  strictest 
sense ;  so that, when it is expired, the  least delay is inexcusa- 
ble, unless it  proceeds  from a  superior f~rce,  or it manifestly 
appears, that it is owing to no bad  design. 
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itself perpetual,  and as it were eternal in its nature ;  that is to 
say, the parties  are supposed to  have agreed  never to take up 
arms on account of  the differences,  which occasioned the,  war, 
and for the future to look  upon them as intirely at an end. 
VIII.  It is also  importaiit to know,  when  a  peace  may be 
looked upon as broken  ? 
I.  Some  distinguish  between  breaking npeace and  giving a 
ne.~u  occasion of war.  To  break a  peace  is to violate  an article 
of the tre'ity ;  but to give a new occasion  of  war is to take  up 
arnis fcr a new reason  not mentioned  iil the treaty. 
2.  But when we give  a  new occasion of  war  in  this man- 
ner,  the treaty is by  such means indirectly broken, if we refuse 
to makesatisfaction for thc offence ;  for then the offended hav- 
ing a rig6t to tahe up arms, and to treat the ofender as an ene- 
my, against whom  every  thing is lawful, he must also  certain- 
ly dibpense with observing the conditions of  the peace,  though 
the trelty has not  been formally broken with respect to its ten- 
or.  3csic!es,  this distinction cannot be much used  at present j 
because treaties ~f peace  are conceived in such a manner,  as to 
include an engagement to live for the future in good friendship, 
in all respects.  We must therefore  conclude, that  every new 
act of unjust hostility is an infringement of  the peace. 
3.  As  to  those,  who only repcl  force  by force,  they  by no 
means break the peace. 
4.  Wiien a peace  is  concluded with  several  allies  of  him, 
with whom the tredty has been made,  the peace is not boken, if 
one of  those allies takes up  arms,  unle~s  it has been concluded 
on that footing.  But this is what cannot be presumed, and cer- 
tainly they, who th~s  invade us without the assistance of others, 
shall be considered as the breakers of  the peace. 
5.  Acts of  violelice  or  hostility,  which  some  subjects may 
commit of their own accord,  cannot break the peace, except we 
suppose, that the sovereign approves them ;  and this is presum- 
ed, if he knows  the fact,  has power to punish  it,  and  neglects 
to do so. 
I.  The peace is supposed to be broken, when, without a law- 
ful reason,  acts of  hostility are committed, not only against the 
whole body  of  the state,  but also against private persons r  folr 
the end of a treaty of peace is, that every subject should, for the 
future, live in perfect security. 
2.  The peace is  certainly broken  by a contravention to the 
dear and express articles of the treaty.  Some civilians however 
distinguish between the articles of great importance,  and those of 
small importance.  But this distinction is not only uncertain in 
itself,  but also very di&cult and delicate in its application.  In 
general,  all the articles of  a treaty ought to be  looked  upon as 
important enough to be observed.  We  must however pay some 
regard to  what  is  required  by  humanity,  and  rather  pardon 
alight faults, than pursue the reparation of  them by arms. 
8.  If one of  the parties is,  by an absolute necessity,  reduced 
to  an impossibility  of  performing  his engagements, we are zot 
for that to look upon the peace as broken ;  but the other party 
ought either to wait  some time for the performance of what has 
been  promised,  if there be still  any hope  of it,  or he may  de- 
mand a reasonable  equivalent. 
9. Even when there is treachery  on one side, it is certainly 
at the choice of  the innocent party to let the peace subsist ;  and 
it would  be ridiculous to  pretend,  that he,  who first infri~~ges 
the peace,  can disengage himself  from the obligation, which he 
lay under, by acting contrary to that very obligation. 
IX.  To  treaties of peace,  for the security of their execution, 
are sometimes joined  hostages,  pledges, and guarantees.  Host- 
ages are of  several  sorts ; for  they either give themselves vol- 
untarily,  or are given by order of the sovereign, or they are forc- 
ibly taken  by the enemy.  Nothing,  for instance,  is at present 
more common,  than  t~  carry off  hostages  for the  security of 
contributions. 
X.  The sovereign may, in virtue of his authority, oblige some 
of his subjects to  put themselves into  the hands of  the enemy 
us hostages ;  for if he has a right, when necessity requires it, to 
expose them to the danger of their lives, much more may he en- 
gage their corporal  liberty.  But on the other hand,  the state 
ought certainly to indemnify the hostage for the losses they may 
have sustained for the good of the society. 
XI.  Hostages  are  demanded, and given, for the security of 
the execution of  some engagement ;  therefore it is necessary, that POLITIC LAW, 
they should be  retained,  in  such a marmer  as shall bc judged 
proper, till the performance of what has been agreed on.  Hence 
it follows that an hostage, who has made himself such volunta- 
rily, or he, who has been given by the eovereig~  cannot make hir 
escape.  Grotius however grants this liberty to the latter ;  but 
his opinion does not seem to be  well founded ;  for either it was 
the intention of the state, that the hostage should not remain in 
the hands of the enemy ;  or the state had not the power of oblig- 
ing the hostage to remain.  The former is manifestly false, for 
otherwise the hostage could he no security, and  the convention 
would  be  illusive.  Nor  is  the  latter  more true ;  for if  the 
prince,  in virtue of  his transcendental property,  can expose the 
lies of  the  citizens,  why  may  he  not  engage their liberty? 
Thus Grotius  himself  agrees,  that  the Romans were obliged 
to return Cklia to Porsenna.  But the case is not precisely the 
same  with respect to  hostages, taken by the enemy ;  for these 
have a right to make their escape,  so long as they have not giv- 
en their word to the contrary. 
=I.  It is a question often controverted, whether he, to whom 
hostages are given can put them to death,  in case the enemy do 
not  perform their engagement ?  I answer, that hostages them- 
selves  cannot  give  the  enemy  any power over their  lives,  of 
which  they  are  not  mzster.  As to the  state,  it has certainly 
the power of exposing the lives of  the subjects, when the pub- 
lic good requires it.  But in this case all, that the public good 
requires, is to engage the corporal liberty of  the hostages ;  and 
hey can no more be  rendered responsible, at the peril of  their 
lives,  for  the infidelity of the sovereign, than  an innocent per- 
son can be treated as a criminal.  Thus the state by  no means 
engages the lives of hostages.  He, to whom they are given, is 
supposed to receive them on these  conditions ;  and  though  by 
the violation of the treaty they are at his mercy, it does not fol- 
low that  he has a right  to put them to death;  he can only re- 
tain them as prisoners of  war. 
XIII.  Hostages, given for d certain purpose, are free so soon, 
as that purpose is answered, and consequently cannot be detain- 
ed upon  any other account,  for which no hostages were promis- 
s&  But if  we have broken our faith in any other case, or  con^ 
tracted a new debt,  the hostages then may be detdned,  not as 
hostages, but in consequence of  rhis rule of  the law of nations, 
which  authorizes  us  to detain  the persons of subjects for the 
deeds of  their sovereigns. 
XIV.  The query is,  whether a hostage  is  at liberty  by  the. 
death of the sovereign, who made the covenant ?  This depemds 
on the nature of the treaty,  for the security  of  which the hos- 
tage was given j  that is to say, we must examine whether it tre 
persoteal or  real. 
But if the hostage becomes successor to the prince, who gave 
him up, he is no longer obliged  to be detained as an  hostage, 
though the treaty be real;  he ought only  to put another in his 
place,  whenever it is demanded.  This case is supposed to be 
tacitly excepted;  for  it cannot  be presumed, that a prince far 
example, who has given his own son and presumptive heir as an 
hostage,  ever  intended,  that  in  case  he  should  die, the state 
should be without its chief. 
XV.  Sometimes pledges are also given fur the security of a 
treaty of peace ; and as we have said that hostages may be de- 
tained for other debts, this may also be applied to pledges. 
XVI.  Another way in fine of securing peace is, when princ- 
es or states, especially  those, who have  been mediators  of  the 
peace, become guarantees,  and engage their faith, that the arti- 
cles shall be  observed  on  both  sides ; which  engagement  of 
theirs implies an obligation of  interposing their good offices, to 
obtain a reasonable  satisfaction to the party injured contrary to 
rreoty, and even of  assisting him against the injurious aggressor. 
CHAP.  XV. 
Of  the  right  of  ambassadov~. 
I.  1~  remains now for us to say something of ambassadors, 
and  of  the  privileges,  which the  law of  nations grants them, 
The sabject  naturally  leads  us  to it,  since it is by  means  of 
these ministers, that  treaties  are generdly  negociated and con- 
cluded. 
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lishes that the persons of ambassadors are sacred and inviolable, 
and that  they  are under  the protection of  the law of nations. 
We  cannot doubt  that it is of  the utmost  importance to man- 
kind in general, and to nations in particular,  not only to put an 
end  to  wars  and  disputes,  but  also to establish and maintain 
commerce and friendship with each other.  Now as ambassa- 
dors are necessary  to procure these advantages,  it follows that 
God, who  certain!^ commands every thing,  that contributes to 
the preservation  and happiness of society,  cannot but forbid the 
doing any injury to those persons ;  but, on the contrary, he or- 
ders we should grant them all the security and privileges, which 
the design and nature of  their employment  require. 
111.  Before we  enter into  the application  of  the privileges, 
which the law of nations grants to ambassadors, we must observe 
with Grotius, that they belong only to ambassadors sent by sove- 
reign powers to each  other.  For as ro deputies  sent by cities 
or provinces to their own  sovereigns,  it is  not by  tlie  law  of 
nations,  that we must judge of  their privileges, but by the civil 
law of  the country.  In a word, the privileges  of  ambassadors 
regard only  foreigners ;  that is to say such,  as have  no depen- 
dence on us. 
Nothing then hinders an inferior ally from having a right to 
send ambassadors to a superior ally ;  for in the case of  an une- 
qual alliance,  the inferior does not cease to be independent. 
It is a question, whether a king, vanquished in war and stript 
of his kingdom,  has a right of sending ambassadors ?  But indeed 
this question is useless with respect to the conqueror, who will 
not even so much as think, whether he ought to receive ambas- 
sadors from a person,  whom he has deprived  of  his  kingdom. 
With regard  to other powers,  if  the conqueror has entered into 
the  war  for  reasons  manifestly  unjust,  they ought still to ac- 
knowledge  that  person  for  the  true king,  who really is so,  so 
long as they can do it without some great inconveniency ;  con- 
sequently they cannot refuse to receive his ambassadors. 
But in civil wars the case is extraordinary;  for then necessi- 
ty sometimes  makes way for this right, so as to receive ambas- 
sadors on both sides.  The same nation,  in  that case, is for a 
time accounted two distinct bodies of people.  But pirates and 
robbers,  that  do not constitute a settled government,  can have 
no right of  nations belonging to them, nor consequently  that of 
sending  ambassadors,  unless they have  obtained it by a treaty, 
which has sometimes happened. 
IV.  The ancients did not  distinguish  different sorts of  per- 
sons sent by one power to  another ;  the Romans called them all 
Zegati  or ovator.es.  At present there  are various titles given  to 
these public ministers.  But the employment is in the main the 
same ;  and  the  several  distinctions are founded  rather on the 
greater  or less splendor, with which they support their dignity, 
and  on the greatness or smallness of  their saldry,  than on any 
other reason  derived from their character. 
V.  The  most common distinction of  ambassadors, at present, 
is into extraorditzary and ordinavy.  This difference was entirely 
unkown to the ancients.  With them all ambassadors were ex- 
traordinary,  that is to say, charged with only a particular nego- 
cidtion ;  whereas the ordinary ambassadors are those, who reside 
among foreign natious, to transact all hinds of  political concerns, 
ani even  to obserte what passes in the respective  courts. 
The situation  of  things in Europe, since the destruction of 
the Roman empire, the diKerent sovereignties and republics, that 
have h7en  erected, together with the increase of trade, have ren- 
dered  thcse  ordinary  ambassadors  necessary.  Hence several 
historians justly  observe,  that the Turks, who keep no ministers 
in foreign  countries, act very impoliticly;  for  as  they  receive 
their news only by  Jewish or Armenian merchants,  they do not 
generally  hear of things till very  late,  or their informations  are 
bad,  which often makes them take imprudent measures. 
VI.  Grotius observes, that there are  two  principal  maxims 
of  the law of nations,  concerning ambassadors.  The first, that 
we  ought to ahnir them ;  the second, that their persons  arc sacred 
and invislable. 
VII.  With regard to the first of these maxims, we must ob- 
serve,  that the objigation  of  admitting ambassadors is founded 
in  general  on the  principles  of  humanity;  for, as all nations 
form a kind  of  qociety  among  themselves,  and  consequently 
ought to assist each other hy a mutual intercourse of  good  offi- 
ces,  the use  of  ambassadors becomes  nrcessary between them 
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for t!lat  very reason.  It is therefore a rule of  t3e law of  na- 
tions,  that  we ought to admit ainbassadors,  and to reject none 
without a just cause. 
VIII.  But though we are obliged to admit ambassadors,  it is 
only a bare duty of humanity, which produces but an imperfect 
obligation.  So that a simple refusal cannot be regarded  as an 
injurious act, sufficient to lay a just  foundayion for a war.  Be- 
sides, the obligation to admit ambassadors regards as well those, 
sent to us by an enemy, as those who come from an allied power. 
It is the duty of princes, who are a1  war, to seek the means of re- 
est.dSli~hing  a just and reasonnble peace; ar,d they cznnot obtain it, 
unless they are disposed to listen to the proposals,  that may  be 
~nade  on each side;  which cannot be so well negociated,  as by 
employing  ambassadors or ministers.  The same duty of hu- 
~na!lity also  obliges  neutral, or  indifferent  princes,  to afford 3 
passage  through  their  territories to ambassadors sent by other 
powers. 
1X. I mentiened,  th2t we ought  not, without a  iust cause,  - 
refuse admittance to an ambassador;  for it is possiblf:,  that we 
may have very good reasons to reject him ;  for example, if  his 
master has already imposed upon us under pretext of an embas- 
sy,  and we have  just reason  to  suspect  the  like fraud ;  if the 
prince,  by  whom  the  ambassador  is  sent,  has been guilty  of 
treachery,  or of some other hcinous crime against us ;  or, in fine, 
if  we are sure that,  under the pretext  of  negociating,  the am- 
bassador  is sent 01iiy  as a spy, to pry into our affdirs,  and to sow 
the seeds of sedition. 
Thus, in the retreat of the ten thousand,  the history of which 
has been  writte:~  by  Se~~ophon,  the  generals resolved,  that,  so 
long as they  were  in the e~~emy's  country, they would  receive 
no heralds ;  and what movetf  them to this  resolution  was their 
having found,  that the persons,  who had been sent among them, 
urrder the pretence of embassy, came really to spy into their af- 
fairs and to corrupt the soldiers. 
It may  &o  be a  just reason  for  refusing  admittance to an 
ambassador, or envoy  from an  allied  power, that, by admitting 
him,  ure are likely  to give  distrust to some other power, with 
wl~cm  it is  proper we  should  maintain  a good  understanding. 
Lastly,  the person or character of  the ambassador himself  may 
furnish just reasons  for our  not admitting him.  'This is suffi- 
cicllt  concerl~ing  the maxim relati~ig  to the  admittance of  am- 
bassa~iors. 
X.  With regard to the other rule of the law of  nations, which 
directs that the persons of ambadsadors be looked upon as sacred 
and inviolable, it is a little more diiscult  to  decide the  several 
questions relating to it. 
I.  When we say that the law of  nations forbids any violence 
to ambassadors, eithcr by  word or action, we do not by this give 
any particular privilege  to those ministers ;  for this is no more 
than what every mar] has a right to by the law of nature ;  a right, 
that his life, his honor, and his propxty, be perfectly secure. 
2.  But when we add,  that the  persons of  ambassadors  are 
sacred and inviolable by  the law of  natials,  we attribute some 
prerogotivcs and privileges to them, wilich are not due to private 
persons,  &C 
3.  When we say that the person of an ambassador is sacred, 
this signifies no more, than thdt we inflict a severer punishment 
on those,  who ofFer violence to an ambassador,  than on such, as 
commit an injury or in:ult  to private persons ;  and the charac- 
ter or  ambassadors is the reason of  our inflicting so different a 
punishment for the same kind of offence. 
4.  Lastly, the re~son,  why  we call the persons  of  ambsssa- 
dors sacred,  is because  they  are not subject to the  jurisdictio~l 
or the sovereign, to w!lom  they are deputed, either in their per- 
sons, their retinue, or efhcts ;  so that we cannot proceed against 
them, according to  the  ordinary course ~f justice ;  and it is in 
this that their privileges  chiefly consist. 
XI.  The  fou,~d.~tion  of these privi!eges,  which the law of  112-  - 
tions  grants  to  ambassadors,  is,  that,  as an  ambassador repre- 
sents the person of his master,  he  ought of  course to enjoy all 
the priviieges  and  rights,  which his master  hin~self,  as a sove- 
reign,  would have,  were he to come into the  states of  another 
prince, in order to transacr his own .~&irs, to negociate,  for in- 
stailce,  or conclutle n  treaty, or an  allia~?cc  ; to  regulate some 
br.:ilch  of  commerce, and other things of  a simildr  nature,  &c. 
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imagine, that he loses his character and independence,  and that 
he  becomes  subject to  the  prince,  whose territories  he visits, 
On the contrary, he ought to  continue as he was before,  equal 
and independent of  the jurisdiction  of  the prince,  whose terri- 
tories he enters ;  and the latter receives him on  the same foot- 
ing, as he would choose to be reccived  himself,  if he went into 
the other's  dominions.  Now we  must  grant the  ambassador 
the same prerogative and immunities, in consequence of his rep- 
resentative character. 
The very end and design of embassies render these privileges 
of ambassadors necessary ;  for it is certain, that,  if an ambassa- 
dor can treat with the prince, to whom he is sent, with a full in- 
dependence,  he  will  be  much better  qualified  to  perform  his 
duty, and serve his master effectually, than if  he were subject to 
a foreign  jurisdiction,  or if  he and his  retinue  could  be  con- 
signed  over  to  justice,  and his goods arrested anti seized,  &c. 
Hence it is, that all nations have, in favor of  ambassadors, made 
a very just exception to the general custom, which requires, that 
people,  who reside in a foreign prince's dominions,  shall be sub- 
ject  to that prince's  laws. 
XII.  'These principles being supposed, I afirm, 
I.  That  there is no difficulty with  respect to  ambassadors, 
who are  deputed to  a  power,  wit!l  whoin  their  master  is at 
peace,  and have injurcd no man.  The most evident maxims of 
the  IJW  of  nature  req~ire  they  should  be  perfectly  secure. 
So that, if  we afiont or insult such a minister,  in any  manner 
wll'itsoever,  ure  give his  master just  reason  for  dec!aring  war. 
Of this king Davici furnishes  us with an example." 
2.  With reg'lrd  to amb~ssadors,  who come fiom an enemy, 
and have  done no harm before  they are admitted,  their  safety 
depends entirely  on  the laws  of  humanity ;  for an enemy, as 
such, has a right to annoy his enemy.  Thus, so long as there is 
110 particular agreement upon this articlc, we are obliged to spare 
the ambassador of  an enemy, only in virtue of  the laws of  hu- 
manity,  which we ought always to respect,  a;id which oblige us 
to hzve a regard for  every thing  tending to the preservation  oC 
order and tranquillity. 
*  a Sam.  chap.  X, 
3.  But when we have promised  to admit,  or have actually 
admitted the  ambassador of  an enemy, we have thereby mani- 
festly engaged to procure him intire security, so long  as he be- 
haves  well.  We  must not  even except  heralds,  who are sent 
to declare war,  provided  they do it in an inoffensive manner. 
4.  With regard to ambassadors,  who  have rendered  them- 
selves culpable, either they have  done the injury  of  their  own 
head, or by their master's  order. 
If they have done it of  their own head, they forfeit their right 
to security, and to the enjoyment of their privileges,  when their 
crime is manifest and henious ;  for no ambassador whatever can 
pretend to rrore  privileges,  than  his master would have in the 
same case ; now such a crime  would  not be pardoned  in  the 
master. 
By hei~zau~  cl-ime~  we here  mean such,  as tend to disturb the 
state, or to destroy the subjects of  the prince, to whom the am- 
bassador is deputed,  or to do them some considerable prejudice. 
When the crime directly  affects  the state,  whether the am- 
bassador has actually used  violence or not,  that is to say, wheth- 
er he has stirred up the subjects to sedition,  or conspired him- 
self  against  the  government,  or favored the plot ; or  whether 
he has  taken arms  with the  rcbels or  the enemy,  or engaged 
his attendants so to do,  &c. we may be revenged on him,  even 
by killing him, not as a subject, but as an enemy ;  for his master 
himself u7ouId have no reason to expect better treatment.  And 
the end of  embassies,  instituted no doubt for the general  good 
of natiotis, does not require that we should grant to an  ambas-' 
sador,  who first violates the law of  nations,  the privileges, whicil 
that law allorvs to foreign  ministers.  If such  an  ambassador 
makes his escape, his master is obliged to deliver him up,  when 
demanded. 
But if the crime, however  henious or  manifest,  affects only 
a private person,  the ambassador  is not for that alone to be  re- 
puted an enemy to the princc or st~te. Suppose his master had 
committed a crime  of  the  same  nature,  we ought to demand 
satisfaction  of  him,  and  not  take up arms against  him  till  he 
has refused it;  so the  same  reason  of  equity directs,  that the 
prince,  at  whose  court the  ambassador his committed  such a 
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to deIiver him up,  or to punish him ;  for to keep him in prison 
till his  master  shall recal  him,  in order to  punish  him,  or de- 
clare that he has absndoned him,  would be to testify  some dis- 
trust of  the justice of  his master, and by that means affront him 
in some measure,  because he is  still represented by the ambas- 
sador. 
5.  But if  the crime be  committed  by the master's  order,  it 
would  certainly be imprudence to send the  ambassador  back ; 
since there is just reason to believe,  that the prince, who order- 
ed the cominission  of  the crime, will hardly surrender, or pun- 
ish the criminal.  We may  therefore,  in  this case,  secure  the 
person of  the ambassador,  till the master shall repair the injury 
done both by his ambassador,  and himself.  In regard to those, 
who do not represent the person of  the prince,  such as common 
messengers,  trumpets,  &c.  we  may  kill  them  on  the spot,  if 
they come  to insult  a prince by  order of their master. 
But nothing ie more absurd than what some maintain, name- 
ly, that all the evil done by  ambass'adors, by order of their mas- 
ter, ought to be imputed entirely to  the latter.  Were it  so, 
ambassadors  would  have  more  privilege  in  the  territories  of 
another prince,than their master himself, should he appear there ; 
and on the the other hand,  the sovereign of  the country would 
have less power in his own dominions,  than a master of a fami- 
ly has in his own house. 
In a word,  the security of  ambassadors  ought  to be under- 
stood in such a manner,  as to imply nothing contrary to the se- 
curity of  the powers to  whom they are sent,  and who  neither 
would,  nor could recieve them  upon other  terms.  Now it is 
plain,  that ambassadors  will  be  less  bold  in  undertaking  any 
thing against the sovereign,  or against the members of  a foreign 
state,  if  they  are apprehensive,  that  in  case  of  treason,  or 
soule other henious crimes,  the government of that country can 
call them  to an account for it,  than  if  they had nothing to ap- 
prehend but correction from their master. 
6. When the ambassador himself  has committed a crime,  it 
is not lawful to use him ill, or to kill him by the law of  retalia- 
tion or reprisals;  for  by  admitting him  under  that  character, 
we  have renounced our right to any such revenge. 
Li vain  would it be to object a great many instances of  this 
kind of  revenge, w!?icll  are mentioned in history ;  for historians 
not only relate  just  and lawful nciions,  but  also  divers  things 
don? contrnry to  justice  in the 1~at  of  ang:r,  by  the influence 
of  some irregular  and tumultuous passion. 
5.  TfThnt has been hitherto s.iid of the right.  of  ambassadors, 
ought to be applied  to their domestics, nnd all their retinue.  If 
any of  the ambassador's  domestics has done an injury,  we may 
desire his master to  deliver hin; up.  If  he does  not  comply, 
he mzkes himself  accessary to  his crime,  aitd  in  this case ure 
hzve a right  to proceed  against  him in  the same manner, as if 
he had  comn;itted  tllc act hiixself. 
An ambassador however  cannot punish  his owl1 domestics ; 
for as this is not  c~nducive  to the end of  his employment, there  -. 
is no reneon to presume,  that ]:is  master has given  it him. 
8.  With respect to tile effects of  a foreign minister, we can 
neither seize the:n  for payment,  nor for securitv,  in the way of 
justice;  for this woultl  suppose,  that he ura; subject to the ju- 
risdiction of the sovereign, at whose  court he  resides.  But  if 
he refuses to pay his debts, we ought,  after  ping  him notice, 
to ~pply  to his rn'lster,  and if  the latter refuses to do us justice, 
we may seize ti c eEects of  the ambassador. 
9. Lastly, as to  the right of  asylums and protections, it is by no 
means a consequence of the nature and end of embsssies.  How- 
ever,  if  it is once granted to the ambassadors of  a cert:~in  pow- 
er,  nothing  but  the welfare of  the state,  authorizes us to  re- 
voke it. 
Neither ought we,  without good reasons, to refuse ambassa- 
dors the other sorts of  rights and  privileges, whic!i  are  est,lb 
lished by the common  consent  of  sovereigns ;  for  this would 
be  a liind cf affront to them. 
END  OF THE FOURTH AND  LAST  PART. 